Defence and Freedom

Well, there is a different approach, and it is rooted in technology rather than organisation and training. A technical solution to problems created by technology. Yes, this often work, too.

Software-defined radios can - in theory - provide a versatile node with no less tasks than our modern touchscreen mobile phones. Once you combine radio emitter and receiver for a certain bandwidth (say, 30 MHz to 2 GHz) with a satellite navigation (GPS and Galileo) chip, sockets for fibre-optic cable/microphone/earphones, a programmable microprocessor of respectable power, a decent flash memory, a useful size of RAM and some kind of USB socket equivalent (for input by digital cameras etc.) you can do maaany things (in theory):

the classic ones

(a) simple encryption

(b) 2-way voice communication

(d) simple direction finding regarding other emitters (not frequency-hopping) within the bandwidth (possible with a handheld directional antenna)

and new ones (I don't expect most of these in the early SDR generation)

(1) datalinks up (such as reconnaissance photos, position reporting) and down ( receiving image, situation updates and even videos)

(2) receiving area-related warnings about minefields or areas full of cluster bomb duds ahead, NBC warnings, air threat warnings, warnings about presence of stragglers and infiltrated opposing forces - and giving a beep and artificial voice warning to the user

(3) direction finding regarding other emitters (incl. frequency-hopping) within the bandwidth (possible with a handheld directional antenna)

(4) triangulation of other emitters within the bandwidth in cooperation with other radios

(5) early warning of helicopters (if the microphone can pick up the rotor's infrasound noise)

(6) triangulation of helicopters with (if the microphone can pick up the rotor's infrasound noise) in cooperation with other radios

(7) employment as non-emitting digital field telephone with fibre-optic cables (no recovery of cables for reuse necessary)

(8) automatic responder function in IFF (identification friend/foe) at the grunt level (with interrogation signal being a laser or a directional radio emission)

(9) active noise cancellation for the user's ears (with earphones)

(10) jamming nearby communication radios (with low power)

(11) jamming datalinks of spotted hostile drones (with handheld directional antenna)

(12) automatic conversion of voice to text for super-short and jamming-resistant burst transmissions and receiving radio converts text back to an artificial voice

(13) use of one-time pads for encryption

(14) prioritised communication (a superior's voice message could override a subordinate's, for example)

(15) programmed nonsense transmissions that simulate radio comm links that do not exist*

(16) automatic employment of radios as relays for range extension, with automatic routing negotiation

(17) other communications devices such as laser communication emitter/receiver for line-of-sight communication might be linked through the fibre-optic cable

(18) within the limits of the chosen radio bandwidth at least some radio proximity fuzes employed by high explosive ammunitions of mortars bombs, bombs, rockets and shells might be deceived and provoked to explode too early due to jamming

(19) recharging items with small batteries (digital camera, for example)

(20) cooperative sniper detection (by using microphone input)

(21) GPS, GLONASS and Galileo jamming (with limited range)

(22) I kid you not; radio and music player for entertainment

The electronic warfare aspects in this list were inspired by the relatively famous "Shortstop" RF fuze jammer and the (partially) man-portable Chemring RESOLVE product. A software-defined manpack radio that can do most of the above list would likely be noticeably heavier, bulkier and pricier than a communications-only radio, but this might be worth it. After all, separate solutions would have redundant components and weigh much more in sum.

Of course, at the end of the day, you need to be able to make do without radios without collapsing as an organisation. Radio communications may be jammed, interrupted (even HF has its issues with blind spots) or in worst case even compromised. That's a different topic, though.

The best approach to design a complex vehicle is in my opinion to first define the interfaces; especially the communication between electronic components. Once that is done you may move on with final design of the various components. Maybe tactical unit 'design' should be similar ground-up, and "ground" meaning "interfaces". First, get communication compatibility right, then a loooong list of opportunities for what you can do in terms of procedures, tactics and capabilities opens up.

