2026/11/08

We need a different way of war

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NATO has been dominated by the American way of war from the beginning. This American way of war rested on superior industrial output, domination at sea and domination in the air. Most European countries gave up on the pre-1945 model of European (land) warfare in which every army expected little support from the air and knew that wartime (=mobilised) strength matters, not peacetime active strength (=only relevant for training the reserves and officer cadre).

Then, when the Americans withdrew from the ground war in South Vietnam, the American Way of War changed: They began pursuing "overwhelming power", "total air dominance" and so on - not just to win battles, but to fight and win battles ideally without taking blows themselves. They also moved to an all-professional (and volunteer reserves) model of military forces, which led them and almost everyone in NATO away from obsessing about mobilised strength and instead focusing on peacetime military strength.

The navies were the most extreme. They were and are largely lacking air/sea battle experience in the missile era and totally lacking sea/sea experience in the missile era. No veteran of naval battles from the gun era is still training or advising, either. Warships are designed with the intent of stopping each and every incoming missile. A single hit may be manageable or catastrophic. The answer was largely to seek air defences that would not permit any incoming missiles to leak the defensive umbrella and hit the ship. We have marginal ship-missile combat experience and none to back up any such infallible force field attitudes. We do have much more land-missile and land-aircraft combat experiences and track records, and they point at air defence lethality that's way too bad to support confidence in quasi infallible naval air defences. In the end, navies have kind of forgotten that they would take terrible blows in major war at sea and the concept that surface warships may be survivable enough only far away from a hostile great power does not appear to be present in force development. I see no writing about modern transport submarines (transport submarines were used by Germany (WW1), Italy (WW2) and Japan (WW2) before) as a reaction to doubts about the ability to convoy to Guam or even Taiwan during wartime.

The most extreme facet is BMD. There's the ambition to had kill (shoot down) every incoming BMD missile that may hit a relevant target. Factor in "hypersonic" glide vehicles that can manoeuvre a lot. This makes it impossible to rule out that any incoming missile may miss its target (something that Iron Dome is able to do against purely ballistic rockets) until it's too late to intercept. The costs of even only trying to establish a near-100% hard kill BMD protection is ridiculous. The Iranians show even to the public that the attacker can defeat such aspirations by launching more relatively cheap quasiballistic rockets. First you shoot your lesser quality rockets to deplete the defender's intercept missile stocks, then you strike with your most accurate missiles. Hard kill BMD is a losing proposition.

That aforementioned post-Vietnam American Way of War - turbocharged during the Reagan administration and seemingly vindicated during the Gulf War 1991 - requires two things to shine:

(1) giant budgets and (2) avoidance of hot conflict with opposition capable enough to tear down the Potemkin' facade.


Europe panicked about Russia and Germany in particular (but also Poland) reacted with ludicrously increased military budgets. The extremely poor display of Russian armed forces against Ukraine (a country that never properly spent to prepare for defence until 2022) doesn't keep people who slept over the entire defence topic from getting scared shitless. Nor do such people compare actual military power. European NATO could attack Russia and occupy Moscow within a few weeks (if not days) of campaigning without any force increase, simply by first moving its peacetime strength into position for attack. This would also be true if Russia achieved victory in Ukraine first and Russian (first) use of nukes would not change the outcome. The only ways how Russia could defeat European NATO is by exploiting that our politicians are weak pussies, selected by our political systems for prowess in domestic political fights, not for character. To spend more on armed forces doesn't eliminate this weak point. I may write more about this later.


So back to the core issue: People need to understand that you take blows in warfare. No boxer can block all punches during his career, or even only finish every fight without bleeding. The pursuit of invulnerability is bollocks and a waste of resources. We need a way of war that works for us, and we should not pursue more than that, for all extras require wasteful spending. Most of all, we in European NATO need to deal with the one real weak spot that undermines our security: Useless pussy politicians in power that are toys to the likes of Putin regardless of military power. 



S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2026/10/13

Deterrence and 'Victory'

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His concept of how to defend NATO / deter Russian aggression is primitive crap. On top of that, he's an American, and who still thinks the U.S: is an ally for any country other than Israel?

