Previous posts dealt with the threat and challenge of a possible surprise air attack on high value targets (HVT*)**, particularly with hundreds of precision-guided missiles (PGM*). Such a surprise air attack could take out much of Europe's air power and other high value targets in the first hour of hot conflict.
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| Hypersonic missiles are the scare missiles du jour, supposed to scare you |
I suppose that there's no promising way to protect against such an attack in calm times because the required defences could not realistically be held in a sufficient readiness (with high-powered radars operating 24/365, for example). It might be feasible to protect against it in times of crisis. Recent events have highlighted the side effect risks of such a readiness, though.
So let's look at how we could set up such (crisis time) defences under the assumption that we could (technically) detect and intercept even terrain-following cruise missiles that possess very small radar reflexivity and quasiballistic / hypersonic missiles with a worthwhile probability of success.
Europe is large, and both its coastlines and its Eastern frontier are long. So I suppose that the only feasible way of actually defending against a large wave of PGMs would be through the use of area air defences. It doesn't appear to be promising to use hundreds of short-range air defence sites. Short range air defences are most unlikely to be effective against quasiballistic / hypersonic PGMs anyway.
The area air defences would have a much smaller 'footprint' (protected area) against quasiballistic / hypersonic PGMs than against cruise missiles (a well-known phenomenon with existing area air defences), so this backbone of defence could be split into a defensive line behind frontier (with spacings suitable for intercept of cruise missiles) and along coasts on the one hand (same) and other 'rear' firing units providing a protective 'umbrella' to clusters of HVTs (also against medium range quasiballistic and hypersonic missiles).
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The erroneous killing of civilian aviation could be avoided by not permitting the area air defences to fire on subsonic targets unless there's a high confidence detection of a large wave of incoming cruise missiles somewhere in Europe.
A small first wave of PGMs might be launched to exploit this and take out the area air defences, of course. Soft kill (multispectral smoke, local and directed jamming against imaging radar and satellite navigation), hard kill (short or very short range air defences to intercept the few incoming missiles) and evasion (quick reaction movement of the possibly targeted assets by few hundred metres) could be used to harden the defence network against this. This would be a particular challenge at coasts and close to certain borders (where many cheap munitions could be used with very little warning time to defeat the defence network), and much easier for rear cluster defence units (such as near Berlin or Paris, for example).
Another problem is airborne standoff jamming. The frontier chain of defence against cruise missiles might be exposed to this, and thus be an unreliable proposition for defence. Standoff jamming would help stealthy cruise missiles a lot. Non-radar sensors may be required to make this line technologically redundant and thus more trustworthy.
A small first wave of PGMs might be launched to exploit this and take out the area air defences, of course. Soft kill (multispectral smoke, local and directed jamming against imaging radar and satellite navigation), hard kill (short or very short range air defences to intercept the few incoming missiles) and evasion (quick reaction movement of the possibly targeted assets by few hundred metres) could be used to harden the defence network against this. This would be a particular challenge at coasts and close to certain borders (where many cheap munitions could be used with very little warning time to defeat the defence network), and much easier for rear cluster defence units (such as near Berlin or Paris, for example).
Another problem is airborne standoff jamming. The frontier chain of defence against cruise missiles might be exposed to this, and thus be an unreliable proposition for defence. Standoff jamming would help stealthy cruise missiles a lot. Non-radar sensors may be required to make this line technologically redundant and thus more trustworthy.
Legitimate supersonic contacts would be known to all firing units (not many friendly supersonic capable aircraft would be around, and they would have their transponders active), so threat supersonic/hypersonic missiles would be identified as such with ease once detected.
Such defences would be integrated (keyword IADS), but this integration must not be a necessity, for a necessity would introduce a potential systemic point of catastrophic failure.
It shouldn't be much of a problem to elevate the defences to crisis (high readiness) mode. This should not require a political-level direction. Spares budgets and personnel policies should allow for military leadership to elevate the readiness to crisis mode at slight hints of a surprise attack threat on its own. The safety precautions and defensive nature should suffice to convince the political leadership to permit this.
This begs three important questions:
(1) Is this technically feasible? Can we really detect and intercept challenging PGM targets with sufficient reliability, possibly in face of standoff jamming by hostile aircraft and disruptions of network integration?
(2) Is this affordable? Several existing air defence projects have shown extremely high costs for area air defences. Active radar seeker missiles are very expensive. Even the Russian S-400 system is said to be multiple times as expensive per regiment than S-300.
(3) Should it be done as a multinationally (EU or NATO) coordinated program akin to what was done with AWACS or at least the coordinated Central European area air defence belt of NATO in the 70's and 80's?
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| NATO SAM belt in Cold War |
The affordability is a question of political will, and thus a question of problem awareness. Even extremely expensive systems would have a price tag that disappears in the noise of economic growth volatility.
