.
A string of twitter threads by different authors create an impression that this war is very different, kind of with different rules than previous wars, military doctrines from pre-2022 are obsolete now.
https://x.com/sambendett/status/1927076283000701067
https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1927714854351085928
https://x.com/Playfra0/status/1928183254089429005
https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1926930735266509094
I object.
Quite generally, when somebody claims that previous military theory is obsolete you should ask yourself what previous military theory this person knows about. You're nearly perfectly safe if you assume the answer is "very, very little" even if said person is a general. Very few people dedicated much of thier lives tot he study of the art of war and people who learned some of it profesionally (such as generals) hardly ever learned much that goes beyond their own country's doctrine, and very little about how and why their county's doctrine came to be.
The drone war in Ukraine isn't terribly new. It's almost exactly a replay of the air war development 1911-1945, for example.
Yes, the kamikaze FPV threat is severe to up to 9 km depth, often extending to 20 km and rarely extending beyond that with almost none happening beyond 40 km depth against non-strategic targets.The long-established military term in English for this is "battlefield interdiction", and air forces aspire to do it not to 40 km depth, but to hundreds of kilometres depth.
To move yourself or goods to the front seems like running the gauntlet on the final 40 km and gets the worse the more close you are to the front? Does that sound all-new to you? Then you're not aware of the experience of the Japanese merchant marine trying to resupply distant island bases in the Pacific War or the experience of the German armed forces in France during June 1944, when the Northern French railway and airfield network was bombed to swiss cheese standards by the 9th Air Force. Do you think it's now that quadcopters are capable of cheap PGM-like precision attacks even on individuals? 8th Air Force fighters got bored in 1945 and began strafing individual bicyclists hundreds of kilometres away from frontlines in 1945.
What's "new" is that wer're in a brief "the bomber always gets through" pahaes during which there aren't enough counter-drone ("C-UAS") defences, so drones of BOTH SIDES are effective at battlefield interdiction instead of one side establishing low level air superiority/supremacy or both sides defending effectively to diminish the threat. That's about the situation we had in the very early 1930s when bombers were not slower than fighters.
All those improved fortifications, evolved through wartime experience? That's fortifications designed by amateurs who learned lessons by spending blood. There were VASTLY better field fortification schemes back in the 1950's already, but the overwehlming firepower of nukes didn't allow them to become very central to doctrines. Netting not just for concealment, but also for keeping drones out is new, but it's also pointless in face of the heaviest anti-trench munitions (bombs, TOS-1, napalm B).
Tanks get cages to keep FPV drones out? How is that conceptually different from cages to keep hand grenades out?
The frontline with up to 40 km battlefield interdiction poses a different challenge than pre-2022 warfare for breakthrough efforts? Sure, but is it really new, or worse? Breakthroughs against ready defenders were never easy, after all. I actually madke the case that the drone war situation is liberating in a way; suppose the FPV munitions are effective in a radius of 10 to 20 km. Traditional ATGMs were effective in a radius of 0.6 to 4 km mostly, with 2 km being a common practical limit in Ukrainian terrain. Now look at my (very) old text about repulsion and let it sink in. The increased radius of action actually liberates the attacker, he doesn't get channeled! Pre-2022 the same effort looked like this and it was the shorter rnage of the ATGMs that was slowing down the attacker. Now there's no such measures to limit losses to ATGMs. Attackers who would want to breakthrough could shout 'Damn the torpedoes, flank speed ahead!' and the breakthrough could be VERY quick if done well, which includes dealing with the WW2 revival band of mines, anti-tank ditches and gimped dragon's teeth as well as a fires plan that would make 1917's Bruchmüller proud.
I could go on, feel free to bring up true novelties in the comments. I have a hunch I'll reply with a military history analogy.
Patton was once asked about how he was such a good general and he replied (paraphrased) that nothing was really new to him during WW2. He knew everything from books already. Such students of military history and art people don't get fooled by fake novelty, but they are RARE.
