tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post2562080893471417323..comments2024-03-29T13:09:31.522+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: Waves of offence and defence techniquesUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-87917582407287362652012-02-03T09:13:58.195+01:002012-02-03T09:13:58.195+01:00I think everyone would say fixed defenses days are...I think everyone would say fixed defenses days are over and yet Israel went into Lebanon and ran into fixed defenses that while made up of small teams of light troops with guided weapons took some heavy hits. What I would say is that on paper they shouldn't have. They failed at doing the recon work that was needed and also I would say thought their enemy not up to the fight. Russia did the same in Chechnya I would say. I think a fixed point target of more then just a few troops would be hard to keep alive on a battlefield these days. But I would also say that few countries these days have the ISR to keep eyes on teh battlefield around the clock. Europe fond that out in Libya. Having a nice shinny military that can't do all the jobs that are needed means that you will fail at many that you thought you could do.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-11523204937873942012012-02-02T10:33:36.948+01:002012-02-02T10:33:36.948+01:00About my book fantasy; I'm terribly busy (and ...About my book fantasy; I'm terribly busy (and lazy).<br /><br />About your survivability concern; this ain't the problem, for the skirmish corridor could extend hundreds of kilometres if not geographical or political obstacles apply.<br /><br />Infantry skirmishing as described above is limited by mobility, and limited on the operational level to regions of (temporary) special interest - plus possibly a kind of last ditch intercept corridor to protect rear services.<br /><br />Most of the skirmish corridor (operational level) would be the skirmish ground for armoured recce-reminiscent forces - mostly tracked in the more combat-intensive low depth part and mostly wheeled in the far part (and beyond rivers, for the wheeled component would be more lightly armoured and could thus be amphibious).<br /><br />My concept still includes battlegroups, as mobile strike forces that exploit the favourable conditions created by skrimishing: Skirmishers ruin the chances of a red brigade/division caught in their net, one or two blue brigades with their battlegroups descend on the de facto encircled red formation and smash it in a shock attack.<br />http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/10/on-central-quest-of-military-art-and.html<br />The key to the whole concept is how to keep the reds from advancing too much. You need to raise fears without setting up a classic front line.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-78216535531175094502012-02-02T10:32:24.510+01:002012-02-02T10:32:24.510+01:00Between Sparta and Napoleon the developments were ...Between Sparta and Napoleon the developments were only minimal. Even the reach of the infantry remained pretty constant, at around 50 meter.<br />What really dropped was the required skill level of the individual trooper. A phalanx required half a life of training from teenage years on and a certain physical condition, a musket only a couple of weeks of training even for a weedy guy.<br /><br />Around 1800 things started to move. Artillery became dominant. Or in other words the triangle mobility - firepower - reach became *the* factor:<br /><br />For a few years the explosive shell made the defense absolutely dominant [firepower], until the Minie bullet changed this for a couple of years [reach]. Artillery regained its superiority with rifling and breech loading. Breech loader, smokeless powder, machine guns, artillery with rifling - everything made the defense stronger. Luckily strategic mobility increased with the use of railroads. To counter that mass armies were needed to cover everything all the time.<br /><br />Again the defense dominated - see WW1. Until the tank, which gave mobility (tac + ops) a huge boost, plus introduced resiliance as a factor, giving the offensive the upper hand for few years.<br /><br />Fast forward: Tactical nuclear weapons changed everything between top-tier enemies. Massed formations are dead. Aerial robotic PGM currently gives the attacker the upper hand against all things technical, as long as he finds the target. But you can't find a ATGM squad, so on the ground the defensive again has the upper hand. Also because modern mechanized formations require huge logistics, so their operational and strategic mobility suffers. That is one of the areas where one could optimize, which is what the U.S. lighter-leaner-meaner (aka transformation) idea is about.Distillernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-68255054630636959532012-02-02T08:48:27.216+01:002012-02-02T08:48:27.216+01:00'Operational offence in this context means tha...'Operational offence in this context means that the area of operation is being extended into a formerly enemy-dominated area.' So this means low presence patrols and stakeouts, right? Interesting idea. If artillery is accurate on the first barrage, I have trouble seeing how even small armored formations will survive extended missions.<br /><br />I guess the time is coming when we'll just have to dump most of the battlegroup drills that are present in the army manuals. None of it applys in this type of scenario.<br /><br />Speaking of which, how is your book coming along, sven? Are we to get a sneak peak at its title and main concepts?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-66220273441442939452012-01-31T09:21:24.496+01:002012-01-31T09:21:24.496+01:00Control depends on whether the enemy contests the ...Control depends on whether the enemy contests the control or not and on whether the (low or high) force density suffices to keep an eye on all routes through the area (not the whole area).<br />Support fires only tell about the expactable attrition of OPFOR formations passing through the area.<br /><br />Fire support and aerial assets will be well-protected and thus difficult to take out withoutsubstantial losses, but occasional successes in this regard would have a great and highly useful diversion effect (= fix reservist infantry and AT troops on object security missions).<br /><br />The scale depends fully on the scenario. My working model is about a corps-sized effort. A border conflict between Russia and the PRC (a kind of Nomonhan II) is probably the least unlikely high end peer vs. peer scenario on flat ground. The East European scenarios look quite unlikely (unless the Ukraine develops a secession war) nowadays.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-21474828252479643152012-01-31T06:32:58.938+01:002012-01-31T06:32:58.938+01:00Am I correct in assuming that artillery and close ...Am I correct in assuming that artillery and close air support coverage is central to whether or not an area is controlled? If so, is the destruction of artillery and aerial assets a major goal of raids and ambushes?<br /><br />What sort of time scale are you considering for a peer–to–peer conflict? I would think that the first side to run out of planes or guns (or just missiles, bombs, and shells) would be at an all but insurmountable disadvantage. Would this be a matter of days or of weeks?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com