tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post5579793651524111297..comments2024-03-27T20:37:08.065+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: Review: Jim Storr's "The Human Face of War"Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-85567519338922600512010-10-13T13:18:11.988+02:002010-10-13T13:18:11.988+02:00the proliferation of explosives and timely indire...the proliferation of explosives and timely indirect fires has rather altered the balance between attacker and defender, think what an ac-130 gunship would do to a first world war trench line.<br />Urban combat between two uniformed armies would be mobile ambush and counter ambush. if your position is indentified, it would be destroyed with artilery not stormed by assault infantryDomohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00240964731398145995noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-17656141088685614332010-10-12T14:37:02.454+02:002010-10-12T14:37:02.454+02:00Quite the contrary. 25 years career as UK Army off...Quite the contrary. 25 years career as UK Army officer, experience in Falklands and NI, UK army doctrine author. A military heavyweight.<br /><br />"Furthermore, in 1987 OA demonstrated that the defender is at a systematic disadvantage in close country (be it woods or built-up areas). It seems that, amongst other things, in close country the defender is generally unable to mass the fire of his weapons, due to very short ranges available in relation to unit frontages. Given their relative protection, if only from view, the attackers can mass forces more safely than is normal. They can therefore isolate and attack small bodies of enemy relatively easily. The overall effect was described as 'counterintuitive'. (...) Attacking infantry generally have an advantage of 3.57:1 in terms of attackers' to defender's casualties in FIBUA. (...)<br />That OA was reported to the army, and published in Army Training News. It was factual, numerical and high-quality evidence based on historical analysis and extensive field trials."<br /><br />He has Rowland and Lynam as references. The mentioned report is Rowland, D. "The Effect of Combat Degradation on the Urban Battlefield" Journal of Operational Research Society, 42.7 1991, pp. 543-553S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-74461165853734159252010-10-12T13:47:27.660+02:002010-10-12T13:47:27.660+02:00Re: "such as that the attacker has a substant...Re: "such as that the attacker has a substantial advantage in house-to-house combat".<br /><br />Sven,<br /><br />I'm assuming that he's had no military experience?YTnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-91586807186567985152010-10-09T18:58:02.081+02:002010-10-09T18:58:02.081+02:00Rule of Four is about having four manoeuvre subord...Rule of Four is about having four manoeuvre subordinates instead of the usual three in a formation or unit (four platoons in company, four companies in battalion, four battalions in brigade).S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-35983664292001176232010-10-09T17:44:12.421+02:002010-10-09T17:44:12.421+02:00I tried looking up the Rule of Four but couldn'...I tried looking up the Rule of Four but couldn't find anything. Can you please explain it?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com