2016/09/27

Logistics

.
In nine years I marked a mere 20 posts with the "logistics" tab.

Unlike "Think Defence", who has a distressing obsession with mexeflotes and containers, I have no such logistics obsession. Yet logistics are very, very central to warfare. I tried - really, really tried - to write some more about logistics for years, but simply didn't come up with any fine ideas.
I even read (mostly terribly disappointing) books about logistics, and most of my insights from those can be summarised as

"Maybe there's really not much good stuff that can be written about logistics!"
and
"Those helicopter logistics aren't going to work out in a European war!"

This year I didn't try to push me to write about logistics, but I did write about them - specifically about how to move in particular forces of the Heer to Northeast Poland if not Lithuania.

This is not a big concern if one assumes weeks of early warning, but collective deterrence would benefit greatly off an ability to intervene in time against a strategic surprise invasion, and I don't see this capability.
Debates about assault rifles, tanks, aircraft upgrades, barracks closures, military head counts and even budgeting pale in comparison to the importance of the ability to deploy meaningful military force to the Polish-Lithuanian border within days (in my opinion).


Some of my articles relevant to modern-day European (continental) military logistics were









S O
.

3 comments:

  1. Some short comments about Vistula river, which is now probably the most critical logistical bottleneck. Czech and Slovak engineers can built at least one pontoon bridge PMS of maximum lenght 382 m and maximum carrying capacity 20 tons - so itsn`t of any use for tanks at this lenght. There is also old Polish pontoon bridge system PP-64 Wstęga (60 sets). As a bridge system it`s too short for Vistula; however it`s still usable as ferry system. - Also, at least theoretically, Poland can probably move its 50 pieces of PTS-M naval amphibious transporters (10 tons each) inland (by train) and use them as river ferries. That surely still isn`t bridge, but.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. That's the stuff I found, makes one wonder why they don't have bridging equipment to build proper bridges over their own rivers. The Dvina has a respectable width in most places as well.

      Well, their almost certainly useless air force and navy need funds, too...

      Delete
  2. You specifically covered how to enable and facilitate rapid movement from Central Europe to the Baltics with:

    a) An investment into the road network from Poland to Lithuania

    b) More brigding/ferrying equipment

    c) Overall mentality, planning, preperation and training

    What about smartly! stockpiling in the Baltics and partly along the route, especially the two tonnage drivers, (artillery) ammunition and fuel? With so few NATO guns but so much range it's likely that there will be demand for hundreds of rounds per day per gun if there is war.

    In more general terms the entry about supply demands and more versatile trucks with Multi as a logical conclusion was very insightful. I might comment later on in detail. Maybe you want to add this link as well:

    https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.it/2012/12/parasitic-land-vehicles-for-army.html

    All in all I would love to see an Italian battlegroup, even just a (wheeled) battalion strong, marching to the Baltics with combat exercises in the (big) training areas along the route. At least simulated high round expenditure beside the fuel used for moving and exercising which have to be supplied from Italian stocks or from partners depending on the decision variables. Sadly "lack of funds", among other stuff, would come up at once...


    Firn

    ReplyDelete