2025/10/22

How many generals do we need? Or: The case against generals

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This blog post will be close to maximum disrespectful towards general ranks. The two reasons for my disrespect are the reasoning I will lay out and military history.

Today's armies (and air forces) have great many officers at general rank on active duty. A ratio of personnel strength to quantity of generals close to 1,000:1 is not unusual nowadays (edit: German military as a whole in 2019: 935:1 for troops to generals+admirals, assuming no vacancies among generals and admirals). The U.S. armed forces had a ratio of about 8,000:1 between overall personnel and generals plus admirals by late WW2, for comparison.

 

So, how many generals do you need?

I'll begin with the field army. One might think a brigade is commanded by a brigade general, but in many armies it's commanded by a colonel. So for a high scenario you need one general per brigade (none per independent regiment), but none for a low scenario.

The commonly most-respected ratio of brigades to divisions is three brigades in a division. The division commander has a general rank, but his executive officer and second in command doesn't need to have one. Moreover, we could use four brigades per division, but I won't choose that for the high scenario. So the high scenario is at five general ranks per division, low one is at one.

Next, the corps level. A corps usually also follows the rule of three, a corps with only two division makes really only sense if the mobilised strength of an army is either two or five divisions. We can safely assume that the second in command of a corps is at general rank like the commander himself. Let's add one reserve general. So we're at 17 generals for an army corps in the high scenario and six for the low scenario.

The entire German field army as of now and into 2030 is not going to need more than 17 generals and could very well make do with six.

 

So why are there so many more generals? They're not needed for the field army. Instead, they're in management jobs, comparable to management board members in a public company.

And here's the thing; we could hire civilian managers for most of those jobs. (Junior) officers of the reserve often advance in business leadership positions, so there's enough of a reserves pool and they can be called up even at high age (not just 45 years of age as is the limit for ordinary conscripts in some countries).

Imagine a mobilised army strength of two army corps. The 2nd (reserve) corps would need 6...17 general rank officers, but it would be inactive in peacetime. These general rank officers could be in exactly the kind of management positions where a civilian manager (even if he/she/it is a captain in the reserves) would be insufficient: Leading the military schools, doctrine development, future force planning.

Many Western countries are in NATO, and the "O" stands for organisation, but by now it should be a "B" for "bureaucracy". Great many career officers have jobs in said bureaucracy and in NATO HQs of often questionable usefulness beyond logistics management purposes. You cannot have a lean army with few general ranks and still play the games at this bureaucracy, for you would have to send generals to fit general rank positions in this bureaucracy. My advice is to largely stop wasting money on the NATO bureaucracy. The degree of influence on the largely pointless work there is small even for a country such as Germany. Command structures above Corps are the only really interesting HQ structures anyway. A country such as Spain would suffer practically no real negative effects if it ceased to participate in the NATO bureaucracy and command structure, for example.

 

So in the end, a bloated, top-heavy army of today could be crashed from around 200 general ranks to less than 40 (at two corps mobilised strength) without loss of deterrence or defence strength. You just need a couple years for the conversion and you need to make sure they never meet in the same room.

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de 

P.S.: I could make a case that a European air force only needs two general ranks because so much operational decisionmaking happens at below general rank level. And don't get me started on admirals!

 

edit: The Bundeswehr had 211 generals (not just army generals) and admirals in 2019. I cannot find any more recent figure, it doesn't seem to have been disclosed any more. So we had about 100 generals in an army that could be described as having a corps-sized field army and hardly any ability to mobilise reserve combat formations.

And don't get me started about the quality of the generals. We promoted the wrong people and turned the right people into wrong people. The problems already begin at lieutenant level - many of those are simply not suitable to become officers. Some of them aren't even suitable to be volunteer soldiers.

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2025/10/21

Drone cloud support to battlefield drones

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Here's one thing that drones can do that manned aviation did not do in either world war nor in the Vietnam War:

A huge quantity of cheap yet EM-hardened drones with about 30 km flying range can saturate any counter-drone defence and thus protect much fewer actual scout and attack drones in the air.



S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de
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2025/10/16

Artillery fires types

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The literature (including field manuals) usually discerns three kinds of artillery fires for lethal munitions*:

Destructive fires, neutralising fires, suppressive fires

The required munitions are the greatest for destructive fires, somewhat less** for neutralising fires (though the fire mission for this has to last quite long) and smallest for suppressive fires.

The usual literature approach is to pretend the target is infantry that has dug in or has some other cover.

Suppressive fires shall scare enough to make them combat ineffective during the suppressive fires, while neutralising fires are meant to shell-shock them into combat ineffectiveness that lasts long enough to complete an assault on the position after the artillery fires ceased.


This thinking about infantry targets with cover fits WWI thinking, but it's not very realistic even in modern trench war IMO.

The use of artillery differs greatly between high force density and low force density battle. High force density battles (such as WW2 Eastern Front) put a premium on the shelling of marshalling areas in which troops prepare for an assault. To shell such areas was reported to have caused more harm than the artillery actions during the by comparison very brief assault. Furthermore, it was reported from WW2 experience that most failed infantry attacks failed before they got into small arms range; so most successful positional defences were entirely carried by artillery and mortars (air power played a negligible role).

