Minimum army weapons set, revisited

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I like to cut things down to essentials, so I wrote in 2023 about a minimum weapons sset for an army. To have very few different weapons helps coping with the difficulties in procurement.

/2023/01/a-minimum-army-weapons-set-for.html

So, almost two and a half years more developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War, does the blog post hold up well (IMO)?

 

#1 hand grenade, a timeless classic

#2 rifle, a timeless classic

#3 (light) machinegun, infantry will go on strike if it only gets rifles

#4 HEDP rifle grenade, infantry will insist on having something to shoot into a window 50 m away and this is the simplest means unless you insist on firing many shots.

#5 short range anti-MBT weapon They're worthwhile, but don't deserve a "minimum" list entry according to my opinion as of today. Fibreoptic FPVs can fly so well around obstacles that they can engage well in areas with very short lines of sight, so we don't need weapons that excel in such places any more.

#6 Well, this was close to the fibreoptic FPV quadcopter, albeit I mentioned a rocket-propelled missile as representative (there were no fibreoptic FPV quadcopters yet). The increased agility, the hover ability and the ambush ability of fibreoptic FPV quadcopters are huges advantages, worth more than the speed loss compared to the missile. So I say the #6 entry would not be represented by a rather fast fibreoptic FPV quadcopter (with thermal channel)

#7 LMM is still quite expensive (~30k €) compared to some targets, so one should rather look at an even cheaper solution now. I don't happen to know a truly satisfactory one, though. Maybe one could trust #6+#10 and scratch #7?

#8 C-UAS RCWS,  absolutely, still a great take!

#9 wheeled 155 mm SPG This one is increasingly dubious until we learn to manage the drone threat at least at 20 km depth. Some reports indicate that towed guns dug in (even 105 mm) are better, it's almost safe to say that spending the same money on towed 155 mm L/52 with auxiliary propulsion rather than on 155 mm SPGs is better. Please note; I am a proponent of using PGM missile artillery, which was not included in the list because a "minimum" list has to assume air support.

#10 Tamir, still a great take (to deal with Shaheed, cruise missiles, GUMLRS-ish munitions, not as the Israelis do against ordinary Grad and homebuilt rockets). Don't buy Israeli, though. Build an analog.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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C-UAS on the battlefield at very low altitude

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/2017/08/very-low-level-air-defence-against.html

/2018/05/summary-modern-air-defences-for-europe.html

One might increase the rate of fire of a MG3 back to about 1,500 rpm and use a duplex cartridge (two bullets in one cartridge) for 3,000 bullets per minute rate of fire, 50 per second.*

 

All kinds of drones and most missiles would be hit very quickly and be stopped by such a volume of fire even from a single RCWS. The detection of drones might depend on a quickly rotating (~100 revolutions per minute) AESA radar with such lower power and (by radio band) such a high atmospheric attenuation that it senses drones out to no more than 400 m and cannot be triangulated from more than two kilometres away.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

* 20 mm autocannons with simple HE-PD rounds would be an option for tanks, I dislike the specialised and expensive 30 mm autocannon with HE-PROX rounds solution. One might also stick with the duplex round MG3 approach as long as the tank has a coax gun of more powerful calibre, ideally a .338 chaingun.

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Free Europe's security challenge if America turns full fascist (Part III)

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previous parts:

/2024/07/free-europes-security-challenge-if.html

/2024/07/free-europes-security-challenge-if_8.html

 

So what could be done for defence of Europe against American airpower?

Defending against aircraft & missiles

We would need to timely detect threats to intercept them. More AEW aircraft and a redundant coverage with long wavelength (metric) air search radars & passive radars would be needed. Distributed sky-scanning imaging infrared and ultraviolet cameras as well as distributed acoustic sensors would complement that. Standoff jammers would need to be detected & triangulated by passive EW.

The American Way of Air War involves intricately-planned strike packages. Stealth aircraft didn't change this much - they merely made the strike packages a bit smaller and more focused on fewer guided munitions. An important part of these strike packages is the anti-radar warfare - "SEAD" (suppression of enemy air defences, albeit they actually aspire to "DEAD" - destruction ...). This means that the defender's radar emitters are at great risk. A way to reduce this risk is to use a large quantity of very cheap emitters in a multi-static radar network. Such very cheap emitters could be nothing but emitters. No receiving of echoes, no processing, no demanding communications. Just cheap emitters with their own electrical power generator. Ten thousands of such cheap emitters could be dispersed throughout free Europe, though with greatest densities in particularly relevant or threatened areas. The passive radars would receive the echoes, process the echo data and communicate using landlines or directional radios. These passive radars would be near-impossible to target for the attackers, as they wouldn't need to emit in the radio frequency spectrum, and what little radio comms they'd have could be done with antennas hundreds of metres away from the actual passive radar trailer.

Active electronic warfare would be required to counter communications and navigation of the attackers. This includes jamming and possibly disabling of communications satellites (including civilian ones used by the attackers) and jamming the satellite navigation signals (GPS, Europe's own Galileo, Russian Glonass, Chinese Beidou) in the areas where there are attacking missiles. The jamming of satellite signals needs to come from above for good effectiveness, ideally by low orbit satellites or numerous low cost very high altitude aircraft. Incoming cruise missiles could also exploit civilian emissions for navigation, so mobile phone networks might need to be temporarily deactivated where the cruise missiles are as well. This degradation of cheap navigation technologies would force the attackers to use more expensive forms of guidance, especially pattern recognition and terrain referencing sensors. It might not yield a large or even decisive advantage, though. A consumer-grade thermal camera is available for less than 1,000 € in wholesale and a minicomputer with pattern recognition software and sufficient data storage would cost less than 100 € in wholesale. Shaheed-style cheap cruise missiles of 1,000+ km range are thus still feasible at very low costs (much less than 100,000 € per missile). Annual mass production of such missiles would be feasible by the millions. Ordinary "Tomahawk" cruise missiles cost more than a million $ for more range and much bigger warheads.

Hard kill defences need to take these missile costs into account. We cannot protect all of Europe with SAMP/T style missiles, for they are too expensive (and of limited promise against very low observable aircraft). 