- - - - -

Finally, a little bit more down-to-earth, I'd like to present a family of software-defined radios that might -more or less- be used for such things. Typically, platforms (aircraft, armored vehicles, ships) gather most attention, with the crucial yet obscure radio tech neglected.
The Harris Falcon III family is under consideration (afaik one of the two two contenders) by the Bundeswehr:

Harris Falcon III(R) RF-7800M-MP (backpack radio, at platoon level or in vehicles)

20 Watt power, 30 MHz to 2 GHz, 3.58 kg + pouch and batteries

Harris Falcon III(R) RF-7800M-HH (handheld radio, for NCOs and officers)

5 Watt, 30-870 MHz, 1.20 kg + pouch and batteries

Harris Falcon III(R) RF-7800S SPR(TM) (intra-squad radio for infantry)

2 Watt, 350-470 MHz, 0.3 kg + pouch and batteries

These three would suffice at company level.Only signaller units / HQs and heavy equipment (radar posts, forward observer vehicles, air defence command vehicles etc.) would need heavier and more capable radios.

The Bundeswehr needs new radios as a replacement for its collection of analogue radios used in the Heer, and preferably they should be good enough to make the improvised use of mobile phones and satellite phones (that became normal outside of the fortified camps on occupation warfare missions) redundant.

The procurement is tricky because the technology is tricky, it is still new, there are no German suppliers, foreign suppliers create licensing and source code access issues. Being late on replacing the old radios means that we skip past some of the teething problems and also dodged the problems that long procurement projects such as the British Bowman had. It does on the other hand leave open a weak spot; the tactical communications of the Heer are obsolete, and spare parts supply will soon become perilous.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: This makes it much harder to establish a situational picture by triangulating radio emitters and comparing their activity. Such signal intelligence could otherwise figure out which is the superior's and which are the subordinate 's radios, thus uncovering the disposition of forces).

P.S.: I've had my lifetime share of tech lectures already, but in case you are seriously interested in SDR, this might be relevant to your interests:

2016/11/01

MEADS/TLVS alternatives

MEADS was a joint German-U.S. area air defence and ballistic missile defence system development program. It seemed like a racket to me almost from the beginning. The quantities planned for purchase by Germany were so small that participation in a major development program was fiscally irresponsible from the start, and had a terrible smell of industry subsidizing.

MEADS made use of existing Patriot missile designs, but added new radar and control systems to cure the great weakness of Patriot; the inability to defend 360°. The limited field of view of Patriot's radar equipment made a cluster of 3-4 Patriot units necessary for 360° protection, and then there was still a need for short range air defences to close gaps caused by hills (Patriot uses semi active radar terminal homing and cannot engage without line of sight).

Germany insisted (even more smell of industry subsidy here) on a backup missile, the IRIS-T SL. This was a modified infrared guided missile as known from Typhoon fighters. A nose cone to protect the infrared seeker against heating up was added. This was apparently beneficial for exploiting the rocket engine's range potential in the dense air at low altitudes. The addition of a missile with a different guidance and independent from the illumination radars makes some sense. No single soft kill countermeasure will be able to address the different missiles (unless it defeats the radar proximity fuzes) and IRIS-T SL greatly increases the demands for saturation.

The Americans had little interest in IRIS-T SL (their air force uses AIM-9X anyway, and the latest AIM-9X block finally has an improved range rocket engine to come close to IRIS-T). They also had little interest in MEADS and don't want to buy it any more.

Germany goes on seeking an area air and missile defence system, and this "TLVS" may still be bought. There are very strong expectations of further cost increases, we may end up paying many billions of Euros (more than five billions for purchasing alone, in addition to development) for this.

I'll lay out some alternatives to this nonsense, but first some context:

(I) MEADS/TLVS is an air defence system for the "rear" area, similar to the line of area air defence batteries that NATO maintained from the south of German to its north during the Cold War. It's not meant to be deployed as a line, but it is a Luftwaffe (air force) program, and this shows. It would probably protect rear area bridges, supply hubs, headquarters, airbases and the like - not a Panzerbrigade on a raid between or behind hostile brigades. Our air defences for the latter practically no more than machineguns, IFV autocannons and some old Stinger missiles which are likely well past their nominal shelf life.

We do need air defences for army brigades, though. That far "forward" we cannot trust fighter support, even if we could for the "rear" areas. Systems like Stinger or 30 mm guns have an effective ceiling so low that air attack from 15,000 ft would be safe. This means hostile air power could - protected against our fighters by its own area air defence systems - bomb our ground forces at will. The old Gepard and Roland systems wouldn't have changed that if they were still in service.

