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Let's have a quick thought experiment: How deep could an armoured battlegroup raid (including a fighting withdrawal)?
The Leopard A4 has a "road range" of approx. 500 km (it differs a little from vehicle to vehicle, and this isn't comparable to the range metrics of a private car). The first approximation is that the raid could go 250 km deep.
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| Leopard 2A4 (c) böhringer friedrich (unchanged) |
But the raid wouldn't be all on roads, so let's use the mixed surface range from the Swedish trials that I wrote about ages ago. The practical range was then 167 km. Later Leopard 2 versions are all heavier, so they would probably not even reach 150 km in such a test. So let's say the 2nd approximation is that the raid could go about 83 km deep.
Such a raid would not go linear, of course. IIRC a rule of thumb from WW2 operations was that you drive 100 km to get 50 km forward. The third approximation is thus that the raid could go about 42 km deep.
There was an old rule of thumb from aviation to always have 25% extra fuel in order to not run out of fuel in case of headwinds, navigational errors - stuff happens. Let's apply a 20% safety margin to the armoured raid - so one 1/6th less range. The fourth approximation is thus that the raid goes to a depth of merely 35 km.
A tank raid may be unattractive - who wants to give up terrain, after all? So maybe one is more interested in just advancing - but you cannot advance to the limits of your fuel without excessive risks, so an armoured battlegroup advance would still not go 2x35=70 km, more likely the limit is near 50 km. This figure could be pushed up by driving more on road as the Russians did in February 2022 (risky and not promising), but not beyond 100 km.
A tank is famously characterized by protected firepower with mobility on the battlefield; the famous triad of firepower, mobility and protection (Germans sometimes add "Führungsfähigkeit" as 4th pillar, which is about human action, sensors and communications).
Sadly, the neglect of the variable "range" in "mobility" limits its mobility to the battlefield. Operational actions beyond the battlefield into areas without battle-ready opposing forces is hardly possible without the support of fuel-carrying logistic vehicles. So how many offroad-capable (8x8 or 10x10) logistics vehicles with diesel fuel would accompany the battlegroup? How many at least bulletproofed such vehicles (protection also for the diesel fuel, not just for the cabin) do we have? AFAIK the count is zero.
The consequences of fighting opposing forces of low capability in sandy regions and especially of training on tiny unrealistic army training grounds are merciless. Logistics is about supplying, carrying and living off the land. We need to carry more fuel for more mobility, for else even a frontline breakthrough could not be exploited decisively.
The German military of WW2 was sometimes unable to stop Red Army offensives by fighting the spearheads and resorted to accelerating that they ran out of supplies instead, moving the culminating point in their favour. Ground attack aircraft did better shoot up supply transport on the road than to try destroy the very difficult tank targets in the field. American logistics vehicles deliveries (Lend-Lease) allowed the Soviets to push the culminating point farther ahead of their railheads. This is how you think about operational art when you don't have overwhelming firepower, one side has the ability to break through and you're not mentally restricted to tactical peacetime training on small training areas.
related:
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Would it be possible to miniaturize tanks thru automation and the use of aluminum to increase energy density of munitions in order to enable supplies?
ReplyDeleteTanks become smaller by less passive&reactive protection ambitions, worse ergonomics and smaller crew.
DeleteAluminium alloy armour doesn't make a tank smaller. In fact, it requires greater thickness than steel for about the same protection.
Burning aluminum gives several times the energy of burning carbon. There are some munitions that burn aluminum and could be downsized. I wasn't talking about building out of aluminum.
DeleteThis was already done in WW2 in German 30 mm Minengeschosse. The additional aluminium gave an extra incendiary effect and boosted the explosive force.
DeleteIt's completely known to munitions designers and I don't suspect growth potential over current munitions in it.
Better propellants or explosives can get REALLY expensive (like the nearly impossible to manufacture CL-20, which may be the cause behind the extreme price growth and performance growth from AIM-120C to AIM-120D).
IMO the range figures are as valid as the fuel consumption figures in car advertisements.
ReplyDeleteQuite a bit of time of a tank, even during a raid, is spent idling, just powering the electrical systems. So for a more accurate estimate, one should take the hourly fuel consumption in 3 modes: idle, road march and cross country and use those for a calculation.
Idling was included in the Swedish trials - that's why the M1 Abrams looked so bad (it didn't have an APU yet).