Free Europe needs

• low density and redundancy of defences for defeating very low observable aircraft (B-21) up to more than 60,000 ft altitude
• low density and redundancy of defences for defeating aeroballistic/quasiballistic missiles (at first only PrSM) with densified defences for priority areas (such as Greater Paris region)
  
• low density and redundancy of defences for defeating low observable aircraft (F-35) up to more than 60,000 ft altitude
• anti-saturation defences for defeating massed (~300 against a country in one wave) 'normal type' (Tomahawk, stealthier JASSM) cruise missile waves
• anti-saturation defences for defeating massed (~3,000 against a country in one wave) 'cheap type' (Shaheed-136 class, Shaheed-238 class) cruise missile waves
  

Surviving the hits by aircraft & missiles

WW2 in Europe and again the current Russo-Ukrainian War have shown that enormous damage can be repaired away or compensated by long-distance grids for energy until the supporting economic base collapses (early 1945 collapse of German railway transportation). A thousand cruise missile hits may have a very unconvincing effect on the European continent unless they are targeted very well with this repair-ability in mind. Much less than a hundred key factories would absolutely have to stay in production to maintain this ability to repair damage.

Some things cannot be produced in great quantities within a year or two, though. A thousand cruise missiles  hits at electrical grid transformer stations and maybe a dozen related factories could leave free Europe unable to resist much longer. Cruise missiles of the 'normal type' render all but the most extreme bunkers ineffective, so we should consider dispersion of such installations over much larger areas to increase how many cruise missile hits are required for decisive effect. We should also do R&D and hardware upgrades to minimise secondary effects (secondary fires, electrical overload damage et cetera).

Base denial

The obvious launchers for attacks on free Europe would be carrier aviation, destroyers and submarines. It's impractical to keep submarines beyond cruise missile range, so it appears unreasonable to pursue an anti-launcher strategy against cruise missiles.

Carrier aviation is different. The Americans make the mistake of producing many F-35 in an air force version that could not be used on aircraft carriers. The sum of existing and planned B-2, F-35B/C and F-18E/F/G in U.S. armed forces is about 1,500. That's a much more manageable threat than if the USAF F-35 fleet was added. Keep in mind the Americans also have to keep an eye on East Asia and could not risk to exhaust their entire inventory without scrapping their war plans contingency plans regarding PR China.

Still, it appears that taking out about a dozen supercarriers is easier than to take out 1,500 1st and 2nd rate combat aircraft. It's clearly feasible if French SLBMs were used. This would leave the Americans with only their amphibious carriers with F-35B (and no real AEW), unlikely to strike at the industrial cores of free Europe.

This leaves mostly the existing map of land bases as a huge (USAF-sized) issue:

Greenland would be difficult to garrison sufficiently in peacetime.

Morocco, Israel (and possibly Egypt) are sovereign non-allied countries and could rather not be garrisoned.

Iceland, Faroers, Ireland, Azores, Madeira and Canary Islands could be defended, but fortifying these with missile-based defences and artillery-strong garrisons (though largely just pre-positioned hardware for such) would require much local real estate, budgeting for more than € 100 bn initial costs, consent by the respective sovereign European country and most of all politicians who actually understand that we may need to deter & defend towards the West. They were raised into a world where this sounds like mirror universe concerns. Additionally, the Eastern European countries are obsessed with the threat posed by Russia for understandable reasons.

What does it take to defend an island base against a dozen supercarriers and the USN's amphibious fleet?  The easiest approach would be detection + area bombing with SLBMs.* This should be an option, for this option would force the attacker to disperse. Dispersed forces are easier to keep out (though not easier to defend against air strikes). Moreover, a "Marianas" base for bombing Europe would probably need to be annihilated by SLBM anyway. This means an evacuation of civilians from the smaller islands at the beginning of armed hostilities would be advisable (at the very least from the Azores). Such an evacuation might be decisive at deterring an invasion; who would execute a risky invasion knowing that it won't give a usable base?

Another important ability would be to enter the fight over Faroers, Madeira and maybe Moroccan Coast in the air. This is similar to the need to fight a conventional air war against carriers. We should have hundreds of sets for turning airliners into tankers and platforms for (anti-ship capable) cruise missiles. Moreover, we should have diverse (in case one technological approach proves a failure) anti-ship-capable cruise missiles and similarly-ranged anti-radar missiles in stocks. These munitions would also be relevant for deterrence & defence in the East (in land attack roles), so the expense may be justified rather easily.

A conventional approach against bases is to attack them via air strikes or to blockade them. A close  blockade might be a job for non-nuclear submarines, while a far blockade could be executed using armed merchantman commerce raiders. Air strikes on bases would be quite similar to air strikes on carriers; a standoff launch of missiles would be preferable. Converted airliners could serve as launch platforms for attack and decoy munitions while military aircraft provide the strike package's escorts (fighters, standoff jammers, passive electronic warfare).

Free Europe might have a good case for cooperating with unfree China to develop such strike package capabilities during the 2030's - all out of necessity.

Finally (for part III), a general statement:

It's foolish to buy any air forces or navy equipment from the U.S. that has a radio frequency antenna or anything that could technically serve as such. All such equipment might have a backdoor command embedded that permits the Americans to sabotage its employment up to exploding while carried by its platform. Such systems often stay in service for decades and take yeas to replace, so it's unacceptable to buy American NOW, not only once America turned full Fascist.

This includes that all F-35 purchases by European countries are foolish, and less obviously so, al Americans-dependent aircraft systems (such as the Korean F-35 equivalent) are off limits as well.

Part III got quite long, so the deterrence topic will be covered in part IV.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: I'm sure that a first use of nuclear munitions against population centres is unacceptable, but a first use against naval forces of an aggressor is IMO neither unethical nor too risky. It depends on what alternatives are available, of course.

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Survivable brigade artillery: Light howitzer

A brigade of the line should be modestly ambitious, high end only in critical key areas (reliable instant communication in the field and ability to defeat any AFV type) and it can be designed to be very dependent on higher level support. This way we can force design a brigade of the line ('infantry brigade') that has the training requirements toned down enough that reservists can fill 99% of its jobs (all jobs except battalion CO, brigade CO and XO and some brigade HQ positions).

