tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post766661395077112981..comments2024-03-27T20:37:08.065+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: A look back: An amazingly bad gun designUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-41558912932498221322012-03-20T23:05:54.974+01:002012-03-20T23:05:54.974+01:00I doubt it. For one, there were enough attempts an...I doubt it. For one, there were enough attempts and the second reason for my doubts is that serious operational research only began in about 1940. The Americans did misunderstand some HE effects as late as during the 1970's!<br />http://preview.tinyurl.com/83xdkge<br /><br />The WW1-era graphics on fragmentation effects (known to me) are very crude and inaccurate.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-18267909360981227712012-03-20T22:54:06.289+01:002012-03-20T22:54:06.289+01:00Did the quality of shell iron delayed the adoption...Did the quality of shell iron delayed the adoption of body armour? Large fragments kill anyhow.Mortarmannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-31656612978763278032012-03-19T08:17:34.717+01:002012-03-19T08:17:34.717+01:00Sven,
ammunition stock is only half of the issue....Sven,<br /><br />ammunition stock is only half of the issue. You have to bring the rounds to the guns and here it becomes interesting:<br /><br />1) Train columns were able to provide supply up to 120 km from the last train station.<br /><br />2) If the advance, during which a only relative small ammunition transport volume is needed, stalls the necessary transport volume increases dramatically when the attacker tries to soften the defense by artillery.<br /><br />Result is that the attacker has not only extended or over-extended supply routes but suddenly needs much higher transport volume. This situation clearly favours the defender who can still use railways and has only short distances to cover with horse drawn columns. The attacker need trucks to transport the ammunition or at least horse fodder. <br /><br />I concur that ammunition stocks and production capacity were too small in 1914, but do not think that the German Feldartillerie was the main problem.<br /><br />UlenspiegelAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-59864375944055552542012-03-18T15:43:27.388+01:002012-03-18T15:43:27.388+01:00one should add that shells per gun numbers for ger...one should add that shells per gun numbers for germany include those of much larger numbers of medium artilery (105 mm). furthermore the arms race of the fin de siecle was interactive increased stocks would have favoured the french strategic position more. its only your everyone-s-stupid-fallacy that leads you to believe the french generals wouldnt have noticed.<br /><br />note that the fk96na was indeed a political scandal in the german reichstag. the options then were holding onto an obsolete gun for the next decade or accept a slightly inferior gun for a longer time of service.mehttp://none.denoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-4235687807288665882012-03-18T11:17:58.897+01:002012-03-18T11:17:58.897+01:00About the ammo stocks at beginning of the war in 1...About the ammo stocks at beginning of the war in 1914 (per gun):<br /><br />France 1,390<br />Germany 1,000<br />Russia 1,000<br />Austria-Hungary 500<br /><br />The British guns had fired 164 to 208 rounds each at Magersfontein (1899), a single battle. It should have been possible to anticipate that bigger ammo stocks were required with quicker firing guns and for a whole war.<br />Ammo stocks are among the hardly visible qualities of an army and thus as important as often neglected.<br /><br />Source: "Waffen der Millionenheere", Georg Ortenburg, 1992S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-50966681771602116462012-03-18T09:54:25.723+01:002012-03-18T09:54:25.723+01:00First I would like to hint at an excellent book sp...First I would like to hint at an excellent book specialized in issues of Industrial Logistics of Germany in WW1 : « La Grande Débrouille » by ret. General Jean-Claude Laparra (YSEC Editions). It is available in french only, but has a great deal of information, cheifly about :<br />recycling of war material<br />use of war booty, also adaptation and hybridation (hints at reverse engineering were also made)<br />lean design<br /><br />About the lack of war materials, there was a lot of experimenting with soft iron, steel etc. before ferrous casings were practical, and it seems they had issues for the durations of war. Another aspect relating to explosives was the use of picric acid, that oxyded with the shell's steel and became very sensitive to shock. The shells exploded when the shot was fired. The laquering of the inner shell eliminated that, but it took a while to find this.