 

So for low force density conflicts, I'd say

  • destructive fires on point targets of justifying value 
  • ad hoc firing missions on moving or briefly halting forces, trying to achieve whatever best effect can be achieved in the brief time available to hit them
  • obscuration for force protection
  • (IR) illumination to enhance friendly forces' vision at night and possibly to damage the enemy's night vision tech

 Whereas for high force density, I'd additionally say

  • destructive fires of heavy munitions (100+ kg or FAE rather than 155 mm shells) on known enemy point positions
  • destructive fires on area targets if the enemy is expected to largely lack cover and hardening
  • neutralising fires on known but somewhat dispersed positions (such as a platoon spread out on 1+ km of trenches or scattered 3-men positions)
  • suppressive fires on suspected enemy positions while friendly are in field or view or about to enter it

I suppose this is roughly similar to the actual opinions in the Western artillery communities.

You can see that low force density battle such as fighting Taleban in Afghanistan emphasises accuracy and small dispersion - essentially precision guided munitions.

A high density conventional warfare on the other hand has good use for very destructive munitions (up to very heavy bombs) and a large quantity of dumb lethal munitions such as 155 mm HE shells.

155 mm DPICM shells are vastly more lethal on paper, but not so when fired into forests with a high tree canopy. This happens to be the most typical kind of marshalling ground for massing forces for and before an assault, though. The second most-typical one is for all I know villages - and DPICM isn't known for great lethality through roofs, while 155 mm HE has quite a reputation for ruining homes.



S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: Other artillery purposes include propaganda (leaflet) munition delivery, illumination, obscuration (smoke) and some shots to measure the weather (multiple rocket launcher batteries used to shoot one rocket, sense its wind drift by radar until the rocket's self-destruction in the air, then compensate the aim for the real salvo). Lethal (high explosive) munitions can also be used for demolition, mostly demolition of buildings including bridges and intentional cratering of routes.

**:Whether the used amount was enough will only be known once line of sight combat troops are in contact. 
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2025/09/18

Mysteries of the Russo-Ukrainian War

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Where are the machineguns? I saw a few photos of heavy (and ancient) machineguns in field fortifications, but other than that - crickets. Machineguns shooting down quadcopters? Haven't seen that.

Are mortars proving themselves or not? I have read a bit about Russian mortar teams, but those may have been the weird Russian long-barrelled mortar-guns rather than normal mortars. I've also seen footage of mortar bombs being delivered by motorcycle, that's all. I suspect the short range makes resupply too troublesome by now, but what did mortars do in 2022-2024? 

What about artillery radars? I understand they wouldn't last this long far enough forward to be of use now, but what about 2022/23? NATO expected WW3 to include lots of artillery duels based on artillery locating radars. Sure, modern navigation did lead to individual gun placement rather than battery placement, but I saw some photos of Russian batteries, so they did exist. Were they hit with help of radars or not? What about the battlefield surveillance radars?

What altitude do Russian cruise missiles cruise at? I saw video that seemed to suggest rather 60...100 m than 30 m (Russians don't use ft. Terrain-following radars of the 70's were capable of ~60 m autopiloted flight, ~30 m is reasonable for less than 45 minutes with manual flight with good visibility). 

Did the Iskander cruise missiles turn out to exceed the INF treaty limit of 500 km or not?

Did the Iskander quasiballistic missiles turn out to exceed the INF treaty limit of 500 km or not?

Why are the Russians unable to procure heavy payload multicopters in quantity when they're supposed to be backed by China? 

Did Nozh ERA work well or not?

I have seen almost no footage of MBT vs. MBT actions. Were they common in the first weeks? 

What's better to destroy the Crimea Bridge; Mephisto warhead of Taurus into the foundations or continuous rod warheads against the suspension part's cable bundles?

Why are TM-62 anti-tank mines used so widely for demolition work? It should be easily possible to provide demolition charges for demolition jobs, even civilian companies have those for demolition work.

Are anti-tank mines still important or is the stopping power now vested in battlefield interdiction based on drones?

Does Russia use satellites for GPS jamming or not? (Satellites could not be countered by phased directional antennas.)

Was the WW2 data about infantrymen getting near-useless after a certain quantity (IIRC 130) of combat days confirmed?

Did any Russian tanks with Arena or Drozd hard kill defences show up in combat?

Did the trade show-grade BMP-3s with lots of heavy ERA show up in combat? 

Are tethered drones in use?

Why aren't the Russians able to regularly find & hit Ukrainian air defence radars or combat aircraft on the ground?

Related to the previous question: How useful is Russian satellite reconnaissance for battlefield uses?

How quickly can Russian artillery and mortars react to calls (I understand this is going to be a huge range of response times, so a distribution would be interesting)? 

Why can't the Russian navy reliably kill off simple motorboats? Even WW2 radars were already able to detect a periscope!

Why can't the Russians stop Ukrainian very low level air attacks despite having missiles such as R-37M and 9M96E2?


S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/08/22

CAS over Ukraine

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So far the most effective* close air support (CAS) over Ukraine appears to be toss bombing of guided bombs.