I suspect that Poland might mobilise such awareness and might set up defences for Warsaw at least. France and Italy might relocate their SAMP/T batteries for protection of their capitals and equip them with the newer BMD missile version, but I doubt that more than this is realistic.
A strategic PGM surprise attack in some war might be a warning shot (similar to the 1967 Six Days' War surprise attack on airbases) that could raise threat awareness to a sufficient level for a 80% solution within ten years.
A strategic PGM surprise attack in some war might be a warning shot (similar to the 1967 Six Days' War surprise attack on airbases) that could raise threat awareness to a sufficient level for a 80% solution within ten years.
The affordability could be helped by grouping HVTs in fewer clusters, but the effort to relocate HVTs is an obstacle.
Should it be done multinationally? Well, at least the exchange of situation data should be arranged. The European geography doesn't necessitate more than that IMO. Let's say Belgium did not set up a coastal line of intercept. That would not force Netherlands, Germany and France to set up lines of intercept at Belgium's borders. We wouldn't really need a linear defence that far west. Belgium's coast should merely be covered by early warning sensors, and that might actually be possible with over-the horizon (OTH) radars that require no Belgium-specific sites.
I see no reason why NATO should be involved. Returning D&F readers may understand that this is because not only Russia, but also the U.S. should be considered as a medium- to long term missile strike threat country by Europeans. A coordination of the effort by the relevant continental countries (Germany, Poland, Italy, France, Spain, possibly Denmark, Czech Republic, Portugal and Netherlands) including joint competitions for technical solutions (even if they lead to purchase of different offers as in some past competitions) would be appropriate.
The purpose of such spending would be to deny aggressor war planning the optimism that could lead to an aggression. Aggressor war planners should fear that a strategic surprise attack would fail if launched in times of crisis, and the European allies would thus retain enough military power through the first day of hot conflict to defeat an aggression with conventional means.
The feasibility depends on technical questions and political will.
related:
/2019/08/inf-20.html
/2018/10/inf-i-dont-hold-back-this-time.html
/2018/05/summary-modern-air-defences-for-europe.html
/2018/03/oth-coverage-for-europe.html
/2017/12/comment-on-european-investments-in-air.html
/2016/11/meadstlvs-alternatives.html
/2010/07/first-week-of-peer-vs-peer-air-war.html
S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de
*: Acronyms used to shorten the text and make it a little less repetitive
**: The links are near the end of the blog post.
**: The links are near the end of the blog post.
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Everything that isnt a 'low cost' drone swarm is vulnerable.
ReplyDeleteBit of a flap going on with the accuracy of 'just' upgraded scuds being revealed. Maybe our foundational concepts of war are just obselete? When phase 1 can strike to infinite depth and defence is impossible, how would war work anyway? The above 'flap' reveals that some have been running simulations with faulty data, but doesnt this just obscure what might be a wider problem. The military isn't going to call itself obselete. But maybe it is.
Day 1, 85% of european air forces wiped out in sneak attack. Political peace follows, almost no change in borders, but a change in political/diplomatic power between RUS/EUR. Think they'd rebuild air forces constituted of +100M wonderkind again?
Its not that your solution is invalid, I just think it shouldnt be discussed in isolation. Which then obviously leads to widening the topic to a point where it can no longer efficiently be discussed.
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ReplyDeleteContinental Europe is largely united - both in EU and in despising the current crop of U.S. ambassadors and their boss.
DeletePersonally, I believe the only thing that keeps the insufferable ambassador to Germany from getting persona non grata-ed is that the dominating German conservatives are by nature almost completely incapable of action (on anything).
In addition: One should not only consider the question of defense in this area on such a purely defensive level. On the one hand, one could significantly increase espionage and active reconaissance, on the other hand (to deter) build up one's own such offensive (stealth first strike) capacities because the enemy is subject to the same problem. If both sides suffer comparable losses on the first day (most of the air units destroyed, etc.), then their first strike has no such decisive effect. Therefore, own counter-strike capacities and a massive expansion of espionage and reconnaissance should complement the airspace defense.
ReplyDeleteNo, a retaliatory strike would not nearly have the same effect.
DeleteThe element of surprise and the geographic depth of the potential aggressors ensure this.
Europe should not strike first as a matter of principle, and it wouldn't against a great power.
Moreover, air power can project effects quicker across a continent than land power. Effective air power is an equalizer against the problem that European land power would take a while to arrive in the Baltics, for example.
Effective European and Russian air power is a better scenario for Europe than no effective European and Russian air power.
No comment about more espionage, sabotage, the usage of corruption in russia, reconaissance etc as offensive means against such an strike ?
DeleteIf such a defence succeeds and fends off a Russian surprise attack of the type described, it does not mean that we have overcome the Russian air defense and our air forces are just as useless until this succeeds - as if both sides had been smashed. The then controversial airspace is just as much to the benefit of the Russian armed forces as if it were in the case that both sides have destroyed air forces.