DeleteRealistic analysis of armored raid depths makes attrition war based on kamikaze drones increasingly attractive. Against an invader buying X tanks with LOS combat range and Y raid range, a defender could buy volleys of 40X drone munitions with 10Y range.
ReplyDeleteFires are no full substitute for manoeuvre. Think of the raid of the Ukrainians though the Donbas in 2014 to relieve besieged forces. You cannot do that with fires alone.
DeleteIndeed, but the economic cost and operational vulnerability of maneuver forces keep rising relative to guided weapons. Conventional APS isn't quite an answer either because tanks are followed by fuel trucks and supply trucks protected against 7.62 at most.
DeleteI agree there's something like a mathematical limit where munitions aren't enough, but financially we have a long way to go before reaching it, and until there's a laser APS on every fuel truck most countries will find the drone spam more affordable.
Near-future operational art might be more about pushing an air umbrella forward than possessing tracks.
Wars last years without manoeuvre, weeks or months with manoeuvre.
DeleteThe cost of war greatly exceeds the costs of two-pronged operational manoeuvre capability.
How can the combatants in the Ukraine war be enabled to maneuver again?
DeleteThere's reason to suspect they don't have the training for Blitzkrieg, and won't acquire the competence for it, either.
DeleteThe alternative way to achieve breakthrough & advance was shown by the Red Army 1943-1945; superior mass (arty, tanks, air).
I think they need to build up & train reserves once again and get the jamming game right at least in one region for a couple weeks in a row with hardly any daytime interruptions.
Then they could maybe push forward 50x50 km per offenisve until the choreography of combat troops, logistics and jamming support collapses and the culminating point of attack is reached.
One obvious solution is external fuel - an M1 carries about 500 gallons (~1.900 liters) of fuel; a pair of 55 gallon (~200 liters) fuel drums would add about 22 percent to total capacity. These are not nearly the hazard people think, and could be rigged to jettison on command. Unsuitable for the vanguard, it could extend the attack range of the task force.
ReplyDeleteGerman tanks used fuel trailers in OP Barbarossa June 1941 and I showed in the linked blog post that a more compact fuel engine could increase internal fuel volume greatly.
DeleteTrailers can work well in some situations, but not in others. The best design/build was the British armored trailer for crocodile flame tanks – actually a napalm carrier. Incorporating a physically smaller power plant certainly frees up much space for fuel in existing tanks; the near future is autoloaders, sensor fusion, and possibly AI ‘crew’ (e.g. drivers), might reduce crew sizes to two (2). This offers many possibilities for increased fuel/ammunition loads in smaller AFVs.
DeleteDidn't the Russian armored thrust toward Kyiv stall, in part, because the Ukrainians targeted the fuel trucks?
ReplyDeleteThe Russians stuck too much to roads (wet of Kyiv that was by necessity because of wet soft soil). Their vanguard got no more forward and pretty much everything in range was shelled.
DeleteThe planning of the advance had been unsuitable. Some interior ministry forces for occupation duty were quite far forward and of little help. The traffic jam NW of Kyiv interrupted supply of everything and the idling engines (cold weather!) used up fuel for no gain.
About 10% difference in fuel consumption for over 20% increase in weight? That's totally unrealistic numbers right there.
ReplyDeleteWhat are you referring to?
DeleteArmoured raids (enemy) fuel logistics
ReplyDeleteThere you go, go after enemy fuel depo or supply, reduce enemy armor tempo while gaining yours. Raids are awful if not snatching something more valuable than the destruction(air raid) or land(army's staying power). Tech, VIP or intelligence too bad to pass out. Fuel can be air supplied and who knows boobie traped.
40t+ vehicles are entirely destoryed by their own weight for this purpose compares to lighter weight ones. Traversing slightly difficult terrain to pass easily anticipated chock points, exploit lightly defended weakpoints, having good milages and ambush reaction forces are more important than push through heavy resistance given little support and then left the hard gain?
However, this may work as extention of air raid. In periods of wide air superiority, heavy forces failed to secure fuel are resupplied and air deploy ground units are inserted into enemy rear. And then during enemy air superiority, inserted units resist ground counter attacks in favorable terrain and harass aircraft passing. At all times, ground units will link up and break up for evening supply or doubling strength/disperse, and targeting enemy anti air or other air assets for more air superiority.