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The invasion of Ukraine shows that I mistook a few things. This includes that Putin would indeed use a lengthy preparation for war - both in terms of military logistics and political mobilisation at home. I believed he'd rather be a strategic surprise attack guy. Such a move would still be on the table for him, but I evidently supposed he'd use it on Ukraine if he really wanted to invade, and he didn't (use it).
Why did I get this wrong?
For one, I constructed a standard scenario for Baltic invasion that on the one hand showed what needs to be done for better deterrence and defence IMO, and on the other hand it was constructed to give a plausible raison d'être for the (approximate) size of Western armed forces at all. A Russia that attacks only after months of crisis would be much less demanding for NATO or EU members regarding deterrence and defence.
Second, I didn't connect an insight that I had for a very long time: Specifically, the insight that even seemingly absolutely powerful dictators are actually very concerned about garnering and sustaining support. They bribe key people, they hand out gifts - and the particularly evil kind like Mao works with terror waves to scare people into supporting them. Seemingly powerful dictators like Hitler, Mussolini, Ceausescu, Louis XIV., the dictators of decolonialised Africa - all of them were actually quite weak and busy managing the necessary amount of support for their own survival.
Putin is a de facto dictator because the legislative branch obeys him AND the Russians cannot vote him out of office in practice. His leading political challengers get jailed by a corrupt judicial branch. He still needs to garner sufficient popular support and toleration for any big move, and thus he engineered the crisis and launched a propaganda campaign of jingoism, lies and deceptions prior to daring an overt war of aggression against Ukraine. He would likely need this kind of preparation prior to a Baltic invasion as well, which is a very good-to-have news/insight for NATO and EU.
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Russians and Ukrainians often have family relations. How is this affecting public support?
ReplyDeleteSubstantial demonstrations against the war in St Petersburg. Whether that will amount to anything is questionable.
ReplyDeleteSt. Petersburg and Moscow are cities of several million people. The protests were small by comparison.
DeleteThere might be other options to effectively protest, like not joining in cyberwarfare, which presumably recruits outside of the armed forces in Ukraine and which can be more successful if Russians don't have as much success with similar efforts. It might also lead to a drop in new recruits for the professional Russian forces and intelligence services, while those in these institutions look for an early retirement.
Discussing things with a Russian yielded some insights. Georgia happend on 8.08.08 and Ukraine on 22.02.2022. Both are rapdigits and palindromes. Chosing such rare dates might communicate preparation for an event at a time of their choosing. With Crimea some rules with the numbers can also be found, but it's less obvious. This might openly communicate that from a Russian perspective, things work after a long established plan, claiming: "I control the narrative."
ReplyDelete>>He would likely need this kind of preparation prior to a Baltic invasion as well>>
ReplyDeleteCannot agree with that for an conventional invasion like now in the ukraine. But could be possible for an hybrid / guerilla scenario using the russian minority in the baltics. Imo your failure is to assume axioms here. There are none.
Sven's original scenario for a Baltic invasion was WITHOUT longer Russian preparations. It has as most dangerous scenario now a smaller probability. (Context changed)
DeleteBut yes, IMHO it still sets the bar for western planning.
Or maybe, your military assessments of both east and west were quite wrong.
ReplyDeleteWell, the West is not involved. My assessment about the trustworthiness of Javelin goes back to my assessment that the Russians are no idiots.
DeleteNow, the Russians clearly do Russian things, which in the military realm means a lot of fail.
Please note that this means they weren't all that much of a threat to begin with, so my overall stance against those who want ever more spending is still being supported by events. German politicians aren't imaginative and now want to break free from criticism with a u-turn towards big military spending, but that doesn't mean it's the smart thing to do. The smart thing to do would have been to make better of the actually big budgets of the past. We waste too much on small wars shit, on staffs, on stupid procurement failures (LeFlaSys, MEADS, NH90, Tiger, A400M), on the navy, on the stupid airmobile division and on the utterly bloated medical branch.
Meanwhile, we lack spare parts, munitions (way too few 155 mm HE shells), battlefield air defences that work, active artillery.
The extra money will likely mostly be wasted. They may order munitions, and then find they have no proper storage facilities in time and such blunders. I also expect a lot of 100% wasteful naval spending.