/2024/05/about-high-low-army-mixes-for-todays.html

It would be dependent on such support anyway, so the force designer can -in an act of self-discipline- drop the pretence that such a brigade could stand against a main effort attack on its own.

Long range artillery fires are amongst what can be outsourced to above brigade level. Supporting fires on several kilometres front width and several kilometres front depth on the other hand is an every day need and should be organic, thus more reliable.

There are two ways to address this; we could think at battalion level and require the range needed to support a battalion. This leads to a 120 mm mortar with usually much less than 10 km range.

To address a brigade sector with all indirect fire support weapons requires more range. How much depends on many factors. A brigade sector is often assumed to be about 20 km wide, which requires about 15 km effective (with acceptable dispersion!) range. That's more than 120 mm mortar offer.

One might say 155 mm could cover much more than that, but shells flying that far isn't quite the same as capability to support well at that distance. The dispersion gets ever worse with longer ranges (especially with RAP shells) and 155 mm shells have ceteris paribus a greater danger close footprint than 105 mm shells have. In combination, you could not give 155 mm fire support against targets close to friendly troops at much greater distances (if any greater ones at all) than with 105 mm guns.

You can expect a dispersion better than 0.3% of range (30 m shot length dispersion at 10 km shot range) and better than 1% of range left/right (with gun set after first shot, about 10 m shot dispersion left/right at 10 km shot range) from a modern 105 mm howitzer.

120 mm mortars are popular as battalion-level support, but they are largely unavailable for brigade main effort fires due to their short range (their time of flight and sensitivity to wind is bad at extended ranges). This makes them reliable organic weapons for the battalion commander, but suboptimal for the brigade. A brigade with 120 mm mortars would need howitzers (105...155 mm) as brigade asset to be able to move fires quickly in the whole brigade area of responsibility. 105 mm field howitzers can also be reliable organic assets; standing orders and hardcoded priorities in fire control software can ensure that a battalion in contact always has support by two ro three howitzers. A brigade with three infantry battalions and 18 105 mm howitzers would still have 12...14 howitzers available for the brigade CO's main effort this way.

Moreover, think of the typical frontline deployment of an infantry brigade: Either one infantry battalion forward and two behind or two forward and one in reserve. Brigade fire support that consists 100% of 105 mm howitzers could be 100% available in such dispositions, while 1/3 to 2/3 of 120 mm mortars would either be detached forward or unavailable for fires at most of the line of contact. A one battalion forward deployment also shows that this battalion's mortars would be overstretched on a 15 km brigade frontage.

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So let's look at 105 mm howitzers for affordable brigades of the line, brigades suitable for creating, holding and occasionally slowly moving a defensible (often entrenched) frontline.

105 mm mountain howitzer OTO Melara Mod 56

The old light (mountain) howitzer OTO Melara 105 mm Mod 56 may serve as an example. Its dimensions in travelling configuration are

• 3.65 m length
• 1.5 m width
• 1.93 m height (can be lowered to 1.55 m)

A more modern piece is the GIAT LG-1 Mk. III:

• 5.20 m length
• 1.85 m width
• 1.62 m height

Both fit into a normal European car garage, which has approx. the internal dimensions

• 5.5 m length
• 2.3 m width
• 2 m height

An ISO 20 ft container (which could be dropped in the landscape by the thousands) has the internal dimensions

• 5.89 m length
• 2.35 m width
• 2.39 m height
  

This makes it much more feasible to effectively hide with such a gun than with 155 mm or self-propelled guns.

I say it's possible to design a more modern light howitzer that fits this description:

• shorter than 5.4 m
• narrower than 2.2 m
  
• lower than 2 m
• fits into a typical European car garage
• fits into ISO 20 ft container
• boattail shell range no shorter than 10 km
• maximum elevation 70°
  

I strongly suppose it's possible to add these features without exceeding the dimensions

• integral accurate position- and northfinding equipment
• integral auxiliary drive (battery-electric or 2-stroke diesel or a hybrid of both) for moving on flat hard surfaces under own power forward/backward up to running speed
• hydraulic power from auxiliary drive can be used to raise the spades (getting them unstuck manually may take time)
• boattail shell range 15 km
• basebleed shell range 18 km
• burst rate of fire 12 shots in one minute (as have L118 and LG-1 howitzers)
• barrel (liner) durability (and carriage durability) better than 5,000 EFC (equivalent full charges)
  

without it becoming too big to hide, to difficult to move or unsuitable for a 4x4 SUV as towing vehicle.

This would give the howitzer fire support qualities against all line-of-sight threats that the friendly forces face. Most targets that are identifiable with small (highly expendable) quadcopter drones or mast-mounted sensors would be within range as well. Deeper fires would be left to 'real' artillery, while this 105 mm howitzer would be more of a 120 mm mortar (practical range less than 10 km) alternative. Some danger close fire missions would be executed with SatNav-independent trajectory-correcting munitions to reduce the dispersion in range.

The howitzer could hide in a partially destroyed building, a 20 ft ISO container, a concealed trench, a garage or in woodland. The crew could receive a fire mission, move the howitzer into firing position in less than a minute, fire twelve shots in one minute (first shot least accurate and possibly self-destructing used for setting and measuring muzzle velocity only, others benefitting of now embedded spades and measured muzzle velocity of first shot) and go back into hiding within up to 2 minutes.

The munition of such twelve shots would weigh less than 250 kg including fuzes and propellants. This means a transportation with some kind of wheelbarrows would suffice for 100 m, alternatively even a small car such as Suzuki Jimny could provide a platform for the munition, for a fire control laptop, a radio and also serve as a towing vehicle (towing capacity of Suzuki Jimny is 1.3 t).

It might even be possible to hide the gun inside a shovel-dug trench (with overhead concealment if not cover and a ramp). The gun's auxiliary propulsion might drive an onboard winch to pull the gun out of the trench easily and quickly.

