Nonsensical German army structure

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I'll deliver a critique of the nonsensical German army structure. It's the same bollocks as we've had for a long time, they just evolve bollocks. The German army ceased to be serious about conventional warfare sometime in the early 90's and the nonsensical army structure that would have been impossible with the 1960's, 1970's crop of generals is a symptom of this non-seriousness.

I did this before

/2008/12/todays-10-panzerdivision-bundeswehr.html

/2015/10/critique-of-german-army-brigades.html

 

I'll use the easily accessed and easily readable structure graphic from Wikipedia.

(c) Noclador see here

 

I partially checked on the Bundeswehr website whether the Wikipedia graphic is correct and as a result didn't find the Panzerbrigade 45 as part of the 10. Panzerdivision. This brigade was formally founded only days ago, so I suppose the official website is simply out of date. Another deviation is that Panzerbrigade is and always was one word, while Wikipedia calls it "Panzer Brigade", same with Panzerdivision and some battalion names.

Sigh. Let's begin, from the left.

 

1. Panzerdivision, three brigades. two to four brigades is OK for a division. An issue is Panzerbrigade 21 that doesn't fit qualitatively, later more about that. There's no divisional logistics formation.

Panzerlehrbrigade 9. A "Lehr-" formation is traditionally for testing, demonstration and training in addition to being an actual combat formation. That's a German thing. So basically, let's treat it as a Panzerbrigade and ignore the "lehr" part for the purpose of this blog post. Two tank battalions, two mechanised infantry / Panzergrenadier battalions.That's a lot, especially a lot of tanks (nominally) for a brigade. A Panzerbrigade should have a 2:1 ratio between tank battalions and (mechanised) infantry battalions.* A 1:1 or 2:2 ratio suits a Panzergrenadierbrigade, but admittedly, the difference should not just be a difference of balance, but also of attitudes and tactical principles (Panzerbrigade being more dashing, while a Panzergrenadierbrigade rather moves from one solid standing to the next solid standing). Here's the big problem with this brigade: It has no artillery and no mortars. It's not a combined arms formation. There is a divisional artillery battalion, but that's no excuse. There's no engineer battalion. The Panzerlehrbrigade 9's structure is simply wrong.

Panzerbrigade 21. It isn't. There's no tank battalion, not even a mechanised infantry battalion. An armoured engineer battalion is the only trace of a mechanised kind of brigade - exactly the battalion that the Panzerlehrbrigade 9 misses! There are three Jägerbataillons (kinda motorised infantry battalions; wheeled APCs, so not really light infantry) in this brigade. So why the heck is it called a Panzerbrigade? It's a Jägerbrigade or Infanteriebrigade! Well, at least it has an artillery battalion (the artillery systems are AFVs, as we have no non-AFV artillery). So this kind of brigade doesn't necessarily belong into a Panzerdivision, but I understand a case could be made for it. A bad, but for defensive missions workable brigade design.

Panzergrenadierbrigade 41. No tank battalion and no artillery battalion, but three (!!!) mechanised infantry battalions. Now we see that the one divisional artillery battalion (a mixed self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launcher battalion IIRC) is not really enough for the two brigades that lack artillery, even if the divisional commander did assign it. The Panzergrenadierbrigade 41's structure is simply wrong.

 

10. Panzerdivision. Five brigades including the 13th Light brigade (Dutch), too many IMO. 

Panzerbrigade 12. Three tank battalions (one of which with a nonsensical 'mountain' designation, but it does use Leopard 2), two mechanised infantry battalions, artillery battalion, engineer battalion. Main criticism: It's way too big, unwieldy. This is more like two brigades in one. That's borderline acceptable for a Panzergrenadierbrigade, but a Panzerbrigade should be agile, and this one is agile only if it separates into at least two parts, for which there's no command and support structure present. A brigade commander should not lead more than four line of sight combat battalions (span of command). Also, this oversizing conceals that there's not enough artillery. There should be two artillery battalions for five line of sight combat battalions. The Panzerbrigade 12's structure is simply wrong.

Panzergrenadierbrigade 37. Four (!!!) mechanised infantry battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery battalion, one engineer battalion. Again too big. The Panzergrenadierbrigade 37's structure is wrong because it has at least one line of sight combat battalion too many, but I understand that some people would argue that today's staff sizes, signals equipment, battle management systems would permit a command span of five.

Panzerbrigade 45, the one to be based in Lithuania. Let's ignore this one, it's being raised. The structure as shown is acceptable, main criticism is the unusually weak (only a company) engineer support and the infantry weakness considering how much woodland is in Lithuania. I generally reject multinational formations (the brigade integrates a NATO multinational composite battalion) and I dislike it being stationed in Lithuania. For one, I reject the concept of tripwire forces and second, being stationed abroad badly hikes the personnel costs due to extra pay.

Franco-German Brigade, a mixed French-German brigade loaded with much symbolic value. As mentioned, I reject the concept of multinational brigades. That being said, it's a kind of infantry brigade and the mix of battalions is OK. 

 

Rapid forces division / Division Schnelle Kräfte. This is basically the Col War cheat of the 12th division promised to NATO being a cheap airborne division, but the current crop of leadership at the MoD probably bought into their own propaganda. A para brigade, a mountain infantry brigade, a special forces command (size-wise a big battalion) and the helicopter forces (extremely shitty due to gold-plated yet extremely bad helicopter designs). A Dutch airmobile brigade actually belongs to this division as well. Marginal support formations.

Luftlandebrigade 1 (paras). Two para regiments, no artillery. The official website does not mention independent engineer and recon companies unlike Wikipedia. Main criticism: Airborne is bollocks, see Hostomel. Secondary criticism; no artillery is bollocks, too. This brigade is crap in conventional warfare. Most likely the brigade would (it certainly should) be reduced to an administrative staff, with the two regiments attached to 1. Panzerdivision and 10. Panzerdivision as divisional light infantry formations for woodland and settlement areas, requiring non-organic artillery support.

Gebirgsjägerbrigade 23 (mountain infantry bde). Three mountain infantry battalions, no artillery (Germany doesn't use pack howitzers anymore). The Gebirgsjägerbrigade 23's structure is simply wrong for lack of artillery.

 

Heimatschutzdivision with six Heimatschutzregimentern; this is basically an object security division, not meant for conventional warfare, but rather for guarding locations against sabotage and so on. It's also supporting allied forces in Germany or passing through Germany.  wrong, but this is due to lack of maintaining suitable artillery.

General remark: I didn't comment on the recon battalions so far. German recon is really more observation by now. Actual recon should be at higher echelon. 

All brigades are lacking proper air defence. There's simply no equipment for that in the German army, so it's not a brigade or division design issue, but a long term force development issue.