(II) Unlike France and Italy we do not pursue a common area air defence missile for land and naval use. (Our navy uses SM-2, old Sea Sparrows and in the future maybe ESSM Block II).

(III) Semi-active radar homing is an inferior guidance method compared to active radar homing, but it's ceteris paribus somewhat cheaper. It is restricted to line of sight and the illumination radar needs to be active during the terminal engagement phase; it cannot be shut down to protect it against anti-radar missiles or else the engagement would fail for sure.

(IV) Area air defence missiles may have probabilities of kill of around 0.8...0.9 in peacetime brochures, but this may be as low as 0.01...0.1 under wartime conditions. Any solution which makes large stocks of missiles unaffordable is thus a bad solution, for among the missiles one should consider the costs grow quicker than the probability of kill does. A gold plated missile may cost five times as much as a simpler one, but it wouldn't offer fire times the probability of kill.

(V) Area air defences are much more about restricting the opposing air force's repertoire, and about repelling hostile air power than about killing. Area air defences are static compared to the mobility of air power, so air power can avoid them.

(VI) Ground radar-dependent air defence missiles are more susceptible to SEAD efforts (suppression of enemy air defences) than others because the radar's emissions give away the location of the radar.

(VII) To use air combat missiles (or parts thereof) for surface to air missile systems may reduce costs greatly, but it also creates a systemic risk. One countermeasure might defeat both our fighters' and our air defences' firepower. On the other hand, if all your land-based air defence radars have been destroyed you might actually be able to use the remaining missiles on your fighters in some cases.

(VIII) All widely used systems can be expected to face effective countermeasures within 10 years at the latest.

(IX) Intercept of munitions (such as cruise missiles, glide bombs) may very well be much more important and likely for an air defence system than intercept of strike fighters. The often very expensive air defence missiles (often 300,000 Euros to more than 3 million Euros) might thus face rather cheap (often 50,000-500,000 Euros) targets.

(X) Missile defence is a popular topic and fashion since the 1991 Gulf War and its Scud hysteria. I do doubt that missile defence is all that useful, though. Ballistic and cruise missiles could be launched in the hundreds at the same time, clearly saturating any kind of affordable air defence and all on-station combat air patrol fighters. Furthermore, such a coordinated alpha strike of hundreds of missiles could be launched at the beginning of a conflict when air defence batteries aren't deployed yet, maybe most of their personnel aren't even on duty at the time.

Furthermore, defence against ballistic missiles - especially the guided ones that can fly evasive manoeuvres - is on the one hand an inherent capability of most area air defence systems and on the other hand enhancing this capability requires additional expenses in particular for development, but also compromises (or specialisation) in regard to fusing, warhead layout or even seeker design. In short, an area air defence system with substantial anti-ballistic missile capability is much more expensive than a plain area air defence missile system.

(XI) By now it's irrelevant how much was spent on MEADS in the past, those expenses are now sunk costs. Sadly, much still needs to be paid to get a single first unit operational sometime in the 2020's.

(XII) There are good reasons to distrust both radar and infrared guidances. These guidance principles have been applied for decades and countermeasures have been developed. IIR seems to be very susceptible to DIRCM (dazzling IR laser pointed at the missile) and radar guidance can be jammed - including by towed jammer decoys (example here) so homing-on-jam doesn't help much either.

(XIII) It's also possible to defeat fuses by jamming (against RF fuses) and false targets (I suspect chaff may be ineffective against modern RF fuses due to their rejection algorithms and doppler effect, but might be effective against laser proximity fuses). Towed decoys may not only be effective against home-on-jam, but also against fuses, since when in between missile and aircraft this towed decoy may initiate the missile's fuse at a safe distance. This is an extension to the Israeli trick of lengthening jet engine nozzles in order to fuse incoming tailchaser missiles just far enough to the rear to save the plane. Any missile but those which rely entirely on hit-to-kill may be defeated by countermeasures to their fuzes.

Israeli A-4 Skyhawk; the exhaust extension is visible

(XIV) I generally think that industry subsidies - as far as legal under EU rules - should be paid from the budget of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, not by the Ministry of Defence (if a all).

Well, what are the alternatives the title is hinting at?

