2025/04/24

The U.S. as we knew it for the past ~45 years may be collapsing, lying moron or no lying moron

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Budget deficits are no problem for a state as long as the trend GDP growth (and thus trend revenue growth) is stronger than the growth of public debt. Suppose there's a country with a GDP of 1,000 and a debt of 1,000. This country may have an annual budget deficit of 50 (5 %GDP). This is really bad with economic stagnation, but with a (hypothetical) growth trend of 5%GDP p.a. (50 per year) the deficit would actually be sustainable unless interest rates rise and grow the deficit.*

Let's look at the development of public debt in the U.S.:


A budget deficit projection of around 5 %GDP p.a. seems optimistic to me (there's good reason to expect bigger deficits), more about this later.

Now what does the GDP growth trend in the U.S. look like?


That looks strongly as if something close to 3% p.a. GDP growth is a reasonable expectation.

 

Let's pay attention to why the deficit developed as it did. 

  1. The long term trend was that Republicans in control of both Congress and White House did cut taxes (thus revenue, fairytales about tax cuts being budget neutral don't fly in continental Europe) and increased spending (especially military spending). The Republicans basically have two policies for economic growth; they claim that their tax cuts bring growth (not for real!), but what really brings growth is the sugar high of deficit spending.
  2. Republicans do on the other hand try to starve the executive branch off funds whenever it's being controlled by a Democrat in the White House. Then they suddenly claim that they're extremely concerned about the lack of sustainability of deficits and social security and run scare campaigns to build up political support for budget cuts. They usually spare the military from cuts, though. These periods of Republicans controlling the purse and a Democrat controlling the spenders (the executive branch) show an improvement of the budget balance. The improvement even reached a surplus late in the Clinton administration, but the improvements (reduction of deficits in %GDP) are visible during the Obama and Biden administrations as well.
  3. Democrats in control of Congress and  Republicans in control of the White House tends to play out as Republican Presidents largely getting the budget size they want.
  4. Another mode is Democrats in control of both legislative and executive branches. This leads to deficits, but in normal times these are not as extreme ones as when Republicans are in full control.
  5. The fifth mode is disaster mode; 2008 Great Recession, 2020 Covid. This produces huge spikes of deficit spending, seemingly regardless of the party in power.

The Republicans are now in control and about to establish a dictatorship on a spectrum from one party dictatorship to overt Fascism. The remaining lifetime and effectiveness of the lying moron decides what it becomes. Their majorities in Congress are small, but they are a thing, and it's clear that they are by now "Republicans" in name only. Actions speak louder than words.

A true republic would likely continue the dysfunctional up and down of the past 45 years (hopefully without a 3rd giant disaster). To project about 5 %GDP budget deficits for the next ten years as in the 1st graphic makes sense under the assumption of a true republic.

A "Republicans"-controlled U.S. on the other hand would likely go all-in on the "Republican" orthodoxy of cutting taxes for the rich (fig leaves for the middle class) and undisciplined deficit spending, including growing military spending. To project a %GDP budget deficit development from 5 %GDP p.a. towards about 8 %GDP p.a. by 2030 seems most plausible for this scenario to me. An issue is that they may enter a war to distract from their domestic policy issues.

So the growth of the public debt till 2030 would likely be in the 27...35 %GDP range. It's at about 123 % GDP by now, so the path to 2030 would be around 150...158 %GDP.

Now let's look at economic growth. Economic growth can be explained by increased inputs (more hours worked, influx of foreign capital pushing investment, greater exploitation of natural resources) and technological progress. The Americans already work many hours per week with few vacation days and holidays per year, so there's little room for increase. Anti-immigration policies will reduce the hours worked (though an increase of pressure on unemployed people may partially compensate for this). The growth of working age population is projected to be very weak. Finally, the misogynistic leanings and traditionalism of the Republicans do not promise an increase of the percentage of females in jobs unless there#s workforce mobilisation for a war economy. 

The Biden administration was already quite eager to exploit natural resources (example crude oil) contrary to some perceptions, so there's little potential for improvement in the next couple years (and IMO also in the 30's).

Finally, technological progress. The rate of it has been shrinking since the 70's. You may look up articles on whether technological progress is slowing yourself, I didn't find a really great one. The phenomenon has been known for a while, and it's not an American one - technological progress has slowed in all rich Western countries. It's the same story in Germany, UK and so on - sometimes even worse because the U.S. recovered particularly well from the Great Recession due to huge deficit spending fiscal stimulus efforts early in the Obama administration.

Long story short; there's no reason to expect a trend growth better than what we've seen in the 2nd graphic. about 3% p.a. GDP growth is a reasonable expectation. Politicians promise much, but they never deliver a clear growth trend improvement in an already well-developed economy. 