Russia needs to be deterred and if that fails its leadership needs to be convinced that

  • NATO won't launch nuclear first strikes, but it would retaliate to Russian nuclear first strikes
  • The longer the war goes on, the worse it is for Russia(n leadership) 
  • up to the point of Russian leadership facing the Mussolini retirement plan

Mussolini's retirement from politics
 

To anyone trained in math, this looks approximately like a graph (horiontal axis = time, vertical axis = how bad is it):

(quick & lazy illustration)
 

Right at beginning of hostilities, there should be strikes of "You regret to attack us!" and the aggressor's situation should rapidly deteriorate from that point until aggressor leadership pays the ultimate price itself from hands of its own people. No decapitation strikes, no attempt to eliminate nuclear second strike capability (= SSBNs in bastions are off-limits!).

That speech laid out a defence that's little deterrence because there's nothing about instant regret of decision to become aggressor. It's rather comparable to Kalkhin Gol 1939; border skirmishes / border battles are entirely thinkable in such a world and carry little more risk than embarrassment.

That's dereliction of duty, for it diminishes deterrence.

 

So the announcement how defence would happen should include that those on the ground who enter have nothing coming but thier own death or mutilation and their national leadership should expect a disaster that's rapidly expnding in case they dare to attack. Feel free to add that Russia's economy would collapse within two months of war if it dares to attack NATO. Everyone should understand that the world needs to rally to save Russians from starving the moment Russians attack NATO.

 
S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de
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2026/09/17

But, but, but ... Red Sea!

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I recently came across the pro-hard kill BMD (= trying to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles) argument that goes like this:

The Houthis shot ballistic missiles at ships in the Red Sea, so we need to shoot them down.

 

This is illogical behaviour in two ways:

1) It's insufficient evidence that a particular soluiton (hard kill BMD at sea) is needed. Other countermeasures may be better and the war might be considered a bad choice in the first place.

2)  Hard kill BMD at sea DID NOT WORK in the Red Sea. I won't even bother checking whether any anti-ship ballistic missiles were stopped by hard kill. Hard kill BMD and all other military activity DID NOT PROTECT that sea lane. Traffic was reduced by 2/3 compared to pre-October 2023 average and is fluctuating with evidence (temporary collapse to about zero) that traffic comes to de facto stop if the Houthis want so.

 

The U.S. Navy is a land attack navy with transoceanic invasion capability. It is not a navy to keep sea lanes open for trade and it is not a navy for sea battles. They gave up escorting in the 90's and sea battle in the late 40's. The nuclear land attack component (SLBMs in SSBNs) is unusable. The conventional land attack via cruise missiles and carrier aviation is mostly relevant against poor and weak countries. The U.S. is learning that Iran is not weak enough to be a suitable target for bullying.

Most European navies are NOT land attack navies. French and UK SSBNs provide an unusable nuclear land attack capability, the French surface ships and UK's submarines have a small land attack capability with cruise missiles and both these countries have weak carrier aviation suitable for bombing much less defence-capable countries than Iran only. They could bomb countries such as Morocco, Haitior Kenya a bit.

All other European naval power is about keeping sea lanes open, albeit it would only suffice if the hostile forces are limited to the Russian ones (and not in the Black Sea or Gulf of Finland). Moreover, Russia would be capable of sallying auxiliary cruiser commerce raiders in the Pacific.

What I'm getting at here is this: The Americans built their hard kill BMD because they want to overcome the so-called "area denial" to get close enough for land attack and because their escorts (general purpose destroyers) protect very high value targets (the supercarriers and the largest amphibious warfare ships in the world). Meanwhile, European navies either use warships for cordoning (GIUK gap), for hunting down stray submarines in the first days of conflict (main activity in the Mediterranean), for sealing bottlenecks (Dover-Calais, Kattegatt, Gibraltar) and possibly for escorts (particularly if the war at sea is outside of European waters). The threat by ballistic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles is rather limited in these scenarios (in large part because European air forces would largely neutralise the Tu-95 threat). I assumed a SSGN's anti-ship missile salvo for my frigate concepts as the main air defence challenge, for example.