Even a combination of counter-artillery radar, standoff observation drones and PGM for counterfires is not very effective if the opposition can move and hide its guns like this. You might need to hit 5...20 probable locations to hit one gun, and such guns are difficult to take out of action for good. The guns would be dispersed; counterfires could never hit more than one gun and its crew. Friendly forces and civilians would be banned in the general area and the gun would thus be deployed at a safe distance to important roads and villages.

So what would be the jobs of such brigade artillery?

• suppressing fires (105 mm is about as effective as 155 mm at this)
• destructive fires at soft targets of opportunity (single gun or few guns on point targets, massed fires on area targets), including fires on mortar teams and triangulated radio frequency emitters
  
• fires at marshalling areas
  
• (IR) illumination shots
• (multispectral) smoke fires
• leaflet (propaganda) fires
• occasional neutralising fires
  
• possibly shooting down observation drones if they are close enough (using proximity fuses)
  

This leaves especially deep fires, fires on hardened targets and most neutralising fires to the higher level artillery (divisional or corps artillery). This frees the brigade HQ of tasks, as they would not have to handle such activities. The forward observer teams and aerial observation would communicate targets for deep strikes and hardened targets directly o higher level fire support.

The brigade HQ would not pay much attention to what happens beyond about 5 km of its troops other than receiving warnings about incoming hostile forces. This limitation of the brigade HQ is possible and driven by not giving the brigade longer-ranged artillery (such as 155 mm howitzers or MRL) and it helps with allowing a slim, quick and largely reservists-staffed brigade HQ.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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A Personal Defence Weapon

 

Personal Defence Weapons (PDWs) are weapons meant for soldiers who do not have shooting at the enemy with small arms as an important part of their job description. Support troops, tank crews, helicopter pilots and even infantry platoon leaders qualify.

Early examples of de facto PDWs were the revolvers or pistols used by officers and the relatively weak M1 "carbines" of the U.S. Army in WW2.

Germany used UZI submachineguns for that purpose during the Cold War and introduced the dedicated PDW "MP7" with its tiny bullet since. The pistols in use with the Bundeswehr are not really de facto PDWs; their primary utility is in being guns with ball cartridges for escorting men outside of barracks who carry war small arms with useless blank cartridges. This way nobody shoots a gun with deadly munition while thinking it's loaded with blanks and there's still protection against people with pitchforks overwhelming and robbing an entire infantry platoon on a foot march.

PDWs are not really meant to be used against hostile troops even in wartime. They would only be used to shoot in anger under extreme circumstances. Most likely, the user would stand no chance due to morale, (lacking) combat training, lacking night vision and/or circumstances anyway.

PDWs do serve purposes, though. They make the user feel armed (and thus respected as a soldier) and they may be used to control prisoners of war or to scare away civilians who interfere with military operations.

PDWs do thus not need to be very powerful or high end. NATO was famously looking for PDWs that can penetrate a certain bulletproof vest concept (titanium plate + aramid layers) at a useful distance. this ruled out submachine and probably served no other purpose.

The cheapest way to create a PDW would be to build some super-cheap submachinegun such as a modern Sterling submachinegun. It would fail to be perceived as a respectable military weapon nowadays, though - and thus fail the morale job of the PDW.

In practice you could use just about any assault rifle or battle rifle (G3, FAL) to equip non-infantry and non-dismounted scout troops, but those would be quite cumbersome practically all the time they are carried. Thus they would not be carried for almost all the time.

I pondered about the concept of a PDW long before I started this blog in 2007, and just in case I ever need a blog post and can't come up with any decent topic I'll write down my currently favoured concept for a PDW (unless the armed forces have enough old assault rifles / carbines in their stocks):

It shall be

1. lightweight
2. cheap
3. not cumbersome
4. respectable
5. with good ergonomics
6. fully sable in all seasons
   
7. built for their users (who don't get much small arms training)
   

• 5.56x45, 5.45x39 or 5.8x42 mm calibre (depending on standard calibre in use with the armed force)
• reason: lightweight cartridge, small recoil, penetrated soft body armour, flat trajectory makes aiming relatively easy out to 200 m at least
  
• chrome-lined barrel of about 28 cm (about 11") length
  
• reason: That's long enough for the purpose with 5.56x45 mm at least, especially with a high pressure cartridge such as EPR
• chrome lining more to preserve the weapon during 50+ years of use than to enable more shots fired
• barrel should be of lightweight construction ("pencil" barrel, outer diameter ~ 16 mm (0.625") and does not need to be armourer-level exchangeable
• few practice shots per year on average, as most PDWs would be stored for mobilization, not be in use by active duty troops
  
• assumed munition loadout: 20 rounds in loaded magazine (wartime only), twice 30 rounds in pouches, maybe another 20 rounds in stripper clips in a pouch
• infantrymen would carry much more munitions, support personnel would certainly not carry more on the body most of the time! Cartridges in stripper clips are a very lightweight reserve just in case the more readily usable cartridges in magazines were spent very quickly.
• 20 rds magazine loaded becuase this protrudes less than 30 rds magazine; less bulky
  
• an effective (but preferably short) flash hider
• the shortness of the barrel makes the muzzle flash worse, so a basic flash hider such as A2 is unsatisfactory
  
• handguard around the barrel with M-LOK interface on top and bottom
  
• just in case upgrades (or iron sights) are later deemed advisable, more lightweight than NATO rails
  
• forward hand grip in front of magazine well
• improving ergonomics of shooting at marginal additional weight
• least protruding solution
• example picture; shaping should be integral with magazine well rather than an aftermarket solution, of course
  
• short stroke gas operated system
• no direct impingement to reduce need for cleaning, quite lightweight
  
• closed bolt operation
• necessary for sufficiently small dispersion out to respectable 200 m
  
• bolt catch; bolt remains in sprung position after last cartridge
• so the user immediately notices when the magazine is empty
  
• so the user doesn't need to repeat manually after changing the magazine
  
• larger tolerances than with infantry & scout assault rifles
• for reliability when dirty and lower costs, leading to a MOA (dispersion) of 2 or 2.5 (2.5 for air force and navy personnel other than guards)
• this should also reduce production costs
  