I understand that shortages of material, shortages of (having maintained) suitable training infrastructure for tank crews in certain areas, restrictions regarding where usable barracks are have influences the brigade layouts. Still, these on average appallingly bad brigade designs are damning for MoD leadership. Most importantly, these brigade designs show that there's no real concept of land warfare behind them.

 

We could have

• three agile tank brigades (tank bde + mech inf bn + arty bn)
• four all-round mechanised infantry brigades (tank bn + 2 mech inf bn + arty bn)
• two infantry brigades (3 infantry bn)
• three light infantry brigades (3 light infantry bn without APCs) 

All these would lack would be additional artillery for the latter five brigades (at 2...4.5 M € per howitzer and minimum 18 howitzers per brigade this would have been affordable; less than 1 billion € including periphery). There would be a clear repertoire portfolio and thus role set for each of these four brigade types. Instead, we have nine brigades, six fo them without proper doctrine / ill-fitted to doctrine.

I believe this continued (I kept complaining since 2008 !!!) failure to set up a sensible army structure is not tolerable, not excusable, not forgivable. The German citizens gave the German armed forces much money during this time. Much of it was wasted on bollocks. Relatively small changes in big ticket procurement would have sufficed to enable a MUCH more sensible army structure, as I laid out above. Instead, we get one abomination after another. The German public doesn't wake up to this, but in my opinion the presumption of competence in favour of the ministry of defence and the top leadership of the army has to be thrown out. Competent people don't produce such abominations. I understand there are restrictions, but those restrictions are not an excuse after 17 years. Every single minister of defence in this period was crap, their ministry bureaucracy was crap, the army heads were crap. The distraction by the idiotic Afghanistan missions are no excuse either. We've left Afghanistan almost four years ago. That's plenty time to reorient an army towards conventional warfare IF COMPETENTS ARE IN CHARGE ! They had enough money, but they are too incompetent to use it well. This is but the structure; personnel system, equipment issues, maintenance issues, training issues abound as well.

related:

/2022/04/an-army-corps-for-germany-revised.html

/2023/04/a-compact-and-agile-exploitation-brigade.html

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

*: 1:1 was highly regarded among 1950's WW2 lessons learned literature, with stronger infantry battalions than today's. What I wrote here applies to German traditional terminology, in which a "Panzerbrigade" is tank-heavy.

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I revised some of my strategic assumptions and conclusions

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It's about time to revisit key assumptions & conclusions of mine that I used since about 2009 at the latest.

I assumed that Germany's contribution to NATO and EU defence should be driven by its geographic position:

• not a frontier country itself
• not directly threatened itself
• close enough to the frontier for airbases that allow tactical aircraft to fly sorties on the Eastern frontier without refuelling
• close enough to the frontier to deploy road-mobile troops to the Eastern frontier within mere days

NATO in Europe (in dark blue), (c) "Starfire25"

My conclusions were:

• The army should orient itself towards very high readiness and the ability to deploy into combat over 1,000 km road within few days. Most allies could not reinforce Poland or Lithuania as quickly as us.
• The army would not need to remain in action for longer than four weeks, as allied troops would relieve German army forces, which could then be pulled away from combat for refit
• It's much more important to provide airbases in Eastern Germany than to add a couple tactical aircraft to active service in an alliance that has 2,000+ tactical combat aircraft in active service
  

Furthermore, I believed that there's about 5% probability of Russia attacking NATO within 20 years. The only "promising" scenario for that would be a strategic surprise attack based on a belief that there would be no nuclear war.

My reasoning was that Russia was the only justification for substantially more military spending than a mere scheme to retain military-specific competencies that could not be reacquired within about two years. We could safely reduce military spending to a small fraction without the Russian threat.

Now for the reality check:

Russia didn't execute a strategic surprise attack against Ukraine. Even the public knew about invasion preparations for months. NATO would have had time to counter-concentrate if it had een the target of the attack.

Russia expended the missiles it would have had to use in a strategic surprise attack on NATO, and it did so piecemeal.*

Russian logistics and doctrine were incapable of rapid and deep incursions in Ukraine. This means it's not all that decisive that Allies arrive in NE Poland and Lithuania within a few days. The same applies to intervention by tactical air power.

Russian non-state but state-steered propagandists expanded the acceptable discourse towards fantasies of killing everyone in NATO except a certain American fascist on TV.

Poland is building a huge (likely Potemkin villages) army with lots of  prestigious and very visible army systems purchases (especially tanks, SPGs, MRLs).

The Polish government (more accurately; the PiS party) is pissing me off with its Germanophobia and adversarial stance towards Germany and its abuse of Germany as a bogeyman to gain votes. Thus I lost interest in orienting the German military to specific Polish defence needs. As of now they can thank us for us not leaving NATO and leaving them with largely cut lines of communications to their Western allies.

The Russian armed forces embarrassed themselves in Ukraine, exposing that they are crippled by combining all known defects of Russian armed forces known from the past 200 years in one moment of time. To work out of this malaise with military reforms seems impossible for the kleptocrat regime. IMO only some of the problems will be solved or alleviated before 2040.

The economic situation of Russia and the fiscal situation of the Russian state have worsened badly due to sanctions, and even lifting many sanctions won't change that Russia will have much less exports in the 2030's, as their export goods are getting substituted. Russia won't be able to afford a rebuilding, much less sustain an enlargement, of its armed forces. The probability of war with NATO has dropped well below 5% over the next 20 years.

Ukrainians proved that at least select troops (with previous basic military training and good performance in primary education) can acquire enough competence with equipment and tactics within months.

Even the German peacetime training course has less than 90 workdays.

Adjustments to the conclusions:

I believe it's fine if the Polish want to go crazy on the army regardless of their small economy. Let them play army powerhouse at their own expense, it's their wealth that gets wasted. To elect shitty politicians has consequences, everywhere. We suffer our consequences, they suffer theirs.

We're close to the Eastern frontier, but I don't care nearly as much about high readiness any more. I believe my conclusions of 2009-2021 regarding high readiness are still easily in the realm of acceptable ambitions, but now I deviate from them. I had been indoctrinated with a cost efficiency mantra during years of university studies, and sticking to conclusions from old assumptions leads to wasteful actions. 

My ambition for Germany is now rather one army division in Eastern Poland within a week than one corps within a few days. The actual, real-world German army readiness is instead up to one brigade there in days (starts moving within 2...7 days).

A second wave should include another division equivalent of reserve formations, none of which should doctrinally be meant for very demanding manoeuvre warfare.

I stick to my opinion that adding and improving airbases matters more for alliance deterrence and defence than to buy sexy toys for Luftwaffe generals who don't want to be real estate administrators.

Munitions should be stocked for 30 days (NATO expectations, but ordinarily I don't care about what NATO wants) as an interim step, with ambition to reach 90 days worth of munition stocks. This is mostly about the need for indirect fires consumables (155 mm HE and IR-SMK shells, multifunction fuses and 4...5 propellant modules per shell).

