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Helmets were introduced in the First Word War and did cut the count of killed in action troops by about a half (rule of thumb) by protecting the skull against most fragments (mostly of high explosive grenades).
Fragmentation protection vests (colloquially 'flak vests') were introduced for real in the Korean War and had a similar effect on top of the helmets' effect, by protecting the torso against most fragments.
The armoured personnel carrier (APC) was invented in the First World War and introduced for real for the Second World War. It was also said to have reduced the killed in action count by about half. The APC protected against stronger fragments (still not all fragments, though) and also against most (not all) bullets. Even the notoriously poorly-armoured M3 Half-track was a huge improvement over any unprotected vehicle.
APCs had thus a spectacular effect; it was much easier and much quicker to approach hostile infantry positions in an APC and the losses were smaller than without APCs.
The open-topped APC designs were followed by closed APC designs since the 1950's.
The force developers and doctrine developers were dissatisfied with a mere APC, though. APCs had already been armed with support firepower during the Second World War, or used for specialised purposes such as forward observer, scout, engineer teams, longer range radio vehicle, illumination vehicle or anti-tank gun carrier. The result was inevitably a loss of life-saving and combat-accelerating protected transport capacity for infantrymen.
There were calls to move from transporting infantry to drop-off locations towards fighting while mounted, and a modification of the APC concept into the IFV (infantry fighting vehicle) concept was favoured. The concept for mounted infantrymen using their own weapons while riding an IFV did not stand the test of time, tough. Nowadays IFVs have similar movement and sensors as main battle tanks, albeit using autocannons and anti-tank guided missiles rather than one powerful large calibre single shot gun.
The costs have risen badly, and IFVs are so expensive that we cannot afford enough of them to transport enough of our infantry in IFVs. A move towards wheeled APCs as cheaper means of transportation wasn't spared from the general urge to demand gold-plating and autocannons, as visible with the American (Swiss Piranha IV design) "Stryker" vehicles, which got first very expensive and nowadays receive autocannon turrets at costs that exceed the costs of an APC.
APCs have certain advantages and disadvantages compared to IFVs:
(+) lower costs
(+) higher seat capacity (often about 10 seats in APCs, about 7 in IFVs)
(+) usually lower weight, thus a tendency towards lower ground pressure
(+) usually a lot smaller (especially lower)
(-) lesser sensors
(-) less firepower
(-) gunner doesn't get directed by a commander
The protection of IFV and (H)APC can be about equal for the hull, this depends on requirements.
The title promised a praise, but so far there's just a historical and status quo summary.
Here's the praise; an APC (a.k.a. "battle taxi") is much more versatile and survivable than an IFV.
Few would agree outright. Isn't an IFV more versatile because it has more firepower? Isn't an IFV more survivable because it can destroy threats and usually has better protection?
The tracked armoured personnel carrier has superior versatility compared to an IFV
This gets obvious once one looks away from spec sheets and line drawings, moving attention towards how AFVs are used in battle.
An APC has superior cargo and passenger capacity, and this is of great utility.
- It can move infantry into the fight.
- It can extract infantry from a fight.
- It can extract prisoners of war from a battlefield.
- It can extract civilians from a battlefield.
- It can supply troops in contact with the enemy with (hot) food.
- It can supply them with beverages.
- It can supply them with munitions.
- It can supply them with batteries (and fuel).
- It can supply them with tools.
- It can supply them with cold weather and night equipment.
- It can transport equipment on its roof.
The importance of being able to rather safely transport stuff and people though the last couple kilometres to a company in contact is easily underestimated. An IFV has transportation capacity as well, but much less so - and it would inevitably have a crew of at least two during supply runs because the autocannon turret is too enticing, while an APC could very well ditch the gunner and make a risky supply run with a crew of only one (or even unmanned).
Moreover, IFVs have only about 2/3 the transport capacity of APCs and are more likely to get fixed rather than foldable seating, which means even more volume is lost for transportation. A fine APC design would have foldable seats for benches and a floor that's suitable for pushing or pulling pallets.