It's similar to the graphic below, save for greater range with glide kits and greater accuracy if the guidance does its job.

The aircraft arrives very low (maybe 100 ft), pulls up, releases flares and chaff, releases the bomb, escapes at very low altitude (again maybe 100 ft).
 

The advantage over artillery is mostly that the munitions are much heavier. Huge craters by delay-fuzed heavy bombs can destroy underground field fortifications or sewers, a single bomb can destroy a large building.  

The speed of the vehicle should be high subsonic in order for the munition to have much kinetic energy (and thus range) upon release.

 

This doesn't look like the "Americans bomb brown people" guided bomb attacks from above ManPADS ceiling (at about 15k ft) or dive-bombing from such safe altitude and it doesn't look like the A-10 concept of CAS, either.

 

Post-WW2 versions of toss bombing were initially developed for free-fall nuclear bombs, as the pilot wanted to get away from the blast in time. Later on, the skills were used by Israelis in 1973 and the British in 1982 when they faced effective air defences and didn't dare to fly in range and in line of sight to said air defences for more than a few seconds.

 

We could dismiss the Ukraine CAS experience as irrelevant to NATO because NATO would go after the air defences, but

  1. anti-radar missiles aren't terribly plentiful (we had shortages in 1999 already)
  2. even radar-based air defences survive anti-air defence campaigns for long if the air defence officers are smart (see 1999 Kosovo Air War and 2022-2025 Ukraine air warfare)
  3. not all air defences require radar (examples IRIS-T SLM and VL MICA IR missiles) and radar-independent air defences are very difficult to suppress.** In fact, medium range air defences based on thermal cameras may be more useful than ones based on x-band radars because of RF stealth aircraft. 

So what should we do based on the observations from Ukraine?

 

I stick to my opinion that we need eyes in the sky, but fires can come from the ground. Air/Ground bombing does not seem to promise a good overall package (cost, uncertainty, rapidity of effects) in peer wars in my opinion. That being said, Russia is no peer to NATO. We can deal with Russian air defences well-enough to rip open gaps in the SAM belt or we would find enough gaps between dispersed air defence umbrellas to bomb enough  (even with unguided 'iron' bombs) for decisive effect.

So we should look at Chinese air defences, really. They haven't been exposed to war and are thus of unknown quality, but a couple of their air-to-air missiles proved to be effective over Pakistan.

 

related:

/2008/11/wurfgert.html

/2010/07/first-week-of-peer-vs-peer-air-war.html 

/2018/03/luftwaffe-f-35-or-typhoon-for-airground.html



S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: There were also super-inaccurate unguided missile attacks and unguided bomb attacks with approx. toss bombing profile and at least some guided glide bombs appear to have been released at high altitude where no area air defences made that intolerably dangerous. 

**: Radars are active emitters. These emissions can be detected, direction finding to the emissions' origin can be used to find the emitter. Triangulation by aircraft (or detector on the surface), detection by satellites and anti-radar missile simply flying towards the emitter are frequently used options. To search for a thermal camera (imaging infrared sensor) in a large area is futile by comparison.

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2025/08/17

My critique of Israel

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I did a search in the blog archive to see how much I criticised Israel after all.

 

January 2009 Called Israel a source of alienation between NATO members and Arab countries

April 2009 Claimed that Israel alienated Western nations with its behaviour for decades

December 2008 Expressed doubts that Israel's self-defence against Hamas/Gaza was proportionate / implying it was excessive.

July 2009 Called Israel's behaviour unacceptable, singling out the bombing of other countries 

July 2010 'tail wags the dog' graphic symbolising Israel-U.S. relationship 

May 2011 Called Israel a "regional troublemaker" 

September 2011 Claimed that Israel has a "usual" disrespect against Muslim nations 

November 2011 "Expect a revolt if you run the largest prison on earth." [Gaza] 

December 2012 Insisted that Israel is no ally to the U.S., using the concept of an "ally" that's dependent on a signed & ratified two-way alliance, not mere good relations. I repeated this briefly in April 2018.

July 2014 A blog post mentioning the lopsided casualty figures in a Israel-Gaza/Hamas conflict at the time. I also supposed that Israel&Egypt could be pressured into peace with Gaza becoming Egyptian. 

July 2014 Criticism of Israel's grand strategy as stupid, drawing parallel to the Crusader states that were dependent on outside support, too. 

May 2015 Israel as #5 threat future threat to Germany, but rated "utterly unrealistic"  

July 2015 "Israel has earned a reputation for not necessarily letting refugees return" 

April 2017 "Israel's attempt to hold on to occupied territories since 1967 in spite of repeated UN resolutions demanding its withdrawal"

August 2018 Claimed that Israel deviated from Western norms and "Apartheid light, routine disregard of international norms" 

May 2019 Indirectly called Netanyahu corrupt

October 2020 Called Israel an illegal occupier of the West Bank

June 2021 Linked without comment to an article of HRW and another from The Intercept that were criticising Israel

October 2021 Mentioned Israel hacking, assassination and subversive actions without elaborating

January 2022 Mentioned without elaboration habitual Israeli occupation and bombing of foreign lands 

February 2022 Linked to an article about allegations that Israeli police illegally wiretapped Israeli citizens

February 2022 Called Israel an aggressor and occupier since 1967

February 2022 One post that is all about Israel's offences and I called it "unacceptable behaviour"

July 2022 Called Israel 5th most important threat to Germany due to the range of its nuclear-tipped missiles (later quoted this part in July 2024)

October 2023 I wrote that peace in Near East should be pursued by forcing a solution on the regional countries, not by negotiating with them.