Don't get fooled by people who claim novelty and impossibility because they don't know the past.
related:
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/fact-check-military-hardware-novelty.html
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/update-ugv-history.html
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2015/05/another-fact-check-military-hardware.html
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2023/07/russian-fortifications-present-old.html
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2025/05/c-uas-on-battlefield-at-very-low.html
S O
.
I broadly agree...but. Your repulsion idea makes sense with direct fire. With indirect (like FPV style drones) the fires advantage lies with the defender.
ReplyDeleteThe repulsion concept isn't about advantage or not.
DeleteIt's about limited range weapons exerting different influence on the battlefield because their effect can be felt in some places, but not in others - which influences where the enemy would prefer to be/go.
This
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/07/247-air-attack-paradox.html
is a similar concept. Limit yourself to daylight action and you limit the time window for enemy movement to the night. At full 24/7 attack capability the enemy does not restrict itself, you gave away the ability to restrict the enemy temporally.
Nothing is new,yet everything is.Until now you could at least get behind some bushes or in hole in the dark for bodily functions,even in the worst situations of WW 1&2.
ReplyDeleteNow there is no way for infantrymen to even observe their sector and engage.
The issue ain't the drones per se,it's the transparent battlefield due to lack of C-UAS that is both numerous and effective enough.See them->kill them has always been the case,since before the dinosaur era.
For this reason,the way of war centered around fire and maneuver by ground elements is dead.Now it's fire,maneuver and protection.
One may argue that protection was always present,but that was achieved by speed stealth,fortifications or dispersion.
And there was a point noticed by Col Dupuy in "Numbers ,predictions and war".That the more lethal the weapons became,the greater
the dispersion ,thereof reduced casualties.
I have yet to get enough data from this war to see if that's still the case.
But without active and pro-active protection by dedicated forces/equipment,at the smallest level there won't any way out of this positional mess.
So for vehicles,every single one ought to be equipped with at least a MG with computer vision AI that can observe and engage at long distance.For close protection,2 types of APS' are needed.One that resembles the current generation,vs ATGM/AT rocketts,but with vertical protection included.And another that are basically shotguns charges that could engage any UAS that manages to get close enough.
A lot of ammo and fast reloading for all these is a main criteria.
Then we get dedicated C-UAS assets,essentialy a reinvention of the SPAAG,with a multidude of active and especially passive sensors for C-UAS abd C-RAM at PLt level.
Then you get a dedicat PLT at CP level in due time Laser and HPM at BTN/BDE level,with more MG& SPAAG formations at each echelon.
There is an analogy with anti-armor evolution.In late 30's early part of WW2,tank fright was a factor.
But training,organization,tactics and weapons came fast,and in a few years almost everything,including a common individual had an AT capability,even if it was a disposable,single shot launcher.
I agree on the C-UAS machinegun mount,
Deletehttps://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2025/05/c-uas-on-battlefield-at-very-low.html
but I disagree on the SPAAG. Guns calibre 20...155 mm can be used on easy air targets above 1k ft altitude. That does not require a dedicated SPAG. Artillery, IFV and tank guns can do it as well. Tanks and IFVs have sophisticated sensors and fire control anyway.
I don't think hyper-specialised HPM and laser weapons make much sense.
Tank APS is nice to have, but not shotgun-style. That won't be adopted bc of risks to friendlies and civilians, incl. risks to exposed equipment (optics) of friendly AFVs.
Normal hard kill APS deals with HEAT FPV, while C-UAS RCWS with MG gives EFP FPV users a hard time.
Something new: empty european weapon depots?
ReplyDeleteWRT "shotgun" APS.That's a strictly C-UAS consideration,considering that fiber optic UAS or in the future AI driven UAS can fly at very low level,a few cm above ground.Today they lie in ambush and can attack on very short notice.
ReplyDeleteYour point about friendlies is a good one but it's a matter of 1.TTP's i.e they dismount when it's safe from drones and stay at least 50m from vehicles
2.There could be a kill switch to disable the system in certain circumstances.
The idea with dual APS and dedicated C-UAS systems and formations is that we're in the infancy of this situation.
If a crappy economy like Ukraine can make millions of these I don't want to know what China can produce.
