No carrier at sea?

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"For the next week, not only will there be no U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in the Middle East, but there will be no American aircraft carriers deployed at sea anywhere else in the world, despite a host of worldwide threats facing the United States."

This quote is from a large (though not exactly well-reputed) media source that I won't link to. 

The quote is remarkable as a demonstration of a particular school of thought. It shows the utter confusion about what constitutes defence and about what provides security.

A U.S. aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf or around Taiwan doesn't reduce ANY threats to the United States. To have a battlefleet thousands of nautical miles away from your mainland is not about defence, ever. It's not necessarily helping to win a war that could not be deterred, either.

"Influence" ( a nicer word for bullying) has become the new meaning of "defense", for these days hardly any "defense expenditures" are about actual defence. The U.S. and the former colonial powers France, UK and even to some degree Belgium have paid much attention and devoted many resources to meddling in distant continents' internal affairs for decades. Much of this was excused as the global part of the confrontation between "communism" and "the free world".

This meddling has become self-evident, even institutionalised and the bureaucracies tasked with it have even spawned new branches.

German politicians have given to the seduction of playing such great power games as well, and through NATO and U.S.-led coalitions even small countries such as Lithuania have joined these games.

I am convinced that the warping of terminology and the associated warping of the idea of normalcy are misleading people (especially) in the Western World to tolerate spending of much of their purchasing power on actions that don't serve them, and may actually endanger them.

Politicians get away with playing pointless yet costly games and deceiving voters in part because they are good at deception, but even more so because great many people not only fall for the deception, but actually side with the playign team.

It's like football; a spectator-fan doesn't gain money from "his" team's success like the players do with their boni. Instead, the spectator-fan does even pay for the entertainment. The fans adopt the cause and make it their own, though they cannot possibly benefit materially even from successes.

Gret power games are no doubt entertainment, with few being in control, a couple more people benefitting economically, great many mildly suffering economically but enjoying teh entertainment and great many others suffering economically without enjoying the spectacle.

And then there are the people in the countries hosting those 'games' ... they suffer terribly, and may even die in droves.

I suppose an ethical person would reject such a form of entertainment and demand that the own government stops playing such games and focuses on actual deterrence for peace, and as plan B a quick white peace (status quo ante) in the event of war.

Hat tip to War News Update for pointing this out (though the WNU editor has a very different interpretation).

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2016 blog stats

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I have no particular idea why the blog visitor stats went up after long stagnation, but the website host insists they did. Statcounter (traditionally) doesn't agree at all, but it had an obvious, trust-destroying glitch:

So what may ahev caused this wave of additional visits?

November saw 19 posts, December a mere 10 - that's rather slow blogging. I skipped a couple military, errorism and civil liberties topics that I would have blogged about without the holidays.

Maybe it was the light AT defences series that drove up visitor stats? Doubtful, since the lightweight equipment and MEADS/TLVS alternatives articles are the only November articles still ranking in the top ten most read articles of December.

 

The website host's stats  didn't point out any huge spikes in referring links, so that's not the reason either. 

Maybe it's simply that confrontational foreign policy and thus concerns about future wars among developed nations made more people interested in a non-hawkish blog on military affairs. From that angle I wish I had less visitors.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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A fine New Year's pledge for the EU

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We're inflicting 150 9/11-scale strikes on ourselves per year. Maybe we should stop this (or at least reduce this quantity) instead of getting distracted by squirrels errorists.

This time I'm not even talking about how big tobacco legally massacres our people by handing out slow poison. 

Air pollution - by many believed to be a solved problem - is still killing more Europeans per day than any non-World War war ever.

Air pollution 'causes 467,000 premature deaths a year in Europe' (BBC) 

Premature deaths attributable to air pollution (EEA)

ESA's 2004 graphic based on ENVISAT satellite data: NO2 pollution world-wide

European NO2 hot spots

The biggest tragedies and political failures aren't necessarily the ones that attract the most attention. Errorists threats and strikes are spectacular by definition, reports about them are kind of entertaining. So is in a way the Aleppo tragedy. The REAL top tier problems are in entirely different areas.

The REAL top tier problems are the ones which we didn't solve yet because by their very nature they kind of 'fly under our radar'. They're the high-hanging fruits. You need to pay attention and mobilise some rational thinking in order to get exasperated about such issues - while all you need to do to get terribly angry about some errorist asswipes is to sit on your couch and use the TV remote.

Problems that easily arouse anger and frustration amongst many people are by their very nature provoking countermeasures and are thus bound to cause little harm after a while.  Meanwhile, big and small problems that do not provoke such intense reactions may linger on - politicians may know of them, but have little incentive to address them forcefully, for there's not public pressure. Solving such issues wouldn't necessarily yield rewards for political action either, since the problem was below the 

attention threshold anyway, and its absence would not be noted.

This is actually an analogy to Luttwak's description of how spectacular technological advance by a military provokes quick and effective countermeasures, while many small barely noticed innovations may provide lasting advantages 

So how about a New Year's pledge for the EU: In 2018 we should address the REAL top tier issues insteaSQUIRREL!