November 2023 I wrote "Israel has to leave the occupied territories and go back to its pre-1967 borders. The state of Israel is only legitimate within the pre-1967 borders." and that the naval (longtime) blockade of Gaza by Israel was illegitimate

April 2023 Mentioned that Israel habitually commits wars of aggression

January 2024 Mentioned that Israel demolitions buildings in Gaza outside of combat.Also claimed that Israel "played the victim card too brazenly" (overplayed it).


I did NOT count my comments in the comment sections for economy of effort reason.

Now put these 28 instances in perspective; about 2,500 blog posts were written in total!

 

Looking back, I think not one of those statements is indefensible.

The "habitual", the #5 threat ranking, the opinion that Near East parties should be dictated/forced into peace rather than negotiation partners are unusual opinions, for sure. Definitely outside of mainstream. Still, in hindsight I still think of them as reasonable.


S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/08/08

Ethnic cleansing complicity by accepting refugees?

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Here's a difficult thing about ethnic cleansing. Suppose the evil party wants a people gone, ded or alive. Just gone from a specific area. They inflict harm on them. Now there's a third party and it has to decide whether to accept refugees.

To accept refugees means to assist the evil party in its plan. Such acceptance of refugees may even be a necessary part of the evil plan. To not accept them means they will suffer harm.

The right thing to do would be to intervene and force the evil party to stop its evil actions, but suppose that would not be practical for whatever reason: 

Should the refugees be accepted or not?

Would help in evacuation / resettling equal complicity in ethnic cleansing?

 

The international law scholars certainly have opinions on this and possibly they even have a consensus. I didn't bother to check this, for this time I'm rather thinking about the ethical dimension than the legal one.


S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

*: Pretend it's only about the quesiton of agreeing with another country taking them in, suhc as permitting evacuation flights over territory if an aversion to let certain brown people into your country gets in the way of thinking clealry and within the limits of this case / model.

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2025/08/05

The finiteness of self-defence

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I wrote about extremist warfare in 2009. The idea was that maximalist war objectives such as total annexation or unconditional surrender raise the bar to victory because they provoke maximalist hostile efforts. The effect is that wars are unnecessarily long and destructive compared to the case of more moderate objectives.

Now I'd like to point out something similar:

Some countries becomes extremist in response to being under attack. They have the legitimate and legal right to self-defence, but then they just keep going, inflate and exceed this right, up to "forever conflicts" where supposedly all military action for all eternity isjustified by the original offence.

I strongly suppose that the right to self-defence ends when the hostilities have ceased (including blockades and occupations by the aggressor being lifted) and only renews when a new aggression occurs. Any remaining entitlements to compensation of damages is then a legal affair that does not justify violence.

Examples for such 'forever' conflicts:

  • American derangement about the Iranian embassy crisis 
  • Israeli conflicts with Syrians, Palestinians, Hezbollah
  • The Frozen Korean War (some people pretend the lack of a peace treaty means an attack on North Korea would still be legal) 
  • The American sustainment of their conflict with Iraq from 1991-2003

I wanted to raise awareness about the problem and shed some light on it, but the latter intent is difficult to realise. I simply don't see any justification for such an open-endedness of a right to commit violence.

Proportionality is for all I know a universally accepted principle in law. An aggression from decades ago that was already punished ten times over cannot possibly be considered to justify further violence. It would simply not be proportional. And I'm not even discussing the "ten times over" part, right now I just take offense at the abuse of the "self defence" or ' UN authorised military action' authorisations of violence by pretending that they are endless.

 

We should go beyond accepting that self-defence is a right and pay A LOT more attention to the limits of self-defence. Civilised countries did this in criminal law, it's about time the public does it in regard to military actions (and subversive, sabotage and assassination activities).


S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de
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2025/08/02

Guilty or not?

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Suppose a man gets killed in his home. He had a long and violent dispute with his neighbour.
 
Should the police investigate said neighbour as suspect even though his grandma was murdered 80 years ago?
 
Or does this mean the neighbour cannot be guilty?
 
 

S O
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2025/07/11

A track record that needs no hiding

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I searched for an old blog post to quote and instead found a blog post-sized comment of mine (colouration added):

I covered Russia previously
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2007/08/no-major-war-in-europe-in-next-ten.html
and as much as I like low military spending, it's a bit more complex than what you suggest.
I don't expect them to turn on us militarily in a few years (rather on Ukraine), but don't exclude it as a possibility.


First problem: Lags (a.k.a. initiative)
The reacting powers would react with a lag of about three years due to imperfect information collection, processing and distribution.