We can go for a smaller active army than I believed; a smaller active army than we have.

 

We should turn away from the "standing army" paradigm that neglects the reserves

towards an emphasis on army power two weeks after mobilisation (V-Fall). This allows for much more army power two weeks after mobilisation with a smaller budget. It still permits to send a proper but small division (two brigades or three small brigades, few divisional troops) within a week (with consumables and 90% personnel and vehicle/major weapon system readiness for action).

I shall adjust my blogging accordingly.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: The use of dedicated launcher vehicles instead of having one launcher per missile lends itself very poorly to a massive surprise attack with missiles anyway. A Russian arms company proposed a containerised missile launcher, but that didn't go beyond CGI. A rearmament with enough launchers for mass launches would put the strategic surprise attack against air forces in Europe back on the table.

P.S.: There are also a couple adjustments to my opinions regarding supply logistics, Russian countermeasures and air defence, but I separate them into later blog posts.

It's good practice in administrations and business administration to revise strategies every about five years. I am revising old opinions after about a decade based on much new information. I don't feel ashamed about the need to change my views.

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Zentraler Sanitätsdienst / medical services in a military

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According to the Bundeswehr itself, the central medical service of the Bundeswehr counts 19,860 personnel out of a total of 183,116 (31st July 2022). This does not include soon-to-be officers who are studying at universities, those are counted separately. The personnel share is thus 10.8%. The Heer has a 34.3% share only! This is insane. The constitutional mission of the Bundeswehr is defence, not being a self-licking ice cone.

This large share is not all due to the greater ease of recruiting (particularly for officers, as they can easily transition into high-paying civilian jobs after their volunteer term). The Bundeswehr does traditionally maintain an oversized medical branch, and it did protect itself well against the otherwise widespread outsourcing to civilian contractors.

Overpriced, overweight, oversized MEDEVAC - a nightmare

 

(c) Wolpat

I will propose an entirely different way of doing business that would provide better care* AND reduce costs. But first, let me make a statement appraising the extremely important role of army medical services:

The confidence of the fighting men in getting good and timely medical treatment is an extremely valuable boost to morale. The effect of seeing a comrade in pain with a leg bone shattered by a bullet turns into sheer horror if you think that he'll either bleed to death, get his arm amputated or die in agony due to wound infections. Small unit leaders can get the minds of his comrades back on track to pursue a mission if the wounded man's pain gets treated (so he stops screaming), his bleeding stopped and blood loss compensated with intravenous liquid (better things than saline solution are available) supply. He needs to be moved away for medical treatment properly, and well-informed troops will understand that the survival rate can be near-100% if wounded men arrive at a surgical hospital within an hour, as even the really bad cases have a good chance of survival if they arrive there alive.

The army needs to take care of its soldiers and doing so does indeed help accomplishing missions. I don't doubt that at all, it's just that the bloated peacetime medical service is largely unnecessary and partially even detrimental to this.

 

So here's how I would do it (or rather, this is a first order proposal for a long-term transition):

(First, a precondition; the German military is for deterrence & defence, not for military adventure bullshit on distant continents. Any deployment outside of geographic Europe and NATO-included territories should be banned (save for tiny 2-men military observer missions).)

 

Every soldier has to join an ordinary Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (regulated health insurance, the most common kind of health insurance in Germany) and the Bundeswehr pays 100% (rather than the normal 50% employer co-pay) for the basic health insurance (no co-pay for any extras, but 100% reimbursement for dental treatments after service-related dental injuries and for certain jobs also 100% co-pay for eye surgery for improved vision). Illnesses and injuries in peacetime would thus overwhelmingly be dealt with by civilian medical care capacities.

The peacetime medical personnel gets reduced to

• One medical doctor per battalion-sized garrison, ideally with a civilian government-employed medical doctor (Amtsarzt) as helping out as backup. This medical doctor (actually no doctor degree required) gives medical courses at the garrison, confirms when a soldier is really too sick for work and is part of the battalion HQ.
  
• One combat medic with a combat medic backpack (and additional stuff stored in motor vehicles) per almost every** platoon meant for employment on the battlefield (not a member of the medical branch)
  
• Soon-to-be reservists on basic training
  
• Reservists on two-week refresher exercise
• A tiny, tiny overhead at whole Bundeswehr level administration for medical topics, mostly busy trying to introduce improvements (methods, tools, consumables, vehicles) and getting necessary procurement initiated.
  

(No medical doctors would be needed for the navy, for I would disband the useless service.)

The mobilised/wartime medical support would look like this:

Every non-officer in the Bundeswehr completes a full First Aid course (with a theoretical and practical test that needs to be passed!) every 2nd year, army personnel additionally receives combat injury-specific courses during the other years (also biannually, also with mandatory pass test). All personnel has a personal injury kit (mostly stored in upper leg pouches due to the low weight) and at least one canteen with (ideally sterilised) water (essential for treating white phosphorous wounds, for example).

Combat medics at platoon level stop external bleeding, replace blood loss (avoid volume shock), treat injury pain, provide quick assembly stretchers and arrange for casualty evacuation together with the assistant platoon leader. These combat medics would still be armed with a self-defence subcarbine with 100 m iron sights and carry maybe 2x20 rounds for it. Some platoon combat medics would receive secondary training as a signaller, to watch radio traffic for the platoon leader when the primary signaller is not available. Infantry combat medics would additionally carry non-munitions supplies such as batteries and not have an active combat role (other than keeping an eye on radio traffic and the back).

Battalion battlegroups have a bandaging station with a medical doctor and a few medics. They provide extra blood loss compensation, improve the blood loss stop and take care of burn wounds to limit the risk of infections. These bandaging stations/vehicles are the transfer point between casualty evacuation (CASEVAC***, transport by ordinary vehicle) to medical evacuation (MEDEVAC, using a dedicated vehicle with a medic taking care of the wounded during transportation - usually 4x4 vehicles).  They need to be highly mobile and should generally match the mobility of the battlegroup (so at least two 4x4 vehicles of less than 8 tons gross weight with 1.2 m maximum fording depth ability, better a 20 ft ISO container on a 8x8 universal container/pallet transport vehicle with protected cab). I would prefer complete camouflage over Red Cross markings for these vehicles, as the Russian military doesn't respect the Red Cross anyway.

We should not rely on helicopters for MEDEVAC, but (mostly civilian) helicopters could be commandeered for the purpose (with a new crudely-applied paintjob) - maybe their employment is not too risky, after all. No gold-plated nightmares like NH90 would even only be maintained in service, neither for MEDEVAC nor for CASEVAC.