Europeans are not going to force a convoy into area denial waters. The Americans are failing at this now in the Mid East and have such forced convoys in their "PRC blockade against Taiwan" war games/war plans, but Europeans should IMO NOT force maritime traffic for Taiwan. Taiwan can be supplied with enough food and medical supplies by air and Europe should not needlessly make the PRC its enemy, for PRC throwing its land and air power weight into Europe is really the only way how we could lose against Russia considering the dismal state of the Russian military and economy these days.

 

It's stupid drone behaviour to assume that the American way of war is the only one that makes sense (despite them failing in so many wars!) and to be emulated by Europeans. The Americans are doing some things the way they do for reasons that are irrelevant to Europeans.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2026/09/09

Protection of industry against cruise missiles

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httphttps://x.com/commandante_/status/2095476400807444622?s=20

https://x.com/commandante_/status/2095476400807444622?s=20

It's extremely easy to adapt conventional cruise missiles (the ones flying at high subsonic speed with heavier than 100 kg warheads) to still hit the right location and pierce through this passive defence.

WW2 aircraft had devices to deflect and cut (barrage balloon tether cables.
German Submarines had cable cutters in WWI already and satisfaction was such that they reappeared in WW2.

A cruise missile might lose its folding wings in a new, but it could be arranged that they get sacrificed on the last couple metres. The tail fins can be built resistant to netting. The frontal area of fuselage and engine/air inlet is small enough.

Overall, I'm, sure that you cannot protect an oil refinery against Flamingo, Tomahawk or Kalibr with scaffolding and netting. It's a defensive iteration that's soon to be rendered useless by the next offensive iteration.
 
- - - - - 
 
The good thing is that we in Europe actually don't need this. IRIS-T SL(M), 76 mm naval gun turrets & 20 to 35 mm autocannons are extremely (cost-)effective against subsonic cruise missiles. You don't even really need IRIS-T SL(M) for point defence if the threat munitions are slow (Kalibr at about M 0.8 is NOT slow). 
 
Chinese naval 76 mm gun on 6x6
 
So we have the technology (weapons, munitions and sensors), but it's of no use if we don't build, pay for it and install it.

Russia may do so until 2030, after the iterative cycles in the ongoing war reach the approximate the state of the technology. They have access to the radar tech, naval gun mount tech, anti-air autocannon tech and missile tech needed for a proper defence. They were just not able to install it in the necessary quantities yet (and Pantsir appears to be very flawed).
 
This may lead to Russia having having non-nuclear blackmail potential against us by the early 2030's. They might threaten destruction of much of our large commercial structures (which includes logistics centres, apparently) with us being unable to threaten a reply in kind due to increased Russian resilience.
 
Now full stop.
I do NOT advocate we secure all our industries with point defences!
 
The old considerations regarding defending at the border or frontline rather than point defences in the rear still apply. The potential of attacks from the sea and clandestine attacks complicate the matter, but I say a defence of the troops at the front + a strategic air defence line behind the front (continued over interrupting coastal waters) plus point defences (preferably 76 mm or cheap SAMs) for the about 200 most critical locations in the EU (most oil refineries, capitals, DNS servers, the most important transformer stations, some satellite control sites, some rail bridges and so on) makes sense to me. Moreover, some extremely critical infrastructure (such as electrical grid coordination) can be moved to underground bunkers.
 


Said defence line posited at a fairly safe distance behind the front line (150+ km behind) could combine AEW, ground-based radars (preferably on high rise buildings and masts), high end fighters (priority on intercepting high end cruise missiles), auxiliary fighters, cheap (old) combat aircraft and the point defences of capitals close to the threat border.
 
The regular Russian air force shouldn't be much of an issue to European NATO. Maybe temporarily to Turkey, maybe in first 12 hours, maybe far out over the sea, but other than that they stand no chance ONCE we stocked enough air combat missiles (the Meteor, AMRAAM and MICA stocks are at ridiculous levels). 
 