Keep in mind the analogy with AFV's.Just because everyone could kill tanks,did not cancel the need for dedicated and optimised platforms and formations.
These are also your dedicated security units,since killing recon,i.e enemy scout drones enables maneuver.
There is a lot to think and debate.
BTW,I bet " normal" APS charges cost is in the range of tens of thousands.That's justifiable vs the cost of an ATGM given that tactics,combined arms etc... can mitigate their threat and allow the armored force to do its job.
DeleteVS numerous cheap UAS' that might penetrate outer defenses,you need something less sophisticated,but with more numerous charges and very cheap and easy to reload.
Low thousands is reasonable. There's a little propellant, a little steel, some explosive with ignition, some metal and the most troublesome part is almost certainly whatever times the fusing, unless that's just a pull cord.
DeleteHard kill APS costs are mostly about R&D expenses and sensors.
There was in the past talk about flying plates armour; essentially ERA that doesn't get fused by the HEAT hit, but by the AFV itself. The outer plate would fly away (possibly fragmenting) and intercept an incoming HEAT warhead. It's fairly impractical because no tank has the right shape for a semispherical coverage by flying plates, regardless of other issues.
Some public (internet) discussions were about outright use of claymores attached to the outside. I can easily imagine that we'll see some such contraption in the ongoing war, but it's not going to become a dominant solution.
They did installed some MON 50's on vehicles,but succesfully only in fixed positions,ambushing grenade droping drones.Even that worked only a couple of times.
DeleteFlying ERA might not be the case,but having directional mines activated internally might be something.They could even have some tilt,to give semispherical cover.They'll probabbly be lighter and cheaper than other ways.
The whole point would be to produce a lethal cone at say 20m.
Technology will come,but the issue is having something that is easily mass produced,comes close to 100% effectiveness and is way cheaper than any drone China could produce.
Next gen drones will probably be more rugged,faster , longer ranged,handle more G's and be guided via computer vision.
So they'll be even more outside mere humans abilities to shoot them down.
That also answers your questions on a previous article about FPV's vs yanks in a mobile phase.The FPV' launchers,be they human or automated won't even budge,but just create a fire sack,since the launchers have range speed and protection via distance and stealth.
Enough of the little buggers must be killed to allow any penetration force to get close enough to force a change of positions.
In essence nothing is changed,the attackers still love the rear areas,where HQ's logistics and artillery/drone launchers are.
But there is a reason they did penetrations and exploitations with tanks,not motorcycles or jeeps.A tank is not functionally a tank without a minimum of protection.Today that is basically non existent.
It's not necessary for the intercept munition to be cheaper than its target.
DeleteThere's no 1 FPV hit = 1 AFV kill relationship.
~90% of FPVs achieve nothing. With Western AFVs something up to 95% of FPV hits don't score a kill (not even only a mission kill)
So no near-100% intercept success is necessary and the intercept shot can cost much more than the FPV munition, even 10x.
The exact variable values aren't published, I'm sure Ukraine collects enough data for NATO countries to process and operational research may actually come up with a 90% probability to shoot down a FPV leads to 500k € attacker costs per destroyed AFV.
That's vastly better than in 1942, when a 14k RM gun with a 20k RM tractor (that was rarely lost) had a much better than 50% chance to kill a 120k RM tank with two shots at 1 km and near-certainly would kills it within 20 seconds of shooting.
And keep in mind the German tanks that overran France in 1940 were merely bulletproof. Every anti-tank gun and light field gun and even howitzer was able to defeat them.
"So they'll be even more outside mere humans abilities to shoot them down."
Detection without excessive false alarm rate is the key anyway.
If a tank battalion is attacking a company of anti-tank guns the AT guns have very limited mutual support.
DeleteIf it's running a FPV gauntlet all FPVs have full mutual support.
Combat shifts towards a salvo model and away from Lanchesterian attrition.
The Lanchester equations are about salvoes.
DeleteIn fact, the current war is a war of attrition. Ukraine attrits Russia's deep reserves of Soviet-era heavy arms and there's very little movement of the frontline except when an offensive surprise hits a marginally defended sector.