An (the) army corps maintains two pairs of leap-frogging (moving alternatingly) mobile surgical hospitals. These would not be container & tent villages, but rather prefer to make use of civilian buildings with man-movable equipment (same as headquarters above battalion). Tents would be backups that should be avoided. Such a mobile surgical hospital would be the place for surgical treatment (including for eye and burn injuries), largely drawing on civilian emergency room experience of their personnel. Much attention would be on maximising the survival rates of highest priority patients, so these surgical hospitals have to be within range for the golden hour for battlefield injuries of almost all combat troops (not forward scouts). The primary job of these mobile surgical hospitals would be to make the patients ready for transportation by civilian medical transport vehicles to civilian hospitals. It would take care of all patients until they can be transported. This explains why we'd need leap-frogging hospitals; whether the army corps advances or withdraws or simply moves laterally to a different region; one hospital of the pair would stay behind with those patients that cannot be moved except in most dire emergencies. The exact required quantity of hospitals is driven by the operations area of the Corps (all combat formations within one hour radius of a mobile surgery hospital) and this leapfrogging (x2).

The MEDEVAC vehicles and their crews (for movement of wounded to the mobile surgical hospitals) would form each one MEDEVAC Company per mobile surgical hospital, consisting almost entirely of reservist drivers and reservist medics.

Battalion-level garrison medical doctors exist as in peacetime (though typically being reservists in wartime) unless the garrison is largely empty (it might be in use for refresher training for reserves in wartime).

And that's it. The use of civilian medical care in peacetime improves the care and reduces costs, while the wartime strength of the medical service would largely depend on reservists, especially regarding medical doctors.

The key challenge would be to recruit the medical doctors and medics who would normally work in the civilian world, but be available as reservists. This is so far being done by giving people contracts for 17 years including the time when they study medical jobs at civilian universities.

We'd need to apply a different motivation than providing medical training while paying them on the job for many years. I basically propose to pay only as much as necessary; they get subsidies for their years at a civilian university and become reserve officers (medical doctors for surgery/emergency care and for eye emergency care) and reserve non-commissioned officers (medics) with little basic military training and a two-week refresher course once every 2nd year (ideally with much of the 2nd week overlapping with a non-computer exercise at corps or at last battalion battlegroup level). The pay would be good, the intrusions into their life kept minimal and they would be shielded from the usual red tape bollocks as much as feasible.

Now keep in mind; this was partially tailored to an army that's based in its own country, preparing for being deployed to a rather populous (not desert-ish, devoid of hospitals) developed world region for alliance defence. This approach would work just as well for Republic of Korea (save for the navy) or Taiwan (save for their stupid forward fortress islands and their navy) and any European country if it abstains from stupid military adventures such as the stupid occupation wars of the past two decades or the war of aggression against Iraq in 2003.

- - - - - 

You may have noticed that what I described is not extremely different from what's being done or meant to be done, but I

• skipped insane waste of budget by relying more on civilian medical personnel,
• opposed the container+tent village nonsense for field hospitals,
• opposed MEDEVAC (dedicated vehicles) within the manoeuvre forces on the battlefield****
  
• and opposed gold-plated helicopters due to their high costs and survivability concerns.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: Disclosure: I received spectacularly bad dental "service" in the Bundeswehr in the 90's myself, and this poor treatment was directly caused by persisting systemic nonsense. The dental assistants were inexperienced and thus incompetent and did not find the correct tools for the dentist.

**: Not for tank platoons, for example. Platoons of mostly vehicle crews (also some logistics small units) could simply have some extra supplies such as IV solution and extra bandages stored in their vehicles and a member or two with extra training. It would be difficult to find a good place for a medic in such platoons.

***: By the way; vehicles suitable for CASEVAC (this includes APCs and if existing IFVs, both of which should have folding seats to enable transportation of stretchers and small pallets) should have equipment to mark themselves as in CASEVAC action, so for example military police knows to prioritise them in traffic. This could range from detachable blue lights to a red cross flag attached to the vehicle front.

****: I am in favour of having tracked protected carriers with a crew of two but no dedicated cargo or passengers, held at infantry battalion level. These kind of (H)APCs would move infantry, supplies, prisoners of war (evacuation only) and civilians (evacuation only) through dangerous areas of the battlefield, preferably with concealment (by smoke and terrain features), rarely support by neutralising or suppressive fires (usually only for infantry assault to objective). They would have thin folding seats on the sides of a separated transport compartment to offer maximum cargo and stretcher capacity with folded seats. These universal battlefield transports would be preferred for casualty evacuation and could easily store a couple litres of medical supplies. The infantry would normally ride in vehicles that have the very same (limited offroad, 1.2 m fording, 1000 km road range, 80 kph road march) mobility and protection (presumably mostly against 99% fragments of 152mm HE@50 m, maybe PKM ball bullets @100 m threat) as the vehicles of the battalion battlegroup support.

 

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An army corps for Germany - revised

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I wrote about my opinion regarding an army (Heer) reform in Germany leading to a single army corps both in 2010 and 2015.

/2010/08/bundeswehr-structure-what-i-would-do.html

/2015/11/an-army-corps-for-germany.html

The Russian land forces have proven to be underwhelming and appear to not have any hidden aces in the sleeve, especially no publicly unknown countermeasures for tank defence. Their tanks' survivability did not improve in more than 30 years. The Russian army will likely not become much better during the 2020's, considering the economic hardships of Russia in the years ahead. The Russian army in its current state would be hard-pressed to defeat a small fraction of European NATO.

 

I already wrote that such information is a reason to cut back plans for military power, NOT to increase the military budgets in an irrational panic move. So what's my update on the army corps?

 

- - - - -

I'm thinking now of a vastly less ambitious doctrine, and thus vastly less sophisticated and less expensive land forces.

My proposal is now to employ the militia concept and use it as a gateway for recruits (militia training equalling basic training for the whole military). The militia would not be part of the army corps, though. The overall militia strength could grow to a little more than 100,000 by the end of the decade and its training courses would be run by government-owned non-profit companies offering non-government union wages to suitably qualified trainers (former NCOs / former SaZ 8).

Army corps table of organisation:

• HQ company (yes, just a company)
• 2 Panzerbrigade (tank brigade; rapid mounted combat counterattack formations, would be most of the time held in reserve during a war)
• 4 Leichte Brigade ("light brigade")
• 1 Jägerregiment 
• 1 Lehrbrigade
  
• 1 support brigade 

About the Leichte Brigade; this is a scaled-down ambition force. Multiple infantry battalions, one wheeled 155 mm SPG battalion, one tank battalion for infantry support with 2nd rate tanks (Leo2A5 without hard kill APS).

The Leichte Brigade would seek to fight in a not very mobile manner, trying to establish a sensor superiority with 20 km deep target detection & classification. It would seek to become oppressive with responsive and accurate indirect fires, and its infantry would seek to win the close fight where standoff sensors cannot detect opposing forces. Take this video as an inspiration.