Second problem: Aggressor's timing advantage
An aggressor can plan ahead to be ready for war in year x (Hitler planned 1940 for basic readiness, 1944 for full readiness against Russia and 1947 for naval readiness against the UK).
He can ensure that his forces are fit at that time. A reacting power - no matter whether low or high expenditures in peacetime - is at a disadvantage.
High peacetime expenditures can even be a disadvantage, as the equipment will be older on average than the aggressor's (example France 1940 - it still had many WWI guns).

My conclusion (I wrote several blog posts around it) is that we need to be aware that conventional warfare is the only truly threatening one (besides genocidal nuclear warfare). Militias at the end of our world will never touch us much, they cannot invade us or cut our sea lanes. Conventional warfare deserves our attention.

Our policy as well as our armed services need to be fit to react quickly.
We need good education for the relevant politicians, a good cultivation of military competence
(including a reserve of trained soldiers; basic infantry training suffices to save 6+ months of lag) and we need always competitive hardware designs.
That's more easily done by many incremental steps instead of 35-year- development and replacement cycles as usual for much of our hardware.

Finally, we need to prevent that these precautions take effect - we should prevent WW3. Reduce reasons for war, don't create new ones - and avoid wasteful arms races and wars.

Published in February of 2009. The typical contents of military blogs and military news were still dominated by the occupation war in Iraq at that time.

 

I can proudly state that I'm still 100% behind those statements and feel pretty good compared to most people who actually got paid in the 2009...2021 period for commentary or studies on military affairs.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/07/05

The direct/indirect/antiair fires tank concept

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I wrote in the past about tanks that have a unusually high maximum elevation of their main gun and can be used for indirect fires and for short range air defence.

/2010/04/medium-calibre-allround-option.html 

/2017/01/42-elevation-tank-turrets.html

/2023/04/a-compact-and-agile-exploitation-brigade.html

/2023/09/the-directindirect-fires-armour.html

 
I have never elaborated on the technical side of the shot, but the technical details matter for understanding the concept.

A tank gun has a very high muzzle velocity even with a high explosive shell (it won't be less than 700 m/s). A variable propellant strength may be used and special shells or fuses may increase drag to brake the shell, but a basic tank gun HE cartridge is going to produce a cannon-like, very flat trajectory.

This makes it difficult to hit a flat target with a point detonating (impact) fuse. A slight error in elevation or a slight deviation of muzzle velocity leads to a much greater range error of the shot than the shot's lethal radius. 

Historically, the best use for cannons in indirect fire at short and medium distances was to use a bouncing shot (cannon shells bounce off flat ground when fired at no more than 10° elevation as a rule of thumb). A delay fuse would then cause the explosion  when the shell is airborne after bouncing off the ground. The fragmentation effect of this would be greater than with point detonation, but the dispersion would be bad.

How about proximity fuses? Again, quite the same as with point detonating, just worse. The fuse may trigger much too early, especially when it overflies a building. Even a time-gated proximity fuse wouldn't be satisfactory. 

Normal time fuses use 0.1 second intervals. A shell travelling at 600 m/s would thus fuse somewhere within 60 metres - unsatisfactory, as the lethal radius even of a 120 mm HE shell in much smaller. 

The technical solution is to use more modern fuses that deliver accuracy of about ten metres. The elevation may still be off a little, but an explosion 3 m lower than intended or 3 m higher than intended isn't a too terrible variation.

Here's an example of such a very accurately fusing fuse.

 

This can be used to explode the shell inside a building (setting the timing accordingly and disabling a point detonation feature if present).

This can be used to shoot at aerial targets in the way heavy anti-air artillery did in WW2, just much more accurately.* 

Ideally, the fuse would have selectable point detonation (quickest direct fire shot mode that's somewhat useful on everything, including messing up a T-14 tank turret) and delay (for exploding BMPs, BTRs and rooms in a building)

 

The technology for proper fuses for very flat trajectory shots hasn't been available for very long. Most main battle tanks of today are from a 1970's conceptual design and prototyping generation, when such fusing wasn't on the horizon yet. The Chinese have newer designs, but they were catching up. The South Koreans have a newer MBT design, but they have mostly hilly to mountainous terrain. Same with the Japanese. The current equipment is thus no argument against the validity of the direct/indirect firepower tank concept. It makes sense that the in-service tanks lack it and at the same time the concept  may be entirely valid with our current technology.

Back to bending that flat trajectory a bit: The muzzle velocity depends on the propellant temperature. One might have a cool/cooled and a warm/heated cartridge compartment to enable a choice between two muzzle velocities. The difference wouldn't be great, though. This would not enable shooting over most hills in the line of sight.

Another possibility is to use a fuse or shell feature that deploys a braking element, such as in trajectory-correcting munitions. Another analogy is the nose or drag ring that can be added to rockets of manually loaded multiple rocket launchers to slow them down and thus reduce the often terribly long minimum shot distance. 

High tech approaches include variable injection of liquid propellant, use of electro-chemical-thermal gun principle and so on, but such already researched and tested technologies appear to find no users for good reasons.