The counter argument would be that the Russians can pull enough air units back into the depths of their space. But Europe could do that too, the continent is basically big enough if it succeeds in stopping the russians in Eastern Europe - or much better, invade their territory from the beginning as offensive and as aggressive as possible.
Air force units for a quick relocation of a schwerpunkt and the rapid concentration of firepower in one place over our own area in the defense, or for a kind of schlagen aus der nachhand (defensive approach) are also subject to the problem of advanced Russian air defense if this fight occures in eastern europe.
The compelling conclusion from this is, in my opinion, that 1: one cannot hold the Baltic States either way and therefore should not even attempt this because it is militarily disadvantageous. 2: that it is better to destroy the Russian Air Force in a retaliatory strike (or even a first strike) because the Russians then also lack the rapid relocation and concentration of firepower to defend their large space which would enable an early offensive of our own land forces into their territory which would be most advantageous, and 3: that one has to invest significantly more in offensive and in highly offensive land forces, and has to think about an aggressive approach for a war with Russia. This is precisely what the Russians don't expect and what can mean the breakdown of their structures relatively quickly as russia is not as stable as it seems to many outsiders.
"more espionage, sabotage, the usage of corruption in russia, reconaissance"
DeleteNone of this strikes me as a deterrence factor.
I thought a lot about new and aggressive land warfare doctrines, but they depend on scenarios with low force densities. Those would not be given if Belarus stays neutral (and escalation against Belarus is neither legal nor desirable in such a case). Aggressive manoeuvering by mechanised brigades or battalion battlegroups would run into the threat of tactical nukes. A single 100 kt TNTeq TacNuke ruins any battalion battlegroup, and a mechanised brigade would rather withdraw after suffering such a blow.
The whole offensive land warfare approach is very tricky once you try to think it through.
There's a certain insecurity about whether a threat of TacNukes against liberation of occupied Baltics would be credible (or could be deterred) as long as the counteroffensive is only about the Baltic terrain. That's a huge field for possible valuable thought.
I don't believe in a Russian first strike with tactical nuclear weapons if our units are only fast enough and deep enough in the midst of the Russian civilian population and our war aims are limited and clearly defined. And that is precisely why we should go to Russia as aggressively and as fast and as deep as possible. In my opinion, the risk of Russian tactical nuclear weapons is even higher if our units are limited to the Baltic States.
DeleteIf we define clear and, above all, limited, war objectives openly and transparently from the outset and thus show clear framework conditions under which the conflict can be ended, the risk of using tactical nuclear weapons can be controlled in my opinion. The Russians moreover face the exact same problem too. We too could use tactical nuclear weapons against their mechanized units.
In addition, the effects of nuclear weapons against fully mechanized units are often overestimated, but the effect on the civilian population is underestimated. Such a use of tactical nuclear weapons could also very fast escalate into full nuclear strategic warfare, a risk which the russians would not take if they knew from the beginning our limited war aims.
My logic is, in principle, that the Baltic States cannot be defended militarily in any case. Unless we can (otherwise) act against Russia, Russia will win every such conflict in the Baltic States. Even the arming of the Baltic States beyond their capabilities would not change that. The first Russian strike would mean the loss of the Baltic States, the fear of nuclear escalation and the inability to act against Russia in any other way would cement this.
I am therefore convinced that we need a complete different doctrine and therefore complete other armed forces that are suitable for the implementation of this doctrine.
If the war is fast enough, we are in the midst of the enemy civilian population early enough (which reduces the risk of nuclear escalation) and we have clearly defined limited war goals, which in particular include the full preservation of Russia's national sovereignty after the end of the war - such an offensive approach to Russia would be - even in spite of the Belarusian problem - in my opinion possible and also superior to any purely defensive approach that is limited to the Baltic States.
There's little Russian population near the Baltics save for the St. Petersburg area.
Deletehttps://pbs.twimg.com/media/DkuToieUwAAR3Xw.jpg
Another problem is that a war of manoeuvre should rather bypass population centres to avoid urban combat (which requires much more infantry than our mechanised forces have) and civ-mil issues. Manoeuvering would largely be in low population density, non-buit-up areas.
The fallout of even a couple 100 kt TNTeq nukes with large fusion share and fireball not touching the ground could very well be tolerable to the Russian government. They could even lie about whose nukes they were (during the war).
Moreover, I expect Rusians to switch into a rather paranoid mode once Western mechanised forces capable of controlling terrain (= more than armoured recce) are in Russia. The mentality of a large nation switches to a primitive and irrational combative mode when it feels attacked, see Americans post-9/11. They could very well tolerate 'defensive' nuclear warfare.