There are no perfect solutions, but avoiding the NIH syndrome helps greatly. I recommend to look closely at two off-the-shelf solutions. Development expenses don't need to exceed the expenses for translations.

Option A: SAMP/T

This is the French solution, already adopted by the Italian military and also used in the naval domain ("Aster"/"PAAMS"). Amazingly, this is even from the same company as MEADS/TLVS. This might make transition negotiations much easier. It uses missiles with active radar seeker (much technology from the French MICA RF air combat missile). The capability against ballistic missiles is likely lesser than MEADS', but it has some such capability. The Italians and Frenchmen already pay for the development of an enhanced ATBM version "B1NT".

SAMP/T, by the way, was the obvious option to use when MEADS was started, since it's quite close in ambition to MEADS. SAMP/T was available before MEADS was begun. We could have had modern area air defences in service for years (in Germany) if we had spent the MEADS development budget simply on purchasing SAMP/T batteries instead.

(company website about SAMP/T here)

Option B: NASAMS II

NASAMS II uses a modified artillery radar and a missile launcher that can be loaded with different missile types, especially AIM-120 missiles ("AMRAAM,", in air defence applications called "SLAMRAAM") is the primary choice because its active radar seeker needs no target illumination (hence no need for illumination radar). The new AIM-120D missile version has much improved range over earlier ones and would thus greatly boost NASAMS II's range, so a mix including D version missiles and old air force inventory versions would make sense. The missile launcher can actually make use of almost all Western infrared or active radar guided air combat missiles, so this system could recycle old air force air combat missile stocks.

Ballistic missile defence capabilities are apparently not claimed for NASAMS II. The huge advantage of NASAMS II is its relatively low cost; the missiles are unusually "cheap" since you can include old stocks and the radar isn't such a big deal either. The launcher could use infrared guided missiles, so a NASAMS battery could even operate in a backup mode without emitting radar (an electro-optical and infrared sensor is integrated mostly for target identification and early warning includes a data feed from air force assets by datalink anyway).

No area air defence would immunise ground forces against air attack, and this one would suffice to offer a substantial obstacle to air attack well past what Stinger, IRIS-T SLS et cetera could offer.

(company website about NASAMS here)

What I would want to see if we started a program and there were no acceptable off-the-shelf solutions:

SAAB giraffe 4A general purpose radar

I would take the SAAB Giraffe 4A multi-function radar as general purpose "brigade radar" system (three or four per brigade), harden its container with a thick ballistic aluminium alloy shell and use NASAMS's multi missile launcher. This can launch old and new short and medium range missiles* as long as they require no radar illumination, including old air force inventory missiles. I would also insist on some trailer-mounted active radar emitter decoys.

This would be an air defence system for an army corps logistic hub and army manoeuvre brigades in the field.

"Rear" air defences for airbases, bridges, capital et cetera could be based on a containerised air defence system employing the ESSM Block 2 missile once available plus some suitable radar and the MIRADOR sensor. This setup would also be meant to be employed on auxiliary warships for convoy area air defence, so it would be protected against severe Atlantic Ocean weather influences. Again, there would be little requirement for ballistic missile defence here due to (X). I would not insist on an active emitter radio decoy in this case because sophisticated strike packages with SEAD support are an unlikely threat in the "rear" area, while cruise missiles without SEAD support are the most likely targets.

- - - - -

Guided ballistic missiles are great BECAUSE defending against them is so hard. An attempt to defend against them with a high quality/low quantity procurement program is futile, and is even irresponsible if the extreme costs for such a gold-plated program leave insufficient funds for plugging other capability gaps, such as battlefield air defences.** The Luftwaffe's area air defences of today are near-useless for the Heer and MEADS wouldn't be much more helpful either.

As of today - and actually since its founding - the Heer could not defend itself against the kind of bombardment that Daesh endures in Syria and Iraq. This is a consequence of insufficient battlefield air defence service ceilings and unacceptable.

It should be high priority to plug this capability gap, but to spend billions on your own development program is nonsense when there are multiple suitable, sufficiently effective systems available off the shelf from allied countries.

