2013/06/04

S-300 as a major deterrence asset

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The recent rumours about S-300 area defence surface-to air missiles of Russian design and manufacture reinforce my impression that this long-range and apparently respected air defence system has become one of the main deterrents against interventionist Western powers with nuclear weapons, the combination of friendly relations + oil wealth and 'allied' status being the others. Ballistic missiles and chemical weapons proved to possess a rather negative deterrence value.

The S-300 versions of 1984 and later (not the 1978 version) are apparently quite highly respected in part because they weren't yet demolished by a SEAD campaign, unlike the 1960's generation.
The nominal range is large enough to nominally out-range typical anti-radar missiles and to provide at least nominal missile range (not necessarily radar range) for coverage of large swaths of a country.

(The newer S-400 missile with its active radar guidance and and comparable ranges is actually more impressive - maybe it will play the deterrence role in the 2020's? Tactically, the longest ranged S-400 version and similar missiles (if they exist) are hugely interesting, for their range allows the participation of surface-to-air missiles in the offensive air superiority fight. The would also push back airborne early warning and control aircraft as well as long-range radar aircraft such as the E-8. Such 300+ kilometre aerial sensors would then be reduces in range to the forward line of own troops (if such a thing exists) rather than being able to support by looking deep into hostile territory.)


The dynamics regarding the S-300 appear to resemble the dynamics regarding nukes in part: There is a sense of urgency to strike before the deterrent is operational. This adds an actually intervention-/aggression-provoking element to this deterrent.

I think it's sad that such a largely defensive system achieved such a fame and importance. It doesn't reflect well on the West.

S O
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22 comments:

  1. What is a SEAD campaign?

    Is there any doubt that these regime changes go according to an already formulated geostrategic plan and politics and armaments just influence the timetable via friction? Syria, Iran & Sudan still need regime change. Iraq, Tunisia & Libya are accomplished loyality and structure switches.
    The game is very old :
    "From the Halls of Montezuma,
    To the shores of Tripoli;
    ..." (we change regime after regime).

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    1. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences, often taking the shape of Destruction of Enemy Air Defences, but that acronym is unusable.

      There is no geostrategic plan, just an attitude of disrespect and interventionism.

      Concerning your mentioned "accomplished loyalty and structure switches": I doubt that handing Iraq to an Iran-friendly government was the plan.

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    2. Lets see:
      Libya is a mess, where fundamentalists have at least a partial influence and have killed a US ambassador.
      Tunisia has not actually changed at all. Its just transfer from one autocratic ruler to the next faction, who are acting in the same fashion.
      Iraq...a Shia-regime friendly with Iran and opposed to the primary US ally Saudi-Arabia, that at the same time procures top-notch US weapons systems...what could possibly go wrong?!

      If that is some sort of geopolitical plan, then really the difference to just making stuff up on the go is nil!

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    3. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ha1rEhovONU
      answers the issue and it's messy.

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    4. Just change "Enemy" to something else, "Opposition" (giving DOAD and SOAD) or "Hostile" (DHAD & SHAD), if you want to specify that it's a destructive campaign.

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  2. The most interesting thing about the S-300-deal, just as in the case of Iran, is how Russia is using this as a strictly political asset to deter Western policy (ie intervention) against their interests.

    When it comes down to this SAM system as a practical asset, I think nobody can seriously assume that Syria will be able to make use of it in any normal military fashion. I mean, as soon as the Israels spot suspicious shipping containers or anything like that, they will just bomb the heck out of it. Even if a delivery can take place successfully, the requirements (choosing a useful site, training and deploying personnel, storage areas etc) to deploy the system in an operationally useful fashion mean, that there is plenty of time for the IDF to identify and destroy respective installations.

    Both with Iran and now with Syria its a nice little dance, where the Russians say "we will deliver, contracts are being respected", only to effectively turn around the next second to say "not a done deal yet" etc. Dont get me wrong, I applaud them, because it is indeed desirable to keep the "hotheads" at bay (see McCains recent visit to Syria), but its so ridiculously transparent, I am amazed that anybody actually takes that stuff seriously.

    I do think, the later iterations (its a pretty organic system really) of S-300, then S-400 and soonish S-500 are very capable systems. Its just that whoever wants to actually use them to good effect, needs to have a lot more preparation both logistically and operationally than Syria could come up with over the next several years, esp given their current somewhat chaotic situation.

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    1. It's common practice to provide trained personnel along delivery of systems if urgency and importance demand it.

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    2. Does operating a weapons system not mean active direct participation in a conflict?

      What would be the possible results if Russian personnel get killed during the elimination of the delivery systems?

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    3. Not sure, what you mean to imply here. Russian personnel certainly wont be included, as there is a drastic chance, that enemy attack will be imminent, is that worth it (esp since the Israelis do not have any interest in getting rid of Assad himself, something the media tend to forget)? Trained Syrian personnel? Perhaps, if they have spent a decent amount of time in Russia. The issue still remains, that the system is pretty vulnerable to immediate strikes by the IDF even before it is fully deployed.

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    4. Certainly? I spot a strong disagreement here.

      Americans, Russians and to lesser extent IIRC Chinese, Pakistanis and French have a practice of providing "advisors" to provide sorely needed highly trained technical and tactical personnel. The Russians continued this Cold War habit post-Cold War, for example with fighter pilots in African conflicts (Eritrea-Ethiopia).