Then the remaining air defence issue for European NATO would be the (more expensive) ballistic missiles, particularly if they get the navigation technology that's jamming resistant or immune. American style hard-kill defences would be excessively expensive, so I suppose the best counter to such ballistic missiles would be resilience. Take the punches and keep going. That's what Ukraine does because it has no other option than defeat.
 
related:
 
 
S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2026/08/31

How to fix the Belgian Armed Forces revisited

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8 1/2 years ago I wrote about a kind of proposal how to get lean yet purposeful Belgian armed forces.

Here's what I would do differently now if I could travel back to 2018 to improve the blog post:

 

about nothing

 

Reason:

The old reasoning holds. The F-35 purchase was wasteful. Belgium is too small (and indebted) to fund the development of equipment that solved pressing problems, such as a Patriot version with a mast-mounted 360° radar and a missile to intercept cruise missiles at 100 ft altitude (such as IRIS-T SLM). Or an affordable C-UAS RCWS for anything ranging from 4x4 car to MBT as I already called for in 2017.


The small army I devised (one 1st and one 2nd rate active mechanised brigade, territorial forces) would hold up well today. Oriented against Russia, not daesh or Taleban, it would be considered about right today, save for lack of drone focus. I should have mentioned a drone component in the brigades' description, that's it. In my defence; I was thinking more of a PGM/drone company added than an entire drone battalion.

 

 S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2026/08/30

Area denial at sea

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https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/08/29/russia-cheap-fast-missiles-cut-ukraine-sea/

The Ukrainians scared the Russian Black Sea Fleet away from the open sea and slowly reduce it to scrap. 

The Houthis were able to render the Red Sea passage impractical for maritime trade.

The Iranians scared the USN so much that it doesn't dare enter the Persian Gulf or use naval gunfire against targets at the Strait of Hormuz.

 

It's almost as if - wait for it! - area denial works and ships are not survivable enough close (hundreds of nautical miles close) to major land mass held by a well-armed hostile power that's prepared to deny the sea (surface) with land-based assets.

That's difficult to accept for career officers of a Western navy. 

 

Now extend this and realise that - as I kept writing for many years - land-based air power can extend this area denial thousands of nautical miles onto oceans.

It's almost as if - be seated firmly! - ships are in wartime practical only at VERY long distance to land-based threats or under cover of AEW & fighters. NATO could keep the English Channel safe, but the Baltic Sea and Black Sea would only become usable with extreme and deliberate effort. North Sea and Aegean Sea would be of questionable safety in wartime. All this without a single Russian ship or boat leaving port or even only existing! Satellites, covert agents with a view on a port, land-based missiles and air-launched missiles is all it takes for this.

 

What's left for navies to do?

Not terribly much. They can protect maritime traffic lanes close to friendly shores (without using a single ship) and they can escort oceanic convoys.

What can air forces do? 

Air forces can employ OTH radars, AEW, fighters and tanker aircraft (this could mostly be quickly refitted airliners) to make aerial incursions towards those lanes (such as Montreal-Brest) too risky.

 

The realm of warships is ever-shrinking. Back in the 18th century 3rd rate ships of the line (~battleships) could anchor in view of enemy ports to blockade them. That ended with coastal armoured ships and at the latest with the first torpedo-armed submarines. Warships have been on a retreat ever since. Now they only belong into distant waters where the threat level is low anyway, likely limited to submarines.

What about the realm of submarines in a war against a well-armed enemy? In theory, they can go where friendly air power cannot go. Now, where exactly can NATO air power not go? Lake Baikal in Siberia? I have a hunch we could go there with a refitted Airbus A340 at normal cruise altitude.

So submarines are not vulnerable to most of the threats that warships face, but there's very little they really bring to the table, in spite of all fanboi propaganda. IMO submarines have largely withdrawn to the role of sparring partner for oceanic convoys. Somehow you need to provide them with an enemy during training, after all. Everything else they can do can be done by more versatile land-based air power, satellite or is only serving themselves (collecting acoustic data to be used exclusively by submarines - self-licking ice cone). Well, there may be one exception - tracking and taking out hostile SSBNs in a bastion. The issues are that taking out such a second strike capability could provoke a nuclear first strike, there's little reason to believe they could really find such targets in wartime and finally, there's little reason to believe they could survive in a bastion given today's low frequency sonar technology.


