I do usually write with the unmentioned assumption that deterrence is necessary for maintaining peace.
Well, maybe it isn't?
There's the historical example of countries or princes paying some other power (not necessarily a weaker one) to maintain the peace. The Byzantine Empire did this, and it survived for more than a thousand years.
The payments may actually be cheaper than to maintain the forces to deter, and were almost certainly always cheaper than actually waging a war. So this choice may be the economically right thing to do (especially as a supplement rather than a full substitute for armed deterrence), but there's the risk that such behaviour leads to ever higher prices for peace and isn't optimal in the long term. Still, there are irrefutable and largely successful historical examples for powers maintaining the peace not only by deterrence, but also by protection money.
Other examples for peace without effective deterrence are modern and obvious. Uruguay certainly does not deter Brazil or Argentina, but it doesn't get invaded. Many other countries don't get invaded despite their obvious inability to deter, either.
Germany and Denmark would not go to war with each other even if there was no repercussion for doing so whatsoever. It would simply not cross anyone's (not insane) mind.
I mean it; Germany wouldn't even invade Denmark if it was invited to do so by all other countries, if there was no EU, no NATO, no Danish military, no UN - it simply would not happen. We wouldn't even invade Denmark if we faced economic sanctions for NOT invading Denmark.
I suppose that maintaining peace without effective deterrence and thus without much military expenditure has to receive at the very least as much attention in writing as does deterrence strategising. After all, there's somewhere the key insight for a world with marginal if any waste of resources on deterrence & defence in there.
So my own priorities are off to some degree, obviously.
S O
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Arrogance to imagine that any action could have sufficient power to alter events to that degree.
ReplyDeleteDeterrence is an abstraction. Besides, it doesn't act on certain 'enemies' due to their mentality, strategy, philosophy etc...
Why do we need a military? To enagage in violence. To be prepared, ready, to engage in violence when we deem it to be required.
I think my brain is rotting, I can't engage in this without recursively nit picking 'what is peace anyway', levels of conflation etc... That isn't productive.
Some conflicts can not be deterred, war is the desired method through which resolution can be reached 'by other means'. The only choice is to engage in the pursuant arms race. Why? Because neither side agrees on the potential outcome of the future conflict and imagines that engaging will benefit them. In that dynamic deterrence can only be temporary, 'now is not the time'. That extends to a thought that perhaps this can be maintained? It is possible, the cold war managed it, but is that normative? Is that to be expected again? An escalating threat environment where options are increasingly lessened. Every action can be misperceived, everything can be interpreted thousands of ways. Chaos and entropy rule everything, is it fair to suggest that because the cold war stayed cold deterrence worked? Is it fair to say the cold war stayed cold anyway?
Waffle waffle. If absolute deterrence was possible there would still be wars. In that situation you need a ready military that can successfully destroy your opponents ability to continue offensive action against you.
WW1 could not have been detered. WW2 same. I'd say WW3 same as well.
Am I attempting to suggest determinism? Nope. Just that war is inevitable and humans are terrible at predicting the future. Recessions are unavoidable in capitalism, wars are unavoidable in international politics.
"Why do we need a military? To enagage in violence."
DeleteThat's nonsense, for violence is not beneficial in itself. A "why?" question needs to be answered with ends, not means.
Step 1: Get invaded.
DeleteStep 2: Non violent resistance.
Am I missing something? That the plan?
Yeah, you missed something.
Delete"What we have here is a failure to communicate"
Delete"I suppose that maintaining peace without effective deterrence and thus without much military expenditure has to receive at the very least as much attention in writing as does deterrence strategising."
ReplyDeleteIt's hard to argue with that. But then, this is a military blog and you are a military, first and foremost. And it seems to me the logic of deterrence is, in comparison, a rather simple or at least predictable one. We're looking at mostly rational actors, having mostly the same interests, and mostly similar information. Why such deterrence would be necessary in the first place goes deep into social and socio-psychologic matters, into emotional and irrational acting of individuals and groups. For instance, there's a wealth of information on the descent of germany into the nazi madness, and it at all seems to make sense in hindsight... but how it could have been effectively prevented, at any time by any interested actor (of which there were many, or should have been anyway) never really seemed obvious to me from it. As for the current state of russian politics, I've never seen a simple and convincing analysis why that is. I'm not a politologist of course.
The armed forces are very useful in keeping the potential enemy at bay. For example, how do you think Monaco protects itself from France? Because if France smiles at Monaco, everyone knows that at the slightest clash, it will not hesitate to cross the border. And we know that France does not take into account UN resolutions and despises the humanitarian consequences of its actions.
ReplyDeleteThe case of Andorra is a little different: it can rely on Spain, only in part. Indeed, the alliance of 2 imperialist countries against a smaller one is not so impossible or so rare.
Germany invaded Denmark twice.