That's why I think it's important to keep such a conflict limited to non-Russian territory in the perception. Raiding of small, elusive elements on the ground - yes. Brigades capturing towns or moving towards cities (other than Kaliningrad) - no. One might discuss a possible bargaining chip Pskov as a counteroffensive objective, though.
In my opinion, Russia cannot afford to use tactical nuclear weapons against the St Petersburg region, even if the Russians claim they are not theirs. In addition, St Petersburg is quite sufficient as a limited war target and a bargain chip. The majority of all war-related industries in Russia, the majority of all modern companies (computers, electronics, space, software, etc.) are located in and around St Petersburg.
ReplyDeleteOverall, around 20% of all Russian industry is likely to be located in this region, and much more in relation to war-related industries. An immediate and determined capture of St Petersburg would be militarily possible if we have another kind of forces. It will then be irrelevant whether there are other Russian troops fighting in the Baltic States.
In my opinion, irrational Russian reactions to this kind of penetration into Russian territory are only likely if our goals in the war are not made clear and transparent and at the same time clearly communicated. The loss of st petersburg (or the destruction of this region) would in any case be extremly devastating for russia, especially also economically and in the long term. It would cripple russia completly.
Even the population of the St Petersburg region is already higher than that of the entire Baltic region.
Of course, you are right that our current mechanized armed forces do not have the necessary structure and equipment for this (I would not even narrow this down to the number of infantrymen, since infantrymen are no longer as crucial in urban combat as is often assumed) , but that's exactly why I wrote that we need completely different land forces.
Since everything we can think of, of course, Russia can also think through, a massive Russian military concentration to defend St Petersburg can be expected, because Russia cannot afford to lose this region under any circumstances. However, this also means that these troops are thus stuck in the defense of St Petersburg and are therefore not available for an offensive into the Baltic States. It also forces a majority of the Russian armed forces in the West to start a decision-making battle as soon as the war begins, and precisely that, the immediate decision-making battle immediately after the opening would be the primary goal of this doctrine. A limited, extremely fast war in which the decision is immediately sought in Russian territory, but at the same time the Russians are immediately offered a clearly defined, and bordered war goal with a complete return to the status quo.
The possibility of losing St Petersburg in this way right from the start also has a very deterrent effect in my opinion and forces Russia to make its land forces more defensive towards the Baltic States and thus less suitable for surprising access to the Baltic States.
You sir, are a clown. Here is another clown, announcing the beginning of military operations against the Soviet Union, of a "purely defensive character" and in "the name of peace". http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Hitler%20Speeches/Hitler%20Rede%201941.06.22.htm
DeleteWie lautet das Lied, Herr Anonymous? Tja, "Freiheit das Ziel, Sieg das Panier!" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ND4KXKQAnRE
Zum ihren Trauer kann ich sowohl Deutsch als ihre transparente Nazipropaganda erkennen.
He's talking operational level offensive, not strategic level offensive.
DeleteBy all means try and take St. Petersburg - Leningrad region - the Russians remember well what happened the last time peaceful people came to the region. This will be the end of not only your army, but also of your civilisation. The Soviets were too soft on the German Reich and their collaborators, a non-ideological Russian government would de-industrialise and Morgenthau-ise a beaten 4th Reich aggressor in a heartbeat.
DeleteBtw, you are wrong about the relative value of St. Petersburg to Russia and the Russian defense industry. It is a cultural and artistic capital, with industry somewhat proportional to its population. Missiles, tanks, computer chips and nuclear weapons are not made there. Your argument about concentrating forces in St. Petersburg drawing them away from the Baltics is a non-sequitur, since modern forces are very! mobile. And all this stuff about a quick war and seeking early "decisional battle" stinks of German war planning in 19th and 20th centuries. Scheußliches Nazi Schwein.
An operational level offensive is indistinguishable from a strategic offensive in the early stages. Moreover capture of St. Petersburg and Leningrad region - 11 million people - is a strategic target.
DeleteGoing back to the topic, your article is a good thought-provoker, but I actually disagree with the main assumption, namely that area air defense is necessary to deal with a cruise missile 1st strike. I think on the contrary that area air defence is needed to wage a large war post any such strike, but that area air defence in the sense of missiles is not the most effective way of handling a cruise missile strike. Area defence radars and short range SAMs over key targets would be rather efficient. I think the longer range missiles would achieve most of their effect in scaring off key enabling assets like ELINT, Airborne radar and CPs, as well as standoff jammers. The 200km "no escape zone" of such systems is a nice bonus, but they are very expensive to use against massed CMs.
ReplyDeleteThis should actually make the whole thing politically easier, because radar's aren't exploding hardware, and short range SAMs plainly not offensive. I'm all for a European comprehensive linked radar network and short range SAM batteries. The other efficient means of handling CM strikes is with Mig-31 type interceptors, but these obviously could handle only a handful or so per aircraft per sortie.