So maybe long-time readers now understand why my navy-themed blog posts centre on oceanic convoy defence and why I'm rather non-friendly to navies and their top brass.

 

related:

/2016/08/summary-of-my-naval-ideas.html

/2018/06/bundeswehr-structure-what-i-would-do.html

/2018/01/modern-warships-i-introduction.html

/2019/07/how-to-fix-united-states-navy.html 

/2021/05/navies-obsession-with-peacetime-hull.html



S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2026/08/25

Auxiliary interceptors

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About 20 years ago people thought giving semi-active laser guidance to a 70 mm hydra missile would cut costs, for Hellfire misiles were expended on Afghna  and Iraqi cars. It took a while, but APKWS II has been in service both for helicopters and aircraft, with occasional experiments to use it as a surface-to-air missile. These missiles turned out to be the best cost:performance munitions in Western arsenals and even the EXTREMELY wasteful CENTCOM has adopted their use to down Houthi Shaheeds.
 
https://www.twz.com/air/f-16s-with-larger-laser-guided-rocket-loads-drone-kill-marking-emerge-over-middle-east

Their advantage isn't just the low costs (though using 1980's and 1990's era infrared guided missiles is kinda free, for they are already in inventory). You can carry 14 (2x7) or 19 such small missiles instead of two normal infrared guided missile or five LMMs under one pylon. I know of no LMM-certified fighter, but most Western fighters can carry a Hydra pod or NATO-origin equivalents. 
 
 
 
Europe has smartened-up Hydra equivalents to APKWS II equivalents: 


(more details on German wikipedia)

I'm not sure whether FZ71 features proximity fusing, but ACULEUS 68 LG does.
 
So these are the European APKWS II alternatives that can serve as cheap air-to-air missiles against munitions. They require laser target designation.
 
Semi-active laser guidance basically uses a laser to illuminate the target at a specific wavelength typical of the kind of laser and a seeker that just pays attention to this wavelength (with a little tolerance to account for doppler shift). This means the starget could be stealthy to it by either scattering the light (avoid returning it 180° back) or absorbing it extremely well (most likely a combination of it). 
 
An imaging infrared seeker is under development for such rockets, but it might cost a lot more. There's the open question whether semi-active laser works against terrain following missiles. I don't know. Maybe the missile would chase the reflections on the (back)ground instead.
 
 
Such cheap A2A missiles might be the munition of choice for intercepting cruise missiles over land, both cheap and expensive ones. Fighters with built-in 30 mm gun might use a 30 mm proximity-fused HE cartridge instead, but these guns are AFAIK not prepared for single shots and AFAIK only Americans produce such fuses. 
 
The platform needs to match and at least briefly exceed their cruise speed, which rules turboprop aircraft out. 
The establishment may be able to assign jet trainer aircraft this mission, equip them with a FLIR with laser target designator plus whatever avionics it takes to coordinate a search line or hunt a particular missile. The problem here is that jet trainers fell a bit out of fashion (exception being the new high performance M-346) because of modern high end turboprop trainers and having jet trainers in the own air force somewhat fell out of fashion a swell because training in a joint establishment was more cost-efficient. 
 
Another aircraft category that might come to the resuce are the business jets. Some of them have the size and flight performance to catch up even with turbojet-powered normal (not Shaheed-style) cruise missiles such as Kalibr (Mach 0.8 at very low altitude). They could fly at medium altitude for superior speed and dive close to their never exceed speed, then maintain M 0.8 long enough for the kill. It's mostly the big and long-range business jets that are this fast, though. There are about 700 business aicraft registered in Germany, but the vast majority will be unsuitable to more than interception of jet Shaheeds.
 
Fun fact; there was a project for using a business jet airframe as interceptor before, and it featured afterburners to catch up with business jet smuggler aircraft.
 
