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I like to cut things down to essentials, so I wrote in 2023 about a minimum weapons sset for an army. To have very few different weapons helps coping with the difficulties in procurement.
/2023/01/a-minimum-army-weapons-set-for.html
So, almost two and a half years more developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War, does the blog post hold up well (IMO)?
#1 hand grenade, a timeless classic
#2 rifle, a timeless classic
#3 (light) machinegun, infantry will go on strike if it only gets rifles
#4 HEDP rifle grenade, infantry will insist on having something to shoot into a window 50 m away and this is the simplest means unless you insist on firing many shots.
#5 short range anti-MBT weapon They're worthwhile, but don't deserve a "minimum" list entry according to my opinion as of today. Fibreoptic FPVs can fly so well around obstacles that they can engage well in areas with very short lines of sight, so we don't need weapons that excel in such places any more.
#6 Well, this was close to the fibreoptic FPV quadcopter, albeit I mentioned a rocket-propelled missile as representative (there were no fibreoptic FPV quadcopters yet). The increased agility, the hover ability and the ambush ability of fibreoptic FPV quadcopters are huges advantages, worth more than the speed loss compared to the missile. So I say the #6 entry would not be represented by a rather fast fibreoptic FPV quadcopter (with thermal channel)
#7 LMM is still quite expensive (~30k €) compared to some targets, so one should rather look at an even cheaper solution now. I don't happen to know a truly satisfactory one, though. Mayb one could trust #6+#10 and scratch #7?
#8 C-UAS RCWS, absolutely, still a great take!
#9 wheeled 155 mm SPG This one is increasingly dubious until we learn to manage the drone threat at least at 20 km depth. Some reports indicate that towed guns dug in (even 105 mm) are better, it's almost safe to say that spending the same money on towed 155 mm L/52 with auxiliary propulsion rather than on 155 mm SPGs is better. Please note; I am a proponent of using PGM missile artillery, which was not included in the lsit because a "minimum" list has to assume air support.
#10 Tamir, still a great take (to deal with Shaheed, cruise missiles, GUMLRS-ish munitions, not as the Israelis do against ordinary Grad and homebuilt rockets). Don't buy Israeli, though. Build an analog.
S O
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Forget fiber optics, the future of cheap drones are repurposed edge TPU chips that enable drones to identify and attack targets.
ReplyDeleteCooperating autonomous battlefield drones will be the future, but the computing power for true autonomy may be too electrical power-hungry for years to come. A datalink from a drone swarm to human commanders would have so little bandwidth requirement and might even be optional, so the radio/ECCM issues would be solved.
DeleteSo far even mere lock-on (a 1970's capability, but now done differently) appears to have proved disappointing (though I don't know whether the issues extend to thermal vision cameras).
You want AI guided slaughterbots? Check again
DeleteWe wasted two decades, didn't establish a global ban. Instead, activists were blathering about small arms export bans.
DeleteWe're going to have autonomous combat drones because our enemies will have them.
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2008/01/screamers.html
Is there a room for LFK NG or MHTK in this list?
ReplyDeleteI have no range information about MHTK.
DeleteLFK NG -> IRIS-T SLS
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2018/05/summary-modern-air-defences-for-europe.html
Interesting history note: the first fiber-optic quadcopter was a DARPA program from the 1990s.
ReplyDeleteSorry, did you mean to say that #6 WOULD be well represented by and FPV fibre-optic drone?
ReplyDelete#6 is not well-represented by a quadcopter FPV with fibreoptic. #6 has additional anti-helicopter ability but much less tactical options than the quadcopters.
DeleteWhat I described was a kind of missile with a (thermal) camera for an operator to see through. The datalink would be fibreoptic, thus immune to jamming and no friendly interferences.
My idea of operation was to send such a missile towards a previously detected target, find it, hit it.
What's really done now is they take something much slower (quadcopters, almost perfectly unable to intercept helicopters in the air) and VTOL. This eliminates the need for a launcher, gives the operator much more time for finding a target up to the point that they may get sent without a previous target detection. The VTOL ability permits ambushing by resting the drone on the ground, becoming a ground sensor and something of a mine.