So there's likely going to be 5...8 %GDP annual deficits and 2...4 % GDP growth p.a. on average. The former because of policy and the latter because of fundamentals that politicians can do little about (unless they deport too many people, as then both deficits and growth would become worse).

Where is the breaking point? I wrote about 150...158 %GDP public debt by 2030. Japan has about 250 %GDP, Singapore about 170 %GDP, Italy about 135 %GDP public debt. There's apparently no accurate breaking point. The U.S. might keep going forward on its unsustainable path (the trade balance is terrible as well) for quite some time. On the other hand, it might collapse anytime as well. To alienate Europeans, Australians, Canadians, Japanese, South Koreans and Taiwanese may create a tipping point in one way or another, for example when confidence in the USD as reserve currency takes a big hit. The cardhouse may collapse if and when the USD loses much of its reserve currency status. There's no reason why all those alienated countries should do the U.S. the favour of keeping the USD as reserve currency. No reserve currency status for the USD means the U.S. could not sustain its trade balance deficits. This means its consumption AND capital investment would collapse. An overtly Fascist U.S. may find it difficult to buy certain capital investmnet goods such as TSMC machines anyway, and right now it's already restricted in terms of rare earths imports. The lying moron's disrespect for Federal Reserve Bank's independent operation as shown in 2017-2020 might create such a tipping point as well. A Sino-American War is a real possibility as well.

The truly scary thing about this is not the possibility of a tipping point or the acceleration of the downhill race. The truly scary thing is the seeming inevitability. The fundamentals cannot really change for the better by much and the political system doesn't appear to be able to improve, either. So the fiscal policy won't improve fundamentally. A long-term dictatorship deserves a projection of a worsening fiscal policy until some kind of disastrous crash occurs that forces a change of a fiscal policy pattern that held for 45 years.

I understand that Americans have been told a plethora of fairy tales and scaremongering stories about this topic. An American who is not an economist would be well-served to ignore those and simply think of the economic growth trend as weakening and being near-impossible to improve, while the budget deficit is essentially about overspending on the military and undertaxing the rich (including the foreign rich; 40% of American stocks are owned by foreigners, so tax cuts on American corporations are in large part tax cuts for rich foreigners). The public debt is not really about escalating healthcare costs (which is stagnating at about 17.x %GDP since the "Affordable Care Act" a.k.a. "Obamacare" went into force) and social security isn't a big driver, either. Example: Social Security had 1.22 T $ revenue and 1.24 T $ expenditures in 2022 - its deficit was tiny in comparison to the federal budget deficit around that time (1.4 T $ in FY 2022).

By the way; the Euro area is not that unsustainable. The public debt stands at about 90% for that area as a whole. The only large Euro area country that's worsening its public debt situation is France. The overall %GDP debt increase in the Euro area was much smaller than the American one and the %GDP public debt level is below 90 %GDP instead of above 120 %GDP. The Euro area has no chronic trade balance deficit, though that may change once the EUR gains use as reserve currency. Last but not least; increases of military spending are unlikely to change this terribly much, as they would act as fiscal stimulus (few Euro zone countries are at economic capacity limit). It's still wasteful to overspend on the military, but increases big enough to propel an European-style about 0.5 %GDP aggregate budgets deficit to an American-style 5 %GDP p.a. budget deficit are plain unrealistic short of WW3.

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

P.S.: This was originally written 21 Feb 25, but not published right away and slightly edited before publication (addition of the reserve currency issue for tipping points mostly).

*: p.a. = per annum = in a year

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2025/04/12

Nonsensical German army structure

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I'll deliver a critique of the nonsensical German army structure. It's the same bollocks as we've had for a long time, they just evolve bollocks. The German army ceased to be serious about conventional warfare sometime in the early 90's and the nonsensical army structure that would have been impossible with the 1960's, 1970's crop of generals is a symptom of this non-seriousness.

I did this before

/2008/12/todays-10-panzerdivision-bundeswehr.html

/2015/10/critique-of-german-army-brigades.html

 

I'll use the easily accessed and easily readable structure graphic from Wikipedia.

(c) Noclador see here
 

I partially checked on the Bundeswehr website whether the Wikipedia graphic is correct and as a result didn't find the Panzerbrigade 45 as part of the 10. Panzerdivision. This brigade was formally founded only days ago, so I suppose the official website is simply out of date. Another deviation is that Panzerbrigade is and always was one word, while Wikipedia calls it "Panzer Brigade", same with Panzerdivision and some battalion names.

Sigh. Let's begin, from the left.

