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I wrote no more than eight blog posts this month, and the reasons are obvious to me:
My thinking about military theory pulls me back to the central point of delaying actions again and again, though I don't make much progress on this regard. Over the years I identified skilful delaying actions as THE central replacement for the extinct frontlines, but I'm simply not ready to write about it even though I had a couple ideas that I've never seen in literature (including field manuals). Everything else appears to be frustratingly uninteresting by comparison, or covered long ago. What new could I write about the hysteria about terrorism? I wrote it all already. Armed forces = bureaucracies? I covered this one redundantly. Much of what I could write about infantry has an eerie if not even embarrassing similarity to Jagdkampf, and it's been like that since 2009. Some other ideas are close to Raumverteidigung and similar 1970's and 1980's concepts that don't fit all that well into Eastern Europe. Maybe this for mountain and urban warfare? Mmmh.
I could comment on faraway countries' defence issues, but experience told me that much effort is required to avoid mistakes based on gaps in my knowledge.
The best I can do today is to remind my readers that this blog isn't a news blog. Posts from 2009 may fit to current events just as well as if they were written today. Tired of mainstream hysteria on terrorism? Use the search function on the left and look for "terrorism" or better "errorists", for example. I never dignified them with a dedicated label.
My view on the German military is that it's doing business as usual under a ambitious minister of defence who had no clue about defence prior to getting this job and since tried to get the bureaucracy under control with help from outsiders. Not so much to provide the common good of security at lowest possible price, but to further her own ambitions minister of defence is usually a dead end for politicians' careers, but she likely wants to become chancellor sometime). The military is getting the budget for extra personnel to handle "new" demands for conventional deterrence, instead of cutting out fat or re-purposing "overhead" personnel slots or simply getting more fit overall.
Milblogging can be quite depressing if you're not easily excited by sexy toys. BTW, this is what pops up when you google 'F-35 sexy':
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All actions under the responsibility to protect idea are supposed to be aid missions, so it would be interesting to put armed the security missions under the overall control of the national foreign-aid agencies, rather than under the war departments directly.
ReplyDeleteFor one thing, aid agencies can have extensive contact networks of trustworthy locals along with a culture of working within the structures of the foreign communities they engage with, neither of which an defence department could credibly claim to have.
An aid agency might also naturally arrive at your tiered force structure with cheap garrison troops in the province and then a heavy gold plated response force that blows shit up in reserve.
Finally, if the expeditionary forces are under the direction of the aid agency, the regular military can stop training for the COIN missions that aren't on their table anymore.
I'd rather write about the predictable misuse of the RfP doctrine than about how to employ it best.
DeleteThe F-35 isn't even sexy. It's physically ugly, largely because the stupid STOVL requirement results in a squat, unattractive airframe to make room for the lift fan.
ReplyDeleteThis is one of the dead tells its a piece of shit. Most good combat aircraft are also physically attractive as a consequence of the laws of aerodynamics.
There are some exceptions, such as the A-10 and a few bombers, but as they say the exception proves the rule.
I suppose its sexy to defense stock owners...and I confess to owning shares in Lockheed Martin. No reason to be a sucker--if we're going to do something stupid I might as well profit.
As far as new goes--you could write more about historical topics (not new but new to your audience) especially prior to the 20th century.
Another option would be the impact of emerging technologies on future tactics and strategy (e.g. combat lasers), but perhaps this isn't what you want to do since it's "sexy" and already covered (badly) by other milbloggers (most of whom are awful).
Anyways, thanks for the years of great work. I am a dedicated fan and will always follow you.
You are sometimes out of your depth in history pre 1500. An issue that has not been covered well are colonial wars in which a small organized core beat larger native forces with support from numerous less organized and equipped locals. This is a template for many current conflicts, which don't involve direct peer competitors. Historical insights in this field would be appreciated. This allows case studies on hybrid warfare. I know your dislike of interventions, but let's be informed about dislikeable things.
ReplyDelete