tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post3244868144562980597..comments2024-03-27T20:37:08.065+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: The battlegroup gunUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-71415931447317459152021-08-05T18:18:13.131+02:002021-08-05T18:18:13.131+02:00The stupid little Cold War there is merely a polit...The stupid little Cold War there is merely a political challenge, not a military one. Turkey would be fucked if it attacks regardless of how much the EU forces fuck up.<br /><br />The Bundeswehr is not tasked to deal with domestic unrest. The police is meant for law enforcement. We have more police than military personnel.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-86895681578405570842021-08-05T14:38:58.965+02:002021-08-05T14:38:58.965+02:00What about an war between greece as an eu member a...What about an war between greece as an eu member and turkey? The eu is also an military alliance and therefore germany must then assist greece. IMO an war with turkey is more likeley than an open conventional war with russia. Or what about a kind of civil war or mass-terrorism in the country itself (for example from rightwing groups and/or the querdenken bewegung developement etc)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-21445665856455370692021-08-04T12:08:50.973+02:002021-08-04T12:08:50.973+02:00A military establishment costs much in budget and ...A military establishment costs much in budget and opportunity costs (personnel not being productive in other jobs). This downside requires justification. Thus a force structure requires justification.<br />The Baltic scenario is the least unlikely legitimate collective defence scenario and thus my benchmark.<br />The Ukraine is not a NATO or EU member and thus there's no legitimate collective defence scenario there. Aggression against Turkey looks pointless, and super unlikely to go beyond some retaliation harassment actions by non-state actors.<br /><br />There is no sufficient justification for non-defence warfare. Use this as test to judge overseas missions:<br />https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2017/01/human-sacrifice-and-military-spending.htmlS Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-91072221632460345182021-08-04T08:10:06.470+02:002021-08-04T08:10:06.470+02:00Interestingly your argumentation here is very simi...Interestingly your argumentation here is very similar to that of Douglas Mac Gregor, who also argues against divisions with nearly the same arguments. He claims therefore that brigades with around 4000 men would be the better solution for this area and wargamed several szenarios in the baltics for comparison which showed clearly the problem a divisional structure would have there. <br /><br />My question is, if this is not an dangerous overspecialisation and if it would not be better to make the armed forces overall more versatile and more able to fight very different szenarios. Also what if an war does not only happen in complete different parts of the earth and if it goes on for an much longer time than three weeks?! I know your political agenda of defence and the holy grundgesetz, but the political reality is quite different. The armed forces should therefore not overspecialise in an baltic scenario but need an structure with which they can fight in very different scenarios, including also expeditionary warfare. I know your position against this kind of warfare, but it is an political reality. <br /><br />Or is it the complete other way around that you want such an force structure and such an overspecialisation explicitly because you want to prevent that the armed forces can be used for other scenarios and especially expeditionary warfare elsewere? Is your target to prevent the use of armed forces in other scenarios through such an force structure?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-17687209305513867952021-07-29T14:50:40.055+02:002021-07-29T14:50:40.055+02:00Batteries cannot discharge much energy quickly. Yo...Batteries cannot discharge much energy quickly. You need capacitators for that. Recharging those does not require much battery capacity relative to driving for hundreds of km.<br /><br />Personally, I expect that military vehicles will keep running on liquid fuels. Flying drones will use battery-electric power and land vehicles will use hybrid (liquid fuels + battery-electric) power. There's no sensible replacement for kerosene for combat aircraft, and batteries won't suffice for tracked AFVs for the foreseeable future.<br />We may rather see greenwashing (biofuels mimicking diesel and kerosene) than any other substantial change in the 2020's.<br /><br />I read much about alternative means of propelling shells since the 1990's, and just about nothing came of it. The only real innovation were temperature-insensitive propellants. Another change is that higher chamber pressures became acceptable in small arms and artillery and artillery barrels keep getting longer.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-17602548275978928332021-07-29T12:50:33.497+02:002021-07-29T12:50:33.497+02:00The drive towards electric cars creates a new infr...The drive towards electric cars creates a new infrastructure to recharge batteries. I think at some point military vehicles will also run completely on batteries. This in turn would allow to replace chemical propellants with fixed size acceleration tubes with size variable electrically powered linear accelerators. How soon do you think this would happen and how will it modify your analysis?Krthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05771203963357763259noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-40482023993173597612021-07-28T16:10:52.493+02:002021-07-28T16:10:52.493+02:00My main scenario is the first 2...3 weeks of a Bal...My main scenario is the first 2...3 weeks of a Baltic conflict, with Russian strategic surprise attack. Few NATO brigades could rush to the scene this quick with Oder and Vistula bridges crashed. <br />So an area of known size with few NATO/EU troops in ground combat formations. The concept of support umbrella delivers about the same technically given effective umbrella radius for both brigades and divisions. <br /><br />The size of the brigades does not matter as much as the qty of brigade/divisional support groups. So divide the guesstimated non-militia forces present by the qty of required brigade/divisional support group and I arrived at what's rather a typical brigade size than a typical division size.<br />The brigades wouldn't manoeuvre as one wieldy formation anyway. <br /><br />Thus I see no role or purpose for divisions. Greece, Taiwan or South Korea could arrive at completely different conclusions. Late-comer armies such as the British Army and U.S.Army could arrive at completely different conclusions as well, for their forces could be tailored for different scenarios than the first two or three weeks of Baltic Conflict.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-78799348686699125402021-07-28T16:03:15.909+02:002021-07-28T16:03:15.909+02:00I wrote this