 
 

We should prepare: Choose business aircraft (and jet trainers) that are available (could be commandeered), test and certify them with equipment for the auxiliary interceptor role (including IFF), develop their integration into the air defence scheme, prepare the conscription of ground crews and pilots. We could greatly complement the normal fighter fleet in face of saturation attack waves.


S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2026/08/23

An opportunity on a silver plate

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Turkey* used to behave a bit bloc-free despite being in NATO. There was the famous S-400 arms purchase from Russia, for example. They were locked out of EU because some EU governments absolutely do not want Turkey in the EU (including Germany and Greece). Their behaviour in regard to migration around 2015 was a bit extortionate and adversarial towards the EU.

The geostrategic position of Turkey makes it an important country for the Europeans, so its alignment is important.

The aggressions of Netanyahu and Putin appear to have served a solution on a silver plate in my opinion. All it takes now to solve this matter in European interests is European politicians not being completely useless and idiocracy-level in foreign policy strategy for once.

First, Russia showed the world that its military is crap, its arms are largely crap, its economy is weak and vulnerable and it is an utterly unreliable ally. It didn't help Armenia when it was obliged to do so. Moreover, its long list of violations of promises given, treaties and agreements agreed to on top of making up obligations of others towards Russia reveals Russia to be an utterly worthless partner.

Second, the U.S. revealed itself as stupid and unreliable.

Third, Israel is on a rampage thinking itself unassailable and wants any country in its six degrees of Kevin Bacon neighbourhood that might oppose it destroyed (if not annexed). There are increasingly signals that it's eyeing to destroy Turkey as a regional power. The lying moron is Netanyahu's lap dog and signals indicate that the U.S. is trying to remove any alliance protection (via NATO) from Turkey to enable Israeli strikes on Turkey.


What Europe cannot do now is solve the Kurds issue or the North Cyprus problem, but it might solve the Stupid Little Cold War in the Aegean and align Turkey via a new alliance (NATO 2.0, without Slovakia and the U.S.), preventing the worst case (Turkey aligning with China). The problem pressure originating from Israel might be just what it takes.


On another note, European politicians are utterly useless and idiocracy-level in foreign policy strategy. On top of that, the British prime minister and the German chancellor can be trusted to suck Netanyahu's Polish dick out of their own initiative.


related:

/2008/08/geostrategy-most-interesting-country-in.html

/2009/03/turkey-and-eu.html 

/2012/10/turkey-and-geostrategy-again.html

/2014/08/if-western-great-power-gaming-wasnt-so.html 

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: I don't bother with learning the new spelling.

2026/08/18

We need to shake off the undue foreign influences

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It's one thing that the interests of the rich get overrepresented in a democracy, but foreign influences have become too harmful as well.

 

Taking the case of Germany:

The Russian influences (including the still-not-closed 'Russian House' in Berlin) on certain political parties (BSW and AfD more and differently than SPD, but in regard to scaring also influence on the CDU) has become a topic of public debate, but there are only marginal visible political actions against it.

The American influence is difficult to see because it was so obvious. The grand strategy of West Germany was Western integration, with emphasis on being allied with th U.S. and reconciliation with France. The 'Atlantiker' network is powerful among politicians of the long-established parties and especially among decisionmakers of the political media. IMO the American influence is now reduced, but it's still giant in regard to use of American bases in Germany for their war of aggression, their support for wars of aggression and genocide of Israel and most of all, the limits of what ideas people may have have been cast by decades of 'Western integration'. Almost nobody in any position of power thinks about substantially opposing the U.S., regardless of what it does. 

The Israeli/Zionist influence was built on holocaust guilt and on the same propaganda that other Western countries were fed, including that Israel is always the side that got attacked or was about to be attacked - even if actual historians vehemently beg to differ. This influence is extremely powerful in the political media, where it exploits virtue signalling and desires to feel superior (ethically). It's not so much influence via money as in the U.S., but almost entirely narrative dominance and fake ethical superiority. There's substantial domestic support for Zionist causes from Jewish citizens, but I don't think it's an essential component any more. Thus I count it as a for all practical purposes foreign influence.