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| Puma IFV |
APCs and IFVs can be organised in different ways. They may be part of a specific section of infantrymen (section leader then being IFV commander, usually dismounting with the other dismounts) or it can be a support assets (one APC or IFV could move different sections in battle). The latter is particularly unpopular because it's less suitable for the quick assault doctrines that originally spawned the 'infantrymen shoot from inside their armoured vehicle' approach. You can also be quick while riding a battalion-level APC, but it's not so natural.
- Most missions from the list above are much more natural to non-organic* APCs than organic APC and IFVs.
- There are huge advantages to be had in separating infantry sections from their vehicle, though.
- The section leader does not need to occupy his mind with the vehicle while dismounted.
- The vehicle can be hiding many kilometres away, while an organic IFV would be kept close to the infantry fight.
- Less training requirements for the dismounts.
A disadvantage is that the small (APC) crew of two would have to do all routine maintenance on their own, but that's not so terrible with bandtracks and they may often visit a maintenance point in the 'rear'.
The tracked armoured personnel carrier has superior survivability compared to an IFV
An IFV could fight against main battle tanks with its guided missiles (and its autocannon), but doing so needlessly exposes it to MBTs. You can kill the MBT with a man-portable missile fired by dismounted infantrymen (or dedicated tank hunter troops).
An IFV is a fire support machine. It needs to expose itself in line of sight with enemies to give said fire support. An APC may be misused as a fire support machine (the American FM 7-7 actually mentions this as doctrinal), but it can also be limited to 95% transportation and 5% assault transportation roles.
An IFV carries great secondary explosive hazards internally (autocannon munition, anti-tank guided missiles) or else it doesn't have much staying power regarding its firepower.
The APC would have better odds of survival even with lesser protection than an IFV simply because it's going to be exposed to less risks. This is especially egregious as IFVs usually fall well short of having the protection level of main battle tanks. A MBT+APC combo would use the better-protected MBTs for fire support that a MBT+IFV combo would largely give with its IFVs.
I consider IFVs to be an ill-advised and overrated concept. The IFV's fans ignore that the IFV concept keeps not delivering on its promises.
The extremely high costs of today's IFVs (due to the electronics of the turret that are equals to MBT electronics) leads to poor infantry strength and in case of long-ongoing wars it leads to most infantrymen lacking protected mobility because peacetime spending was wasted on gold-plated IFVs.
The "battle taxi" concept is underrated because people don't quite understand the importance of transportation on the battlefield. They pay too much attention to the shooting part.
S O
*: Not belonging to the same unit.
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About armour: years ago I read an article were I discovered that the first layer of armour for an MBT is being in a position were it can't be engaged like behind a building, a hill, a defilade, etc.
ReplyDeleteBonus if you can also engage the enemy.
I think this applies battle taxis: transport the troops, if possible out of reach of the enemy, and get out of the way. This is the best armour.
JM
Excellent article. The APC is designed to protect troops from small arms fire and artillery shrapnel while moving into position on the battle line. It was never designed for front line fighting (that is what heavily armored tanks are for!)
ReplyDeleteTracks are essential to be able to move off road. Wheeled APC's are heavier, less protected, less mobile, and more complicated than plain vanilla tracked APC's.
Unpopular opinion: The old M-113 is still perfectly serviceable for the job.
The M113 is still bulletproof, but most M113s are in a bad technical shape and not very mobile (or mobile under own power at all) any more.
DeleteWe could easily devise a vastly superior tracked APC using military off the shelf (MOTS) parts and a sufficiently protective hull. I would greatly favour composite bandtracks over metallic padded tracks for noise, vibration and maintenance reasons.
The biggest challenge would be to develop a RCWS that could shoot at drones/loitering munitions/ATGMs in an automatic mode without effing up too often. We need that kind of RCWS for most vehicles of a fielded brigade anyway, though. So it should become MOTS ASAP.