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....I wrote this<br />https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2017/01/42-elevation-tank-turrets.html<br />but I disagree with you because I prefer to add serious VShoRAD capability to tanks. This means 76 mm 30...60 rpm -5...+43° elevation main gun + bulletproofed rocket launchers for a total of 8 blast and AT-HVM rockets (no reserve rockets in the hull). AT-HVM (~CKEM) would penetrate as well as a 130 mm gun past the first few hundred metres (and ripple fire would be devastating). Blast rockets of that size would finish a building in one shot, better than a 130 mm gun could with HE or HESH. 76 mm would be superior against infantry, aerial targets and AFVs up to good IFVs.<br /><br />BTW those Cockerill turrets have no provisions for indirect fires in the fire control system and the cartridges are fixed, not semi-fixed. The 105 mm gun cannot shoot like a howitzer. This could be changed, but munition supply into the turret would be quite slow.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-57235798778034817062021-07-28T14:20:20.497+02:002021-07-28T14:20:20.497+02:00SO:
Your summarize shows that you want 155mm SPG ...SO:<br /><br />Your summarize shows that you want 155mm SPG and MRL on the brigade level and 105mm SPG (multipurpose) on the bataillon level. This leads imo to very big brigades which then will also become slower and less mobile even with smaller support groups. I guess, that you want this because you want a structure of corps and brigades without divisions between them. Is that guess correct?<br /><br />Under the assumption this corps-brigade structure is here the target, this would inevitable make the brigades to mini-divisions which could have two problems imo: first this mini-divisions will be to slow in comparison with other brigades but will not be able to deliver much more fighting power in comparision. In praxis the fighting power will be nearly the same between such a mini-division and a much smaller brigade. As i understand you here, you therefor want to build bataillon battle groups out of the brigade as an answer to this. But why then not use a compact division with only a few thousand man more than the brigade aka mini-divison and have organic smaller brigades within the division? The overall structure would be the very same, but the compact division-brigade structure would have more fighting power and could absorb more losses and still function. Its endurance in combat would be better, the brigades as mobile as the bataillon battlegroups and you can then move the 155mm and MRL to the divison level and free the brigades of this units. This would greatly enhance the mobility of the brigades and would decrease the demand of ammunition, fuel etc, so it is better for the logistics. <br /><br />Instead of an around 6000 to 7000 man brigade which would be imo the result of your suggested 155mm SGP and MRL on brigde level - you could use an 10.000 man division, with the same units on divisional level which would give you better organic brigades instead of the bataillon battlegroups. Overall the compactdivision-brigade structure seems for me more organic and overall better in comparison for conventional warfare. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-45077221238389839582021-07-27T22:19:14.958+02:002021-07-27T22:19:14.958+02:00As i wrote in the article about fractals in the st...As i wrote in the article about fractals in the structure, one can also regard such an unit: battalion-level 105 mm turret SPG (multi-purpose)as the main combat unit as a replacement for the main battle tank. If you replace the MBT in the current brigades with an heavily armoured mulit purpose SPG (a kind of new generation Sturmgeschütz) you have both functions in the same unit and this "SPG" would not longer be support units, but main combat units. To make this possible one have only to give the 105mm Howitzer SPG a more heavily protected plattform (stronger passive armour, softkill, hardkill) and you can use them nearly like MBTs, but also like an SPG and for air-defence etc<br /><br />So in a brigade you then do not need an seperate artillery unit in a support group to the four bataillon battlegroups and therefore the support group becomes much smaller and more mobile. The same in the bataillon battlegroups. You can mix there mechanised infantry and such "SPG" companies together in a combined mech bataillon and you have all you wish again with a smaller support element because one of the main elements of the support unit is now an main combat unit.<br /><br />One have only to discard the MBT instead, who is also questionable as a system for the next war. More versatily means fewer support units, means faster and more flexible combat units. <br /><br />As future warfare will happen more and more in the cities one should also think about the problem of the elevation which is not sufficient with main battle tanks and with the fact, that even in earlier wars (like WW2) assault guns were the most effective urban combat weapon. <br /><br />There are even turrets with an 105mm canon available now from cockerill for example, which offer today an indirekt fire range of around 10 km and are for the use on tanks, and could use ATGM (Falarick). This turrets could very easily be improved with a little more range and all the possibilities you mentioned for anti-air etc<br /><br />http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product.php?prodID=5142&printmode=1<br /><br />Now think of an similiar turret but with heavier armour and other protection on an heavily armoured plattform and you have the Sturmgeschütz 2.0 which could replace the standard MBT and the standard SPG in one new type of system.<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-66214249972679607772021-07-24T11:39:03.014+02:002021-07-24T11:39:03.014+02:00The only part I ahve an issue with is:
"The ...The only part I ahve an issue with is:<br /><br />"The distinction between field artillery (later divisional artillery) and regimental or infantry guns (later battalion mortars) was driven by a need for long-range main effort artillery that dominates the battlefield on behalf of the army (or Napoleonic-era corps, later division) commander and some artillery that supports an infantry regiment (later battalion) on behalf of the the regimental (later battalion) commander."<br /><br />The opposite actually happened: The regimental guns of the bats in the 18th cebtury were combined in 6-pounder batteries under the command of artillery officers during the Napoleonic wars. <br />Then one of these batteries was assigned to divisions or brigades (Prussia) but still under command of an artillery officer. (The reappaerance of regimental guns in the French army for a few years was the exeption.)<br /><br />The heavy (12 pounders) were under command of the corps, later divisions. This approach was used until 1914, there was then only one kind field cannon in addition to one kind of howitzer. <br /><br />Only in the second half of WWI infantry guns (under the command of the bat/regiment) were seen again.<br /><br />The use of siege artillery as corps artillery ("Fußartillerie*) was an Prussian invention of 1904.<br /><br />Good discussion is found in Müller "Geschichter der Feldartillerie), published in 1873.<br /><br /><br /><br /> Ulenspiegelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16681823070584500277noreply@blogger.com