• suitable design and oil for reliable operation at -30°...+50°C operation at any humidity and the use of manually repeating weapon should be possible down to -40°C
• four seasons lubricant and four seasons cleaning oil
• no touching of metal parts necessary for combat use
• in case it's freezing cold and the user has no or only thin gloves
  
• good (nowadays ordinary) ease & quickness of assembly, cleaning and disassembly
• better odds of good-enough care even if the NCOs fail to enforce it
  
• for aiming just a cheap AAA battery-powered red dot sight on a NATO rail, flip switch for on/off (explanation later)
• red dot sight because this requires the least training and is the easiest to use under stress, a really cheap one suffices
  
• red dot suffices for effective range of 200 m due to flat bullet trajectory with this cartridge & barrel combination
• AAA instead of AA battery for less weight and bulk
• red dot size 2.5 MOA
• suitable for 200 m
• large and thus easy enough to see for close fights
  
• 2.5 MOA happens to be close to the dispersion MOA value of the gun
• sight line protected against smoke from hot barrel and possibly evaporating weapon oil
  
• trigger group with fire select trigger (single shot and either burst or full auto, depending on the armed service's preference - I would go for a 3...5 rds burst)
• mostly meant to make it easier for already terribly stressed users in close combat defence situation
  
• safety lever and all other interfaces in ambidextrous design
• ergonomics for right handers and left handers
• this includes symmetrical grip shapes
  
• ejection of spent cases can be changed between left and right by unit armourer, ideally without requiring spare parts
• ergonomics for right handers and left handers
• comfortable resting location for the index finger to promote safe behaviour (again ambidextrous)
  
• all interfaces and trigger guard designed with possible use of winter gloves in mind 
• a short buffer spring
• so unlike with AR-15 design you may use fully folding shoulder stocks
  
• a fully top-folding stock, unfolding it should switch the sight light on and folding should switch it off
  
• example (for a shotgun) here. I understand this is not exactly top ergonomic, but it doubles as mechanically protective cover for the red dot sight
• minimizes the folded length (shorter than telescopic stock)
• narrower than side-folding stock
  
• it discourages the shooting while folded unlike the ergonomically similarly bad underfolding stocks, as it would obstruct the sight and would be very visible on top
• the stock would be angled when unfolded
• so the sight line is directly above the barrel and no bulky carry handle on top would be needed to raise the sight line as with a straight stock
• happens to reduce the silhouette when shooting aimed shots over a cover compared to straight stock weapons with their sights mounted high over the barrel
  
• no use of a sling, but multiple carrying solutions; the most relevant one would be a cushioned carrying on the back parallel to the spine with magazine well facing outwards (with a quick release interface!), ideally with other things (counterweights) worn on the other side of the spine such that you could even sit comfortably in a (vehicle) seat with the PDW on the back
• cleaning kit either stored in the primary hand grip or stored in the carrying interface
• no such thing as a forward assist
• marginal utility
• understood to be unnecessary in all rifle families but one
  
• compatible with all cartridges of the calibre at least with unit armourer-level adjustment of the gas operation
  
• steel parts gunmetal-finished, all other parts in a brown matte unicolour camouflage
• steel magazines
• cheap and durable
• I understand this is an exception from the rule to not need to touch metal in freezing temperatures
  
• unit-level armourer should be able to measure & replace magazine springs that were worn out
  
• availability of easy-to-use dry zeroing device on the small unit level
• important for maintaining zero and thus trust in the guns
   

Sadly, I do lack both the artistic talent and graphics software skills to illustrate such a PDW concept.

In the end, such a PDW would be more expensive than mass-produced assault rifles unless it is mass-produced itself as well. There's good reason why a PDW would be mass-produced; the vast majority of military personnel are neither infantry nor dismounted scouts. Those are a minority even in an infantry brigade.

One problem remains; non-combat and non-scout troops don't have much night fighting ability. Their NCOs may use flare guns for illumination and there may be some lights (essentially state of art of early WW2), but the expensive, fragile and scarce 3rd generation night vision devices and the thermal vision devices (which discharge batteries quickly) would be limited to infantry and scouts. The typical PDW user small unit is thus* at an even more pronounced disadvantage against infantry at night than at day. One could use cheap digital night vision with some illumination, but would that really be in stock for reservists throughout the 'lifetime' of a PDW (which could be 60 years)? Electronics don't last as long as guns, even when stored properly and separately from batteries.

And then there are other challenges for non-combat troops who need to defend themselves against infantry or scouts. In the end, nothing much more successful than a modest 'always carry' PDW with basic night vision will prevail due to the expenses involved.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: With PDW or an assault rifle like G36 or HK 416 doesn't matter - it's almost entirely about the night vision, training, mindset, organisation and the other weapons.

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A praise for the disrespected "battle taxi"

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Helmets were introduced in the First Word War and did cut the count of killed in action troops by about a half (rule of thumb) by protecting the skull against most fragments (mostly of high explosive grenades).

Fragmentation protection vests (colloquially 'flak vests') were introduced for real in the Korean War and had a similar effect on top of the helmets' effect, by protecting the torso against most fragments.

The armoured personnel carrier (APC) was invented in the First World War and introduced for real for the Second World War. It was also said to have reduced the killed in action count by about half. The APC protected against stronger fragments (still not all fragments, though) and also against most (not all) bullets. Even the notoriously poorly-armoured M3 Half-track was a huge improvement over any unprotected vehicle.

 

APCs had thus a spectacular effect; it was much easier and much quicker to approach hostile infantry positions in an APC and the losses were smaller than without APCs.

The open-topped APC designs were followed by closed APC designs since the 1950's.

The force developers and doctrine developers were dissatisfied with a mere APC, though. APCs had already been armed with support firepower during the Second World War, or used for specialised purposes such as forward observer, scout, engineer teams, longer range radio vehicle, illumination vehicle or anti-tank gun carrier. The result was inevitably a loss of life-saving and combat-accelerating protected transport capacity for infantrymen.