There are no perfect solutions, and the higher the ambition for quality rises, the more clearly insufficient the quantity becomes. Powerful air defences for a mechanised brigade can easily grow so expensive that they cost more than the brigade's main battle tanks! The Gepard self-propelled anti air gun did not three times as much as a Leopard 1 main battle tank in the 1970's already*, and this ratio can easily turn much worse once you demand a much higher service ceiling. Self-discipline is required to seek an optimum compromise instead of gold-plating a program to death, delaying an in-service solution for decades.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

P.S.: Please don't lecture me in the comments that MEADS can do more than NASAMS and is in an entirely different league. That's kind of my point. It's in the WRONG league

*: old and new AIM-120A/B/C/D, MICA, IRIS-T, IRIS-T SL, AMRAAM-ER, ESSM Block II, old AIM-9, South African and Israeli missiles, and potentially the cheap RBS-23 (for intercept of glide bombs) if the radar can handle that one. The CAMM project with its development costs is bollocks in face of ESSM Block 2 and I expect it to be cancelled.

**: The concept of opportunity costs isn't understood nearly as widely as it should be.

*: 5.4 million and 1.7 million Deutsche Mark.

edit July 2017: I overlooked AMRAAM-ER, a AIM-120 seeker mated to a ESSM rocket. Certainly something to have a look at. The range is guaranteed to be better than with MICA and AMRAAM.

2016/10/29

Link dump October 2016

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I added a hardware-centric blog to my blog list (on the left,), and here are some of the reasons:

defence-blog.com/news/china-develops-multiple-rocket-launcher-that-hides-in-container.html

A containerised multiple rocket launcher module is an intriguing idea, and I wrote about something similar a few times. It's clearly practical for guided missiles, but at the same time rather questionable for unguided or minimally course-correcting rockets. The traverse for any simple such design would be very, very minimal - maybe 15°. Enough for deliberate bombardments, not enough for quick reaction fires. MLRS type munitions couldn't be used without much effort, for they are front-loaded.

A full traverse containerised MRL module may very well be possible (with folding walls) but this would likely be rather elaborate and the expenses for such systems can be quite astonishing (see MLRS modernisation costs from years ago; hundreds of thousands of Euro per launcher).

- - -

defence-blog.com/army/ukrainian-company-developed-omnidirectional-review-system-for-armored-vehicles.html

Such a see-through 'virtual reality' helmet mounted sight for tankers is overdue. This was already tried with the F-35 fighter, and much of aviation technology finds its way to tanks sooner or later. All-round cameras were already installed in Merkava IV years ago. It was obvious from the start that mounting multiple monitors was a quite unergonomic interim solution.

(Meanwhile, the German industry and procurement agency finally moved away from cathode ray tube monitors in the newest IFV Puma. *sigh*)

- - - - -

There's finally a towed/tethered sensor system for modern warships to extend the line of sight / horizon beyond what can be done with masts. Keyword DARPA TALONS:

www.uasvision.com/2015/05/14/darpa-tern-programme-produces-spin-offs/

www.technologyreview.com/s/602718/darpas-autonomous-ship-is-patrolling-the-seas-with-a-parasailing-radar/?utm_campaign=socialflow&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=post

Of course, this has been done before - as many 'innovations' - which made me expect such a thing for a long, long time. I probably didn't publish anything about this expectation because naval affairs aren't quite in my focus most of the time. I did expect it to take the shape of an autogyro anyway, for the first incarnation was an autogyro. Guess who did it. ;-)

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Achgelis_Fa_330

www.bredow-web.de/Hubschrauber/Focke-Achgelis_Fa_330_Bachstelze/focke-achgelis_fa_330_bachstelze.html

The challenges for any such concept are quite obvious; you need enough payload (not much of a problem, as evidenced by Fa 330 Bachstelze which operated at 15 kts and lifted a man), you better supply electricity by copper cables from the ship and you need to stabilize whatever sensor you use (except maybe passive radar). I suppose this was technically feasible since the 1990's at the latest. The radar lifted this way cannot be nearly as powerful as the mast- or even superstructure-mounted ones, of course. Such radars can detect ships at long ranges, though - and I think they can also detect wave pattern disruptions caused by periscopes much easier than a much lower mast-mounted radar could.

150 m high electro-optical or imaging infrared sensors would also be VERY helpful with identification of boats and ships without a helicopter sorties.

One couldn't fully rely on such a system, though. It won't work in severe weather.