 

#Ukraine: A Ukrainian Recon drone found the firing location of a Russian Buk SAM system and despite Russian forces wisely moving quickly, was able to direct artillery fire, destroying the TELAR and other vehicles. pic.twitter.com/kiQmPwIizE

— 🇺🇦 Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) March 16, 2022

 

Its tanks would play a minor role with occasional direct fire support and they would be able to ambush hostile tanks with delaying action tactics, thus deterring rapid mechanised attacks (which could overburden the indirect fire support). The brigade would need to be able to fight with much dispersion. It would be a defence-only force until the tanks arrive, and then become limited offence-capable with the tanks.

It would receive the icon of an infantry brigade in NATO HQs, but I don't want to call it like that because it' really a triad of sensors + artillery + infantry (with tanks being support to the infantry mostly).

The Leichte Brigade is back on the table in my opinion because the Ukraine War showed that Russian tanks are indeed much more vulnerable to infantry anti-tank hardware than is state of the art. A single Leichte Brigade would have massacred the equivalent of four Russian brigades Northwest of Kyiv due to its artillery strength.

A Panzerbrigade is a high effort formation with high hardware and training costs. Relatively few are needed. Two would have sufficed in the Ukraine war so far, particularly for a counterattack ("Schlagen aus der Nachhand") between Mykolaiv and Cherson. Such a formation is extremely budget-heavy when done right, so we should not afford more than necessary. They would be kept in reserve much of the time because of their unique and rather specialised counterattack capability. They would not be as good for controlling or defending terrain as a Leichte Brigade.

 

The Lehrbrigade would be  a very unstable experimental formation testing new concepts in two-year cycles. They might even get leased equipment for two years and would be responsible for demanding troop testing of equipment (not testing new night vision goggles, but a new AFV generation, for example), tactics and organisations[edited in later because I forgot this]. Its personnel strength could fluctuate from 1,500 to 3,000 and its basing should make varied terrains accessible for training and exercises in a sensible radius.

The Jägerregiment is what would be a ranger regiment abroad. One battalion using Wiesels (since we already have them), the other one being totally light infantry with soft vehicles only. This is mostly a competence centre for light infantry and for providing VDV/Spetznaz-simulating adversaries in exercises. These battalions might temporarily be attached to a Leichte Brigade in particularly infantry-demanding terrain.

The expectations for air defence are much-reduced considering the unexpected ineffectiveness of the Russian tactical air force. Still, it makes sense to procure about the same mix; RCWS with an eye on the drone threat, some air defence suitable against munitions and MALE drones (relatively cheap missiles) and a high end area air defence probably along the lines of CAMM and IRIS-T SLM (NOT its radar), as SAMP/T has grown old by now and likely has a much lesser seeker performance. I would not rely on AMRAAM-ER or ESSM Blk 2 any more after the experience of the U.S. almost completing a transition of Fascism. The U.S. could turn into a threat within the 2020's and is thus no more an acceptable supplier for air defences, combat aircraft, AEW or anti-ship strike munitions in my opinion.

 

I do now rate the survivability of helicopters higher than before - against the Russians only. Helicopters are worthless targets against a state of the art opponent, but against Russians they could be used in rear area purposes; mostly MEDEVAC and liaison flights.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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Towed artillery "battery" / future German artillery options

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This is not how a competent land force (this may have been marines) sets up towed artillery nowadays (if it's stupid enough to still use towed artillery at all). More about this soon in the blog. https://t.co/kfT1WdUhQc

— Defence and Freedom (@DefenceFreedom) March 6, 2022

Destroyed Russian Artillery unit somewhere near Mykolaiv. pic.twitter.com/lbtz7NSl6M

— Aldin 🇧🇦 (@aldin_ww) March 6, 2022

A towed artillery firing unit used to be organised as a battery and set up as either a battery or half battery. Half batteries made sense; they supported the infantry like a battery using half as many artillery pieces, so the battery could leap frog; one half was always emplaced with guns ready to shoot and often times one half was not ready because of movement.

Batteries were often emplaced as seen in the videos, even as a long line. This made command & control easier. You might need to correct the aim of at leat some guns of such a linear battery, for else they would not aim at the same point.

This is utterly obsolete, outdated behaviour and has been utterly obsolete and outdated for well over 20 years.

See, the biggest issues with setting up an artillery piece is to know your position precisely (satellite navigation or measuring the angles towards multiple landmarks) and to know your orientation precisely (finding north - using landmarks or stars is better than a mere compass and map). You cannot accurately shoot at a coordinate if you don't know where your gun is and what direction your barrel is pointing at.

This has become rather automated with the availability of satellite navigation since the 1990's, and it's since become state of the art to give such navigation ability not just to the battery or half-battery, but to each individual towed gun crew or self-propelled gun vehicle.

This permits to emplace the guns with a wide spacing of kilometres, distances where counterfires would not hit more than one gun and radio or cable communication is still easily possible within the entire battery.  Self-propelled guns might even be completely independent, having their own fire control (no more need for one or two fire direction centre vehicles per battery), navigation and presumably self-defence capability.

So you can protect a towed gun firing unit even when you don't have the time for field fortifications to protect the guns (the hydraulic recoiling system is quite vulnerable to fragments, and the tires sure are as well) or at very least the crews (which didn't have even only shallow trenches in the video).

What we see in the videos is a battery of 1960's guns (actually very good ones back then, but badly outranged and thus very restricted in their possibilities today) in a hasty firing position that's reminiscent of the 1700's to 1980's. This is a consequence of incompetence at the small unit and/or unit level. I mentioned that the use of landmarks and maps for position-finding and north-finding is doable without any electronics. It takes simple yet accurate mechanical tools (to determine horizontal angles between landmarks correctly) and good maps. Technically, artillery firing positions could already have had spacings of 300 m between individual guns in the 1920's.

Furthermore, it's possible to explosively excavate a foxhole on the quick (been around for a long time, can be improvised). Towed gun crews who had no time to dig for cover could prepare such foxhole excavator charges and set them off once they notice counterfires. Combine this with a DRFM jammer against radio frequency proximity fuses and the odds of survival are greatly increased even against MRSI counterattacks.

- - - - -

By the way, the aforementioned advance in the state of art is a good reason to give up the concept of a "battery". Artillery firing vehicles should be self-propelled with a bulletproofed cabin and munition stowage, have a nearly 360° defensive gun (I would prefer a .338 machinegun) and be accompanied a second bulletproofed vehicle with the same armament (ideally a munitions resupply vehicle) for covering the dead angle in firing position (and especially if it's a 4x4 car also as advance guard during movement). This small unit should move, secure itself and navigate independently one the battlefield. It would receive firing missions by radio datalink and the "battery" turns into a artillery firepower unit (such as a company), which is merely an administrative construct with little relevance on the battlefield. The independently moving firing small units of two (maximum three; 8x8 SPG, 8x8 resupply and 4x4 scout car) vehicles each would also have to report by datalink where from where they have fired shots, so others don't drive into counterfires meant to hit another team.

