2010/08/15

"Iraq inquiry: Ex-MI5 boss says war raised terror threat"

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This article is a few weeks old, but I want to show it because it wasn't widely cited in the security policy blogosphere.

Baroness Manningham-Buller said she had advised officials a year before the war that the threat posed by Iraq to the UK was "very limited", and she believed that assessment had "turned out to be the right judgement".


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Map of population density

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This is a map of the world-wide population density in 1994,
based on NASA data.
A much higher resolution version is here.


It's very impressive in my opinion. The centre of gravity of mankind is obviously in Asia. The "Western" regions of the world appear to have a rather mediocre population density.

I know the figures and many maps, but this kind of map is every time a kind of wake-up call.

It lets me take those people who want to stem against the Western world's loss of influence (beyond its frontiers) less seriously.
We are rich, educated, trained, experienced and have a huge capital stock. The sheer quantity of humans in Asia will likely still trump this in the long run. The benefits of being influential are doubtful anyway, swimming against a current is rarely advisable - why do that many people insist on maintaining "influence", "reach" and "power" in such distant places that are clearly in the periphery of other powers?

This isn't really about Afghanistan.
It's about the growing quantity of voices which talk of the Indian Ocean as an important area of operations for European navies in the future.
It's also about apparent Western-driven containment policies in Central Asia and East Asia.


Sure, population ain't everything. Yet, as a democratically-minded individual I've got some difficulties grasping the logic behind the idea that we Westerners should (or are entitled to) exercise global, decisive influence. I hope that we won't stumble stupidly into unnecessary great wars because of the insistence on global meddling.

S O
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2010/08/14

NATO finally remembers its raison d'être

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IN THE heart of NATO’s military headquarters, SHAPE, near the Belgian city of Mons, an unspoken revolution is taking place: planners are thinking about how to defend eastern European members from Russian attack. For years after the cold war, the orthodoxy was that Russia did not pose a threat, so NATO did not need to draw up contingency plans to protect newer members, such as the Baltic states.


edit: Voices from Norway also expressed their concerns regarding Russia a while ago. The theme was basically that they had to prepare for fighting on their own because many, many allied forces were tied up in Iraq or Afghanistan or simply not (well-)prepared (training!) for a quick deployment to Norway. This is not only about the Baltic nations.
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"We need to retain the industrial competence and capacity"

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It is very common to claim that this or that armed service needs to buy x or y simply because the specialised industrial capacities would otherwise break away, with a terrible loss of industrial competence. This is often an argument behind portions of military budgets that remind rather of industry subsidies than actual military procurement, such as the third buy of a ridiculously overpriced EGV (Einsatzgruppenversorger, fleet supply ship) for the German navy.


Several facts irritate me in this regard:

(I)
Many suppliers may have some competence, but often times their corporate culture is so rotten and wasteful that creative destruction might be worth it. Shipyards and generally arms industries with a reputation for producing overpriced products are prime suspects.

(II)
Nobody can prove that civilian industries are unable to convert to military products in a matter of a few years. Actually, the World War experiences suggest the opposite.

(III)
Maybe it takes technical expertise at the procurement agency to retain the necessary competence, not in the industry? Civilian industries are used to produce according to their customer's specifications. The ability to specify what you want is probably the key, not keeping an industry used to your specifications.

(IV)

Historical examples. The French aviation industry got many small orders throughout the 20's and 30's from the Armée de l'air, but it was worse than the German one by about 1938 (there had been almost no German aviation industry during the 20's!).
The French were late to convert from old airframe technologies to all-metal airframes, did not innovate much and their production capacity was rated as manual and unsuitable for quantity production by foreign visitors.

(V)
Lobbyism. There's a systematic bias in favour of the status quo industries not only because of widespread intellectual laziness and risk aversion, but also because said existing industries can spend on lobbyism. Not-yet-existing suppliers cannot do the same.

(VI)
Large, modern procurement projects last for so long and are so expensive that it's difficult to imagine that civilian companies which survived the fierce competition in civilian markets and met the requirements of civilian customers with projects lengths like one to six years could perform worse.
The only good explanation for such a scenario seems to be the A400M pattern; a civilian industry might misunderstand a military development & procurement contract for a subsidy.



