I do often use more or less implicitly a certain thought that can be summarised as
'Only a very powerful force would dare to be an aggressor
against a NATO member.' And by this I mean blockade, bomb or invade.
The great utility of this is that it provides a filter; everything that's of use only against weak forces is of no use for our (collective) security. Drones that would easily be defeated by any area air defence are of no use. Towed artillery pieces may be fine for pounding Taleban, but they're pointless against an opposing force that has SPGs, MRLs and artillery radars. Heavy radio usage including blue force tracker may be great in Third World beat-ups and occupations, but would break down against a ESM- and ECM-savvy opposing force with strong artillery. Surface warships cannot be dependable combat ships for collective security unless they have area air defences AND a good antisubmarine capability. Long planning cycles that are fine in slow occupation warfare are quite useless in mobile, conventional warfare. Road de-mining efforts that clear but a kilometre per hour or so are useless in conventional warfare. Et cetera.
I consider this method of filtering out (disqualifying) concepts, habits, hardware, tactics, procedures and organisations as very useful. It's one way to draw a line between what may be necessary for collective security (deterrence and actual defence) and what's certainly not part of it.
This criterion may be misused, though. One might warp it to advocate for ever more military power by arguing that defence against the only plausible threat (one that would dare to attack) requires more military power than is available. After all, why would anyone dare attack us without us being at least partially weak?
This leads nowhere. It's an ever-escalating spiral. No strength is great enough against a hypothetical aggressor who is powerful enough to dare challenge it. That's why we should look at actual powers, not hypothetical ones.