tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post7553304288269167447..comments2024-03-27T20:37:08.065+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: The support group fractal (I)Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-77158499514812527462021-07-16T12:51:50.461+02:002021-07-16T12:51:50.461+02:00The dedicated artillery formations won't be at...The dedicated artillery formations won't be attempted again anytime soon.<br />The German artillery divisions of WW2 (which had some infantry for their security) were misused and were disasters.<br /><br />Such formations don't fit well into a low force density battlefield. They work fine if you have a somewhat stable front-line. Greece could have an artillery brigade in its Northeast where a land conflict with Turkey (hundreds of thousands of mobilized troops) would be compressed on a 20 km front.<br /><br />July 24th and August 21st posts may be relevant to your interests.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-86887765579428426762021-07-16T11:06:18.015+02:002021-07-16T11:06:18.015+02:00In my opinion, the most important thing is to give...In my opinion, the most important thing is to give up the previous structural extrapolation and to adopt new perspectives, i.e. a new point of view.<br /><br />Take the artillery, for example. If one understands this as a support unit, then the question arises of how to set it up at which level and how it relates to the combat troops it supports. But you could just as well classify the artillery as a combat force and understand, deploy and structure corresponding artillery brigades as maneuver elements. Already decades ago Simpkins presented such concepts in detail, in which independent artillery brigades no longer act as support, but are themselves the primary bearer of the fight. Correspondingly, such brigades would also have organic mechanized infantry as part of their structure.<br /><br />This basic principle can also be expanded in other ways and the more you expand it, the more you can drastically reduce the number of support units by reallocating units and using them in a new, different way. Keeping skills available organically within maneuvering units is not necessarily slowing down in every case.<br /><br />Maneuvering units are not automatically sluggish and more difficult to lead just because they contain support units, the question is more what kind of support units and how they are incorporated into the maneuvering units. Then there is the question of the management culture and how the management handles these support units within the maneuver units.<br /><br />If you significantly reduce support units per se and move the remaining ones correctly into the respective maneuver units, then these do not represent any significant hindrance for them, but offer the possibility of organically tapping their capabilities within the unit. In modern war it is becoming more and more difficult to get skills from a completely different association and to call them up from there. The low number of troops in the room, the problems with communication (EloKa) and frictions will make it more and more difficult to call in separate support units. Therefore it is better to have as much as possible within the unit itself (backpack).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-11072314738377338592021-07-15T21:21:57.038+02:002021-07-15T21:21:57.038+02:00Well, on levels above battalion the support group ...Well, on levels above battalion the support group would de facto be accompanied by a manoeuvre group and thus receive security assistance by it. <br /><br />To rid the manoeuvre forces of the additional bulk and slowness of the support forces is 90% of the reasoning here. Some support forces are even better when not with manoeuvre forces, such as support forces that have long setup/decamp times as medical support or area air defence. Artillery is best when fired from a certain distance. Some MRLs have a minimum range of about 2 km, and SPGs have a MRSI capability only within a certain range window (17 km is a fine spot for PzH 2000 IIRC). Certain emitters are better not with maneouvre forces because they'd give away their location.<br /><br />Versatility can reduce the dependence on support forces only to some degree. Versatility helps with support forces outside of the support umbrella, of course. I'll later discuss raider forces in August, those could very well make good use of triple use (duel, AAA, SPG) main guns on their vehicles. Some missiles can double against ground vehicles and helicopters (fibre optic guided missiles, loitering kamikaze drones), but a dual ground combat and air defence vehicle won't get beyond ShoRAD ranges without being a silly contraption.<br /><br /><br />The Bundeswehr has severe issues, but too much combat support is not amongst those. We have silly air-mobile forces without a sensible mission, a ridiculously oversized medical branch, too much useless army aviation, useless special forces, too much administration. In short; many combat battalions are of totally wrong kinds, too much gold-plating, too much what used to be called "combat service support" in DOD speak.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-60106852233239991472021-07-15T20:53:50.537+02:002021-07-15T20:53:50.537+02:00About the topic: if you have support units in dedi...About the topic: if you have support units in dedicated seperate units for them own, the problem is in many cases that they can not support the combat companies because they loose the contact with them. Also it is to often to much eggs in one basket which makes them a very nice target for the enemy. And moreover such units also slow down the other units, these are only more mobile on an tactical level but not overall. In the long term the perseverance of such a divided unit structure can lower and an rucksack mentality in which the units carries all what is needed can be more advantagous - also against frictions. Such units are more persistent. <br /><br />To increase the tactical mobility then the main target should be to reduce support troops through an intelligent use, novel composition and the use of different systems and new structures and doctrine. The standardization and consolidation of skills can drastically reduce the need for support units.