I wished that this "we need to retain the industrial competence and capacity" argument would be taken with a grain of salt, not as gospel. It really doesn't deserve to be treated as "black box" argument that requires no further inquiry. It's likely more often than not a very, very poor argument.


Sven Ortmann

edit 2010-08-20: Changed 1936 to 1938.
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2010/08/07

The waning of the 2005-2010 COIN theory fashion wave


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The star of the new COIN fashion is certainly descending. The wave came up in about 2005 as a response to the dumbness in Iraq and attempted to give a smart answer to the challenges of the occupation in Iraq. Military history, shooting star advisers (typically ranked Colonel or close) and even social scientists became involved.


The FM 3-24 became this fashion movement's manifest and the Small Wars Journal became its expert media centre. Petraeus became its representative in the mainstream media, while the ranks of advisors like Kilcullen became the more important figures for experts.

Previously, Americans believed that the USMC Small Wars Manual was great and Brits believed their Northern Ireland and Malaya strategies were the benchmark.
By 2006 there was a new sect in town, with its own bible and prophets.


The new strategy downplayed the combat component and became more Sun Tsu-like. Break away hostile factions from the enemy's ranks, keep the enemy from acquiring more allies, win more allies for yourself.

All this diplomacy was of course no job for the diplomatic corps of the involved nations. No, these nations weren't enough in war to mobilise many diplomats for it.
Army lieutenants, captains, majors and colonels were supposed to become diplomats, administrators, politicians.
Privates were expected to be(come) highly disciplined and behave "strategically", i.e. understand the strategic intents of the theatre commands and not sabotage it with gut-led (re)actions.

Much can be written about this new COIN theory, and it was. Much of it is easily accessible in the internet or book-stores and doesn't need to be repeated here.

The problems were quite fundamental, though:

* The troops at level battalion and below had to meet atypical expectations.
* The environment needed to be fertile for the strategy.

It looked as if practical success crowned the theory. The U.S.Army had finally published FM 3-24, politicians had launched a "surge" as a domestic policy trick to maintain the political initiative and to buy yet another year of popular/political support for the war in Iraq.



It's too bad that they were kind of a sideshow all along. The Iraqis had their parallel power struggles and ethnic cleansing. The Iraqis were finishing these in 2007 and the violence ebbed away.
Some Americans were almost enthusiastic - the coincidental application of the new COIN theory was crowned by the ability to transmit good news to home.


Meanwhile, the Taliban had their slow yet constant return in Afghanistan, along with other armed groups in opposition to domination by the mayor of Kabul or his viceroys.

Proponents called for another "surge"; more troops, new COIN theory. Some experts warned that recipes from Iraq should not be applied 1:1 in Afghanistan albeit there was no "for Iraq only" in the title of FM 3-24.

The effect so far: There's not even a dent in the disadvantageous trends. Every new year becomes worse than the previous one, and hope in the mayor of Kabul is eroding.


The tragedy is probably that the new COIN theory is likely a fair weather theory. It works if the population is willing to allow it to work. It's nothing that you can enforce.

The proper time for the new COIN theory's application in Iraq was probably 2003 and for its application in Afghanistan was probably 2002-2004*. The populations were probably ready to cooperate as envisaged by the COIN theory at that time.
War sows much hate and mistrust. The environment got tainted too much and COIN was obviously unable to deliver convincing results under such conditions.

- - - - -

There's a quote from Churchill:

The Americans will always do the right thing ... after they've exhausted all the alternatives.

That quote has a true core; wars are often a trial & error exercise. Peacetime preparations cannot fully prepare an army for war; it needs to learn on the job. Long wars make this easily visible. Armies triumph quickly if they got much right in their preparations, sometimes by sheer luck and coincidence (or simply because their political leaders had sent them against a weak nation).
Others defeat their enemies because they themselves adapted to the previously misunderstood realities of the war. This does often coincide with a huge and superior economical war effort.

Afghanistan does not seem to suit these paths well. The Western forces didn't get it right initially. Adaptiveness doesn't seem to work well beyond mere survivability efforts. Finally, more resources don't seem to leave much of an impression. Their offensive use is restricted by the enemy's elusiveness and political/moral restraints that are utterly necessary in order to avoid a perversion of the war.