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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How to harm your people and mankind as a whole by starting a war

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"Natürlich, das einfache Volk will keinen Krieg […] Aber schließlich sind es die Führer eines Landes, die die Politik bestimmen, und es ist immer leicht, das Volk zum Mitmachen zu bringen, ob es sich nun um eine Demokratie, eine faschistische Diktatur, um ein Parlament oder eine kommunistische Diktatur handelt. […] Das ist ganz einfach. Man braucht nichts zu tun, als dem Volk zu sagen, es würde angegriffen, und den Pazifisten ihren Mangel an Patriotismus vorzuwerfen und zu behaupten, sie brächten das Land in Gefahr. Diese Methode funktioniert in jedem Land." 

Interview mit Gustave Gilbert in der Gefängniszelle, 18. April 1946, Nürnberger Tagebuch (1962; Originalausgabe: "Nuremberg Diary" 1947)

"Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America nor, for that matter, in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship. [...] That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.”

Interview with Gustave Gilbert in jail, 18 April 1946, "Nurembourg Diary" (1962, 1st edition: 1947)

(This quote confirmed, albeit by a single source.)

Parental advisory: Don't try this at home!

Nor should you ever be played like that (again)!

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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Christmas truce

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How to deter errorism

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Asswipes who want to provoke us with violence cannot be deterred with good reliability by the threat of primitive retaliation. All-too often retaliation is what they want to provoke, after all.

Years ago I proposed a schedule for withdrawal from a war of occupation which featured a deterrence element against violence; the troops would be scheduled to withdraw piecemeal over time, but for every one soldier killed or wounded in action a fixed quantity of soldiers would be sent as reinforcements. Any 'freedom fighters' claiming to fight against occupation would face the dilemma that fighting against occupation would actually prolong or even greatly grow the occupation.

I think something similar could be done against errorists, particularly errorists who are linked to a non-elusive party like daesh:

We could simply pass a law (effective for 10 years) which compels us to send aid to the enemies of the errorists for every of our citizens killed by errorists abroad or anyone killed by errorists in our country.

For one killed person:
1,000 small arms with munitions and accessories
100 4wd cars
100 missiles and one missile launcher
10 mortars with a thousand rounds (and more auxiliary charges) each
10 instructors who train the new users for six months


For one severely injured person:
500 small arms with munitions and accessories
50 4wd cars
50 missiles and one missile launcher
5 mortars with a thousand rounds (and more auxiliary charges) each
5 instructors who train the new users for six months

Both would be to be delivered (very publicly) within two months. Stocks would be purchased from other countries if the own stocks would otherwise drop below a defined minimum level for collective defence. Such purchases could be pre-arranged just in case, in order to meet the two-month deadline.

Additionally, the law could include a lump sum delivery as answer for failed every errorist strike.

I suppose we could skip many "counter-terrorism security" expenses and would still be safer than with the status quo policies.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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Military engineers' railway bridges

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I wasn't specific about how quickly a railway bridge could be replaced during wartime when I wrote about pontoon bridges or about the Baltic Invasion scenario. The reason was that researching this topic wasn't very fruitful.

Now I learned why; apparently,

"H-17.  The  MAN SE railway bridge is a panel bridge that is  similar to the Bailey bridge but is much stronger. It has two configurations: upper deck and lower deck. With the upper deck configuration, it can span gaps up to 40.95 meters; with the lower deck up to 50.4 meters. It is designed to withstand the crossing of locomotives with 30 tons per axle and wagons with 20 tons per axle. Installation time is 20 to 30 hours with a 50-man crew and two cranes. This bridge requires a prepared abutment (existing railway abutments or concrete abutment). Spain and Italy are the only NATO countries with  existing military railway bridges in their inventory."

source: FM 3-90.12/MCWP 3-17.1  (FM 90-13), page H-17, (July 2008)

Well, it's difficult to find info if there's hardly anything in existence. Thus this is not a blog article about military engineers' railway bridges as much as about them not having the same.

There is an important Oder bridge at the border between Germany and Poland. I suppose the central span over the water (104 m long) could be taken down by two well-aimed cruise missile hits. The MAN SE railway bridge would be less than half as long as needed.

Maybe there's a way to realise a railway pontoon bridge, but you'd need to lay the rail lines to and from it as well, and would still suffer from the vulnerability of the mostly unguarded rail lines and their signal systems.

This marginal capability to reconnect railway lines of communication reflects the reduced reliance of armed forces on railway transportation; we can make do with roads nowadays, though particularly tank transporter semi-trailers are in rather short supply for this.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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LOS situational awareness

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I'll try a bit of prophecising here.

Its known that a few modern main battle tanks have all-round camera vision (not upwards or downwards, of course). The F-35 LO strike  fighter has a subsystem called DAS, which with six cameras surveils all surroundings, serving as target tracker, missile detector and even (large calibre) muzzle flash detector. Some drones were equipped with a "gorgon stare", nine cameras watching a huge area simultaneously.

All this is sooner or later going to disseminate to the lowest level, the infantryman.