We appear to be subjected to terrorism. Germany experienced 'lone wolf' terrorists strikes in recent years, usually briefly before state-level or federal-level elections. This pattern has become statistically implausible and is very suspicious. Moreover, these terror attacks mostly have one effect; more political support for the AfD, for their bogeymen (Muslim migrants) hatemongering gets supported. Russia is under suspicion of orchestrating these terror attacks. This is something that you might even read in establishment political media, but there's another possible explanation (potentially acting in parallel) that's still in the realm of conspiracy theories: Israel is under suspicion of being behind ISIS, was revealed to be somewhat behind Hamas, many of the suspicious 'lone wolf' terror attacks in Germany were ISIS-linked, Israel is supportive of the AfD out of shared hatred for Muslims, was born by terrorists and is under suspicion of having terrorised Jewish people in other countries to motivate them to become Zionists and emigrate to Israel. So basically, Israeli 'intelligence' may have orchestrated terror attacks in Germany as well. The public wouldn't know even if German police figured it out; the influence is such that it would be covered up by our establishment.


At this point I am completely fine with

  • minimising those countries' diplomats in Germany to single digit skeleton crews of known actual diplomatic personnel
  • expelling their citizens (save for those who were granted political asylum, double citizenship holders and the few accredited diplomats)
  • telling double citizenship holders to chose exclusive German citizenship, lose it or keep double citizenship but stay out of Germany

as simple measures with great (not 100%) effect. They would also set the narrative to more people understanding that these powers are not friendly to Germany.

 

These influences do in my opinion explain European foreign policy paralysis much better than the absence of a EU foreign minister and ministry. Foreign policy is policy to represent the own interests (including indirectly, so also in support of other parties' interests at times). To be paralysed in foreign policy means harm to us, so we need to shake these influences off.

 

related:

/2022/07/threat-country-ranking-for-germany-top.html 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

P.S.: There's a by comparison marginal influence. Many Turkish-Germans with German citizenship are beholden to Erdogan. That's IMO of marginal relevance by comparison, but it might become a substantial issue sometime in the future.

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2026/08/17

High and low end surface to surface missiles

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There are two land-to-land ballistic rocket design philosophies in the SRBM and MRBM brackets:

One is the kind we in the West have known well for decades. It's high-performing, compact, safe to store for many years, accurate, reliable, proprietary design and most importantly, it's built for manoeuvres and with countermeasures to make intercept super hard.

The other kind is by comparison crude, but can still be made to hit the factory you're aiming it at.

 

The high end rocket defeats defences by surviving them (only to crash into the target soon after). The low end rocket defeats defences by being still a difficult-enough and threatening-enough target to warrant the use of two interceptor missiles that each cost more. This way, defences can be overcome by attrition if you can afford volume production of the attack rocket. On top of this, the low end rocket does almost the same job against undefended or poorly defended targets. Its reliability and precision would be worse, but you'd get the job done at a smaller budget.

A case can be made that a hi-lo mix would make sense, but IMO the case of the high end rockets would be fairly niche. You don't need the ability to overcome defences without attrition or saturation if you have attrition and saturation potential in the arsenal anyway. The only need for the high end would be for naval use (most punch in small weight and volume budget) and for targets that require a very high precision.

Now look at this:

found here

 

Ballistic rockets are different. You do not get REALLY cheap with either them or defences against them. Furthermore, air defence that adapts and achieves a high kill rate would be expensive and thus self-defeating. It would also have a small footprint (small protected area) unless it's intercepting exoatmospheric, which makes the intercept missile really expensive. So it would need to be deployed in many places.

There's thus good reason to believe that an arsenal of low end (kinda affordable) MRBMs would not be defeated in a long time. On the other hand, using economics and thus taking into account interest effects, any big spending on military power long before a war or the need for powerful deterrence would have inflated cost due to accumulated interest. So there's no good reason for lots of countries to build up large low end MRBM arsenals for deterrence. 


S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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