So I kinda got this, but didn't anticipate the advantages of slow & VTOL. In my defence, I had no good information on how reliable the fibrelink is (mechanically) other than it's fine for 9 km with an ATGM.
Why not buy Tamir from the Israelis? They aren't going to threaten us, unless we repeat the Nazi times.
ReplyDeleteTheir government is sliding into Fascism itself while majority of Israelis delude themselves into thinking it ain't possible.
DeleteMoreover, the Israeli arms industry makes profits with exports, not in domestic market. Tamir costs us roughly 3x as much as Israeli gov, that's then IRIS-T SL territory.
I think we need to develop a truly cheap interceptor drone/SAM ourselves.
Your comment makes no sense.
DeleteEpstein/Maxwell were not Israeli agents.
The U.S.-Israeli subsidy relationship goes back to the Camp David peace in late 70's. Israel and Egypt get subsidised and don't wage war against each other.
Maxwell's father Robert was literally a Mossad agent lol.
DeleteThat doesn't make here one, even if true. Nor does it show that she was sent by Israel. Nor does it in any way show her to be a driving force.
DeleteThe idea of reducing an army's equipment to a minimal, essential set of systems is compelling—especially from a training, logistical, and cost-efficiency perspective. However, limiting the arsenal to just 10 core systems inevitably creates critical capability gaps that can severely limit operational flexibility and survivability in modern combat.
ReplyDeleteSome examples of missing or underestimated capabilities:
If you're aiming to reduce systems, the Carl Gustav recoilless rifle is indispensable—it delivers unmatched punch, range, and precision, while offering exceptional versatility against armor, fortifications, infantry, and even airborne threats with the right ammunition.
Anti-tank mines, demolition charges, and shaped charges – essential for area denial, delaying enemy movements, and creating defensive obstacles.
Armored personnel carriers – necessary for protected mobility and survivability of infantry in contested environments.
Mortars (60mm, 81mm and or 120mm) – provide indispensable organic indirect fire on the platoon, company and or battalion level.
Sniper rifles – critical for precision engagement and reconnaissance in open and urban terrain.
Mechanized warfare assets – without armored mobility (e.g., tanks & IFVs), it is virtually impossible to conduct maneuver warfare, including coordinated attacks and counterattacks.
Furthermore, consolidating too many roles into a single system often results in tactical over-simplification. For example:
A layered combination of
- light anti-tank weapons (e.g. RGW-90, LAW M72),
- 40mm grenade launchers, and
- light mortars
offers far more flexibility than relying solely on a single HEDP rifle grenade.
CG rounds weigh 2.6...4.4 kg. CG capability is barely portable at platoon level (1 CG per platoon) unless you use some kind of cart.
DeleteMeanwhile, assuming usable battlefield comms, you could just call a CGequivalent warhead to fly precisely to where you want it, it's coming flying from up to 20 km away (2 km if it's urgent). That's the fibreoptic FPV quadcopter.
AT mines - not absolutely indispensable, and difficult to use well in mobile warfare. Their height of relevance in UKR may have been 2023, largely superseded by battlefield interdiction via drones.
I treated demolition charges as tools, not weapons.
APCs - APCs are vehicles, not weapons. I listed the RCWS (#8) that would be on an APC.
Mortars - they appear to be much less used in UKR than was to be anticipated, especially keeping in mind the ease of 120 mm mortar and -munitions production. It appears that their short-rangedness is a huge problem, as the drone threat is effective at battlefield interdiction, so you rather want indirect fires from 20 km in the rear than from something that needs to be up front. The latter would cause too many logistical problems and friendlies losses.
Sniper rifles - not minimum equipment, especially considering that the 5.56 mm weapons may have a MOA of 1.5 and a 4x scope and be really good out to 300 m at the very least. Moreover, the alternative to a sniper shot is to call in fires or to gather intel while observing.