Now keep in mind how tiny and cheap 12+ megapixel cameras on smartphones are already.

Also, keep in mind how tiny and cheap radio-controlled quadcopter drones are. 

Finally, keep in mind that every fiberglass communication is essentially a communication by coded laser pulses.

_ _ _ _ _

Combine the ideas and the already available technology and you might end up with an infantryman possessing all-round vision with four cameras mounted on his helmet, and a worn minicomputer interpreting the all-round vision, alerting him of whatever is of interest; muzzle flashed, optics flashes, movements, recognizable shapes of interest, moving drones etc. 

The findings would be communicated to the user by stereo sound from earpieces and by a helmet mounted display not much more cumbersome than Google Glass.

He might even have a third set of eyes mounted on a kind of drone that's attached to a tiny backpack and launches from it to hover over his head, communicating with his helmet-mounted sensors by laser pulses and adding ranging by triangulation to the sensing of his "helmet's eyes". Well, this and  also the advantage of a bird's field of view.

The whole package may easily weigh less than a kg and cost less than two month's worth of pay.

ETA: About 2 years judging by technology, 10-20 years taking into account the sluggishness of the procurement agencies.

Finally, keep in mind I wrote this blog post under (very much felt) influence of alcohol, and it may be crap. Just as any other claim or idea of some dude on the intertubes. Always be critical, use your own judgement!

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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"Europeans Debate Nuclear Self-Defense after Trump Win"

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This article was linked in the comments. I will not link to it for legal reasons, but you should be able to look it up easily.

I'd like to offer a quick hint that reveals how the author totally did not do his homework and in fact wrote an article that mostly and as a whole made no sense whatsoever because of this ignorance.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

source: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

An anecdote was leaked years ago that French then-president Sarkozy had proposed (in a meeting with chancellor Merkel) a binational control over French nukes as one of his erratic ideas and got angry when German minister of foreign affairs shot the idea down pointing out the NPT. I suppose a Spiegel journalist and his editor should have been aware of this part of the NPT since that leak at the latest.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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Tripwire forces - and why I reject them inevitably

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Here's the very root of the tripwire forces issue:

(1) Many people think that tripwire forces are purposeful because they - being a kind of hostage taken by their own government - would force their government to get involved in the event of aggression, and thus ensure it political commitment  to defence. This act of foreign policy communication is meant to bolster deterrence and protect the peace.

Sure, the tripwire forces (especially super-symbolic multinational ones) would likely be easy targets in the event of deterrence failure*, but that doesn't matter, for this whole paradigm depends on one assumption: We are overwhelmingly superior in military power, and effective defence only depends on signalling that this superiority would be brought to bear against an aggressor.

I'm not sure that people who follow this paradigm really thought this through, but what I wrote above seems to explain their behaviour regarding deterrence and tripwire forces.

(2) And then there's the other paradigm, which I am applying: In this paradigm military forces are for deterrence AND defence, and setting part of one's forces up for failure in the event of an aggression is unacceptable.

As an addition that's rather uniquely mine I did add that the will to defend against an aggressor should be signalled by extreme fitness of the armed bureaucracy. Reaching this fitness requires the political masters to pursue it, disrespecting the self-interest of the (naturally lazy and egoistic) bureaucracy if not outright punishing the bureaucracy so much that it doesn't dare pursue any self-interest but avoiding said punishment for pursuing self interest.

Well, before I digress even more I'd like to admit that my preference for the latter paradigm is predetermined. I once studied economics, and this includes a creeping yet thorough indoctrination: You get indoctrinated to hate wastefulness.

The first paradigm is the wasteful one, since it requires overwhelming military superiority, not "just enough" military power for deterrence and defence. Only overwhelming military superiority would allow for a waste of military resources, and even negligence regarding fitness and deployment speeds.

I suppose everyone understands that "overwhelming superiority" isn't the same as "just enough". In fact, "just enough" may be reached at a state of military inferiority. Just look at Finland coexisting with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. The Finns were no doubt NOT superior militarily.

My other insistence on fitness and on addressing typical issues of bureaucracies (I wrote a lot about the basic descriptive models Niskanen's budget-optimizing bureaucrat and the  principal-agent model) was predetermined by my economics studies as well.**

The first paradigm is kind of correct; European NATO HAS an overwhelming military superiority of Russia, the only not entirely ludicrous threat generator in its neighbourhood. Within the existing imbalance of power and the first paradigm militarily ineffective symbolic composite battalions, one per Baltic country and even one for Poland, make sense.

It's just unbearable to me how wasteful the whole situation is. To spend but ten billion Euros too much on the military is equivalent to killing more than a thousand of our citizens by neglect. Scratch the "equivalent to". I suppose we overspend by a much greater margin, looking at how poorly the armed forces in European NATO / in the EU are oriented at deterrence and defence.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: Think about how extremely well the poorly armed U.S. airborne troops who served as tripwire forces in Saudi-Arabia during the Gulf crisis 1990 fit to this description; hopeless militarily, but backed up by overwhelming power.

**: So very much that I grew tired of adding links to it.

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