ReplyDeleteThings change.
DeleteOtherwise all effort to better the world would be wasted.
Last Dingo:
ReplyDeleteThe byzantine empire survived for so long not because of paying for peace, but instead mainly because of its excellent military forces, its ability to adapt its forces to the rapidly changing circumstances and because it excelled in all kind of warfare most times of its existance.
The same time it began to pay for peace and began to weaken its military, it fall victim to foreign invaders (Manzikert) and lost the most important parts of its empire. The loss of this areas was so severe, it never recovered from it and was then destined to collapse and end.
The paying for peace and maintaing economical small forces lead to the destruction of the byzantine empire before all other factors.
Also in war efficency and effectivity are not the same, but often even opposite to each other. IMO you very often talk to much about efficency but not effectivity. A military that is very efficient, especially one that is very efficient economically can be very ineffective and weak.
The Byzantines clearly used subsidies/tribute as part of their appraoch to survival. To pay off threats reduces the quantity of foes they had to fight at the same time. The importance of doing so became evident when the Arabs overran the almost undefended Levante because the empire had exhausted itself against the Sassanids. That was the first big step towards their downfall. Manzikert became a disaster because of incompetence; for once, an emperor had preferred quantity over quality and then allowed his quantity to become dispersed during a campaign.
DeleteAn efficient military meets its purpose at minimum costs. That's the "given budget, minimized expenses" optimisation approach. Effectiveness is only of use up to a point, beyond which adding effectiveness costs more than it creates returns. I'm usually thinking of the strategic level when I'm writing about efficiency. I think I prefer the term "elegance" instead of efficiency on the operational level.
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/03/elegance-in-warfare.html
I did not wrote that they do not used tributes as part of their strategy, but that this part was a failure. Instead of investing high amounts of moeny for tributes, the same moeny could be used for the military and then stays within the own country (weapon industry, wages for soldiers etc) and in the other case (tributes) if flows out of the country. The tributes weakened the byzantine empire or were a necessary mean in times of (military) weakness.
ReplyDeleteThe problem of the byzantine army in the years before manzikert was also not one of a preference of quantity over qualitiy, instead the byzantines did not have neither quantitiy or quality because of their disastrous armament policy in the decades before this battle and in the overall change of the byzantine society and military structure in that time (growing feudalism, growing gap betweeen the rich and the poor, decline of the akritai (border protection !) and the militia forces of the themes, and paying to much tribute as an solution to foreign enemies or pseudo allies, not only in gold but also in privileges, especially for the italien city states).
To pay of threats (like the huns in the early byzantine history) to reduce the quantity of foes also most times did not work well to say at least. And to the contrary: the byzantines did often fought victorious in wars on two or even more fronts.
Also: especially the byzantine-sassanian war of 602 to 628 falls in a time in which the empire had not chance to buy the peace but had to fight in any case and this also in a war on two fronts, as for example the Avars and the Slaws conquered great parts of the balkans at the same time and although the byzantine empire tried to pay tributes to the avars, the same avars and the sassanians together layd siege to constantinople itself. They would better had invested the same moeny into the armed forces.
Therefore the muslim conquest (which was also succesful because of religious reasons (monophysitic christians against the orthodox church),and several other factors was not the result of not paying tribute! and shows therefore not the importance of doing so, but to the opposite to pay not tributes but to invest more in the military, as the muslims did not accepted tributes either.
But i can agree in the point that the byzantine empire for most of its existence had and very efficient military and spended much fewer moeny for the army as other nations. The byzantine military was often suprisingly strong at minimum costs and is in my opinion an example for your thesis in this point.
The most elegant point of the byzantine military was in my opinion the themes and their militia troops that rescued the empire from the muslim onslaught. Today most people speak about the arab conquest, but after the first succesful years many of the troops that then become muslims and attacked the byzantine empire were former byzantine citiziens (especially monophysites which converted to islam). This mass conversion even became a economical problem for the earyl muslim conquest society, because it lowered the taxes and therefore the income declined.
For example: who builded the ships and manned them for the attack on constantinople 674 ? For sure not arab tribesmen.
One last example for the paying tribute strategy: as the emperor heraclios tried to get his back free and to avoid a war on two fronts (against the avars and the sassanians) he tried to pay tribute to the avars. This was used by the avars for an ambush to capture the emperor in the year 623 and only in the last moment did heraclios escaped the treacherous avars. Several of his court members and thousands of civilians were killed by the avars.
ReplyDeleteDespite this he later again payed tribute to the avars, 200 000 solidi in gold and also he sended hostages to the avars, among them his own nephew and his bastard son. And again the avars did not stay quiet but after a short time again attacked the empire and occoupied further parts of the balkan and then attacked constantinople itself together with the sassanians in 626, only 3 years after their treason and attempt to capture the emperor himself and only 2 years after he had paid them 200 000 solidi which was an tremendous amount of moeny. Moreover the killed tenthousands of byantine civilians and peasents and looted and destroyed great parts of the byzantine balkan.