A bit about hardware; we shouldn't spend big on getting stored Panzerhaubitze 2000 back into service in Germany. They are a pain in the a** to move long distances on road and guzzle much fuel.

The Rheinmetall/MAN 10x10 HX3 with 155 mm L/52 AGM turret seems much better-suited (capable of long range self-deployment by road) and could easily be accompanied by another HX2 or HX3 series resupply vehicle.

(sorry for the stupid audio, that's a stupid fashion from beyond the great pond)

In case that the AGM is so far commercially unsuccessful because its Panzerhaubitze 2000-derived autoloader doesn't convince: The Swedish Archer on MAN HX2 series 8x8 vehicle is another option (easily transferred to HX3). Both AGM and Archer vastly outperform the wheeled 155 mm SPG competition in terms of burst fire capability.

AGM: 

9 rpm, MRSI 4...6 rds depending on range, 360° traverse  (though over cab likely with some restrictions regarding elevation, maybe also propellant charge strength), shoot-on-the-move indirect fire capability, 60 rounds stored on 10x10 HX3 including 30 ready rounds in turret

Archer:

9 rounds per minute, 21 rounds in 2.5 minutes (then reload needed), MRSI 4...6 rds depending on range, 170° traverse, 20 seconds into action & 20 seconds leaving site (according to brochure), 21 rounds stored on MAN HX2 (or HX3) 8x8 vehicle

now for comparison a famous non-autoloader 155 mm SPG on wheeled vehicle:

Caesar 2

6 rounds per minute, thus much weaker MRSI, 60° traverse, "less than" 60 seconds into action, "less than" 60 seconds leaving site, 36 rounds on 8x8 vehicle

 edit: I should have mentioned Zuzana 2 as well: 6 rpm, 16 rounds in 3 minutes, MRSI 2...4 rds depending on range, autoloader and (very slow) backup manual loading, 360° traverse, 40 rounds stored on 8x8 vehicle that could use a German engine. I don't know if the 360° traverse means 360° capable of shooting full charge in lower register. Videos show Zuzana 2 firing without even deploying its two hydraulic legs, but I don't know how much propellant was involved in such shots. The advantages over Caesar 2 are the better crew protection and the certainly (even with caveat) greater traverse.

Zuzana 2 is supposedly cheaper than Caesar and Archer. AGM would be a fully domestic product, so about half of the price paid would return to the government through taxes. Its price should thus by understood t o be half of its nominal price, whatever that would be (I guess 10+ M € for the turret unless it's a bulk order for 200+ pieces).

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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[German] Behelfsweise Schnellreparatur des BMVg innerhalb einer Legislaturperiode

 

Man kann viel erhoffen für die Verteidigungspolitik in einer Legislaturperiode, doch schon bescheidene Hoffnungen werden seit Jahrzehnten zuverlässig enttäuscht. Die Bundeswehr bedarf jedoch erheblicher Reparaturen nach Jahrzehnten des Herabwirtschaftens seit 1990, nachdem die Bundeswehr schon 1989 eigentlich bereits vielfach Die Note "Mangelhaft" in Ausrüstung, Doktrin und Bevorratung verdiente. 

Hierzu beschuldige ich nicht vorrangig die Politiker. Das Hauptproblem stellt die Inkompetenz der Berufsoffziere und die kulturelle und organisatorische Nicht-Eignung der gesamten Organisationskultur oberhalb der Kompanieebenen dar. Die vielen offensichtlichen und katastrophalen Probleme gehen nicht darauf zurück, dass diese Leute nicht wissen, was funktioniert und was nicht:

Die Berufsoffiziere als Gruppe arbeiten schlicht systematisch in die falsche Richtung. Wer als Politiker ohne viel Ahnung ins BMVg kommt und sich erhofft, das Berufsoffiziere ihm/ihr/es erzählen, was getan werden sollte, ist bereits verloren und nutzlos. Die Böcke sind am Gärtnern. Und die Böcke wählen die nächste Generation von Gärtnern aus und befördern sie.

Die Schuld der Politiker ist hauptsächlich, dass sie nie das Ruder herumgerissen haben. Mehr Geld auf die Bundeswehr zu ver(sch)wenden hätte nichts gebracht. Man sieht ja, wie nutzlos die Steigerung des Einzelplan 14 von 2014 zu 2019 um nominal ein Drittel war. Die Lage hat sich nicht verbessert.

- - - - -

Hier ist meine Liste an Top Prioritäten für eine behelfsweise Schnellreparatur der Bundeswehr innerhalb einer Legislaturperiode. Das wäre keine Generalüberholung, sondern Flicken dort, wo besonders große Hebel oder größte Verschwendung sind.

Zweifellos hat jeder eine eigene Liste und die Allermeisten hätten gewiss einen diplomatischeren Stil in der Formulierung, aber ich könnte jeden Punkt recht ausführlich mit Fakten begründen und meine Geduld und Nachsicht mit der Bürokratie ist erschöpft. Dass die hoch angesiedelten Rädchen der Bürokratie seltenst absichtlich sabotieren oder böse sind ändert nichts daran, dass durchgegriffen werden muss. Die Reihenfolge der Liste ist übrigens bedeutungslos.

• Zerstörung aller Besatzungskrieg-spezifischen Geräte einschließlich Verbrennung aller persönlichen Tropentarn-Ausrüstungsgegenstände (bis auf Museumsstücke) in Freudenfeuern . Nie wieder Militärabenteuer außerhalb Europas!
  
• Einstellung aller Marinebeschaffungsvorhaben und Herunterfahren der Marineausgaben und -rekrutierung. Grund hierfür ist die weitgehende Nutzlosigkeit und Irrelevanz der Marine für die Bündnisverteidigung, an der sich durch fortgesetzte Rüstung auch nichts ändern wird.
  
• Einstellungsstopp für den Sanitätsdienst und erst mal keine Übernahmen von Sanitätspersonal in das Berufssoldatentum. Der Sanitätsdienst ist katastrophal aufgebläht.
  
• Begrenzung der Luftwaffen-Kampfaufgaben auf eine reduzierte Zahl von Eurofighter eines hohen Ausrüstungsstandes. Grund ist die weitgehende Nutzlosigkeit der vorhandenen 80er Jahre Flugabwehr und die zweifelhafte Durchsetzungsfähigkeit unserer Luftangriffe während der ersten Tage eines V-Falls.
• Zahlreiche (eigentlich kostengünstige) Maßnahmen, um die Position von beweglichen Hochwertzielen gegen Überraschungsangriffe zu verbergen
  
• Umorganisation des Heeres für ein Feldkorps mit vier ausbalancierten Feldbrigaden für das Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Panzerbataillon, PzGrenBtl, JägerBtl, PanzerartillerieBtl, UnterstützungsBtl einschließlich Pionieren) und einem Spähregiment einschließlich Fernspähern.
  