In the end, a fixed cartridge with combustible case is realistic, a semi-fixed cartridge for varying the propellant strength by adding or removing modules would only be reasonable if the tank is used mostly in indirect fires. Another option is to simply have two different kinds of HE cartridges with combustible case; one for high muzzle velocity and one for low muzzle velocity. The latter could be used to shoot over hills, but it would have a reduced maximum range and longer time of flight. The shell orientation at explosion would also differ, leading to a different optimisation for fragmentation pattern and thus a different shell design.

 

The great potential of the concept of a direct/indirect/antiair firepower tank is in the versatility. This may go so far as to enable a much smaller and thus much more agile tank brigade without a dedicated artillery component. I described that concept in the 3rd and 4th link above. The same brigade would have dozens of assets capable of sniping away observation drones without need for any dedicated air defence vehicle.


S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

*: Proximity fusing may be preferable for this, but ordinary artillery proximity fuses meant to fuze a couple metres above ground don't work on air targets. Their safety feature keeps them from exploding before the zenith of the trajectory was passed.

2025/06/22

Due to recent events...

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I'd like to remind you that any NATO member attack on another country without permission by the United Nations is a violation of the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

The U.S. has ONCE AGAIN intentionally, habitually and grossly violated its obligations to the NATO other members.

The high risk of this happening again was obvious for days, but the terrible NATO general secretary didn't put it on the agenda during the NATO meeting. Instead, the "5%" brain fart of a lying moron was to be discussed.


/2008/09/overly-aggressive-allies.html

/2010/09/anglophone-disrespect-for-international.html

/2014/03/hypocrisy-in-effect.html 

/2017/04/the-us-blatantly-violated-north.html 

/2018/04/comment-on-recent-cruise-missile.html

 

It was completely unnecessary, actually. 

And it's not sure at all whether the supposed goal will be achieved. It's not a nature's law that a nuclear weapons program needs to be confined to a few locations. A dispersed enrichment program could lead to a simple gunshot uranium fission device. Iran is likely holding back from expending some of its better rockets.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/06/16

Hostility caused by fundamental misunderstanding

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I ask you to read this (shockingly, already 15 years old!) blog post first:

So, Iran is sponsoring terrorism abroad, right?
graphic taken from U.S. Congress

 
Well, look at the following map and search for "coincidences":
regarding copyright: see lower bound of image

The so-called proxies turn out to be Shia / Shi'ite groups outside of Iran.
 
This opens the possibility that the Western public (not terribly literate on such issues) misunderstands Iran's policy regarding support for outside groups. It might actually be about
  • support for religious fellows who are (or feel) oppressed by sunni-dominated governments
  • an effort to overcome the solitude as only Shia country by having at least some friends abroad 
Again (I wrote so previously), maybe the best approach to overcome the war in Yemen including the Red Sea crisis and missile launches on Israel is to split Yemen into a Shia state and a Sunni state. The unification of both Yemens was an obvious mistake.
We should have a peace conference with incentives to both Houthis and their main opponents to agree to a partition (preferably with better-drawn borders, but a decent seaport for the Houthis) rather than focusing on shooting down Houthi munitions and bombing them targets in Houthi-controlled territory.
 
Lebanon's issues could be addressed by replacing the Shia sponsor Iran with a more secular, more international order-focused sponsorship.
 
 
Last but not least another thought; even a democratic Iran would still be majority Shia and might still behave very similarly, feeling solidarity with Shias abroad, supporting their cause in some way, including arming them!
 

S O
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2025/06/13

Issues with "self defence"

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Countries are entitled to defend themselves against aggression, that's universally accepted international law and almost everyone (exceptions include some particularly dumb Germans who apparently like to give BJs to Putin) gets and respects that.

The application in practice isn't without issues, though. Those issues go beyond 'false flag' actions and lying about who started the shooting.


Suppose there's a country A and a country B. They've been at each others' throats for decades. Maybe four decades, maybe eight. Maybe it's possible to tell who did start it originally, maybe not. Maybe the conflict escalated through non-warfare hostilities such as sponsoring terrorism and sabotage/assassination campaigns, maybe not.

Is there still a right to self-defence in such a permaconflict? And if yes - who has it if the origin is unclear?

Even more troublesome: What if the originator of the conflict is known, but the origin has been many decades ago and both sides were actively hostile to each other (albeit not waging open warfare) for a long time? Suppose we agree that if country A was the original culprit then country B has the right to self-defence. When does this right end? Does it ever end? Can A be blamed for not quitting the permaconflict even if it gets harrassed by below-warfare level hostilities of B? It's human nature to NOT show the other cheek for decades. Suppose we say B loses the right to self-defence in response to below warfare level hostilities if A shows the other cheek. For how long does A have to show the other cheek, or how much punishment does it have to endure while showing the other cheek until B loses the right to kill citizens of country A and destroy things in it (or possibly maintain a naval blockade)?

 

Personally, I believe there are seemingly perpetual conflicts in which I stop caring about who started it. I transition to looking who does much more damage and then am convinced it's appropriate to demand an end to lopsided killing and damage as a step towards getting out of the vicious circle of violence. That demand is easier to meet than a demand for showing the other cheek for a long time.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/06/06

Minimum army weapons set, revisited

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I like to cut things down to essentials, so I wrote in 2023 about a minimum weapons sset for an army. To have very few different weapons helps coping with the difficulties in procurement.