 

 

There were calls to move from transporting infantry to drop-off locations towards fighting while mounted, and a modification of the APC concept into the IFV (infantry fighting vehicle) concept was favoured. The concept for mounted infantrymen using their own weapons while riding an IFV did not stand the test of time, tough. Nowadays IFVs have similar movement and sensors as main battle tanks, albeit using autocannons and anti-tank guided missiles rather than one powerful large calibre single shot gun.

/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html

The costs have risen badly, and IFVs are so expensive that we cannot afford enough of them to transport enough of our infantry in IFVs. A move towards wheeled APCs as cheaper means of transportation wasn't spared from the general urge to demand gold-plating and autocannons, as visible with the American (Swiss Piranha IV design) "Stryker" vehicles, which got first very expensive and nowadays receive autocannon turrets at costs that exceed the costs of an APC.

 

APCs have certain advantages and disadvantages compared to IFVs:

(+) lower costs

(+) higher seat capacity (often about 10 seats in APCs, about 7 in IFVs)

(+) usually lower weight, thus a tendency towards lower ground pressure

(+) usually a lot smaller (especially lower)

(-) lesser sensors

(-) less firepower

(-) gunner doesn't get directed by a commander

The protection of IFV and (H)APC can be about equal for the hull, this depends on requirements.

The title promised a praise, but so far there's just a historical and status quo summary.

Here's the praise; an APC (a.k.a. "battle taxi") is much more versatile and survivable than an IFV.

Few would agree outright. Isn't an IFV more versatile because it has more firepower? Isn't an IFV more survivable because it can destroy threats and usually has better protection?

The tracked armoured personnel carrier has superior versatility compared to an IFV

This gets obvious once one looks away from spec sheets and line drawings, moving attention towards how AFVs are used in battle.

An APC has superior cargo and passenger capacity, and this is of great utility.

• It can move infantry into the fight.
• It can extract infantry from a fight.
• It can extract prisoners of war from a battlefield.
• It can extract civilians from a battlefield.
• It can supply troops in contact with the enemy with (hot) food.
• It can supply them with beverages.
• It can supply them with munitions.
• It can supply them with batteries (and fuel).
• It can supply them with tools.
• It can supply them with cold weather and night equipment.
  
• It can transport equipment on its roof.

The importance of being able to rather safely transport stuff and people though the last couple kilometres to a company in contact is easily underestimated. An IFV has transportation capacity as well, but much less so - and it would inevitably have a crew of at least two during supply runs because the autocannon turret is too enticing, while an APC could very well ditch the gunner and make a risky supply run with a crew of only one (or even unmanned).

Moreover, IFVs have only about 2/3 the transport capacity of APCs and are more likely to get fixed rather than foldable seating, which means even more volume is lost for transportation. A fine APC design would have foldable seats for benches and a floor that's suitable for pushing or pulling pallets.

Puma IFV

APCs and IFVs can be organised in different ways. They may be part of a specific section of infantrymen (section leader then being IFV commander, usually dismounting with the other dismounts) or it can be a support assets (one APC or IFV could move different sections in battle). The latter is particularly unpopular because it's less suitable for the quick assault doctrines that originally spawned the 'infantrymen shoot from inside their armoured vehicle' approach. You can also be quick while riding a battalion-level APC, but it's not so natural.

• Most missions from the list above are much more natural to non-organic* APCs than organic APC and IFVs.
  
• There are huge advantages to be had in separating infantry sections from their vehicle, though.
• The section leader does not need to occupy his mind with the vehicle while dismounted.
• The vehicle can be hiding many kilometres away, while an organic IFV would be kept close to the infantry fight.
• Less training requirements for the dismounts.
  

A disadvantage is that the small (APC) crew of two would have to do all routine maintenance on their own, but that's not so terrible with bandtracks and they may often visit a maintenance point in the 'rear'.

The tracked armoured personnel carrier has superior survivability compared to an IFV

An IFV could fight against main battle tanks with its guided missiles (and its autocannon), but doing so needlessly exposes it to MBTs. You can kill the MBT with a man-portable missile fired by dismounted infantrymen (or dedicated tank hunter troops).

An IFV is a fire support machine. It needs to expose itself in line of sight with enemies to give said fire support. An APC may be misused as a fire support machine (the American FM 7-7 actually mentions this as doctrinal), but it can also be limited to 95% transportation and 5% assault transportation roles.

An IFV carries great secondary explosive hazards internally (autocannon munition, anti-tank guided missiles) or else it doesn't have much staying power regarding its firepower.

The APC would have better odds of survival even with lesser protection than an IFV simply because it's going to be exposed to less risks. This is especially egregious as IFVs usually fall well short of having the protection level of main battle tanks. A MBT+APC combo would use the better-protected MBTs for fire support that a MBT+IFV combo would largely give with its IFVs.

I consider IFVs to be an ill-advised and overrated concept. The IFV's fans ignore that the IFV concept keeps not delivering on its promises.

/2022/03/ifvs-are-failing-again.html

The extremely high costs of today's IFVs (due to the electronics of the turret that are equals to MBT electronics) leads to poor infantry strength and in case of long-ongoing wars it leads to most infantrymen lacking protected mobility because peacetime spending was wasted on gold-plated IFVs.

The "battle taxi" concept is underrated because people don't quite understand the importance of transportation on the battlefield. They pay too much attention to the shooting part.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

*: Not belonging to the same unit.

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Artillery calibres and concepts

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The most common artillery (gun) calibres are nowadays in the 105...155 mm range. Bigger guns largely fell out of favour due to aircraft bombs taking over their roles and smaller guns largely fell out of favour because direct artillery fires lost importance post-1914.

 

75 mm was considered the minimum calibre for a high explosive (HE) round to be really good at supporting infantry with direct fires. Infantry support tanks of late 1930's received guns of such a calibre, albeit wartime experiences led to the introduction of bigger calibres (up to 152 mm plus one freak design) for that role.