- - - - -

You want to criticize the Puma IFV or the procurement agency publicly?

Here's some more fodder for you.

- - - - -

I wrote a lot about Iskander, LORA and other such "under 500 km" missiles. The Americans are actually giving this approach a try and seem intent on replacing the ATACMS missiles (which don't necessarily age well in storage) with something in the 300-499 km range. This time it's likely cluster munitions ban compliant and may thus be interesting for the German army as well. After all, we have hardly any suitable munitions for our MARS/MLRS (afaik no more than 1,000 GUMLRS missiles were ever purchased by Germany).

www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/long_range_precision_fires/

www.dtic.mil/ndia/2016armament/Turner.pdf

I doubt that this will influence air warfare doctrine (of the U.S.A.F.) much, though.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

2016/10/28

The jerry can

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A bit of technical-military history that shows how important little, cheap innovations can be:

www.carryology.com/utility/carry-history-the-wwii-jerrycan/

www.livesteammodels.co.uk/dhmg/funnel01.html

This provides a good excuse to mention once again a very wise insight of Mr. Luttwak:

Great advances are highly visible and quickly provoke a powerful reaction of rival powers, but small, unimposing innovations may provide a lasting advantage.

In this case the importance of cans for storage and transportation of liquids was underestimated and the superior solution only recognised when it made itself felt on a campaign.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

2016/10/26

The biggest German foreign policy sin post-1945

Back in 1990/91 a coalition of 28 countries defeated the Iraqi military and drove it out of occupied Kuwait with roughly 2/3 U.S. troops. It seemed like a post-Cold War triumph for peace among nations at the time.

Some countries did not participate much or not at all with military means, but provided subsidies to support in particular the U.S. effort fiscally.

The U.S. Department of Defense has estimated the cost of the Gulf War at $61 billion.

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states covered $36 billion.

Germany and Japan covered $16 billion.

(source CNN)

In hindsight, I think this was the biggest German foreign policy sin in many decades. Even the decision to de facto go to war against Yugoslavia in 1999 pales because without this earlier sin, it would likely not have happened.

To make a "won" war almost for free gave a terrible, utterly misleading signal to the people in the United States; a signal that war may be profitable. No doubt all that glory with a neat parade in best weather through flag-decorated streets, the testing of military equipment, the prestige gain et cetera was worth a very few billion dollars and about a hundred dead war heroes?

The U.S. had regained its appetite for great power games post-Vietnam already under Reagan and Bush sr before the 1990/91 Gulf War, but afterwards it was altogether different, public approval was much easier to get and sought after instead of rather sudden and previously unannounced military action. "Cruise missile diplomacy", the casual bombing of other countries, was born soon after 1991. Iraq had met all disarmament requirements by 1996, but wasn't left alone at all, and eventually broken for good in 2003.

What seemed like a moment of triumph for a world in which invading other countries was unacceptable and to be punished by the international community turned into the moment when one country decided that bombing and invading other countries does cost little, is fun and perfectly fine as long as it's the only country that does it. The German government helped to create that impression, with German public funds, fed by German taxpayers.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

2016/10/25

"War with Russia"

WTF?

2016/10/21

Colours and camouflages

Just a tiny info: There are a couple simulators on the web that allow you to look at images the way colourblind people see them. This one is an example, this is another one.

Flecktarn as seen by a blue-blind person (Tritanopia)

Naturally, I used this free opportunity to satisfy my curiosity about how camouflage patterns fare in the different modes*, but the outcome after using several photos with different camouflages and backgrounds was very simple: What matters more than anything else** is brightness and darkness. Shadows attract one's attention very much if they're in the wrong place.

Even tank camouflage colour patterns can be quite effective (at 1+ km), but the shadowy running gear still makes a tank easily spotted (and the warmth of the running gear of a moving or recently moved tank is easily recognizable with thermal sensors).

So in the end, the best camouflage pattern is still the one worn while hiding in a shadow of a large, inconspicuous object.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: This may be interesting to hunters, birdwatchers, wildlife photographers as well, since their camouflage will often look different to the wildlife than to themselves.

**: I need to mention that out-of-place or easily recognizable shapes are a big issue as well. This is the reason for why the Israelis use such irregular, odd-looking helmet covers - they make the helmet not look like a helmet any more.