tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post5398394079663249058..comments2024-03-29T12:15:13.832+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: Elusive raids and ambushesUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger15125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-5381699377920284692012-02-21T12:55:30.728+01:002012-02-21T12:55:30.728+01:00* observers know their position better and quicker...* observers know their position better and quicker than before because of <br />widespread availability of good maps, increased quantity of landscape features for orientation, satellite navigation<br /><br />* observers can communicate their call for fire quickly by radio (calls for fire were mostly limited to company level or fixed positions in WW2 because of scarcity of radios and dependence on landlines)<br /><br />* quicker ballistic calculations<br />computers<br /><br />* no pre-defined impact points necessary any more because of improved calculations (useful only for quicker communication)<br /><br />* calculation speed allows for better accuracy today<br />(taking into account propellant temperature or environment temperature, barrel wear, radar-measured muzzle velocity of previous shot fired, for example)<br /><br />* HE can be fired more closely to friendly troops than the Cold War favourite DPICM. Its proximity fuse allows for 'good' fragmentation effect (almost never available in WW2)<br /><br />* gun design has been improved for a smaller dispersion (tighter tolerances, vibration design, better barrels) and greater range (shell aerodynamics, propellant power, barrel length, barrel friction)<br /><br /><br />On the 30%: You misunderstood.<br />"For one, 30% probability of dying on first enemy indirect fire strike experienced is way too much, too. It doesn't need to be 100% to require a strong adaption."<br />is an example. 10% is arguably too much, 20% is too much, 30% is too much, 40% is too much ... I stated what's too much, not what's going to happen.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-1959017589870716922012-02-21T09:37:19.224+01:002012-02-21T09:37:19.224+01:00I understand the need for camouflage and concealme...I understand the need for camouflage and concealment, and also that foot soldiers cannot safely run away from an artillery barrage, but I was interested more specifically in the advances that lead to this unprecedented accuracy, which is, quote: 'Modern navigation, direction finding, measuring propellant temperature, ballistics calculation with computer, use of proximity fused HE fired in upper elevation group (can be used relatively close to friendlies), accurate (digital) maps with accurate altitude info, guns with vastly improved dispersion over earlier types.'<br /><br />Are there specific technologys, like those ballistic DGMS computers, which promise this? I'd certainly appreciate a short list of such things, plus that elusive source for your '30% probability of dying on first enemy indirect fire' statement. If thats not too much to ask, of course :)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-78022275197042473822012-02-20T01:40:39.973+01:002012-02-20T01:40:39.973+01:00I would probably scramble to bring forward a sourc...I would probably scramble to bring forward a source if you could point me at where I wrote <br />"30% probability of complete destruction" as you appear to quote it.<br /><br />I could have written "A % probability of dying" with 0 < A << 100%, but I doubt that such a mathematical way of expressing oneself unmistakably would motivate anyone to read it.<br /><br />Point being, infantrymen cannot accomplish a mission if they're dead or badly wounded. There aren't 2 million of them around either. It doesn't need to be anything close to 100% probability of getting hit before it becomes highly important to avoid getting hit.<br />10, 20, 30, 40 % - that's all too much, especially from the POV of the grunt.<br /><br /><br />Back in WW2/Korea era indirect fire support was capable of great accuracy and responsiveness (in the 1-2 minute range) with great preparations (registering guns, pre-defining locations for impacts based on guesses) and at modest ranges.<br />Nowadays technology replaced much of said preparations and the improved accuracy of guns enables the same or better dispersion at the now much greater ranges.<br /><br />Active defences, armour, vehicle speed, field fortifications - none of this will work well for the infantry, and beginning to run when the incoming fire can be heard is badly unsatisfactory. Modern infantry needs to be a shifting, elusive target - it basically needs to be too quick for the enemy's fire support.<br /><br />The worst imaginable mistake is to become fixed, and that's an incredibly tough nut of a problem since this happens to infantry all the time. The ability to break contact needs to be available for modern infantry; that's the key challenge. My best idea for it is to build this into the tactics repertoire even before combat begins, and to expect that even seemingly successful actions be aborted in time.