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Back during the Second World War infantry divisions defined the frontline during the less hectic phases; they did set up and maintain a string of pickets and positions that defined 'ours' and 'theirs'. These de facto divisions of the line made up about 85% of the German field army throughout WW2.
The other 15% were about 10 per cent points fast troops (armoured, mechanised, motorized or semi-motorized cavalry divisions) and about 5 per cent points specialised light infantry formations; mostly mountain troops, few dedicated Jäger divisions, and the Luftwaffe's true paratroopers (let's count them as army here). These figures were rules of thumb, not accurate - but descriptive enough for painting the overall picture.
Later, during the Cold War, West Germany promised a twelve division army for a planned 26 division defence in central Europe against the Warsaw Pact. Germany had rebuilt and recovered so quickly that by the mid-50's it had a higher economic output than ever before WW2, and motorization had progressed as well. The new army was almost fully motorized, and the infantry (Grenadier-) divisions were equipped much heavier than their ancestors - more like late WW2 American infantry division orders of battle (that had organic tank support).
Army structures were changed a couple times, infantry was renamed from "Grenadier-"* to "Jäger-", but what mattered the most was that both the more infantry-strong and the more tank-strong brigades were meant to establish and maintain a semblance of a front line with mobile warfare tactics. This had been done before, for example by a motorized division south of Stalingrad that covered a sector hundreds of kilometres wide (steppe terrain).
There were some mountain and paratroops brigades as well, not the least because they were supposed to be cheaper (not so much or at all if you consider the need for transport aircraft and helicopters). The old infantry division-centric idea of an army was gone, at least regarding peacetime order of battle.
Post-Cold War, the Jäger brigades went away as well, and even the occupation mission in Afghanistan and earlier similar peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia did not change this: Jäger brigades used wheeled vehicles that were most suitable for such missions, were relatively cheap, had the infantry strength to 'put boots on the ground' - but they were not preferred. Save for Jäger leftovers on the battalion level, the only German infantry of the 2000's were para and mountain infantry.
This is a similar outcome to what happened in other NATO powers; 'regular' infantry demised, 'special' infantry (marines, mountain, para, heliborne, ranger) survived the cuts (and "
special forces" were created), possibly due to higher prestige and higher perceived utility.
This begs the question; why differentiate at all? Why not go to a unified (light) infantry?
Let's compare the two most common infantry types; para and mountain
(a) both largely lack heavy weapons
(b) both are typically motorized, with lightly armoured wheeled vehicles at most
(c) both are typically expected to meet high physical fitness standards
(d) both are heliborne-capable
(e) both depend on light infantry tactics and little (if at all) on infantry-tank cooperation
The paras get some parachuting training, but you can get a more demanding (manual jumps) parachuting training on four weekends in a civilian parachuting school for a few hundred Euros. The mountain infantry gets (or is supposed to get) some high altitude training, usually with at least some serious mountain climbing training.
Yet it's neither realistic to expect a parachute assault larger than battalion nor is it realistic to expect more than a fraction of mountain troops to be of much use above 3,000 m altitude.
And there are lots of air defence systems and very few high mountains at the periphery of European NATO.
Furthermore, "brigades" imply an accomplished combined arms capability, whereas "regiments" admit a focus on one of the branches with little combined arms capability. A light infantry regiment could still have a regimental artillery battery or two rather than only infantry, and would still deserve to be called "regiment" more than "brigade".
I suppose we could and should garrison army
unified light infantry forces close to mountain, swamp, settlement and woodland training areas. The size could vary
from a two infantry battalion regiment to two regiments with each four infantry battalions. "Battalion" sizes may vary, so this may really be about 1,500 to 5,000 personnel.
One battalion with extra qualification in parachuting including a
HAHO platoon of parachuting experts/trainers.
One battalion with extra qualification in high altitude combat including a platoon of mountaineering experts/trainers.
One battalion for combat support (two batteries which choose between 120 mm mortar and 105 mm howitzers as the French do, one company for electronic intelligence and joint forward observers.
One battalion for non-combat support including a platoon which retains the super-rare skill of (combat) bridging at high altitude and a small company that maintains animal-handling skills (mules and llamas, forget the inferior Haflinger horses).
Bavaria has both some mountains and some swamps for training (assuming the latter could be used legally). Two unified light infantry (Jäger) regiments in Bavaria would make sense for Germany - particularly if they were allowed to train in Austria (EU ally) often. Their ease of long-range administrative marches in exclusively wheeled vehicles would allowed for frequent exercises with mechanised forces in low lands as well.
Other countries could unify their infantry as a versatile force for terrains where mechanised troops are inefficient or ineffective as well. (The reasoning changes if a country decides to mechanise its airborne forces in Soviet/Russian style.)
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This may have had the appearance of some military history summary followed by an Order of Battle proposal.
It was really meant as something different; the regimental OoB example isn't important. I mean to point out that the current army structures with their infantry types are legacies** and neither optimal nor necessary. A force design released from the shackles of the past would almost certainly not arrive at what we have nowadays, but at a force structure that recognizes the small importance of the infantry specialisations and the great importance of the infantry's unique strengths vis-a-vis mechanised forces.
Also, please not I did not argue to unify all infantry forces. Mechanised infantry and
my basic volunteer infantry proposal were not included. The separation between stand-alone "
Jäger", "
Gebirgsjäger" and "
Fallschirmjäger" forces makes hardly any sense, though.
related:
2010/09/glorified-cannibals.html
2010/11/airborne-afvs.html
2012/03/air-mechanization.html
2013/01/a-british-parachuting-capability.html
2014/09/special-forces.html
S O
*: Grenadiers were elite troops from the 18th century that used hand grenades and early grenade launchers. The ordinary infantry had been renamed "Grenadier" or "Volksgrenadier" by the Nazis in mid-WW2 in an attempt to bolster their prestige and morale. "Jäger" were reliable light infantry with rifles instead of muskets during the 18th century, and with their open order tactics precedents for 20th century infantry. The term "Jäger" had not been used much by the Nazis, so it was more politically correct in West Germany and used to rename the regular infantry, while the "Panzergrenadiere" were never renamed.
**: Originally airborne forces were separate from mountain infantry because they were first introduced during the Nazi era and the head of aviation ministry and air force, Göring, wanted to be in control of airborne troops. The training and material needs of mountain and airborne troops were never very different. Airborne troops were often employed in gliders, which could have been done with mountain troops and their light equipment as well.
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Depending on the type of division and nationality, infantry comprises 8-30 percent of division strength, tank crews 1-10 percent, and artillery (including antiaircraft and antitank weapons) 6-12 percent. Combat troops comprise an even smaller potion of non-divisional forces, something like 5-10 percent. Since combat divisions account for 20-50 percent of army manpower, combat troops comprise only 10-25 percent of all personnel. In all armies, combat support troops are very much the majority.