Salvo models as in Wayne Hughes' model; representing missiles instead of spears or guns.
DeleteThe current war has slow attrition because the gray zone is light infantry hiding at the limits of weapons range trading shots. They do so because when a group throws away its concealment by mounting vehicles and breaks into a nearer range band, combat stops resembling Napoleonic riflemen or Americans in Afghanistan and starts resembling missile duels between naval destroyers. Breakthrough attempts in those conditions are more aptly termed suicide charges.
There's no 1 FPV = 1 tank kill relationship.
DeleteHow many FPVs can be operated at a weak spot of the frontline? 500? 5000? How many can fly at the same time (bandwidth issues for the video feeds of non-fibreoptic drones, how many operators are available)?
Let's say 1,000 FPVs can be brought to bear within one 1 hour at a 1 km wide sector.
Rule of thumb from 50's was that at suitable terrain and without facing Kursk '43-ish defences, the assault of a tank platoon will succeed if done right.
So 1,000 drones vs. 500 tanks supported by 50 IFVs/APCs.
Assume the AT minefields were scouted, MRL threat reduced the days before the assault. Supporting drones & arty defeat the mines, the full width mine clearing attachments on some tanks create safe lanes. MRL-laid scatterable AT mines are visible on thermal cameras and the few on the breakthrough lanes would get defeated by mine ploughs. The smart jumping AT mines would simply not be present.
Now it's 1,000 drones vs. 100 AFVs. Assume Western tanks, 10 FPV hits per actual tank (mission) kill. 5-10 FPV hits per IFV kill. 20-50% of fibreoptic drones don't make it to target because of technical issues. EW umbrella (jammers on AFVs) wideband jams control frequencies of non-fibreoptic drones. Airborne jammer redundantly jams videofeed datalinks with line of sight to the operators.
Guided (guide) bombs get lobbed and destroy known defender locations to 20 km depth. Artillery fires are used for suppressive fires on probably defender positions. Artillery coats the whole breakthrough sector in ordinary (HC) smoke, neutralising the non-thermal imager drones.
I strongly suppose this would lead to a breakthrough or at least an advance of 20 km. I didn't even mention that drones could be used in "fighter" mode to defeat enemy drones (or their fibreoptic connections, which would also be very susceptible to artillery blasts) or any radio comms jamming.
Now multiply this by 10 and use a 10 km wide breakthrough sector. 500 tanks, 500 IFVs, 500+ EW jammer sets, 50 airborne videofeed jammer drones, 3,500 infantry, 120 full width mine ploughs, 100 guided (glide) bombs dropped by 20 aircraft, 100 155 mm artillery pieces with 15,000 HE shells and 5,000 SMK shells.
The central 6 km would face marginal defences, as FPVs coming from left or right would already engage AFVs on the wings.
Breakthrough is possible if the breakthrough plan is good, the units are trained for it, morale is good and the required assets are available.
The real problem is to anticipate whether the breakthrough could be exploited well.
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2025/05/a-mystery-about-fpvs-and-tanks.html
500 tanks & 100 155mm guns is about two armor divisions. 1000 drones is 1 BCL for 50 drone teams – a large company.
DeleteDo you see the fundamental problem? You’re a persistent target without persistent defense but the opposition retains their concealment and maneuverability. Concealing yourself for one hour doesn’t matter because you’re too big to hide for the other 23 hours of the day – or the preceding 23 hours.
Suppose you break through 20 km. One hour has passed. If it was the 1950s you’d have the tactical and operational advantage. The enemy wouldn’t know where your units are until they see the front of your Leopard’s armor. They’d have to scramble to move their own reserves to slow you, which would come too late.
NLOS changes that, which is why drone teams are the designated anti-breakthrough units in the war. Tank breakthroughs don’t create tactical or operational surprise. You can’t outmaneuver the drone teams because with wheeled transport they have better operational speed (and fuel, while your tankers are priority FPV targets) and with FPVs they have better tactical maneuverability. Quadcopters don’t care about mud. They can maintain vision on you at the tactical and the operational level. They can keep shooting and your tanks cannot. Your breakthrough is a mobile fire sack.