      Israel and Western powers are not going to dare an attack on the Russian military; an interception of the delivery is thus impossible and a SAM regiment can become operational without leaving the SAM cover of Russian warships in harbour.

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  3. I think S-300 is so feared more from not having been faced in combat yet. For the most part Soviet and now Russian weapons don't fair to well against their western counter parts. If some one makes it a fixed target it will die fast. The max range sounds good on paper but what is it's range for low level in ground clutter?

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    1. I think you overestimate Western SAMs. Western SAMs did not exactly excel. The Falklands air war showed how area air defence missiles were effectively avoided by low level attacks and the British were confident both against the Hawk battery of the Argentines and against their Roland system.
      U.S. naval SAMs have some embarrassing episodes, including series of hilarious launcher failures.
      Patriot is known for downing friendly aircraft more than hostile ones and it's disputed whether it actually scored even only a single hit on a Scud in 1991.

      Soviet SAMs performed quite well if used correctly, as demonstrated by Egypt early in the Yom Kippur War and Yugoslavia in 1999 (Syrian use in Bekaa valley was as stupid as possible). Their greatest problem in employment was that they were often employed long after countermeasures were developed; I suppose Patriot and Aster wouldn't fare well against a full range of dedicated Russian countermeasures either.

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    3. The minimum engagement altitude of the S-300 is about 650ft IIRC, so you can get below them. The Russians are very good at employing different systems in overlapping defence, and move them often to remain unpredictable, which means they're very hard to destroy from the air.

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    4. Such specs depend a lot on circumstances, especially range and terrain.

      Western airpower prefers to fly above 15k ft to avoid ManPADS, though. S-300 would be a huge troublemaker in this regard (especially at daytime and clear skies when ManPADS are most relevant).

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  4. I do not disagree about sams systems. I think what seems to let sams be effective is thinking then easy to defeat. If treated with respect I think most sam systems can be defeated.It doesn't matter what defense you have if they are not well rounded. A very good sam system does no good without aircraft to defend as well. Soviet and now Russian sams are I would say overall most likely good systems. But they are not designed to be used in the way that most of the countries that buy them use them. Russia plans to have aircraft up fighting also and not just have it's sams defending. Have we seen Russian systems used anywhere to attack a western sam defended country?

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    1. Iraq used among others Suchoi aircraft in attacks on Iran (24 Improved Hawk missile defences), but that was a rather poor test.

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  5. With regards to the S-300 SAM, battery arrangements, and probable provision of Russian PVO officers and crews for the battery while Syrian crews are being trained (most likely trained in Russia at PVO facilities), I advert to you the Air Power Australia website. This site is the premiere source in the English language regarding Soviet and Russian air defence systems and many of their post-Soviet upgrade packages, amongst other information. Dale Agar, you would do well to read and make an effort to understand everything relevant to Russian SAMs on the APA site. You would find it most illuminating, as your questions are answered in full there... to include Soviet and later Russian battery SOPs, which preclude targeting it as a "static" system.

    Some points:
    1) The Russians have a long history of providing advisers who are in effect combat personnel. Some of them died operating SAMs provided to the North Vietnamese and this did not result in a major war. The same could happen in Syria. The Russians are much less sensitive about personnel losses than the West is. Recall all of the screaming about potential losses to USMC cadres in Georgia during the Georgian attack on South Ossetia in 2008: the Russians have never done something like this and only begin care about it when a political point is to be made for other reasons. For instance, the Israelis provoking the Russians by blowing up the S-300 during delivery. That would involve a great deal of photos of grieving widows and the like in the international media stream... and because it portrays the Israelis ("Evil Jew" syndrome) in a poor light, it might even gain traction in the Western world despite Western opposition to the Russians' actions in support of Syria.

    2) The West has an extraordinary reliance on air interceptors, the Russians do not. This colours our understanding of the relevant technologies. The aviation industry has biased our defence analysts and the work they have done. This is, fundamentally, what caused the loss of the F-117 in ALLIED FORCE to a Serbian SAM shot. I also advise strongly against the American habit of "technological determinism." The obvious counterargument is: "That was an ambush against an obsolete VLO aircraft." Fair one: explain now how F-22 or B-1B are to survive a far more capable system, probably supported by a VLO-defeating radar system such as Vostok-E or Nebo-SVU? The argument must not contradict basic principles of physics... and therein lies the rub.

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    1. Careful with APA, it's rather opinionated and there are plenty people who dispute its assertions.

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    2. SO: Yes, they make their anti-F-35 bias quite clear but support it with working science. Their information regarding SAM systems is accurate as per their open source bibliographies. While I would not pay attention to editorials ("Notice to Airmen" features) and the like, their technical information is perfectly respectable.

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  6. Look you don't have to be a expert to understand that having your defense based on one system is a game looser. Many countries buy these sam systems and expect them to keep a air force out of their skies. While it might allot of air forces it is not going to a modern one. A fixed target is a dead target. But moving your sam system around allot not only cost but requires more work to keep it up and running. We in the west have some major advantages over the countries we have had wars with in the last 20 years. None of them thought they would be fighting first rate powers.

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    1. Philip II of Macedon said: "a fortress can always be taken if only a mule laden with gold can be got inside."

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