75 mm infantry gun, for supporting infantry

75 mm calibre guns had often a high muzzle velocity, which gave them a secondary anti-tank capability. This also allowed for a little better ranges than the common 105 mm howitzers of the time had. Their indirect fires usefulness was hampered by the small explosion signature (bang, smoke, dust) of their 75 mm HE shells, though. It was difficult to observe the explosions with sound ranging or visual observation from afar. There's no correction of fires without feedback from observers, thus poor accuracy.

105 mm howitzer HE was an indirect fires sweet spot for a long time, and probably still is. The Russian/Soviet 122 mm calibre was a bit more powerful and the British 87.6 mm (25 pdr) calibre was fairly close as well, but 105 mm was understood to be very efficient for fragmentation effect and suppression. 150...155 mm HE shells were more powerful individually, but covered less area with fragmentation effect or suppression effect than did the 105 mm HE - pound for pound. 105 mm HE also enjoyed a reputation for being more capable at shooting danger close (at targets very close to friendlies), albeit this is a negligible difference when the guns don't have a tight dispersion.

I've seen tables and lessons learned about 105 and 150 mm howitzers use in WW2 and the conclusion from the different quantities of munitions needed for certain effects was simple: You did not need more 105 mm munitions mass for the purpose than 150 mm munitions mass. The calibres were largely substitutes for effects. You needed more 105 mm shells for the job than 150 mm shells, but a 105 mm shell weighs about 17 kg, and a 150 mm shell weighed about 40 kg. 105 mm howitzers also had a little higher burst rate of fire (fires in first minute before the barrel is hot and rate of fire has to match how quickly the barrel cools down). 150 mm howitzers had some manpower efficiency and sustained firepower advantages (both calibres sustained about the same rate of fire).

150...155 mm had two big advantages over 105 mm  during the world wars, though. One, it was more capable of piercing overhead cover and the roofs of field fortification bunkers (several layers of wooden logs plus earth, supported by wooden logs). This is where the 150...155 mm success came from; Germans tested field fortifications around 1900 and came to the conclusion that a 150 mm shell was required to penetrate a field bunker (but keep in mind howitzers had poor muzzle velocities at that time). Such intent to destroy almost entire sections or platoons in a field bunker led to a mass employment of heavy howitzers (and even heavier artillery) in the Great War a.k.a. First World War.

Two, larger calibres are also more efficient for long range (better ratio of kinetic energy to drag), and howitzers grew into high velocity (and thus long range) guns especially after the Cold War. Today's 155 mm L/52 howitzers have ballistics that rival late WW2 high-performance cannons of about the same calibre.

modern 155 mm L/52:  43...43.5 kg shell, approx. 945 m/s with maximum charges

150 mm Type 5 (1945): 41 kg shell, 930 m/s

155 mm is thus superior to 105...122 mm for two purposes; destructive fires on field fortifications and long range fires. The latter were a nice niche for dumb shells in the 1990's till 00's, but it's obvious that guided rockets are more suitable for it because it's much easier to give guidance to a rocket than to an abruptly launched (electronics need be hardened to this shock) projectile. Shells are normally spin-stabilised, which prohibits normal steering by rudders. Guided 155 mm projectiles are fin-stabilised and thus differ only in the mode of acceleration from rockets. The barrel restricts the calibre, so using rockets launched from pods makes much more sense for long range fires.

Which leaves us with the destructive fires on field fortifications (and rare effects on armoured vehicles) for the 155 m calibre. So let's talk about what I meant with "destructive fires".

There are harassing fires, suppressive fires, neutralising fires and destructive fires.

Harassing fires are almost always bollocks, waste of munitions and at times plain war crimes (if shot at the wrong coordinates).

Suppressive fires are more intense and shall limit hostile activities, especially how much hostiles dare to move or shoot. It's not so effective at limiting how much they observe and report. Suppressive fires may make sense to support (= protect) exposed (usually that's = moving) friendly forces.

Neutralising fires are more intense than suppressive fires and shall render hostiles combat ineffective through psychological effects (up to shell shock). The targeted troops may have a few per cent losses of personnel and material through blast or fragments, but that's not what matters. Properly done neutralising fires allow almost none of the targeted hostiles to be effective shooters for minutes after the end of the neutralising fires. Neutralising fires make much sense when friendly troops assault and take the targeted position soon after the neutralising fires ceased. Neutralising fires are thus most important for manoeuvring forces and for attacks with limited objectives (by forces of the line).

Destructive fires are not necessarily more intense, but they require much more munitions (or precise knowledge of hostile positions and great precision at firing at them with powerful-enough munitions). This is wasteful for manoeuvring forces such as a armoured formation on a rampage after breaking through a frontline. Destructive fires usually take more time and more munitions than neutralising fires (and may make the ground less trafficable by cratering), which is really bad for a manoeuvre force (force of exploitation).

also see FM 3-09 pages 3-25 and 3-26 if in doubt

Coming back to the forces of the line and forces of exploitation distinction, we can see that the middle calibre group of 100...105 (maybe up to 122) mm calibre was very suitable to support forces of exploitation.

The same calibre group was also very suitable for forces of the line most of the time. The two exceptions were long range fires (especially in WWI), which could be left to levels above divisions and destructive fires. Bigger calibres for destructive fires were not essential when breakthrough (using artillery mostly for neutralisation of the assaulted positions and suppression of other possibly intervening positions) was possible. The possibility of breakthrough depends more on morale and competence than on equipment, and some armies had this competence from late 1917 onwards.

The actual niche for 150...155 mm calibres was thus attrition through destructive fires along the frontline. This was likely the main reason for why 150...155 mm "heavy" howitzers were used by most European and American infantry divisions of WW2 and also considered essential during WW1. Their popularity also stemmed a bit from (slightly) better ranges than 105 mm had and subjective preference of bigger bangs. The weights particularly of WW2 howitzers were troublesome if not intolerable for horse draft, though.

152...155 mm calibre munitions are also more efficient for the deployment of cluster submunition types than 105 mm, but this advantage is now gone due to the widely followed cluster munitions ban.

