tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post6002518046216522054..comments2024-03-27T20:37:08.065+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: Brutes in warfareUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-23287039428506346322018-01-27T23:41:10.364+01:002018-01-27T23:41:10.364+01:00What's left to explain?
In the old times a bat...What's left to explain?<br />In the old times a battery commander left his 2nd at the battery, went to a forward position, was forward observer and directed the fires of his battery. Later he was also able to be forward observer for other batteries, if not the whole regiment.<br />Nowadays FO are specialists, even JFST have been created that are FO for arty, mortars, fixed wing support and rotary wing support (and possibly even naval gunfire support) in one.<br />Whether they can actually command anyone to deliver fires differs between land forces and may also depend on earlier orders given. Often times they can merely request fires. A battery CO was at least able to command his own battery to deliver fires.<br /><br />The firing artillery has become a mere service provider, and now batteries are de facto unnecessary because individual SPGs have the position finding, directionfinding, radio comm and computing ability to position themselves individually.<br /><br />The state of the art arty of today is -even without PGMs- as different from the arty of the 80's as the arty of the 20's was from the arty of the 1900's.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-7172901698544920692018-01-27T22:49:22.132+01:002018-01-27T22:49:22.132+01:00Good list. I can see why some of these practises h...Good list. I can see why some of these practises have fallen out of favor, though.<br /><br />'properly securing almost all possible routes while on defence (not enough infantry).'<br /><br />Maybe thats not a bad thing. Remember your post on repulsion?<br /><br />'elaborate field fortifications (including howitzer-proof underground bunkers) and field obstacles (AT trenches, barbed wire - not just at camps)'<br /><br />The field manuals still pay alot of attention to this, though. Isn't the value of fortifications in open terrain reduced due to artillery accuracy?<br /><br />'proper, tight encirclements.'<br /><br />Yes. Its not emphasised in doctrine. They think the enemy can be defeated with artillery fires.<br /><br />'artillery battery COs as forward observers and thus FO in full command of at least one battery.'<br /><br />Could you explain that?<br /><br />'Tanks-infantry cooperation looks very different, with much less exposure of infantry on open fields.'<br /><br />Mechanised, mounted infantry for the win.kesler12https://www.blogger.com/profile/06730943788519488679noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-70963414154917914042018-01-27T19:10:25.053+01:002018-01-27T19:10:25.053+01:00You misunderstood me, though.
The Americans are no...You misunderstood me, though.<br />The Americans are not brutish in warfare; they merely have a very resource-rich and -dependent way of warfare combined with extremist objectives (though not including annexations).<br /><br /><br />Burtish today would look different. Examples<br />(1) Drop leaflets with "surrender now or die" messages, next day attack and take no prisoners. rinse repeat. After a few times leaflets alone dissolve the defence. (Kind of Alexander the Great's strategy regarding walled cities)<br />(2) Drop 20 nukes on 20 battalions, overrun the capital, then annex the targeted country.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-823442314910732592018-01-27T19:04:02.256+01:002018-01-27T19:04:02.256+01:00Plenty.
- artillery fire plans for breakthrough (...Plenty. <br />- artillery fire plans for breakthrough (last time seen in 1991) including suppressive fires with free lanes left for attacking forces<br />- generally trust much in regular infantry for snatching POW for interrogation and other things now deemed "SF" jobs<br />- multi-layered fixed defensive positions <br />- properly securing almost all possible routes while on defence (not enough infantry)<br />- elaborate field fortifications (including howitzer-proof underground bunkers) and field obstacles (AT trenches, barbed wire - not just at camps)<br />- proper, tight encirclements<br />- proper anti-tank plans for defence (there aren't even dedicated AT troops any more)<br />- artillery battery COs as forward observers and thus FO in full command of at least one battery<br /><br />AT tactics changed entirely due to better AT ranges and portability. Tanks-infantry cooperation looks very different, with much less exposure of infantry on open fields.<br />The availability of radios down to squad if not individual level changed command and control very much and made messengers largely unnecessary. <br /><br />Interestingly, many things that seemed to have fallen out of practice reappeared in the Ukraine, where rather resources-poor forces fought in battle. Stuff like SPGs in AT work, for example.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-88066908464531412502018-01-27T18:18:18.108+01:002018-01-27T18:18:18.108+01:00In one sense, modern armys (especially firepower c...In one sense, modern armys (especially firepower centric forces like the U.S.) can be considered as kindof brutes. <br /><br />You once told me that armys of the past (1940s and 1950s era) depended on many tactics that are now considered unnecessary.<br /><br />You were referring to infantry battalions sneaking into enemy lines at night. Are there any other examples of things that modern armys have stopped doing?kesler12https://www.blogger.com/profile/06730943788519488679noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-20012338676715313522017-11-11T05:41:28.546+01:002017-11-11T05:41:28.546+01:00Shaka, mad as he was - and he was about as mad, ba...Shaka, mad as he was - and he was about as mad, bad, and dangerous to know as any dictator in history - was also a logistical and social innovator. He reorganized the Zulu agricultural and social system to support a full-time army. His tactical innovations worked because he had professional infantrymen who could learn the techniques of melee combat he taught, as opposed to a raggedy-assed bunch of herdsmen who "trained" by throwing their spears at a tree while standing around guarding cows.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.com