/2023/01/a-minimum-army-weapons-set-for.html

So, almost two and a half years more developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War, does the blog post hold up well (IMO)?

 

#1 hand grenade, a timeless classic

#2 rifle, a timeless classic

#3 (light) machinegun, infantry will go on strike if it only gets rifles

#4 HEDP rifle grenade, infantry will insist on having something to shoot into a window 50 m away and this is the simplest means unless you insist on firing many shots.

#5 short range anti-MBT weapon They're worthwhile, but don't deserve a "minimum" list entry according to my opinion as of today. Fibreoptic FPVs can fly so well around obstacles that they can engage well in areas with very short lines of sight, so we don't need weapons that excel in such places any more.

#6 Well, this was close to the fibreoptic FPV quadcopter, albeit I mentioned a rocket-propelled missile as representative (there were no fibreoptic FPV quadcopters yet). The increased agility, the hover ability and the ambush ability of fibreoptic FPV quadcopters are huges advantages, worth more than the speed loss compared to the missile. So I say the #6 entry would not be represented by a rather fast fibreoptic FPV quadcopter (with thermal channel)

#7 LMM is still quite expensive (~30k €) compared to some targets, so one should rather look at an even cheaper solution now. I don't happen to know a truly satisfactory one, though. Maybe one could trust #6+#10 and scratch #7?

#8 C-UAS RCWS,  absolutely, still a great take!

#9 wheeled 155 mm SPG This one is increasingly dubious until we learn to manage the drone threat at least at 20 km depth. Some reports indicate that towed guns dug in (even 105 mm) are better, it's almost safe to say that spending the same money on towed 155 mm L/52 with auxiliary propulsion rather than on 155 mm SPGs is better. Please note; I am a proponent of using PGM missile artillery, which was not included in the list because a "minimum" list has to assume air support.

#10 Tamir, still a great take (to deal with Shaheed, cruise missiles, GUMLRS-ish munitions, not as the Israelis do against ordinary Grad and homebuilt rockets). Don't buy Israeli, though. Build an analog.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/06/05

Rackets

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So according to the news, the German minister of defence comes with news from NATO; according to NATO directives or whatever Germany is supposed to add formations to its armed forces.

Meanwhile, some American dipshit in office blathered something about seeing NATO countries moving towards 5% GDP military spending.

 

This truly is the idiocracy timeline !

 

The German constitutions says 

Article 87a
[Armed Forces]

(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Their numerical strength and general organisational structure must be shown in the budget.

Translated to commoner language, this means it's the legislative branch that defines the general organisational structure in Germany, NOT the minister of defence. I understand it's done differently in practice, but the German minister of defence has jack shit authority to define the general organisational structure of the German armed forces (except in his capacity of also being a member of parliament and having one of hundreds of votes in there).

That's exactly as much (=jack shit) authority as NATO does have in the matter.

This is a well-established racket. It's something similar to the appeal to authority fallacy.  

 

Regarding the 5%: Dipshit's own country won't spend that, there's no reason to bother paying attention to the word salat puke of the lying moron. There's no 5% GDP military spending agreement, no 5% GDP military spending obligation - there's none for 2% GDP, either.

Our #1 defence policy issue is the efficiency of spending followed by keeping China out of Europe. The military spending budgets are plentiful, regardless of the fact that claiming the opposite is fashionable.

 

related:

/2017/02/stephen-m-walt-on-2-debate.html

/2018/04/patterns-of-propaganda-for-higher.html

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/06/01

In-war deterrence by nukes

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It's about time to spell out something painfully obvious, because I don't see anyone else doing it:

Russia would have lost this war decisively long ago if it was no nuclear power.

The frontline combat is at a stalemate, the naval blockade crumbled long ago and Russia cannot win by strategic air war because Ukraine gets enough outside support to cope with the damage done to its infrastructure and economy.

Ukraine, on the other hand, could have won long ago by a strategic air war effort:

It could have destroyed the oil refineries, which a Russia under sanctions could not have coped with.

It could have destroyed enough transformer stations to collapse the Russian rail traffic in European Russia, which Russia could not have repaired due to sanctions alone (tiny chance that China could have helped out enough). 

Both would have collapsed the Russian economy as much as the railway grid bombing collapsed the German economy in I/1945. 

Why didn't Ukraine do it? My best guess is that its Western supporters gave support under the condition that no such extreme (=decisive) measures would be taken. Why would they have done that? Nukes.

So nuclear munitions are not just a deterrent in peacetime that so far helped to avoid direct war between nuclear powers. Nuclear power status has consequences during wartime that go beyond making force concentrations and single breakthrough points impractical. They also exert political influence. In the case of Russia, nukes protect Russia against strategic knockout blows.

 

Ukraine really has to work toward collapsing Russian ground forces' morale in order to reconquer the occupied areas. That is, unless a Western nuclear power grows some balls and knocks out Russian oil refineries by itself. The British could do that with cruise missiles.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/05/30

The "new" warfare in the Russo-Ukrainian War

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A string of twitter threads by different authors create an impression that this war is very different, kind of with different rules than previous wars, military doctrines from pre-2022 are obsolete now.

https://x.com/sambendett/status/1927076283000701067

https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1927714854351085928

https://x.com/Playfra0/status/1928183254089429005

https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1926930735266509094

I object.

