tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post7819404960881109632..comments2024-03-29T13:09:31.522+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: Air superiority in a European war in the next years (V)Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-36511585239536501252017-03-24T16:09:35.249+01:002017-03-24T16:09:35.249+01:00I have a bias towards assuming that the opposition...I have a bias towards assuming that the opposition is competent. Competent opposition would not have its equipment hacked or codes real-time cracked when using indigenous or competent ally-made equipment.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-82724880739834037932017-03-24T14:43:11.623+01:002017-03-24T14:43:11.623+01:00I'm curious to hear your thoughts on electroni...I'm curious to hear your thoughts on electronic attack and deception in such an air war. Your discussion of the S/DEAD mission seemed to focus on the means to kill or suppress ground based air defence with anti-radiation missiles. What about electronic attack? This article (https://www.wired.com/2007/10/how-israel-spoo/) is now about a decade old, meaning that (assuming the capability actually exists) there's been plenty of time to advance measures and counter-measures, but hacking air defence networks could be more effective than missiles. It could also prolong that capability. There are also options to saturate air defence systems with decoy drones, exposing radars, exhausting ground-to-air missile stocks, wearing out operators and so on.<br /><br />That said, I fully agree with your assessment that CAS missions could not be counted on in the opening phases of such a war, with the corresponding concern that NATO forces are too light in artillery.Fhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09312193379783857568noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-65924652883273580352017-03-24T09:07:36.643+01:002017-03-24T09:07:36.643+01:00This was an excellent series and i want to thank y...This was an excellent series and i want to thank you veryy much for your work at this point.<br /><br />In my opinion bombers (mainly as weapon carriers) and stealth-drones (mainly as spotters) could be the most effective combination in such a future air war because of reach, weapons load, flexibility and so on. Stronger Ground Air Defences are in my opinion to defensive and according to my ideas a concentration on the offense is necessary in a future war. But that is only my personal thought and of cause a more defensive approach fits perfectly to your political beliefs. <br /><br />Bombers will soon outclass classical multirole fighters in a air-war even in aircraft to aircraft combat but they need "spotters" with stealth and higher range as an F-35 (for example), item a stealth drone. <br /><br />Instead of a strong ground based air defense a strong bomber / drone force could provide the same amount of air defense for the same costs (i guess) and can then deliever much more fighting power in the offensive because it can be used in several ways and not only for air-defense as the ground based systems. <br /><br />Such a bomber force could also be stationed out of reach for an enemy suprise attack on airfields and so on to avoid a "pearl harbour" scenario.<br /><br />For the same reason i am very convinced from your (old) ideas about using higher caliber (76mm and more) air defence artillery for ground attacks and vice versa. More versatility, more flexibility, more redundancy, more useful in the offense.<br /><br />In my opinion every system should be designed and usable (if possible) in such a way that you can use it against different targets, for different tasks and that it is especilly useful in the offense. <br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-83013559102595213742017-03-21T14:00:18.066+01:002017-03-21T14:00:18.066+01:00Finland is a special case, comparable to Canadian ...Finland is a special case, comparable to Canadian or Siberian air defence.<br />The ratio between budget and area or forces and area is very low there.<br /><br />Their conclusions on relative benefits of SAMs and fighters are not necessarily transferable to NATO 'front line' air warfare.<br /><br />I generally don't see much utility in air forces of countries like Finland or Switzerland.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-83835164038224089672017-03-18T19:37:37.097+01:002017-03-18T19:37:37.097+01:00This is a rather complex topic (and I fear I might...This is a rather complex topic (and I fear I might be somewhat out of my depth here). However, as I understand the core issue, it will always boil down to mobility vs firepower. Aircraft will always have the advantage in mobility and ground based air defense will have firepower - meaning weight restrictions vs freedom of movement. Of course there will be certain limits to both realms.<br /><br />I've heard from the Finnish that a lot of the suggested capabilities of ground-based air defense systems are rather optimistic (and I guess it applies the same way to aircraft). A NASAMS battery isn't going to be nearly as effective as it says on the Wiki page or brochure. That is why Finland wants to carry on with the procurement of new aircraft instead of a much more comprehensive set of air defenses, because they judge the cost of an effective air defense cover just as expensive or even more expensive as operating modern fighters, while not having the same flexibility as the aircraft.<br />Clearly there is a physical limit to what you can effectively launch from the ground and have reliably hit a fast-moving and unpredictable target. The heavier (longer range or faster) you make the rockets, the more difficult they maneuver. Making the rockets multi-stage adds weight and complexity (questions about reliability) and designates limits to their capabilities against shorter range targets. The limit for an S-300 air defense rocket, which is meant specifically against fighters, has a supposed upper range of around 100 km, which itself is optimistic and depends on many factors. And that is before we start going into the gritty details of the reliability of radar data. Sure you can see the target, but can you reliably lock it (especially with newer generation airplanes)?<br /><br />Another issue that is interesting to me is the development of counter anti-air technologies. It is not unfeasible to think of an AEW working inside its own anti-air-defense bubble. Just recently the Israelis allegedly shot down an anti-air rocket (S-200 possibly?) that might have posed a threat to their fighters. Again, this complicates the picture quite a lot. And the issue becomes more prevalent as fighters gain even more situational awareness and communication capabilities. <br /><br />I'm not saying the issues you raise are wrong, far from it. However, I do think the issues are much much much more complicated and can't be solved with simple linear logic, where A+B=C. The variables are constantly changing from day to day and trying to catch up to every single piece is a monstrous task. I don't envy the people, whose job it is.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com