 

1. Panzerdivision, three brigades. two to four brigades is OK for a division. An issue is Panzerbrigade 21 that doesn't fit qualitatively, later more about that. There's no divisional logistics formation.

Panzerlehrbrigade 9. A "Lehr-" formation is traditionally for testing, demonstration and training in addition to being an actual combat formation. That's a German thing. So basically, let's treat it as a Panzerbrigade and ignore the "lehr" part for the purpose of this blog post. Two tank battalions, two mechanised infantry / Panzergrenadier battalions.That's a lot, especially a lot of tanks (nominally) for a brigade. A Panzerbrigade should have a 2:1 ratio between tank battalions and (mechanised) infantry battalions.* A 1:1 or 2:2 ratio suits a Panzergrenadierbrigade, but admittedly, the difference should not just be a difference of balance, but also of attitudes and tactical principles (Panzerbrigade being more dashing, while a Panzergrenadierbrigade rather moves from one solid standing to the next solid standing). Here's the big problem with this brigade: It has no artillery and no mortars. It's not a combined arms formation. There is a divisional artillery battalion, but that's no excuse. There's no engineer battalion. The Panzerlehrbrigade 9's structure is simply wrong.

Panzerbrigade 21. It isn't. There's no tank battalion, not even a mechanised infantry battalion. An armoured engineer battalion is the only trace of a mechanised kind of brigade - exactly the battalion that the Panzerlehrbrigade 9 misses! There are three Jägerbataillons (kinda motorised infantry battalions; wheeled APCs, so not really light infantry) in this brigade. So why the heck is it called a Panzerbrigade? It's a Jägerbrigade or Infanteriebrigade! Well, at least it has an artillery battalion (the artillery systems are AFVs, as we have no non-AFV artillery). So this kind of brigade doesn't necessarily belong into a Panzerdivision, but I understand a case could be made for it. A bad, but for defensive missions workable brigade design.

Panzergrenadierbrigade 41. No tank battalion and no artillery battalion, but three (!!!) mechanised infantry battalions. Now we see that the one divisional artillery battalion (a mixed self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launcher battalion IIRC) is not really enough for the two brigades that lack artillery, even if the divisional commander did assign it. The Panzergrenadierbrigade 41's structure is simply wrong.

 

10. Panzerdivision. Five brigades including the 13th Light brigade (Dutch), too many IMO. 

Panzerbrigade 12. Three tank battalions (one of which with a nonsensical 'mountain' designation, but it does use Leopard 2), two mechanised infantry battalions, artillery battalion, engineer battalion. Main criticism: It's way too big, unwieldy. This is more like two brigades in one. That's borderline acceptable for a Panzergrenadierbrigade, but a Panzerbrigade should be agile, and this one is agile only if it separates into at least two parts, for which there's no command and support structure present. A brigade commander should not lead more than four line of sight combat battalions (span of command). Also, this oversizing conceals that there's not enough artillery. There should be two artillery battalions for five line of sight combat battalions. The Panzerbrigade 12's structure is simply wrong.

Panzergrenadierbrigade 37. Four (!!!) mechanised infantry battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery battalion, one engineer battalion. Again too big. The Panzergrenadierbrigade 37's structure is wrong because it has at least one line of sight combat battalion too many, but I understand that some people would argue that today's staff sizes, signals equipment, battle management systems would permit a command span of five.

Panzerbrigade 45, the one to be based in Lithuania. Let's ignore this one, it's being raised. The structure as shown is acceptable, main criticism is the unusually weak (only a company) engineer support and the infantry weakness considering how much woodland is in Lithuania. I generally reject multinational formations (the brigade integrates a NATO multinational composite battalion) and I dislike it being stationed in Lithuania. For one, I reject the concept of tripwire forces and second, being stationed abroad badly hikes the personnel costs due to extra pay.

Franco-German Brigade, a mixed French-German brigade loaded with much symbolic value. As mentioned, I reject the concept of multinational brigades. That being said, it's a kind of infantry brigade and the mix of battalions is OK. 

 

Rapid forces division / Division Schnelle Kräfte. This is basically the Col War cheat of the 12th division promised to NATO being a cheap airborne division, but the current crop of leadership at the MoD probably bought into their own propaganda. A para brigade, a mountain infantry brigade, a special forces command (size-wise a big battalion) and the helicopter forces (extremely shitty due to gold-plated yet extremely bad helicopter designs). A Dutch airmobile brigade actually belongs to this division as well. Marginal support formations.