• Dieses Feldkorps übt wie verrückt. Ausgebildet wird da nicht, nur geübt. Meisterschaft kommt von Übung. Auf dem Kasernengelände wird nur Material gewartet, repariert und gelagert. Üben, üben, üben (und angemessener Ausgleich durch zusätzliche Urlaubstage)!
  
• Ausbildung von Heeressoldaten für das Feldkorps von Grundausbildung bis Verbandsausbildung im extrem beweglichen Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen erfolgt außerhalb des Feldkorps, wofür mindestens ein weiterer vollständiger und identischer Brigadesatz Material benötigt wird (SaZ 6 oder Weiterverpflichtung nötig für Mannschaften des Feldkorps)
  
• Alle Verbände des Feldkorps machen in Sommer und Winter jeweils unangekündigte Verlegeübungen nach Litauen oder Polen; 80% Einsatzbereitschaft von Material und Personal binnen 48 h vor Ort wird gefordert, Munition und Diesel für 48 Stunden Kampfeinsatz mitgebracht (alternativ Ballast statt Munition). Die Termine werden mit Polen vom Auswärtigen Amt abgesprochen und gegenüber dem BMVg bis zuletzt geheimgehalten. Ausgenommen sind Zeitfenster, in denen jeweils (nur) eine ganze Feldbrigade eine 16-Tage Urlaubsperiode hat.
  
• Sofortauswahl eines Ensembles von Digitalfunkgeräten für das Heer, das sich bei einer vertrauenswürdigen Partnernation bereits bewährt hat (+Fähigkeit zur Emulation unserer Antik-Funkgeräte zwecks Funktion mit vorhandenen Peripheriegeräten). Dann direkte Beschaffung per Bundesgesetz, notfalls unter Mißachtung von EU-Recht (Ausschreibung auf Farce reduziert). Hier kann man nationalen Notstand und Recht auf Selbstverteidigung geltend machen, auch wenn das für europäische Verhältnisse vermutlich eine juristische Innovation wäre. Der Bundestag verabschiedet wissentlich ein verfassungs- oder EU-Recht-widriges Gesetz nach dem Anderen, das kann dann auch mal für einen guten Zweck riskieren. Vollausstattung von Feldkorps und entspr. Ausbildungsverbänden bis Ende der Legislaturperiode.
  
• Entsprechend rabiate Beschaffung von genug Wärmebildvisieren (auf Waffe, für Infanterie) und typgleichen Monokular-IR-Handkameras (für Nicht-Kampftruppen-Unterführer des Feldkorps)
• Sofortige Ausschreibung für ein RCWS (ferngesteuerte Waffenstation für Fahrzeuge) mit 7,62x51 mm bis 20x102 mm Waffe und guter Hunter-Killer Fähigkeit gegen Drohnen in der Luft und am Boden ohne Einsatz von aktiven Sensoren bei der Zielsuche. Preisrahmen niedriger bis mittlerer sechsstelliger Bereich/Stück bei zehntausenden zu beschaffenden RCWS (Beschaffungskooperation mehrerer Länder, aber ohne Einbringung von Sonderwünschen). Software und Hardwarekomponenten/Chippläne offengelegt. Denkbar wäre auch ein RCWS mit entsprechender Aufrüstmöglichkeit für Anti-Drohnen-Fähigkeiten.
• Verdoppelung der Anzahl M3 Amphibien, alle einzusetzen in aktiven Verbänden nahe der Oder und ständig wechselnden Parkplätzen mit Sichtschutz gegen Satelliten und Agenten. 
• Wenn nach zwei Jahren auch nur bei einem einzigen eigentlich zu erträglichen Preisen beschaffbaren Ersatzteil Mangel herrscht, werden bis zur Abstellung des Mangels die Berufsoffiziere des Heeres jeden Monat dezimiert (zufällige 10% werden in die Wüste gefeuert) und die Zahl der Planstellen für Berufsoffiziere des Heeres 1:1 reduziert. Motivation ist alles!
  
• Bau eines OHK Truppenübungsplatzes mit möblierten Wohn- und Gewerbegebäuden im Stil baltischer Siedlungen.* Realistische Bewegungs- und Sichthindernisse (sehr viele Bäume aus Stahl+Kunststoff, Kunststoffhecken, flache Gräben, Holzzäune, Gardinen, Polycarbonatfenster mit Stellen zur Simulation von Löcher schlagen und komplett einschlagen).
• Die Division Schnelle Kräfte wird ersatzlos aufgelöst. Sie ist zur Bündnisverteidigung völlig ineffizient ausgerichtet. Auflösung der Heeresflieger und Außerdienststellung aller Heereshubschrauber, weil sie auf einem osteuropäischen Schlachtfeld nutzlose Ziele wären.
  
• Alle Stäbe von Heeresverbänden werden um durchschnittlich 3/4 ihrer Offiziersplanstellen reduziert bzw. die Reduzierung in der Summe wird teils mit  Auflösungen erreicht. Keine Aufstockung der anderen Stellen dieser Stäbe. Die personelle Verschlankung ermöglicht eine Beschleunigung, teils auch durch erzwungene Beschränkung von Aufgaben.
  
• Internationale Ausschreibung für eine kinetische Panzerabwehrrakete (KE Durchschlagwirkung wie 120 mm DM63 ab spätestens 500 m, 90% Treffer auf 40 km/h fahrendes 2x2 m Ziel auf 500...2000 m Distanz, PLOS Autopilot); kein Entwicklungsbudget, sondern Festpreiskaufangebot für 4.000 Raketen für 1 Mrd € bis 2027, vorausgesetzt es werden Hard- und Softwareinterface bis Vertragsschluss spezifiziert. MELLS und alle anderen in Dienst stehenden PzAbwLFK sind konzeptionell 30+ Jahre alt und deshalb als längst technisch durch Gegenmaßnahmen entwertet und nutzlos gegen russische KPz zu betrachten.
  
• Internationale Ausschreibung für ein Heeresflugabwehrsystem mit weniger als 400.000 € Munitionspreis je Abschuss einer Mach 0,75 Drohne auf 30k ft Höhe (bei rechnerischer Berücksichtigung von probability of kill). Außer russischen, weißrussischen, nordkoreanischen und chinesischen Systemen muss binnen zwei Jahren ein System ausgewählt und der Vertrag unterschriftsreif sein (sofern überhaupt ein passendes Angebot vorliegt). Bei Nichterfüllung dieser Vorgabe halbjährliche Dezimierung aller Berufsoffiziere von Heer und Luftwaffe bis zur Erfüllung. Noch eine exzellente Motivationsmaßnahme für die Bürokraten, die sich Generale nennen.
  