- - - - -

Enthusiasm for modern COIN theory is waning, but so is support for the war itself. A rational and well-informed analysis should have told us from the very beginning that staying there in 2003 was a stupid idea.
Now even less rational analysis leads many to lose confidence in the idea of direct Western military involvement in Afghanistan. The utter lack of success in combination with the vastly increased effort and rising toll wears down the ranks of the supporters.




COIN theory and its representatives were not shiny rescuers. They created much noise that covered the reasons for the decreasing violence in Iraq and they served politicians as tools for an extension of stupid wars.

And just to make sure there's no misunderstanding; nobody should believe that a nation should enter the next stupid war just because there's probably the right theory on the bookshelf for keeping it under control. All stupid wars are wrong wars. Stick to national self defence and alliance defence!

S O

*: Not joining and sticking with stupid, needless wars is of course even better.

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2010/08/01

Bundeswehr structure - what I would do

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It's easy to criticise details and develop ideas for niches, but difficult to balance conflicting preferences and needs. It's just fair to take a position on the whole thing for a change.

Here's my concept for a Bundeswehr structure.

The general idea is to

(1) maintain the competencies

(2) improve in order to remove known defects

(3) improve in order to meet new conditions

(4) be prepared for a rapid two-year expansion to a mighty continental army

(5) waste no national wealth


The conscription should be deactivated immediately. Its reactivation should not require more than a simple Bundestag majority. Its greatest short-term relevance would be in the mobilisation of civilian logisticians, technicians, medical personnel, construction personnel and pilots.

- - - - -

Luftwaffe (air force):


The air force should think of itself primarily as an operational level continental land war air force. Think of 1940, but more politically correct.

* The Typhoon is a fine aircraft for the 2010s, but we should begin to look for a successor concept (or two). A KWS (update) should be planned for the late 2010s. Numbers of aircraft and wings aren't nearly as important as are numbers of qualified pilots. We can draw an overwhelming quantity of qualified personnel for maintenance and repair from the private sector.

* Air defence is important, but it should be worth its money. Quantity of firing units needs to be meaningful; the present MEADS plans are crap.


* The Luftwaffe needs rather small air-lift capability and no NH90. Huge civilian air-lift and helicopter capabilities would be available in times of defensive alliance warfare.

Deutsche Marine (navy):


The focus should be on Baltic Sea, Mediterranean and North Sea. There's no need for a high seas or expeditionary navy as long as several European allies comply to their urge to be great naval powers.

* Only small quantities of frigates, mine counter-measure boats and submarines are necessary for retaining of competencies.

* Maritime SAR helicopters should be civilian (federal police, for example).

* Standardisation on one (on-board capable) naval multi-role helicopter with modest capabilities.

* Containerised solutions for minelaying, standoff mine countermeasures, support and other ship functions should be developed and tested on small chartered container ships.

* One squadron Typhoons should be transferred to navy command in order to ensure that the air/sea strike mission competence is retained. Air force pilots should be assigned to the squadron by the ministry.

* Land-based surface-to-ship missiles should be introduced.

Heer (army):


I propose a three-part army, optimised for the Eastern NATO border.

* A 99% German, exemplary (small) Corps with a good mix of forces for Eastern European defence - as good as it gets. (x)

* Bilateral or multilateral corps that are more than mere staffs. The typical German contribution per such corps would be the equivalent of a large brigade. The actual cooperations depend in part on our neighbours, of course.

* The army schools and a single mixed Lehrbrigade (training, experiment and show formation) that's NOT supposed to be high on any emergency deployment list.

The army units would also be divided into active force and dedicated reserve formations. The reserve formations would primarily train infantry and possibly engineers (for labour-intensive engineer tasks) and be based on very short-serving volunteers. The service would end exactly when they are trained. The purpose is the reserve, not having active formations. This reserve training component would replace the conscription both in regard to recruiting volunteers and to maintaining a strong trained personnel reserve.


Streitkräftebasis (combat service support):

* Huge personnel reductions are possible here.

* The whole concept of a tri-service CSS service should be revamped based on lessons learned.

Regrettably, I'm not very well-informed about the Streitkräftebasis and don't dare to offer more specific proposals.

- - - - -

The necessary strengths in peace, upon mobilisation and upon mobilisation after a two-year expansion would need to be defined with both possible threats and allied capabilities (EU allies) in mind. I suspect that an active strength reduction below 200,000 personnel is acceptable, but the minimum would likely be around 150,000. The goal for strength after expansion & mobilisation should be more than 500,000 + rear security forces and logistics units consisting of older (conscription-era) reservists.