Luftlandebrigade 1 (paras). Two para regiments, no artillery. The official website does not mention independent engineer and recon companies unlike Wikipedia. Main criticism: Airborne is bollocks, see Hostomel. Secondary criticism; no artillery is bollocks, too. This brigade is crap in conventional warfare. Most likely the brigade would (it certainly should) be reduced to an administrative staff, with the two regiments attached to 1. Panzerdivision and 10. Panzerdivision as divisional light infantry formations for woodland and settlement areas, requiring non-organic artillery support.

Gebirgsjägerbrigade 23 (mountain infantry bde). Three mountain infantry battalions, no artillery (Germany doesn't use pack howitzers anymore). The Gebirgsjägerbrigade 23's structure is simply wrong for lack of artillery.

 

Heimatschutzdivision with six Heimatschutzregimentern; this is basically an object security division, not meant for conventional warfare, but rather for guarding locations against sabotage and so on. It's also supporting allied forces in Germany or passing through Germany.  wrong, but this is due to lack of maintaining suitable artillery.


General remark: I didn't comment on the recon battalions so far. German recon is really more observation by now. Actual recon should be at higher echelon

All brigades are lacking proper air defence. There's simply no equipment for that in the German army, so it's not a brigade or division design issue, but a long term force development issue.


I understand that shortages of material, shortages of (having maintained) suitable training infrastructure for tank crews in certain areas, restrictions regarding where usable barracks are have influences the brigade layouts. Still, these on average appallingly bad brigade designs are damning for MoD leadership. Most importantly, these brigade designs show that there's no real concept of land warfare behind them.

 

We could have

  • three agile tank brigades (tank bde + mech inf bn + arty bn)
  • four all-round mechanised infantry brigades (tank bn + 2 mech inf bn + arty bn)
  • two infantry brigades (3 infantry bn)
  • three light infantry brigades (3 light infantry bn without APCs) 

All these would lack would be additional artillery for the latter five brigades (at 2...4.5 M € per howitzer and minimum 18 howitzers per brigade this would have been affordable; less than 1 billion € including periphery). There would be a clear repertoire portfolio and thus role set for each of these four brigade types. Instead, we have nine brigades, six fo them without proper doctrine / ill-fitted to doctrine.


I believe this continued (I kept complaining since 2008 !!!) failure to set up a sensible army structure is not tolerable, not excusable, not forgivable. The German citizens gave the German armed forces much money during this time. Much of it was wasted on bollocks. Relatively small changes in big ticket procurement would have sufficed to enable a MUCH more sensible army structure, as I laid out above. Instead, we get one abomination after another. The German public doesn't wake up to this, but in my opinion the presumption of competence in favour of the ministry of defence and the top leadership of the army has to be thrown out. Competent people don't produce such abominations. I understand there are restrictions, but those restrictions are not an excuse after 17 years. Every single minister of defence in this period was crap, their ministry bureaucracy was crap, the army heads were crap. The distraction by the idiotic Afghanistan missions are no excuse either. We've left Afghanistan almost four years ago. That's plenty time to reorient an army towards conventional warfare IF COMPETENTS ARE IN CHARGE ! They had enough money, but they are too incompetent to use it well. This is but the structure; personnel system, equipment issues, maintenance issues, training issues abound as well.



related:

/2022/04/an-army-corps-for-germany-revised.html

/2023/04/a-compact-and-agile-exploitation-brigade.html

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

*: 1:1 was highly regarded among 1950's WW2 lessons learned literature, with stronger infantry battalions than today's. What I wrote here applies to German traditional terminology, in which a "Panzerbrigade" is tank-heavy.

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2025/04/10

Two paths to Fascism / A permanent challenge for societies IV

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I think I figured out why people have such a hard time to believe that the current American government is Fascist.

There are two paths to fascism. 

One entails forming an ideology based on certain roots, jingoism, it includes building up organisations, rewriting/reinterpreting national mythology and history. The mythically inflated nation becomes supreme to the individual. It's an effort of thousands of people.

The other path is to simply be an ignorant piece of shit who doesn't give a shit about the well-being of fellow citizens. This path is just fine for ignoramuses, including those who fell for propaganda lies that amoral yet intelligent people devised decades earlier. This path leads to Fascists who don't proclaim to be Fascists, and make minimal use of Fascist-y visual elements. Basically, this is Fascism as the natural destination of moronic sociopaths.

The challenge is probably not so much to be alert and push back against the beginnings of formal Fascism. The challenge for the society is rather to keep dangerous idiots away from extraordinary power.

 

But I repeat myself.

/2009/07/permanent-challenge-for-societies.html

/2012/09/a-permanent-challenge-for-societies-ii.html

/2013/08/a-permanent-challenge-for-societies-iii_5.html



S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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