"Based on my experience at JMRC and by talking to company commanders who come here to train, I believe U.S. Army tactical proficiency at company level and below is lower than many of our multinational partners due to a lack of emphasis on collective training and tactical proficiency at home station prior to training at combat - training centers (CTCs)."
"Overtasking and Its Effect on Platoon and Company Tactical Proficiency : Opposing Forces and Observer/Coach/Trainer Perspective" by CPT J. Scott Metz
(from U.S.Army's own eArmor journal)
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The Russians are paying attention to non-radar detection of artillery firing positions and impacts. That's the old way to which there are few technical countermeasures.
http://defence-blog.com/army/russian-state-owned-media-unveils-new-penicillin-counter-battery-system.html
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Old (1998) interview, still worth some attention:
Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski,
President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser
President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser
Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998
Question: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs ["From the Shadows"], that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke it?B: It isn't quite that. We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.Q: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against a secret involvement of the United States in Afghanistan, people didn't believe them. However, there was a basis of truth. You don't regret anything today?B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.
(copied from here)
P.S. I found this in the list of my draft articles as a June 2017 link list. My apologies if I had published it in June before and accidentally reverted to draft. I truly cannot remember if I had published it or not.
S O
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