The location of the commander

.
From field manual FM 3-90.2 "The tank and Mechanized Infantry Task Group", June 2003 (U.S.Army)

3-3. Location of the commander
In the past, commanders have been torn between the conflicting requirement to visualize the battlefield and the requirement for his presence in the main command post to participate in the military decision-making process. This dilemma slowed the planning and execution of operations while frustrating the commander’s efforts to “get out of the command post.”
     a. All commanders within the task force have the ability to visualize their battlespace in all dimensions and to share a common operational picture (COP). Perhaps the largest and most immediate impact of digitization is its effect on the operations process (plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations). Digitization streamlines planning and preparation by allowing the near-simultaneous transfer of information to all leaders. This transfer of information facilitates parallel planning and preparation. Using digitized equipment should compress the planning cycle for commanders and allow planning at all levels to begin sooner. Task force commanders also have the ability to locate and track targets precisely and conduct simultaneous operations employing lethal and nonlethal means while operating with joint and multinational forces. In addition, task force commanders retain the ability to recognize and protect their own and other friendly forces. The commander cannot, however, fully visualize the battlefield while directing and synchronizing the efforts of his task force from a computer screen at the main command post. He must move from the main CP to assess the situation face-to-face with subordinate commanders and soldiers. The C2 system within the task force permits a commander to position himself where he can best command without depriving himself of the ability to respond to opportunities and changing circumstances.
     b. The commander can be virtually anywhere on the battlefield to best affect ongoing operations without disrupting the planning and preparation for future operations. Near-real-time information updates, continuous assessment, and command decisions can be briefed, approved, and disseminated from task force to company team level via the available INFOSYS with the C2 system.

Astonishingly, this quote is from "Section I: The art of command".

I suppose I don't need to quote older German or American sources which highlight the morale influence of the commander on the troops through his presence. Nor do I need sources to highlight how being where the main action is can be crucial for quick decision-making and quick communication of orders to subordinates, right? Nor do I need to elaborate on radio ECM or radio silence, for sure. The OEF and ISAF troops in Afghanistan had radio communication troubles for years even without facing any electronic warfare threat.

I didn't quote this I-want-to-believe-in-technology text to bash a particular institution or country. Instead, it's a very very nice document to show how innovations are often exaggerated, and even supported by deliberate exaggeration in order to push them forward, to reap their benefits.

 

This quote may actually be useful if combined with a more classic education of the officer. I'm not sure that all of them get the same, but there are only so many mechanized battle group commanders, so I suppose it's possible to reliably convey the critical omissions in a less formal way if necessary.

Such biased military education tools may be much more troublesome when directed at less experienced personnel than majors. This is - especially in regard to technological exaggerations - worthy of major concern because technological sophistication has crept from supreme HQ level (general staff having telegraph connection to all armies by 1864) to squad/section level (electronic warfare tools, radios, GPS et cetera carried even by small patrols). It's important that laymen politicians and bureaucrats don't fall for the fashion du jour either. The barrage of pro-fashion propaganda in military journals (including the advertisements!), in field manuals, in presentations, on official websites, in parliamentary hearings and in private discussions can easily warp the idea of what's important when it comes to deter or prefer for war.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

P.S.: This is how I would have written this sub-chapter about the location of the commander in battle (my first and only draft):
 

The well-established insights on the great morale value of a commander's presence among his troops during times of great challenges remain valid in face of digitization. A commander's first-hand experience of the terrain and the current combat situation remains valuable under most circumstances.
An old commander's conflict is between choosing his presence at the HQ for great influence on the staff's performance and choosing his presence with the troops in contact for great influence on their performance. This conflict can be reduced through digitization if reliable radio communication can and shall be maintained.
The commander can through digitized radio stay in sufficient contact with his staff while away from the HQ and he can exert some morale influence and gain impressions from the battlefield remotely as well. Couriers such as motorcycle couriers can transport not only verbal or on-paper information, but also large amounts of easily transported encrypted digitized information between the commander and his staff, allowing him to benefit of digitization without radio emissions, albeit with lags of several minutes on average. The same applies to the commander's communication with other distant subordinates, such as platoon leaders on a flank security mission, for example.

.