Many people focus on Afghanistan instead of on Iraq these days, and one of the 'political' assumptions seems to be that it's possible to 'surge' in Afghanistan.
There are many voices (including generals) who deny that the export of the 'surge' to Afghanistan would work, but the idea that the OEF-A's troubles could be reduced by more troops floats around.
Maybe it's possible to increase the troops strength there by a brigade or two, but really strong increases are imho unlikely.
The logistical situation wouldn't allow for 100,000 troops.
The supply lines from the north are threatened by the political fallout of the South Ossetia War.
The supply lines (and overflight rights; the truck convoys alone are said to deliver 80% of the supplies) of Pakistan are being threatened by potential attacks of Taliban and the political fallout of the recent raids into Pakistani territory.
Iran is no friend of Taliban, but doesn't really qualify as reliable supply line due to the political fallout of the U.S./Iranian troubles about the Iranian nuclear program.
(As you can see - the global policies of the GWB administration weren't cohesive and eroded good relations to many places.)
It's a miracle that we've been able to supply the small troop strength that is in place.
Unless our forces learn to live off the land (and drastically reduce fuel consumption), we will likely not be able to sustain (even as alliance) a much larger presence there.
Whatever the strategy is; it needs to work without much more troops and needs to achieve more than an effective ANA. An effective ANA alone is just one more enemy for the Taliban, not their defeat.
S O
There are many voices (including generals) who deny that the export of the 'surge' to Afghanistan would work, but the idea that the OEF-A's troubles could be reduced by more troops floats around.
Maybe it's possible to increase the troops strength there by a brigade or two, but really strong increases are imho unlikely.
The logistical situation wouldn't allow for 100,000 troops.
The supply lines from the north are threatened by the political fallout of the South Ossetia War.
The supply lines (and overflight rights; the truck convoys alone are said to deliver 80% of the supplies) of Pakistan are being threatened by potential attacks of Taliban and the political fallout of the recent raids into Pakistani territory.
Iran is no friend of Taliban, but doesn't really qualify as reliable supply line due to the political fallout of the U.S./Iranian troubles about the Iranian nuclear program.
(As you can see - the global policies of the GWB administration weren't cohesive and eroded good relations to many places.)
It's a miracle that we've been able to supply the small troop strength that is in place.
Unless our forces learn to live off the land (and drastically reduce fuel consumption), we will likely not be able to sustain (even as alliance) a much larger presence there.
Whatever the strategy is; it needs to work without much more troops and needs to achieve more than an effective ANA. An effective ANA alone is just one more enemy for the Taliban, not their defeat.
S O
No comments:
Post a Comment