So much for paying tribute.
The Byzantine Empire lasted for roughly a thousand years. You may phrase it as if a few failures were damning to the approach, but your arguments are far from conclusive.
DeleteThere were also numerous battles and wars lost, which doesn't damn the approach of military strength, either.
The tribute/subsidies were paid repeatedly because the emperors expected them to work. They would have ceased to use this approach if it hadn't worked much if not most of the time.
They were an important part of the survival strategy of one of the longest-surviving empires of world history.
Furthermore, there would have been no need to pay if deterrence were believed to be sufficient. So we know that the transfers were meant as a complement to an insufficient deterrence capability.
First: it is very adulterand to claim that byzantium was one and the same empire for over a thousand years. To be correct one had to speak about at least three complete seperate time periods: the late antiquity, the early medieval (classical) byzantine empire, and the very different greek relic state(s) (there were even several "empires" after this date at the same time) after the fourth crusade 1204.
ReplyDeleteThe culture changed very much from period to period, even the language, the composition of the people and so and so on. To claim that the greek city state of 1400 to 1453 under complete italian control and with only 30 000 to 40 000 citizens at all - from which only around 25 000 were byzantines - is the same as the empire under justinian (a thrakian who spoke latin) or the same as under Basileios II is misleading to say the least.
So to claim the byzantine history as an long lasting success is misleading, as it was not one of the longest surviving empires in world history. As an byzantine (!) empire it lastet "only" for around 600 years - which is long enough for sure.
But even if you overlook the complete history of this state, it was not the approach of paying tributes that keept this state alive, but to the opposite. That is my thesis here: that the byzantine empire survived despite (!) paying tributes. You now claim, that the fact that again and again emperors paid tribute is a proof that this approach worked. That is not the case and moreover you missunderstood here the cultural self-understanding of this payments and why they were paid. But in most cases the paying of the tributes did not resulted in success, but often to the opposite. You may now than ask: why did the byzantines used this strategy again and again if it did not worked well most times and the answer is, that first the tributes were not an clever strategy but an emergency solution in times of extreme crisis and a result of domestic affairs and cultural traits.
The question of the importance of domestic affairs for the byzantine tribute system cannot be overestimated. To clearify that i want to explain it: because the taxation was so high and the income from the trade the same, the emperors had tremendous wealth for their disposal. This was mainly invested in the capital, for luxury, for the court etc. The city of constantinople was like an parasite for the rest of the empire in the classical byzantine era in which the complete rest of the empire was sucked from everything to maintain the capital and the luxury of the elites of the capital. This was not a system for the people of the empire.
ReplyDeleteBecause the byzantine military was very efficient (one of the most efficient in history) the emperors also often did not invested much into the army. This led to a weak army, or to strong local nobles which armed troops for the empire and become a danger politicaly. The same with generals. If then an enemy attacks, the emperor had the following options: first: lead the army himself (some emperors did this) and then he has to leave the palace, the luxury, the saftey of constantinople and had to risk his life with an efficent but often in comparison weak army. Or he sends and general and/or local noble but then this general / local noble often becomes a threat, overthrows his throne and become emperor himself (Nikephoros Phokas, Johannes Tsimiskes, Maniakes etc etc)
Or two enemies attack the empire, then the emperor can fight only on one front and the general who comands the second front again becomes a political threat for the emperor.
So you have much moeny, much gold and luxury, and because of the enemy attack your life and your throne are at danger (not from the outside enemy but from the enemy inside the empire or from desease etc) So its a high risk to leave constantinople and therefore not so many other options were available.
This combination of factors was the main reason then why the emperors of bzyanze often paid tribute. To avoid that an general overthrow their rule and to stay in constantinople in saftey and luxury for themself. And the necessary moeny was simply gained by higher taxation for the rest of the empire.
The tribute system was therefore not for the saftey of the people outside the capital, not for the gaining peace, not for the good of the people, not because it was clever, but it had the main target to keep the emperor in power against his domestic rivals and to keep his luxus life in the capital. Under Basileios II around 12 million people lived in the empire and were bleeded for the wealth of around only 300 000 in the capital so heavy, that great parts of the empire erraded economically and in any other way. And this was an emperor with an comperativly strong army who was militariliy able and leaded his armies in many cases. Under weak rulers like constantine porphyrorgenetos for example the overall situation forceful resulted then in the said tributes.
The same kind of story gets told about Louis XIV, but in reality only 10% of his revenue went to the court.
DeleteI doubt such stories about huge spending of the courts or on the capital. There's usually a grain of truth, but the figures-free storytelling of such stories is usually an exaggeration.