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-28175062727974130622012-02-20T01:00:27.995+01:002012-02-20T01:00:27.995+01:0030% probability of complete destruction? Where are...30% probability of complete destruction? Where are you getting these figures, sven? <br /><br />As for state of the art in artillery, yes, I can verify your statements on ballistic computers (the pinnacle of which is the Digital Gun Management System [DGMS] produced by SELEX, for the now infamous M777 howitzer), but all the rest is speculation.<br /><br />I certainly don't see any sources backing up these outrageous accuracy estimates of yours. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-69992861261206612332012-02-19T12:49:12.048+01:002012-02-19T12:49:12.048+01:00Suppression is for when you merely suspect hostile...Suppression is for when you merely suspect hostiles or otherwise don't have good enough info for accurate destructive fires. Fire for effect is meant to be used when you got a good chance of hurting them really bad.<br /><br />Again; a support fires officer may be totally unsatisfied with a low kill chance percentage while the same is utterly unacceptable for those on the receiving end. Even suppressive fires can easily cause 10-50% casualties in a platoon and are thus a great motivator for more elusive behaviour.<br /><br /><br />There's furthermore a difference between mechanised warfare (where often times the forces just want to pass through an area, not defeat everyone in it - and where the speed and armour makes indirect fires-dodging much easier) and infantry warfare as depicted here (infantry gets way more easily pinned down 'fixed' than AFVs).<br /><br />It makes rarely sense for mechanised forces to attempt to destroy a defensive position because this would be a slower and often more ammunition-intensive process than suppression. Speed is their key to success once they leave their staging area and the amount of ammunition that can be carried by a mechanised battlegroup into a deep incursion is not very large.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-63826230395377482152012-02-19T06:11:55.818+01:002012-02-19T06:11:55.818+01:00Okay, I guess that was kindof a dumb question that...Okay, I guess that was kindof a dumb question that I asked, lol. Its just that, in other posts, you have put much more emphasis for arty on suppression than destruction, even when the OPFOR is not dug in. Isn't this is a case of either or neither, to some extent? I mean, switching out all the battalion 81mm mortars and replacing them with 60mms (which, yes, I realise have more range than the 81mm mortars of WW2 vintage) for the benefit of ammo quantity -and thus suppression- at the expense of bang is what gives this impression.<br /><br />I don't necessarily disagree with a stronger suppression role: Its a better compromise, and after all, the infantrys job is to close with and destroy the enemy (at least, as long as nothing else is better suited to do the job for them. Overhead cover and C-rams, wherever they are encountered, present obstacles for arty).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-91252203429713034572012-02-18T15:46:40.847+01:002012-02-18T15:46:40.847+01:00For one, 30% probability of dying on first enemy i...For one, 30% probability of dying on first enemy indirect fire strike experienced is way too much, too. It doesn't need to be 100% to require a strong adaption.<br /><br />Second, it's simply state of the art. Modern navigation, direction finding, measuring propellant temperature, ballistics calculation with computer, use of proximity fused HE fired in upper elevation group (can be used relatively close to friendlies), accurate (digital) maps with accurate altitude info, guns with vastly improved dispersion over earlier types...modern indirect fire support is extremely accurate and exposure to it is unacceptable.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-25249313689136997452012-02-18T01:32:59.032+01:002012-02-18T01:32:59.032+01:00Sven, why do artillery barrages that are accurate ...Sven, why do artillery barrages that are accurate on the first salvo feature so heavily in all your thoughts? How are you so sure that the OPFOR will be able to achieve such accuracy? Surely you don't imagine they will rely on the crutch of precision guided munitions?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-54763011617827373952012-02-17T22:13:55.399+01:002012-02-17T22:13:55.399+01:00Indeed, it's not very original in the form pre...Indeed, it's not very original in the form presented here.<br /><br />Sand bag castles in Bosnia, desert warfare and fighting rag-tag militias who aren't even capable enough for handling a mortar properly did not help to remind the modern forces about what they need against a peer enemy, though.