tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post8267159751962561997..comments2024-03-27T20:37:08.065+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: Strike Complexes vs. Countermeasures and FrictionUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-50117923383717575362012-10-09T20:15:39.667+02:002012-10-09T20:15:39.667+02:00The Kosovo War showed the surviveability of Serbia...The Kosovo War showed the surviveability of Serbian hardware.<br /><br />Such a complex is meant for eliminating reported observations. What does it do with fake observations and counter-observation of strike positions? If you take de-camouflage by strike and fake targets into account the question will be not if you can strike, but if you will strike. Here we get to an information warfare because the degree of reliable observation and transmission of that information to strike tools all contains many information leaks that each strike complex is looking for in order to cripple the enemy complex beyond effective capabilities. Such crippling must not be physical destruction, but can be effective hacking of known communications and causing friendly fire for example.<br /><br />It's my theory that the shorter an OODA-loop gets by programmed reactions, the easier you can predict and play with it because the less information and evaluation leads to the action.<br /><br />KurtAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-26144373490568159662009-08-28T15:05:32.040+02:002009-08-28T15:05:32.040+02:00I wrote about submarines here:
http://preview.tiny...I wrote about submarines here:<br />http://preview.tinyurl.com/mrduon<br />The Swedish sub episode isn't extraordinary in any way; modern navies did chose long ago to mostly ignore SSK survivability and to live with illusions instead. Quality SSKs were never really under control, but they weren't decisive in the Cold War or later either.<br /><br />The length of development cycles has many reasons, and this problem doesn't exclude the possibility of countermeasures.<br /><br />Some developments are much longer than necessary for budgetary, industrial policy and other reasons. We have seen quick wartime product developments of a few weeks or months many times - in projects that would normally have taken years.<br /><br />Some countermeasures are long-established and only need to be adapted to new challenges, while others can be developed while the threat itself is still under development.<br />Look at the F-22, for example. Its concept based on opinions formed in the early 70's, and even the public knew about the concept back in '90.<br /><br />The "RMA" and "Strike complex" concepts date back to the late 60's and the early 40's. Nevertheless, they had still full mainstream credibility ten years ago and partially even today.<br />The mainstream doesn't seem to take the degrading effect of countermeasures into full account, which leads to wasteful developments and procurement and wasted opportunities.<br /><br />Most people simply ignore the likeliness of countermeasures because we spent the past decades without any war against competent, well-equipped and well-supplied enemies. Nobody provided an obvious reminder about the importance and power of countermeasures.<br /><br />We were subjected to marketing hypes from hardware developers and project offices instead.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-83787174568404946452009-08-28T14:47:39.452+02:002009-08-28T14:47:39.452+02:00Interesting post. But how does this square with th...Interesting post. But how does this square with the ever-increasing complexity and development-time of systems that we see? While past R&D + technical realization of concepts have been measured in months or years, nowadays it seems more like decades or significant fractions thereof. <br /><br />On one hand this trend seems to favour countermeasures as the cost of defeating them can be vastly more complex than the subsequent counter-counter. Aircraft stealth seem a good candidate for this... Defeat the shape and there is little that the designers can do about it (although broadband stealth seem more resilient).<br /><br />A possible counter-example (no pun intended) may be conventional submarines and the added stealth achieved by AIP systems. Perhaps (or: very likely) due to the medium (water vs air) and the speeds involved this has proven to be a much more difficult nut to crack. <br /><br />As the 2 year lease with the Swedish sub in San Diego showed (if in no other way than the projects the US suddenly conjured) the new generation subs are so difficult to detect that only a network of in-theatre active-sonar buoys can have any reliable inpact. <br /><br />Or are perhaps submarines the ultimate countermeasure? After all, they force inaction on your opponent by virtue of just being active, somewhat like a single undetected sniper can tie up an entire batallion.Upandawaynoreply@blogger.com