The most important changes would be outside the scope of a force structure. Our personnel system and administration need to be revamped (this is probably true for all NATO forces). Failed experiments need to be concluded.

Politicians need to understand the concept and be ready to initiate the two-year expansion early once necessary. Such a build-up should be understood not as an escalation that leads inevitably to war but as the production of a subject for negotiation - it would after all only be necessary as a counterweight to another power's build-up.
It's similar with large-scale exercises; make them regular.

Likewise, soldiers need to understand the concept. The small size must not lead to approaches that would be unsustainable and unsuitable during an expansion. Instead, the small force should see the possibility of a quick expansion as its raison d'être.

S O

(x): This is where my most unorthodox ideas are concentrated. An army corps of my design would look and operate very, very unlike present corps and divisions.


edited in 2015: Clarification: The strengths mentioned above are meant as peacetime strengths. Mobilized army strength should to be two corps, with the 2nd corps ready to go after a week. Also, four corps mobilized strength after a two-year expansion = West German peacetime strength of 1989.
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2010/07/31

Another voice for ground/ground air force missiles

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(context was a possible F-35 purchase):

If we continue to use the very advanced [versions of the] F-16 and F-15 and upgrade some of the systems, we could save so much money that we could buy other important systems like ground-based missiles. And you can use more [air-launched] standoff weapons because they have extreme precision and a very long effective range. You don't have to put all your effort into the aircraft.
(my emphasis)

2010/07/18 Defence and Freedom:

On infantry small unit development


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(First a disclaimer: I'm going to write about warfare with opponents who have corrected vision, comparable combat morale and who can aim.)



Some authors claim that a German infantry squad of WW2 typically had 80% of its firepower concentrated in its one machine gun; a MG34 or MG42.
That was probably quite correct, but the carried ammunition and practical rate of fire indicate a slight exaggeration.
The issue was more fundamental than simple mechanical or material statistics, though. A machine gunner has the feeling that he can actually achieve much in battle and has typically a different psychology in effect than most other soldiers have.


Infantry is not all the same - you cannot give a special weapon to just anyone and expect always the same results. Differences are also deeper than mere qualifications and physical fitness or strength.

Some soldiers are aggressive, many are capable if lead well and some are basically porters, not fighters. The most basic problem for infantry is therefore to identify who belongs to which group and to assign jobs and missions accordingly (and possibly reject the porter guys).
The aggressive, daring guys who are very difficult to suppress need to become leaders (the smart ones) or operators for the most important weapons (such as a machine gun).



A 80/20 or 70/30 rule of thumb fits to many forms of human activity: 20-30% of the people have 80-70% of the overall effect (Pareto Principle). This idea is recognisable in the spreading of diseases, the work in staffs, the kills of World War fighter pilots, the number of friends on social networking sites, the performance of snipers, the performance of computer gamers, the success in flirting and it's also relevant for infantry combat.
We can dream on in fantasy land and look at a platoon as a small unit of 20-50 equal men, but that's not going to be confirmed in intense combat.

- - - - -

OK, let's say we succeed to assign the most valuable men to the leadership jobs or give them the most powerful weapons. What does this tell us about the others in the platoon or squad?

The readers may not like it, but to be honest; the average assault rifle user will be little more than an ammunition porter for the main weapons and a rear/flank security man and message relay.

How does this fit to the everyone-a-super-soldier approach of modern Western infantry equipment programs? The average assault rifle user has got some heavy AT weapon, a designated marksman rifle or an underbarrel grenade launcher nowadays. He's so overloaded with his own kit that carrying additional ammunition for a machine gunner or a platoon commando mortar reduces the mobility to that of a four-year old.


The technology-driven approach with a flair of combined arms (accurate single shots, full auto suppressive fires, high trajectory HE projection) down to squad or even fire team level may be a terrible misunderstanding.


To equip everyone with better rifle optics than were available to WW2 snipers isn't going to turn everyone into a super soldier either. The sights may be worth their weight and bulk, but they don't turn cowards or extremely frightened and shaking men into cold-blooded fighters with an overwhelming lethality in a 400 m radius.
Such equipment will still have the greatest effect with the few men who are psychologically best prepared for combat (this may include being simply too dumb or crazy to understand the danger - in fact, smart people rarely turn out to be among the most daring).


