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There's usually little talk about European naval strategy. The UK's "Atlantic Bastion" concept is an exception.
Basically, they rebrnad the Cold War's "GIUK Gap" obsession. The idea is that Russian (then Soviet) submarines in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea are easily bottled up (and very few anyway) and Pacific Fleet submarines are not concern to Europeans, so there's an obsession with Russian Northern Fleet submarines (especially the nuclear-powered ones). They're not too much of a conventional war issue as long as they stay in their home waters (thier "bastion"), but we'd want to keep them from launching a third Battle of the Atlantic. Soviet subs were loud and thus relatively easily found and tracked. Russian subs are mostly old crap and no better relative to top of the line Western ASW sensors. So the idea was and is to find them when they transit the waters between Norway and Greenland.
Moreover, the Royal navy/MoD added some seasoning to the rebranding by talking about unmanned boats and stuff.
RUSI wrote an article about the whole thing and also provides a convenient grpahic to point at two weaknesses of this cordoning approach:
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| image source: RUSI authors |
One, nuclear-powered subs can cruise under Arctic ice and reappear north of Canada, then enter the Atlantic. That explains why the Canadians are interested in under-ice-capable submarines themselves.
Two, Russian subs could be prepositioned in the Atlantic, for Russia would be the aggressor and thus able to choose the timing of hot conflict. Germany had sent a couple surface commerce raiders into the Atlantic before the war began on 1st Sept 1939, for example.
Feel free to read more about the Atlantic Bastion at their article. I won't discuss the strategic weaknesses of the plan other than one: It's oriented against Russia and Russia only. It would not be relevant if China breaks out of the island chains and wages war on commerce in the Atlantic. It would not be relevant if the U.S. rather than Russia (or worse, both) is the enemy of Europe.
I wrote previously about two ways of doing ASW (anti submarine warfare):
(1) coastal secured sea lane from about Oslo to Gibraltar
/2016/06/asw-and-defended-corridors.html
(2) convoys with a modestly ambitious escort (no defence against strong air power and no hard kill BMD)
/2018/01/modern-warships-i-introduction.html
/2026/04/a-general-purpose-frigate-for-small.html
Apart from that I once wrote about how pointless it is to spend much on ASW in the Mediterranean (on the example of the Italian navy).
My approach works in RUS, USA and PRC threat scenarios and I suppose it requires less expenses. That's mostly so because the tranoceanic convoying would be modestly ambitious and the coastal sea lanes would be secured mostly from land, without many expensive warships. On top of that, land-based air power (that we have anyway) including land to land missiles would attack the infrastructure of the opposing threat to our maritime traffic.
The British establishment is still confused about whether the UK is a European or American country and hardly any Western establishment type ever dares to publicly ponder about the U.S. as a threat to Europeans. The result is a naval strategy that falls short of being a responsible long-term defence strategy by employing a tunnel vision on the Russian threat. That's already an improvement over the pretense that some goat herders in Central Asia are the worst threat to Europe, but it's still horribly insufficient in my opinion.
So aside from the counters that RUSI mentions, keep in mind that a navals trategy such as Atlantic Bastion (a rebranded and spiced-up Cold War strategy) is msot of all limited by what limitations the establsihment forces on its own thinking.
S O
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