The smaller size of 105 mm guns and their easy integration into wheeled motor vehicles (such as 6x6 or 8x8 lorries, which allows for a fragmentation and bullet protection, 360° turret, 85° maximum elevation, whole crew onboard, RCWS and lots of munitions onboard) as well as their danger close qualities position them as rivals of 120 mm mortars. Meanwhile, their muzzle velocity allows their use as heavy anti-air gun against easy targets (such as multicopters) with appropriate proximity or electronic time fuses. Their much better range (and dispersion at range) than 120 mm mortars opens up opportunities for covering larger areas, including assisting neighbouring units by massing fires.

 

So long story short; 105 mm is still a great calibre. 155 mm is more impressive and can do almost all the same jobs (except danger close shots), but 155 mm is far from a necessity. A mix of 105 mm howitzers and precision-guided rockets of long range (as much maximum range as target detection range) would do the artillery job just fine and render mortars unnecessary. 105 mm is less demanding regarding platforms, purchase costs and just generally lends itself better to the battalion battlegroup organic fires role (and to small brigades).

 

related:

defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/search?q=artillery

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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Anti-tank mines

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Long frontlines are defensible after all when you're facing the Russian land forces because they suck and can't even match the state of art of breakthrough of 1917.

This means that frontline defence is something to look at - something I clearly didn't do much in the past.

The most messy element of a breakthrough is in my opinion the need to overcome (defended) AT minefields.

Anti-tank mines can be scatterable (and then lay on the surface) by helicopter or rockets, but fortifying a frontline for months demands an emphasis on properly-laid anti-tank mines that are just below the surface.

The laying of such AT mines leaves some visible traces, but this can be exploited to creating fake mine barriers without expending any mines.

A typical minelaying trailer/plough, source Ministry of Defence Ukraine

There are different kinds of AT mines. The simple pressure-fused circular mines are not very efficient. A more efficient form of AT mine is the bar mine, which is laid crosswise to the expected movement direction of hostile vehicles and can be triggered by pressure along its entire length (AT mines require pressures that normal humans don't generate without jumping onto the mine). This bar mine concept originated in Italy and was copied by Germany during WW2.

Italian WW2 bar mine (wooden)

A modern bar mine does not neet to be a simple blast mine. A linear shaped charge might make sense. Linear shaped charges might not cut through a tank's belly, but they would easily cut tracks with much less explosives than a blast mine. A downside would be the magnetic signature of the mine. A simple blast mine on the other hand could be largely non-magnetic, which has major upsides (low-flying tiny drones could map the locations of actual mines by using magnetic anomaly detectors).

Linear shaped charges, widely used in demolition

Moreover, the fusing should not be simple pressure fusing, so thermobaric and high explosive munitions cannot clear a lane in the minefield reliably. The fuse should either be built to require a longer pressure than explosions do cause or it should have a second fuse (acoustic or magnetic) confirming the contact before the charge explodes.

Magnetic-acoustic/vibration fusing can be combined with ordinary non-bar shaped AT mines. The advantage would be fusing across the entire tank's width rather than only under the tracks. This means a shaped charge(s) effect could be used to penetrate to the driver (or an IFV's engine). The blast would still be enough to cut tracks if they're on top of the mine. Personally, I would not trust such fusing because it can be defeated without damage to the mineclearing equipment and the fusing principle has a huge challenge in determining the right time for the explosion.

Tilting rod fuses can be used as well to explode a mine when a tank is touching the rod, but having a rod extend 60 cm from the soil seems to invite simple countermeasures to me. Furthermore, such tilt rod fuses can be activated by people, so there's the AP land mine ban issue.

The explosives should be insensitive enough to not go off on the shock of nearby explosions (or vegetation fires) for the same reason.

The mines should have a self-deactivation function (programmable time). They might also have a radio receiver and processor, so they can receive coded signals to deactivate and activate. This would enable friendly forces to pass when the mines are deactivated. Such functions do require a battery, though.

In any case, the minelaying device should create accurate recordings of the positions of laid mines.

None of the AT mines should have any trap mechanism against pickup; this would turn them into banned anti-personnel mines. It should be militarily unnecessary anyway.

Last but not least, the mines should have an interface for a demolitions fuse, so they could alternatively be used for demolition purposes.

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A defensive AT mine barrier (behind a picket & skirmish zone) could consist of 

• multiple fake mine rows
• a few low density mine rows
• a few high density mine rows
• ATGM teams with thermal sights guarding the actual mine rows against clearing vehicles in areas of long lines of sight
  
• infantry, remotely-operated AT weapons and jumping mines guarding the actual mine rows against clearing vehicles in areas of short lines of sight

About jumping mines; these videos explain this 1990's technology. They're very expensive and tend to hit the vehicle engine, stopping the tank or minesweeping vehicle. Enough and suitable passive armour on top could mitigate that.

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Infantry positions can be dealt with by proper reconnaissance, a decent brief artillery fires plan and a rapid assault with armoured vehicles (including dismounting infantry) with suppressive HE fires up front and smoke on the flanks. Resistance by infantry should be weak and largely ineffective if this is done correctly. Modern technology should even enable hasty attacks with near-full use of this breakthrough pattern.

A resilient AT minefield can mess with such a breakthrough plan. It makes the assault more hazardous and slower. The ATGM defences may only need to stop the few mineclearing vehicles in order to stall a breakthrough effort.

AT mines are not very expensive (save for the jumping ones) and are no high tech. The laying of such minefields is not terribly demanding, either. AT minefields can thus be a very affordable reinforcement to those forces that defend a frontline.

It may make sense even for NATO to pay attention to defending frontlines because this would enable a lower risk build-up of forces, an exploitation of superior artillery targeting ability and an exploitation of superior air power. To go all-mobile warfare with mechanised forces right away would be rather risky by comparison, especially as there are usually relatively few NATO forces on the Eastern frontier.

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

P.S.: There are lightweight AT mines meant for laying by infantry (rather than engineers). They can be very lightweight (about 1 kg) with a full-width fuse (magnetic, magnetic-acoustic or tilt rod) and are not meant for large minefields, but rather to be laid in a few select places. They may make sense in an AT plan, but the concept appears to be rather attrition-oriented than meant to stop or slow down a large assault. They could still be worthwhile, particularly with a secondary use for demolition & wall-breaching by infantry.

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