tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post8584276780322346689..comments2024-03-29T12:15:13.832+01:00Comments on Defence and Freedom: Missed survivability opportunities in WW2 (army-related)Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-6694857553884342452012-06-19T21:32:06.642+02:002012-06-19T21:32:06.642+02:00Although these propositions are sound and interest...Although these propositions are sound and interesting, it seems to me they miss the major problem : any further advantage the Germans would have gained in WW2 would have been jeopardized by their leadership. Adolf Hitler is the main culprit, but the other members of german leadership were abyssimally incompetent as well (Herman Goering, obviously, as well as Hermann Göring).<br /><br />Any of the measures mentioned in your post would have helped the soldiers survive, only to be sacrificed again on (deeply) flawed strategic concepts. I'm going to mention micromanagement of procurement issues as well (focus on very large tanks, delayed introduction of Sturmgewehr and Jet fighter, prohibitively expensive Drilling hunting rifles as Luftwaffe survival weapon etc. etc.)<br /><br />Only Albert Speer was able to make sound decisions (development of the the Hetzer tank destroyer / subsitute tank, "Heimstofflok" (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kriegslokomotive) (very interesting concept to me), and ultimately, saving German infrastructure and industry from idiotic "scorched earth" strategies. The last contribution probably saved thousands of lives, on top of Germany's present world position.Solsysnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-71308562929263689882012-06-18T18:59:48.873+02:002012-06-18T18:59:48.873+02:00Re (9): training of enlisted men of infanty
IIRC ...Re (9): training of enlisted men of infanty<br /><br />IIRC the real problem was the incorporation of replacements into depleted front line units. Starting in 1942, many divisons in the east could not longer do this. Would have longer basic training really changed this problem? <br /><br /><br />Re (14): neglect of artillery<br /><br />Here the basic problem of the Wehrmacht could have been the lack of transport volume. Guns become useless as long as you can not move them and their ammunition. Would the Wehrmacht have been able to provide more trucks or horses to move more guns? I bet not, reduction of AA guns is only haf of the solution as most were stationary.<br />Or do you think it is a pure coincidence that the US army and the Red Army, both had an order of magnitude more motorized units, fielded much more artillery and were able to supply the guns with rounds? <br /><br />UlenspiegelAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-23985941993181739112012-06-18T14:45:14.311+02:002012-06-18T14:45:14.311+02:00OK, it was possible to improve equipment and train...OK, it was possible to improve equipment and training time of the infantry, but infantry was just one among many fields of necessity for a military and even the Nazis had to make compromises.<br />Some compromises were due to their political system (a military fights to enforce the will of a political system against external opponents, not to topple the system = often neglected truth), some due to their intertwined connections with great profiteering of industry magnates and some about managing a scarcity economy.<br /><br />You started on the political issues, but yet missed the industry connections and what about scarcity economy?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-29750578151670967112012-06-18T11:09:27.981+02:002012-06-18T11:09:27.981+02:00The infantry was at times superior thanks to the n...The infantry was at times superior thanks to the non-neglected training of its leaders. German junior NCOs usually had a more thorough training and experience than American 2nd and many 1st Lieutenants.<br /><br />About the divisions:<br />TO&E of the first four waves, showing the already remarkable drop in quality:<br />http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Infanteriedivisionen/Gliederung.htm<br />Description of the problems of the next five waves in Frieser's "Blitzkrieg Legend" book.<br /><br />The shortages concerning the late 25 waves are self-evident after you saw these and I know no concentrated source about them.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-42715556720957568522012-06-18T10:22:52.250+02:002012-06-18T10:22:52.250+02:00'It did not manage to follow its better judgem...'It did not manage to follow its better judgement in regard to infantrymen training. Six weeks training for infantry was simply inadequate.'<br /><br />But the wermacht were kicking the americans ass in man to man fighting, even though they had the semi-automatic garand rifle! Wow, the yanks must have really been scrapping the bottom of the bucket with their foot soldiers, in terms of quality...<br /><br />'Germans did not solve tactical problems with much artillery fire often until there wasn't enough infantry left any more.'<br /><br />The americans had just the opposite problem, unskilled infantry who were over reliant on artillery bombardments. It is better to have infantry capable of employing strosstrup tactics and not requiring them, then requiring the tactics and not possessing them. It is unwise to assume that there will be a surplus of artillery during great conflicts. Though in the final equation, it all goes back to that cultural/conditional premise you mentioned in your review of john pooles book.<br /><br />'Finally, the army itself was forced to raise far too many divisions. There were 35 waves of new divisions overall. To put this in context: Even as early as 1940, creating the 5th to 9th wave of new divisions was faced with severe criticism because of the huge drop in quality due to age structure, short training and the inadequate leader pool.' <br /><br />This is a fascinating topic. Can you elaborate on it some more, sven?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-55409057552125281482012-06-17T22:11:23.246+02:002012-06-17T22:11:23.246+02:00Most were converted Canadian Ram tanks or M7 Pries...Most were converted Canadian Ram tanks or M7 Priest. Afaik there just weren't enough of them to have a large impact, but I like the fact that they show the ingenuity of the men to try and solve the problems that they had with what they had on hand.<br /><br />TimAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-84708010260171935422012-06-17T21:44:50.176+02:002012-06-17T21:44:50.176+02:00There were also a handful of very speedy M39s
http...There were also a handful of very speedy M39s<br />http://olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_m39auv.php<br /><br />Both the various "Kangaroo" designs and the M39 played no large role due to tiny production runs afaik.<br /><br />There were more than 40,000 M3, 6,000 SdKfz 250 and 15,000 SdKfz 251 half-tracks produced. The small yet ubiquitous Universal Carrier was more important, too.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-386077914312449748.post-1218068792996039252012-06-17T21:26:28.009+02:002012-06-17T21:26:28.009+02:00Kangaroo http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kangaroo_(ar...Kangaroo http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kangaroo_(armoured_personnel_carrier)<br /><br />found this amusing.<br /><br />TimAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com