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-72601360185424330182012-02-17T21:51:31.204+01:002012-02-17T21:51:31.204+01:00Sometimes, timing in life almost unbelivable. For ...Sometimes, timing in life almost unbelivable. For many years, I have tried to locate a book written in the early 1950s by the Swedish Waffen-SS volunteer Gösta Borg. The book is called "The russians are coming", and deals with how the outnumbered and massively outgunned Swedish army should be fighting the Soviet army, if that gruesome scenario had ever become reality.<br /><br />About a week ago, I finally got hold of the book, and I finished reading it only yesterday. In the book, Borg champions almost exactly the same tactics you describe in this post, based on his experiences fighting the soviets during the last years of WWII. He talks about the need for using "defensive zones" instead of front lines, having very large areas dominated by teams of snipers and ranger (jäger) units (what you call skirmishers, I guess?), and the need to operate by ambushes, limited surprise counter attacks, and relying heavily upon support weapons to achieve the desired effects against enemy forces. All in an effort to avoid being crushed by the opponent's heavy firepower.<br /><br />Quite remarkable how I have come across such similar ideas from two such different sources, separated by so many decades, on almost the same day! :-)Johannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-46408493106314261092012-02-16T21:30:33.477+01:002012-02-16T21:30:33.477+01:00I am not sure that any western country is ready fo...I am not sure that any western country is ready for a peer fight. Not one western country has faced a peer in a long time. Without the US I am not sure any western country could face a near peer let alone a peer. I think the Fakland's is a good test case. While the UK has far better trained forces they are hit hard by distance and yet if they had to refight the war of 1982 I am not sure they would win today. We have become used to having total control of many parts of the fight we have now. Land, Air and Sea. The Faklands war was the closes that there has been a all out fight in every domain of the combat environment in decades.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-38573333890972096032012-02-15T13:42:32.576+01:002012-02-15T13:42:32.576+01:00This goes back (as so much else here) to the "...This goes back (as so much else here) to the "Square Trick" post:<br />http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/09/square-trick.html<br /><br />The skirmishers would be on a recce & battlefield shaping mission if viewed at from the operational level. Combined arms shock brigades would shatter those red formations which are badly disadvantaged by the skirmisher's effects (these and more armoured recce-like skirmishers).<br /><br />The light skirmisher infantry should be organisationally separate with little organic battalion support, but I'm not entirely settled on how to draw the lines between different infantry types. It would certainly not be the classic general infantry (Jäger) / mechanised infantry (PzGren) / mountain infantry / paratrooper mix, though.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-49473967222018589252012-02-15T09:26:31.938+01:002012-02-15T09:26:31.938+01:00Nice out of the box thinking!
You would face the ...Nice out of the box thinking!<br /><br />You would face the same options/limitations a general on a Napoleonic battlefield had:<br /><br />1) Skirmischers buy time, screen own heavy inits, i.e. they are essential, but they do not decide anything.<br /><br />2) The art is to determine how much of your force is spend as skirmishers, how much is retained for the decision. <br /><br />2) Do you use specialised soldiers (expert skirmishers and expert heavy forces) or do you try to train an allround soldier...? <br /><br />UlenspiegelAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-72246388909951706902012-02-15T02:12:30.757+01:002012-02-15T02:12:30.757+01:00Very short combat requires a modest amount of dire...Very short combat requires a modest amount of direct fire ammunition. Much of the firepower would come from long-range indirect fires (think: GUMLRS+).<br /><br />The troops could sustain themselves fairly easily in European terrain (compact food reserves, filtered water) if small vehicles (up to SUV size) are being used (and hidden most of the time; that's a different topic).<br /><br />The most problematic limit would likely be the psychological endurance; about two weeks until redeployment into a less stressful environment might be realistic.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-174578878714850232012-02-15T01:38:02.341+01:002012-02-15T01:38:02.341+01:00Hi.
While it is certainly true that dispersal int...Hi.<br /><br />While it is certainly true that dispersal into small units is a must in the face of modern effectors, I see a problem with supplying your skirmishers. After all, we would have to assume that any larger logistics tail could be tracked and targeted. Therefore, either your skirmishers have to have ample supplies and weapons mix (for how long?) or are limited in target choice?MMKnoreply@blogger.com