Important is not so much the question how much percentage of the income was invested in the court, the capital etc, but how much this in total numbers and how much this affected the overall macro-economy.
ReplyDeleteIn the classical byzantine empire (early middle ages) nearly all parts of the empire declined, were deurbanised, everything went downwards despite the capital (there were drastical reductions there too, for example for the question how many inhabitants lived there). The reason was, that macroeconomically more and more moeny, income etc was concentrated at the capital, as this was the main concern for the emperors. This is not only about court-costs so it is misleading to look only at the court. There were man other capital-centric expenses too. All had the same purpose: to keep the capital as safe and as rich as possible to ensure the rule of the emperor, so because of questions of domestic affairs. So the byzantine overall politics was often dominated by questions of domestic affairs, and that lead to the tribute system.
That is even true for the question of military expenses: for example most income which was used for the military was concentrated for the tagmata (imperial elite regiments, stationed in the capital or near to it). As this Tagmata (Regiments) ensured the rule and the saftey of the imperial familiy and the elites of the empire (which were stationed at the capital).
To the opposite extreme few to none income was used for the militias of the themes, especially the border themes and the akritoi, but this troops had to burden most of the fighting.
Espeically for the byzantine empire we also have relativly good numbers. Lets take the time of Basileios the II as he was a efficient militaristic emperor who invested not much in the court but in comparison much into the military. At this time the income of the empire was short under 6 million numismata per year.
Around 2 000 000 numismata went to the payroll of the army (1/3). 500 000 numismata went to the byzantine bureaucracy, espeicall the many officals in the capital. Presents and other gifts of the emperor withing the empire costed another 500 000 numismata per year. The rest of the 3 000 000 nomismata was used for the court, for other expanses, for tributes, for luxury, etc. There is a reason why foreign visitors were overhelmed by the luxury of the city at this time !
For this enourmous difference basileios II also had not fewer than 14 400 000 nomismata - this are 200 000 pounds of gold - for his succesor in the state treasure.
So it seams that much moeny was used for the military but basileos was an extremly militaristic ruler and such high military costs were absolut usual in earlier non-modern states as maintaing the military was in all non-modern states the highest part of the expanses.
So lets asssume that all emperors would have not used fewer moeny for the military but even more: for example all emperors would have not invested one third of the moeny for the army, but always 50 % at least. This would have changed the overall military situation completly and the empire would not have payed any tributes to anyone (theoretically).
Moreover most of the around 33 % were not invested in the border armies, the theme armies etc but into the tagmata at the capital. If this would have been complete reverse again the empire would have had not difficulties to expell all foreign invaders.
And then the moeny would not been lost macroeconomically as the soldiers would give it again into the economical circle within the empire. Instead the tributes moved all this moeny outside of the empire and it was lost.
The amount of the tributes is underestimated. After Manzikert for example the ransom for the emperor alone was 10 000 000 nomismata with an tribute of further 360 000 nomismata per year only to one enemy!
This tribute alone was in comparions to the then overall payments for the army of around 1 000 000 not fewer than around 1/3 of the overall moeny used for the army. Such an high bleeding damaged the macroeconomy of the empire sustainable.
"Important is not so much the question how much percentage of the income was invested in the court, the capital etc, but how much this in total numbers and how much this affected the overall macro-economy."
DeleteMaybe you shouldn't write at first:
"the emperors had tremendous wealth for their disposal. This was mainly invested in the capital, for luxury, for the court etc."
The early Byzantine Empire existed at a time when the former Roman Empire in general was in decline; especially in regard to population. That's mostly about climate rather than waste of resources.
The post-1000 Byzantine Empire suffered from raiding in its Eastern provinces; the loss of economic vitality there was not due to waste of resources, either.
The high times and low times of Roman and Byzantine Empire were markedly synched with climate extremes; civilisations are being favoured by high agrarian yields, while nomads and migrating people are being favoured by low agrarian yields.
Civilisations draw their strengths from cities, with rural areas contributing little more than food and recruits. Low agrarian yields reduced the rural:urban population ratio; there were smaller urban populations and the empires became weak (with additional issued with rigidity that made adaptions of the government slow).
See, what your argument falls 100% short on is any evidence that spending the tributes on the military instead would have yielded better results. I understand such a counterfactual is hard to prove, but you're not even trying. Instead, you#re trying to make the case that spending less on luxury would have been better.
Moreover, my point was that teh byzantine EMpire did
-a) use subsidies as part of its strategy to avoid war
- survived with this strategy for a very, very long time
Both are historical facts and not really refutable. Moreover, many many emperors sided with my appraisal that the transfers were useful, and all anyone could put up against that are counterfactual hypotheses.
The basic message of the blog posts stands unscarred; there are other means to maintain peace than just deterrence, and they deserve more attention(, for deterrence is expensive and amassing military power risks misuse of said power).