 

Quite generally, when somebody claims that previous military theory is obsolete you should ask yourself what previous military theory this person knows about. You're nearly perfectly safe if you assume the answer is "very, very little" even if said person is a general.  Very few people dedicated much of thier lives tot he study of the art of war and people who learned some of it profesionally (such as generals) hardly ever learned much that goes beyond their own country's doctrine, and very little about how and why their county's doctrine came to be.

The drone war in Ukraine isn't terribly new. It's almost exactly a replay of the air war development 1911-1945, for example.

 

Yes, the kamikaze FPV threat is severe to up to 9 km depth, often extending to 20 km and rarely extending beyond that with almost none happening beyond 40 km depth against non-strategic targets.The long-established military term in English for this is "battlefield interdiction", and air forces aspire to do it not to 40 km depth, but to hundreds of kilometres depth.

To move yourself or goods to the front seems like running the gauntlet on the final 40 km and gets the worse the more close you are to the front? Does that sound all-new to you? Then you're not aware of the experience of the Japanese merchant marine trying to resupply distant island bases in the Pacific War or the experience of the German armed forces in France during June 1944, when the Northern French railway and airfield network was bombed to swiss cheese standards by the 9th Air Force. Do you think it's now that quadcopters are capable of cheap PGM-like precision attacks even on individuals? 8th Air Force fighters got bored in 1945 and began strafing individual bicyclists hundreds of kilometres away from frontlines in 1945.

What's "new" is that wer're in a brief "the bomber always gets through" pahaes during which there aren't enough counter-drone ("C-UAS") defences, so drones of BOTH SIDES are effective at battlefield interdiction instead of one side establishing low level air superiority/supremacy or both sides defending effectively to diminish the threat. That's about the situation we had in the very early 1930s when bombers were not slower than fighters.

All those improved fortifications, evolved through wartime experience? That's fortifications designed by amateurs who learned lessons by spending blood. There were VASTLY better field fortification schemes back in the 1950's already, but the overwehlming firepower of nukes didn't allow them to become very central to doctrines. Netting not just for concealment, but also for keeping drones out is new, but it's also pointless in face of the heaviest anti-trench munitions (bombs, TOS-1, napalm B).

Tanks get cages to keep FPV drones out? How is that conceptually different from cages to keep hand grenades out?

The frontline with up to 40 km battlefield interdiction poses a different challenge than pre-2022 warfare for breakthrough efforts? Sure, but is it really new, or worse? Breakthroughs against ready defenders were never easy, after all. I actually madke the case that the drone war situation is liberating in a way; suppose the FPV munitions are effective in a radius of 10 to 20 km. Traditional ATGMs were effective in a radius of 0.6 to 4 km mostly, with 2 km being a common practical limit in Ukrainian terrain. Now look at my (very) old text about repulsion and let it sink in. The increased radius of action actually liberates the attacker, he doesn't get channeled! Pre-2022 the same effort looked like this and it was the shorter rnage of the ATGMs that was slowing down the attacker. Now there's no such measures to limit losses to ATGMs. Attackers who would want to breakthrough could shout 'Damn the torpedoes, flank speed ahead!' and the breakthrough could be VERY quick if done well, which includes dealing with the WW2 revival band of mines, anti-tank ditches and gimped dragon's teeth as well as a fires plan that would make 1917's Bruchmüller proud.

I could go on, feel free to bring up true novelties in the comments. I have a hunch I'll reply with a military history analogy.

 


Patton was once asked about how he was such a good general and he replied (paraphrased) that nothing was really new to him during WW2. He knew everything from books already. Such students of military history and art people don't get fooled by fake novelty, but they are RARE.

Don't get fooled by people who claim novelty and impossibility because they don't know the past.

 

related:

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/fact-check-military-hardware-novelty.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/update-ugv-history.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2015/05/another-fact-check-military-hardware.html 

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2023/07/russian-fortifications-present-old.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2025/05/c-uas-on-battlefield-at-very-low.html

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/05/12

C-UAS on the battlefield at very low altitude

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/2017/08/very-low-level-air-defence-against.html

/2018/05/summary-modern-air-defences-for-europe.html

One might increase the rate of fire of a MG3 back to about 1,500 rpm and use a duplex cartridge (two bullets in one cartridge) for 3,000 bullets per minute rate of fire, 50 per second.*

 

All kinds of drones and most missiles would be hit very quickly and be stopped by such a volume of fire even from a single RCWS. The detection of drones might depend on a quickly rotating (~100 revolutions per minute) AESA radar with such lower power and (by radio band) such a high atmospheric attenuation that it senses drones out to no more than 400 m and cannot be triangulated from more than two kilometres away.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

* 20 mm autocannons with simple HE-PD rounds would be an option for tanks, I dislike the specialised and expensive 30 mm autocannon with HE-PROX rounds solution. One might also stick with the duplex round MG3 approach as long as the tank has a coax gun of more powerful calibre, ideally a .338 chaingun.

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