<br /><br />Lets take the mentioned 120mm Mortars. Theoretically: if i make them the main combat system of the combat company, in form of an tank-mortar which can also fight against enemy MBT and fire directly on enemy targets the 120mm are not longer an support unit, so the amount of support units will be smaller (this is only an theoretical example and not an statement that tank-mortars are an solution). Or lets take Anti Tank Missiles and Air-Defence Missiles. If you can fight against tanks on the ground and against air-targets with one and the same system - then you spare support troops overall. Or lets take artillery, which can also be used against air targets, again the summary of skills makes it possible to save support units. This is true to the smallest level: if you use an commando-mortar in an infantry group instead of an 40mm grenade launcher, then you do not need an extra support group with commando mortars. <br /><br />the more you can standardize and summarize and the more you can reduce the number of systems, the more the number of support units also decreases. Therefore, everything should serve as many purposes as possible at the same time.<br /><br />Likewise, the number of support units decreases if you rely on technically simpler, simpler and therefore less complex systems. In many areas we have too extensive over-technology, which makes the support units an end in themselves. They no longer support the struggle, instead they tie up far too many forces and become the majority in an army. Especially when you pull them out of combat units and combine them into their own units, such support units develop a life of their own, with a tendency towards an end in themselves and self-enlargement. The armed forces base in the Bundeswehr is a very good example of this.<br /><br /> Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-2008720127293368742021-07-14T20:04:29.678+02:002021-07-14T20:04:29.678+02:00Thank you.Thank you.Krthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05771203963357763259noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-5105959503803219242021-07-14T15:43:36.360+02:002021-07-14T15:43:36.360+02:00The insurgency in Iraq was fuelled by Sunni Arab d...The insurgency in Iraq was fuelled by Sunni Arab demographic feeling oppressed by the Shia majority. The democratic constitution that was kind of imported enshrined Shia dominance over Sunni Arabs without incentive to be nice.<br /><br />The situation is similar in Afghanistan; the Taleban are representing the Pashto demographic and rural Pashto customs more than religion. Yet the ~42% Pashto -and especially the rural ones- expect to dominate the country as biggest ethnic group, not to be dominated. The West did bet on the non-Pashto "Northern alliance" at first, and Pashto collaborators/crooks. Now Afghanistan is returning to the 'natural' dominance by its biggest ethnic group, and sadly, their main political (and military) representation isn't exactly liberty- or progress-minded.<br /><br />Iran only cares about the Shia minority in the border region and was able to mostly get along with TB, so they don't need to put up much effort to achieve what little they want.<br /><br />Turkey's current government would probably rather side with the TB than with the anti-TB. Their "fighting" against daesh in Syria was already a sham. Their pasha may want to play great power, but I don't see how they could have any major impact.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-61142583952052436182021-07-14T11:27:21.619+02:002021-07-14T11:27:21.619+02:00Why does the population accept these theocrats? Is...Why does the population accept these theocrats? Is it because of the drug money?<br />Do Turkey and Iran (Hazara) stand a chance to prop up at least parts of the government regions? <br />This was little about the specifics of the organization of the German withdrawal.Krthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05771203963357763259noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-90534827046246668892021-07-13T17:04:21.718+02:002021-07-13T17:04:21.718+02:00The Taleban collapsed in 2001 not because of bombs...The Taleban collapsed in 2001 not because of bombs but because of a cascade of desertions, local groups changing sides. The expectation was that at the very least the foreigners would take over the cities and the ring road like the Soviets did.<br />This is very likely what's happening now. The previously West-supported central government (basically the non-Pashtu factions) is likely collapsing without giving much of a fight because local allegiances switch again. Their troops were motivated by the foreign money, not by patriotism, faith or ideology.<br /><br />This local allegiance thing is the whole reason for all thatr lieutenant-level diplomacy that was done for decades with the elders of villages and such. The foreigners were trying to have such local factions on their side, and this effort has ended with obvious consequences.<br /><br />Those few anti-Taleban forces that won't collapse (basically some narco warlord armies) will probably withdraw to some defensible section (IIRC they held a Northeastern valley by 2001) or to neighbouring countries other than Pakistan.<br /><br />The mobile Taleban troops are very, very few compared to the astonishingly large population, but the very much armed population doesn't fight for its freedom from pseudo-theocrats, so they will lose it.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-5884478313452922442021-07-13T14:45:37.476+02:002021-07-13T14:45:37.476+02:00Off topic, it would be nice if you could analyze t...Off topic, it would be nice if you could analyze the retreat from Afghanistan. I just read a report that of the 500 people on base the weapons of 300 were sent home before their owners followed and the remaining equipment wasn't handed over to Afghan military and police, but looted as the Germans left. Does this mean there's a deeper management problem?Krthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05771203963357763259noreply@blogger.com