This probably will look like the Kongsberg RS6 mount used for the USMC MADIS program with the 30mm XM914 using proximity or air burst rounds. Will require a radar too.
DeleteGreat article like usual.
ReplyDeleteOne thing I have always wondered is why countries don't split the difference between an APC and an IFV by making a "light" IFV. What do I mean? Why not just take a standard APC, give it slightly better amour (such as STANAG Level 3+ protection all around) and give it a better main gun such as one of those lightweight 20mm/30mm guns remotely controlled (that more or less weighs the same as a M2 .50 cal anyway). You would create a vehicle that is only slightly more expensive than your typical APC but a vehicle that is far more safer and powerful but still has the troop carrying capabilities of an APC. A Patria 6x6 would be a perfect chassis for such an idea and would cost 1.2-3ish million euros a vehicle.
A 50cal RCWS costs about half a million €, a 20 or 30 mm RCWS would be built with longer-ranged sensors and approach the cost of one million €, just for the RCWS.
DeleteThe firepower mounted on the APC / light IFV would entice leaders to voluntarily employ the vehicle in firefights. This is detrimental to survivability, as I pointed out in the blog text.
Moreover, the munitions carried in a RCWS or turret would be few rounds, and likely poorly protected. The army would be enticed tos tore rounds in the hull, which costs one seat and adds secondary effects hazards when the hull is penetrated.
That's crazy that RCWSs cost so much! You should do a blog post just on how much everything costs to outfit a vehicle with what is considered the "basics" nowadays. Too bad the STK 50MG never took off because it is perfect for a RCWS role (dual-feed + half the weight of a M2).
DeleteThe IFV is a despecialization by trying to have everything do everything. This might an old debate about the benefits of specialization.
ReplyDeleteLast Dingo:
ReplyDeleteA completely different idea: in my opinion one should abandon the MBT and instead use (heavy) IFV in its place. Heavy IFV would also have a larger transport capacity, for example it would be possible to transport 9 men with such a IFV without any problems. The question of transport capacity would then have been solved immediately.
Then you can also think of a combination of IFV and APC and combine these two systems with each other instead of combining MBT and APC with each other. And immediately the transport capacity would be higher than with an MBT / APC combination, the whole armoured units would be much more versatile and the costs would be lower. One could also build IFV and APC on the same components / systems as far as possible and thus one could achieve further synergy effects, while this is not possible with a combination of MBT and APC.
So my idea would be to just abandon the MBT and combine IFV and APC instead.
"in my opinion one should abandon the MBT and instead use (heavy) IFV in its place."
DeleteGreat, you have still a combination of expensive disadvantages. Useful alternative would be to divide the IFV in an heavy APC and a support tank.
A simple arithmetic example: we take three battalions, with a total of 150 tanks. Now we have 75 heavy APC that can even transport 12 men per vehicle and 75 main battle tanks as support tanks. Then we have a transport capacity of 900 infantrymen overall. And 75 large caliber cannons that can be used primarily LOS and cannot be used against enemy drones and other over-elevated targets.
DeleteIn the other case, with a transport capacity of 9 men for each heavy IFV, we have a total transport capacity of 1350 infantry. So we would have no less than 450 more infantry and we would now have 150 medium caliber autocannons which are much better suited against enemy infantry, drones etc.
Also, all vehicles are the same, which means lower costs and advantages for the logistics instead of two different vehicles.
The calculations of converting existing mechanised infantry or armour brigades or divisions into a MBT+APC setup don't show the APC's advantage.
Delete75 MBTs and 75 HAPCs would cost less than 150 (H)IFVs, BTW. It makes sense to compare fleets possible with a given budget, not 1:1 comparisons.
The APCs advantage comes into play when you think of a more infantry heavy force, as the one Ukraine uses. That's a vastly cheaper way to deter and defend an alliance.
Ukraine entered the 2022 campaign with 38 manoeuvre brigades.