While you are maneuvering multiple divisions with planning stretching days in time, your opposition is a company size force in white vans.
Suppose again you’ve won. You’ve assumed no friction for yourself and maximum friction for the enemy. You’ve broken through in a wonderful German set-piece battle and defeated the drone company.
Great! It’s hour two. You are reorganizing after the breakthrough and distributing your battalion level resupply. Here come the drones. Since you planned meticulously and outnumber the enemy 3:1, they have only 5 more fresh fully supplied thousand-drone company attacks to deliver on your reorganizing forces before considering their own organic artillery…
Now factor in modernity. When you were making these estimates, you were using old data. Today it’s 4 drones launched per 1 catastrophic kill.
"Concealing yourself for one hour doesn’t matter because you’re too big to hide for the other 23 hours of the day – or the preceding 23 hours."
DeleteYou're simply out of range. There's very little threat beyond 40 km depth. I wrote about that before - AFV forces should not loiter at the front.
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2022/08/battalion-battlegroups-and-front-lines.html
"NLOS changes that(...)"
Artillery was NLOS since WWI, but artillery ran in panic from German tanks (actually just rumours of them coming) at Sedan 1940. You do not appear to take into account the moral element. Breakthroughs as opposed to wide frontage advances were always largely about morale effects. Darius III ran from the companion cavalry.
Besides, once there's war of movement - why would the side conducting the offensive be at disadvantage compared to the other side? Both have FPVs.
"They can keep shooting and your tanks cannot."
Ready FPVs in a sector are limited by quantity and most can be defeated by jamming. I also mentioned that their effect per drone is rather low.
"While you are maneuvering multiple divisions with planning stretching days in time,"
That's not how exploitation works. To assume gross incompetence on part of those executing the breakthrough is a trivial and thus worthless argument.
Tank forces that break through are rather expected to aggressively expand, aggressively defend, overrun not battleready opposition.
"You are reorganizing after the breakthrough"
That's not how it works. An attack happens in waves, even if only spaced by minutes. 12st wave deals with 1st defenders, 2nd wave passes by and deals with 2nd defenders, 3rd wave passes by and races to overrun instead of facing defenders.
"Today it’s 4 drones launched per 1 catastrophic kill."
Feel free to provide sources.
I have a VERY strong feeling you'd have calculated in 1936 that the superior (wheeled vehicle) mobility of anti-tank gun teams will stop any tank assault in no time, making breakthrough impossible. Especially taking into account that unstoppable bombers will bomb the road columns et cetera.
You do not appear to take into account the moral element....I have a VERY strong feeling you'd have calculated in 1936 that the superior (wheeled vehicle) mobility of anti-tank gun teams will stop any tank assault in no time, making breakthrough impossible.
DeleteI see, you've gotten emotional. This should be a clue to you that you've extended your comparison of towed guns from last century to self-scouting precision munitions too far. I'm clearly not going to convince you.
We're discussing something that cannot be solved with mathematical precision and reliability.
DeleteTo bring up an analogy seems appropriate to me.
See, it's not really about the "self-scouting precision munitions", it's about whether someone employes them. That someone needs to have the morale to do it.
Also, I note you didn't provide a source for 4 FPV per AFV kill.
"It's not necessary for the intercept munition to be cheaper than its target."
ReplyDeleteI agree. If a $50K defense kills a $2K FPV drone, then great, but it's more about what you lose if it misses.
If 100% intercept is required as humans/v.expensive equipment is at risk then $50K it is.
If it's a supply UGV with pallets of supplies, maybe something ~$5K is OK ... and so on.
Trouble is western defence procurements wants a 'master in all' type equipment in a cheap as package as possible.
The attacker ,the side with superior mobility,were the AFV's in the past.Now we're in the same situation as in 1914.Indirect fires vs limited mobility.
ReplyDeleteSpeed is relative.A tank is faster than a man, a tracked vehicle is more mobile than roadbound ones.Flying with 100kmh in almost straight lines beats both.