<br /><br />Basing myself on your data, I'm convinced that the 7,7 cm gun was not well conceived in the first place. But issues relating to copper and brass were probably not envisionned at the time of conception. It requires an advanced kind of mind to envision the « life cycle » of a product, whereas it seems the minds of top management is not primarily geared towards these kind of issues. The term « ASAP », or the phrase « you need to do that for yesterday » is a sign of bad anticipation management. Managers try to disguise this as a form of management by stress, but in reality it is just shoddy management. (There are things I witnessed in my experience as business consultant that made me lose all illusions on the matter).<br /><br />That said, between say 1880 and 1910 the technology was evolving with leaps and bounds. A long life cycle was likely not envisionned, as the development history of this very gun (7,7 cm FK 96) shows. One year after it was introduced, the french « 75 » made it obsolete. An even more telling exemple is a series of austro-hungarian field guns and mountain guns ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_cm_Gebirgsgesch%C3%BCtz_M_99 ) that used bronze barrels (special hardened bronze called Eisenbronze, but it could have been propaganda). Such models are made only to bridge a gap. As a matter of fact, the FK96 was itself a modernization of the FK 73 ( http://www.lovettartillery.com/9cm._C_1873_Kanone.html ).<br /><br />As history showed, the very concept of a field gun was made obsolete during WW1, so there is substance to this argument. In retrospective, the effort saved on the 7,7 cm guns was perhaps meant to be better invested on other issues, like heavy howitzers for instance (if it really was is another matter I won't discuss here).<br /><br />These kind of shortcomings were seen everywhere at that time. The french had an enourmous amount of 1886 Lebel rifles, that on the one hand allowed them to have enough rifles in the first place, onthe other hand impacted (cartridge) the development of more modern weapons (such as the semi-auto rifle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusil_Automatique_Modele_1917 that began in 1913, or the Chauchat LMG).Solsysnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-16174593484846868112012-03-18T08:38:21.626+01:002012-03-18T08:38:21.626+01:00Sven,
some problems were a direct result of maint...Sven,<br /><br />some problems were a direct result of maintaining large peace time armies, you could not longer replace hardware in the rate of technological developement. (See v. Seeck's plans for the new Reichswehr) <br /><br />Ammunition production required machinery that was not available in sufficient numbers in 1915/16 and of course chemicals.<br /><br />To my best of knowledge the low quality of rounds in 1915/16 was a production problem, not a lack of metals.<br /><br />The Fußartillerie compensated a little bit for weak German Feldartillerie, see the Battles of the Border.<br /><br />However, most of the problems in 1914/1915/16 could have been avoided by a more careful analysis of insustrial structure. The German army like most of its peers was not good in this department and was bitten by the decision to attack in the west.<br /><br /><br />UlenspiegelAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-63850348360447861242012-03-15T21:31:05.522+01:002012-03-15T21:31:05.522+01:00which is a function of the mainly defencive stance...which is a function of the mainly defencive stance of french forces. comunications (technology but also procedures) of those days didnt realy suit mobile employment of artillery. this is one aspect of the overall superiority of defence then. the french stocks of ammunition were only marginaly larger.mehttp://none.denoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-64984287716943295002012-03-15T20:12:08.051+01:002012-03-15T20:12:08.051+01:00Actually, pretty much every account of the 1914 ba...Actually, pretty much every account of the 1914 battles in France that I've seen tells about active French artillery with rare action of the ammo-depleted German artillery.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-17646312609830546422012-03-15T19:32:31.713+01:002012-03-15T19:32:31.713+01:00and so did the french. the only difference being t...and so did the french. the only difference being that the reich was unable to win a long war in the first place. langemarck surely was a failure of german strategy but in a very different way than you implymehttp://none.denoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-76832568530983963862012-03-15T19:03:48.105+01:002012-03-15T19:03:48.105+01:00This "strongest artillery branch of the world...This "strongest artillery branch of the world" ran out of shells real quick and did support the infantry very little in 1914.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-44072048628368650832012-03-15T18:50:32.607+01:002012-03-15T18:50:32.607+01:00what do we learn? which army can replace their inv...what do we learn? which army can replace their inventory every 15 years? none! did it matter? no! most armies had guns of similar design! btw you missed the point: german shells were einheitsgeschosse. the worst of both worlds. appart from this fk96na was a usefull design augmented by a strong medium artillery it was part of the strongest artillery branch in the world.mehttp://none.denoreply@blogger.com