You cannot afford giving 108 battalions (H)IFVs. That would be ~5,100 (H)IFVs of ~€10M each without any reserves, spares or munitions.
38 battalions of MBTs (~€10M each) and 76 battalions of ~€3M APCs, maybe ~€4M APCs with hard kill APS sounds MUCH more affordable.
You might cut that down further by having a battalion worth of APCs with hard kill APS per brigade and three battalions worth of frag-protected standard lorries used as APCs for movement not in contact (~€1.5M each). Those could be replaced easily with wartime production, as it's merely RHA plating welded to 6x6 lorries (which can be civilian types in wartime production).
€10M for battlefield mobility of 7 infantrymen is unacceptable (and a HIFV would NOT have 9 dismounts).
You can do the same thing with IFVs. Don't have to equip every brigade with them. Others can get APCs or protected mobility vehicles.
DeleteYes IFVs cost more and deliver a couple fewer infantry, but they add a VERY capable optics, autocannon and (sometimes) ATGM suite.
I am more on the fence here than I used to be though. In Ukraine, old fashioned numbers seem to matter more than anything else. The Russian Army has lost much of its armored forces, so there's less of a need to kill hordes of BMPs and BTRs.
I do think adding a capable enough anti-drone RWS is probably going to eat up most of the difference. The US MADIS or M-SHORADs remote turrets with 30x113mm proximity rounds and a radar (perhaps part of an APS suite) might be a minimum.
Last Dingo: There are areas where you could easily spend a lot more money just by saving a few frigates and you'd still save a lot of money if you use an HIFV Force.
DeleteBut beyond that, I also explicitly wrote about a combination of HIVF and APC. And these would be even significantly cheaper.
Your claims about the costs are also such a thing. By no means do HIFV necessarily cost 10 million per vehicle, nor do APC only cost 3 million per vehicle, although that is possible (depends on the vehicles).
You just calculate it nicely so that it fits your already preconceived view. For example, the GTK Boxer already costs about 5 million per vehicle here and now, and that without a hard kill system. And GTK Boxer only transport 8 men and is a wheeled vehicle which although very heavy and amoured could not withstand the newest autocannons. On the other hand, heavy IFV are available that can transport 9 men, such systems exist.
Similarly, modern MBT not only cost 10 million as you write. The Bundeswehr is currently paying no less than 525 million euros for just 18 new Leopard2A8s, which is around 29 million per MBT.
If we now take the 75 main battle tanks mentioned and the 75 APC with hard kill, then we are talking about 2.700 to 2.800 million euros here.
With the figure of 10 million for each HIFV you mentioned yourself, we already come up with at least 270 tanks with the same amount of money. Or with a number of 150 HIFV, you save no less than about 1.200 million euros in comparison to your MBT / APC fleet.
Now of course you can as next argument explain that you can build cheaper MBTs and also cheaper APCs and the GTK is a bad example etc. but you can also build cheaper HIFVs and if you buy them in larger numbers and they are all of the same type then that saves too costs again (synergy effects etc).
And to emphasize this again: of course you can also combine HIFV and APC, and then save a lot of money compared to a combination of MBT and APC. With a much higher transport capacity.
Let's say we now have 75 HIFV and 75 HAPC. And the former could only carry 7 men each (although there are HIFVs that can carry more) and the HAPC can carry 10 men, so the total transport capacity is 1.275 infantrymen for the entire formation.
While with a combination of MBT and ACP you only get a total transport capacity of 750 infantrymen.
Then the difference is already 525 infantrymen, in favor of the variant with the HIFV! That would be even 75 more infantrymen than in my first example with an HIFV only force.
The MBT is the true problem, and that most IFV are not HIFV. The HIFV is the MBT of the future, and replacing MBT with HIFV would immediately solve the problem of protected transport capacity and give overall more flexiblity.
Which performs better may depend on the situation.