The calculation that only very few drones could be concentrated is mistaken.
This is a very fast evolving tech,with a lot at stake,and computer vision drones,free from both individual operators and the jammable connection are around the corner.Better batteries,better designs,no need to account for operator skill will increase maneuvrability,speed and range.Vehicles,afterall,do not have the same performances as in 1915.
Yes,they will still depend on recon,on a decision to launch,on the time needed to give them a task,but we must assume those will be solved.
So,the issue will remain that way larger of drones will come at greater speeds,from farther away and in vastly bigger numbers.
That is only what we now call FPV's -drones designed to strike directly.But we should also consider combined arms drones,with different munitions .
A very simple thing to do would be to equip them with a very basic launcher.
A breakthrough depends on attackers having superior firepower,while the defenders cannot concentrate on time.A heavy company attacking a PLT may face a few launchers,that are limited both in numbers and positioning.
Now consider that instead of 3-5 direct fire launchers trying to hit AFV's frontally,the defenders gets 500 launchers that arrive on the flanks and rear of the attackers,do not get scared or supressed and aren't blinded by smoke
Since most folks quit after 30% casualties,a mere 1% of the defender''s munitions must hit the vulnerable areas of the tanks to put a stop on the attack.
A more primitive way would be to simply overwhelm any vehickes with speed and numbers.
But if there will be no restrictions due to bandwich or operators,tens of thousands can be brought to bear at any time and place.
Now,I am not a fan of these.They will kill maneuver as certainly as they do it now ,thus prolonging wars.
The primacy of maneuver forces must be restored.But it will be only after,as I've argued,an array of C-UAS weapins will be able to kill them en masse,fast and cheap.
Protection from indirect fire was armor,combined with lack of accuracy of arty and movement which exacerbated that inaccuracy.You'd had to be very unlucky to have your tank hit directly by a 155mm.
That sort if percentage of low efficiency must be strived for,if we are ever to see wars that end reasonably quickly.
I wrote about autonomous drones since 2007, but there will be autonomous counter-drones, and the old laws of war regarding concentrating mass will prevail. Maybe a breakthrough and exploitation will just be a bigger drone swarm and a few vehicles to transport infantry/MP to take possession/handle civilians plus vehicles transporting additional containers full of drones, but it won't just be drones killing everything unopposed. That didn't happen with machineguns despite such prophecies, didn't happen with tanks despite such prophecies, didn't happen with aviation despite such prophecies, didn't happen with nukes despite such prophecies.
DeleteOperational art is timeless, the equipment used changes. Mobile warfare will be ineffective as long as people think that it is the tank that enables mobility, when it does nothing with very inefficient armor scheme and weapon optimized against itself as opposed to modern threats.
ReplyDeleteSuccess in high tempo attack is about mass/speed, and drones/artillery is mass, and CRAM is also mass, all enables superior exchange rate when massed. Tanks is anti-mass as it inefficiently consumes limited logistic capability (and can not influence the decisive long range fight) and anti-speed due to lower operational mobility: it makes surprise and exploitation more difficult for the formation. It is not like there are any target that is immune to an RPG, missile or 155mm while a 120 would work, and economy probably only matter if one wants to demolish a city SAA style.
Even without CRAM/drone interceptors, breakthrough is possible today if only one side is capable of generating sufficient mass of drones to suppress defenses and maintain that. Sufficient mass of deep recon/strike to neutralize artillery is necessary for success in any case.
Currently drone/long-range-strike mass is limited by the spectrum, lots of small problems that add friction and that neither side have large advantages and poor operational art in generating local advantages. That is potentially further caused by nuclear threat preventing the "stronger" side pressing as the worst thing than losing the war is winning it.
All said, current land breakthroughs are likely to be disappointing as attackers don't have an mobility advantage to catch mobile elements while force density at the front is low, with high vulnerability targets pushed back due to all the deep strikes. This would change when mass on mass drone (/CRAM) warfare develops that pushes more mass to the front and operational maneuver enables things like defeating millions of drones in one encirclement.