Nichts, absolut gar nichts davon wird so oder ähnlich umgesetzt werden.

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

*: Beispielbilder für baltische Ortschaften:

shutterstock.com/de/image-photo/aerial-early-summer-morning-view-small-1125499943
shutterstock.com/de/image-photo/aerial-view-over-slampe-village-latvia-1452198905

 man vergleiche, was für einen Dreck von OHK Übungsgelände die Bundeswehr beschafft und auch noch stolz drauf ist:

youtube.com/watch?v=UajU2aUTK1g 

youtube.com/watch?v=ySvKGYJT6cY

 

Nachtrag 2022:

Ich habe peinlicherweise vergessen, den Aufbau von Munitionsvorräten zu erwähnen.

18 Rohre 155 mm je Brigade, 4 Brigaden, 5000 Schuss pro Rohr + Übungsmunition. 400,000 155 mm Granaten (80% HE insensitiv, 20% SMK multispektral) + 2 Mio MTLS Module. Entsprechend reichliche Bevorratung für 5,56 und 7,62 mm sowie 120 mm Mörser (80% HE-PFF insensitiv, 20% SMK multispektral). Übergangsweise auch beschleunigte Beschaffung von MELLS.

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The German army radio scandal

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You may have read about the German army radio scandal: The German ministry of defence is about to purchase up to 20,000 radios of an analogue technology model from the early 1980's. The price per copy is expected to be outrageous (you could buy two new small cars for one museum piece-styled radio), and the order is going to Thales because they bought the developer of those Cold War era radios long ago.

 

[German] https://augengeradeaus.net/2016/11/gefaehrliche-funkstoerung/

 

[German] https://augengeradeaus.net/2021/09/gefaehrliche-funkstoerung-die-fortsetzung-80er-jahre-bitte-kommen/

The need to replace the old radios was obvious many years ago already (and published). We already missed out on buying late 1980's/1990's technology radios. The British Bowman program disaster and the huge excess of 1980's radios after the downsizing during the early 1990's may have contributed to this.

The scandal is a scandal because the need to replace the old radios was obvious, the technological progress in the field was obvious and the German army is obsessed with talking (and writing) about "Führungsfähigkeit", the ability to lead (for Americans; Command and Control, C2). And it interprets this ability in large part as the technical ability to communicate.

I have not yet any special insights into why the bureaucracy (and politicians!) failed so grossly, merely a couple suspicions. The list of my suspicions is topped by the guess that they went for a gold-plated maximum ambition solution, and then failed to get it done for the all-too-usual reasons of bureaucratic impotence. They clearly tried to get something customised to their requirements, for there are evidently plenty battlefield radio systems on the market, military-off-the-shelf and there was enough money in the budget all along if you know how to prioritise.

Some blame was put on politicians who spent on other things (such as warships - the parliamentary defence committee is infested by directly elected politicians from election districts with shipyards). The bureaucracy didn't put the necessary priority and bureaucracy resources on the radio procurement, though.

The radio procurement scandal also involves (though not mentioned in the recent reports that I saw) a miniscule quantity purchase of some modern radios a few years ago. AFAIK only special forces and the AFVs of a battalion for deployments received modern radios (aside from civilian satellite radios).

 

I have zero confidence that this extremely embarrassing scandal will lead to decisive change for the better. This is not a specific critique of any particular politician or any particular party. I simply don't think that ANY party has understood that the Bundeswehr is a bureaucracy that needs a harsh political leadership that breaks it away from the current path and forces a change of course towards doing the constitutional job of the armed forces. I don't expect any officers to be fired and no civilian bureaucrats to be kicked out of their positions of relevance at all in this most embarrassing Bundeswehr scandal of the post-Cold War period.

The blathering in writing will go on as well. They will write about a fantasy world in which the army is focused on getting command & control right, on getting combined arms right, on getting training realism right, on getting technical readiness up and in which 30+ years old concepts and hardware are still top notch. No concerns about them being easily countered by capable opposing forces will be part of the cheerleading articles. The senior officers will tell each other that they'll keep doing their job in the ultra-competent way they've always done it, and the tactics and techniques they learned at the Führungsakademie are the global gold standard.

I'd be surprised if the politicians who take the reins (ceremonially at the very least) will be able to see  through the B.S..

S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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Recent scandals in the Bundeswehr

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The Bundeswehr has 184,000 active personnel. Some of them are bound to not meet expectations and requirements. A handful of extremists and nutjobs are to be expected in such a large personnel pool.

There are higher expectations regarding officers and NCOs Feldwebel or higher, but I understand the requirements for a Feldwebel career have been eroded by the 1990's already. Some bad apples may even make it to officer rank, though at the very least the professional (not limited time volunteer) officers should NOT be extremists or nutjobs, for the organisation has seen them in action for 12 years already. 

I don't blame anyone for having a decoration MP 40 in his room, either. Yes, that gun was introduced and used by the Wehrmacht (nazified German military 1935-1945). So was the MG42 as well, but we re-labelled it "MG3" and continue to use it to this day despite its obsolescence.* So was the P38 pistol as well, and we re-labelled it "P1" and used it well into the 1990's. And then there's the K98 - iconic rifle of the Wehrmacht (based on a very late 19th century design) and still in ceremonial use. Our federal government literally greets foreign dignitaries with soldiers handling the K98. A MP 40 is an ugly and tasteless decoration, but otherwise nothing bad in itself.

There IS a limit, though. Extremists and nutjobs that were recognised as such and not removed over years despite multiple officers knowing? THAT is a systemic issue. It's not necessarily a Bundeswehr-wide systemic issue, but it's unforgivable and should have severe consequences. A systemic issue means that the bureaucracy should be punished, not just individuals. The bureaucracy should be conditioned to fear to NOT intervene against nutjobs and extremists. I've read that the disbanding of a company was considered the ultimate humiliation. Oh boy, whoever claimed so has no concept of my creativity in such a regard. I would have dragged hundreds of senior officers to an event where they get to stand at attention for hours like recruits, and watch not just a final "Zapfenstreich" disbanding ceremony. They would watch a defilement of the unit. Scratch that, I would have the entire formation defiled and disbanded in shame. And I would let them know that this won't be the last such event if they ever dare to not do their job to minimum requirements.

Having mentioned this; I would not disband the KSK for its scandals. I would disband the KSK for having been a stupid concept and appalling waste of resources all along. That, too, deserves defilement to punish the bureaucracy.

related:

/2010/09/glorified-cannibals.html

/2014/09/special-forces.html

/2016/05/a-call-for-unified-light-infantry.html

S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: Too heavy, very suboptimal rate of fire, no proper mounting for a night sight or magnifying sight, changing the hot barrel requires protective gloves. There were machinegun designs without these faults even before the MG 42 was invented.

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