Mechanised assets are necessary for winning a land war quickly, but this was just a list for land warfare. A country may seek the victory in strategic air war. I'm sure Russia would fold if all its oil refineries in geographic Europe would burn out.
40 mm HEDP is not the replacement for LAW+40 mm GL + light mortars. 40 mm HEDP is the replacement for 40 mm GL and fibreoptic FPV quadcopter is the replacement for LAW and partial replacement for light mortars.
I understand the danger radius of 155 mm may be a concern, but in worst case its HE could be used with delay fuse option and a trajectory correcting capability for really close support fires.
If you already aim to reduce systems to a core minimum, the Carl Gustav stands out.
DeleteIt combines long range, precision, and substantial firepower in one system—usable against soft targets, fortifications, and armored vehicles alike.
That kind of multi-role capability in a single, infantry-portable weapon makes it irreplaceable in a minimal force structure.
Regarding anti-tank mines: In both offensive and defensive operations, they remain indispensable.
- In the offense, they provide flank protection, enabling forward momentum without exposing vulnerable gaps.
- In the defense, they are a cost-effective force multiplier—denying routes, shaping the battlefield, and forcing the enemy into kill zones.
This is not just theory. Ukrainian, NATO, and historical doctrine consistently affirm their value in controlling tempo, shaping terrain, and offsetting numerical inferiority. Even in a drone-dominated battlefield, mines persistently shape movement—something a loitering munition cannot guarantee.
Drones are game-changers—but they don’t replace everything. They rely on bandwidth, power, weather, and coordination. Mortars, on the other hand, deliver instant, low-signature, low-tech firepower in terrain where drones can’t see or fly.
And mortars? They always come back.
Dismissed after every war, rediscovered in the next—because no system offers the same mix of simplicity, mobility, and organic fire support. From WWII to Ukraine, they remain a core infantry weapon.
Air War ≠ Ground Victory
Strategic bombing may degrade industrial capacity—but most wars are still decided by who holds the ground.
Mechanised units enable initiative, tempo, and operational shock—they are essential not only to exploit breakthroughs, but also to regain lost territory. Without armored/mechanized formations, it's nearly impossible to seize the initiative or reverse territorial losses once the enemy has established a foothold. A list about land warfare that omits MBTs and IFVs fails to account for offensive operations altogether.
1991 Gulf War - decided by air war. Saddam had already ordered the withdrawal (and it had begun) when the coalition attacked on the ground.
Delete1999 Kosovo Air War - won by air power
And then there are great many post-1945 wars that were not decided by mechanised manoeuvre. It was mostly the Israelis that did that, whereas Falklands, Iran-Iraq, Vietnam, Angola, India/Pakistan, Aserbaidjan/Armenia, all civil wars, all wars of decolonialisation -- those were won/decided without mech manoeuvre successes. And RUS-UKR doesn't look like AFVs will win it, either.
War is in large part a contest of wills and in another large part a contest of coins. Strategic air war that collapses a developed economy promises to be very effective.
You're right that some wars were ended by air power or decided by political collapse. But as someone trained in armored maneuver warfare, I’d argue: you don’t want to bet your nation's survival on the enemy folding under bombing alone.
ReplyDeleteAirpower can break infrastructure—but only ground forces can retake it.
Mechanised formations don’t just win ground—they seize the initiative, impose tempo, and force the enemy into reaction. That’s not outdated doctrine—that’s operational art.
And frankly, if the enemy holds your territory, there’s no substitute for going there and throwing them out—with speed, shock, and steel. Some things can’t be done from 10,000 meters.
This is the minimum list, not the optimum list.
DeleteThere's not even a MMG on it.
10,000 meters is well within the range of some light weapons. ATGMs (Kornet), 120mm mortars (M95) and 20mm autocannons (20F2).
DeleteEffective range of hvy mortars is more like 7 to 9 km. Ranges much beyond that require RAP, which is horrible with wind.
DeleteATGM effective range is usually less than 2 km due to obstacles in line of sight.
Effective range of 20 mm is about 2 km.