It's probably about time that the psychological differences between infantrymen again consciously influence the setup of infantry small units. This ranges from personnel selection over equipment to tactics and TO&Es (tables of organisation and equipment).

Combat in complex, though. It may be a good idea to 'waste' some good weapons on not very good soldiers in order to distract hostiles, to relieve the few over-performers off (suppressive fires) pressure.


Next, we should keep in mind another pressing challenge: The extreme lethality of modern weapons. Forget about the experiences against unskilled paramilitary (or lesser) fighters in recent warfare. The extreme lethality of modern infantry battalion arsenals (up to 120 mm mortars) restricts the infantry small unit repertoire for most actions. Only very high pay-off actions justify very risky tactics. Most often infantry needs to be very cautious in order to preserve itself for important actions (the military view) and a life after the war (the individual's view).

The combination of high lethality and cautious behaviour leads quite naturally to very short yet intense fire fights with (whenever possible) the advantage of surprise, followed by a quick withdrawal and rallying. The latter is necessary in order to avoid being stuck (and fixed) in a protracted fire fight till hostile mortars end it.

This justifies an emphasis on the right weapons (and munitions) for such an action. A salvo of M72 or SARPAC-like weapons, a very high rate of fire for the machine gun (with an appropriate, stable tripod) and the use of command-detonated mines (~Claymores) are possible answers.

Another approach might emphasize stealth and the avoidance of breaking said stealth. A minimised muzzle fire thanks to suppressors and optimised flash hiders, barrel lengths and cartridges as well as the employment of deception tools (fake muzzle fires) are imaginable.

There's also the possibility that both the own and the hostile infantry are very cautious and often stumble into each other at short range. That could be avoided with detached scout pairs and the use of military dogs, but it's still a possibility. Devastating and immediate fires would be important in this case. Hand grenades might become more important in such situations than all electronics combined and independent (re)actions of all soldiers without much leadership would become most important.

Other patterns for dominant forms of infantry combat are imaginable and need to be considered. Every such form might lead to distinct preferences that could shape the ideal infantry small unit TO&E.


Another hugely important factor in 'real', wars of necessity (if not even total wars) is attrition.


Life expectancy drops to very, very sad levels once a man becomes an infantry lieutenant in wartime. It doesn't look substantially better for infantry NCOs.
A serious army needs to be prepared for appalling losses among its leadership. One way to prepare is to have more leaders than necessary (the U.S. way), another one is to overqualify their subordinates (the old German way).
As far as I can tell, the latter is superior because it enables a very quick adaption once losses happen. A decapitated platoon can continue its mission if an NCO takes the lead, while it would need to wait a while till a replacement leader arrives (and that guy would be unknown to the soldiers).
Some of the most effective and consequential small unit actions in military history have been completed by subordinates who took over command after the initial leaders fell.

This is quite a challenge for TO&Es, for you need enough well-suited men for leading, for employment of the main weapons AND as 2nd or 3rd in command. You don't want to rely on your best machine gunner as emergency platoon leader - that would equal a terrible loss of firepower. The 2nd in command should on the one hand not be too close to the 1st in command, but on the other hand you don't want him too far away. For example, he shouldn't be in the assault element if your army's tactic prefers the platoon leader to be with the fire support element.


Psychological capability in combat, the expected nature of infantry combat and attrition should influence our infantry small unit concepts much more than they seemingly did after the Cold War. Gadget-driven concepts of infantry combat and infantry small unit TO&Es have dominated for about 15 years and are still in fashion. This exaggeration needs to be corrected.

Again, it was impossible to cover the topic comprehensively. I limited myself to mention a few rather rarely discussed aspects of infantry small units setups. Maybe I ruined all the future fun of discussing gun calibres and 40mm underbarrel grenade weapons for you, but that's within the limits of the usual risks of reading this blog...

S O

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2010/07/30

Ridiculous

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This is BAe's idea for a GCV: A ridiculous antenna farm.

This is how vehicles look when they're overloaded with gadgets after their third upgrade. A vehicle in CAD stage shouldn't look fucked up already.

Maybe they should think about this project more like a soldier and taxpayer, less like an electronics engineer.
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