DeleteAgainst the types of fixed fortifications and minefield the Ukrainians are encountering, APC equipped units may fare just as well as IFVs, if not better.
In a maneuver fight, IFVs are probably better.
In both cases, they probably need organic quad copter drones that can scout ahead, look downward from an elevated perspective, and even deliver light air dropped munitions.
Small FPV drones with light, command detonated (or dropped) warheads (flying grenades?) should be used to precede infantry in trench and bunker clearance.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CpXa8K1BhI
Ulrich,
DeleteIt doesn't matter what specific vehicle you look at. An IFV is essentially a turreted APC. The base APC vehicle will always cost significantly less than an APC+turret. It doesn't matter if that APC is a Stryker, Boxer, AMPV, or whatever. Add a turret to it, and it will cost more.
The Polish Dragonfly is probably the closest to a non jury-rigged FPV loitering munition. Might be nice to have something even smaller that just carries a 40mm grenade warhead.
Deletehttps://wzl2.mil.pl/wp-content/uploads/Ulotka_Dragonfly_ENG_Internet.pdf
The unit price of a MBT purchase of 18 vehicles is not relevant IMO. 200+ yields a reasonable price. Poland's K2 Black panther price was about 8.5 million $, add some for spares and hard kill APS (Iron Fist) and you're very close to 10 million.
DeleteGTK boxer is a horrible design, I bashed it myself already. We have no recent tracked APC sales (of new vehicles), so we don't have good example prices. I suppose 2 million is very doable for a M113-ish APC with RHA hull and diesel engine, all MOTS.
HIFV instead of MBT is not going to fly because big guns are so very effective against buildings and because missiles tend to rely on shaped charges, and everyone wants kinetic energy penetration (APFSDS) as well to avoid betting everything on one horse.
And then there's the aspect that an army wants a full-time mounted combat vehicle. HIFVs would have to ditch the dismounts somewhere (for their safety) to go mounted combat the way MBTs do. That adds much complication.
A HIFV would be much bulkier than a MBT even with the HIFV using an autocannon and the MBT a 120 mm, especially any 9 dismounts HIFV (which one is supposed to exist? Namer IFV either lacks munition capacity or sarifices a seat). The additional bulk means it's easier to see, to hit and the additional surface area means it's easier to penetrate at a given mass.
A system that can take down drones might be necessary for the survival of APC, be it a laser or some gun. This system automatically has more kinds of targets against which it can be used, so the APC probably transforms into something more like an IFV, while tanks might become lighter and more missile based and more remote controlled from an armoured crew vehicle, the APC/IFV. This could make the tank a lighter armoured unmanned gun traveling with a datalinked APC/IFV. And someone will probably figure out how to reduce costs and logistics by fitting these different design on the same basic frame.
DeleteB.Smitty: Of course, an IFV always costs more than an APC, but I've never written anything else either. In fact, I explicitly wrote of 10 million for an IFV and 5 million (half!) for an APC.
DeleteLast Dingo: The question is IMO, isn't a medium caliber autocannon (50mm up to 75mm) actually even better against buildings? Because you can then work against elevated targets (higher buildings) and you have more ammunition with you for the same volume and weight (many targets, buildings without resuply) and the rate of fire is higher (supression, air-defence), which offers also other significant advantages and you can also use the machine cannons quite well to defend against drones etc. All of this is not even remotely possible with a 130mm or even 140mm BK as they will come now and also not with the currently used 120mm.
DeleteIn addition, one could also reverse the respective effects of rocket and cannon in IFV, so that the rockets use KEP and the cannon therefore specializes more in area effects. There are corresponding rockets available as prototypes (CKEM) and you yourself have been writing positively about such rockets that use KEP for years.
Also: The question of whether you hit a vehicle and whether you hit it well no longer depends so much on the size of the vehicle. Modern weapons hit small and larger vehicles alike. The primary problem in terms of size is therefore only the weight of the armor before anything else. It does not help you at all to have an smaller tank for the question of getting hit or not.
But if you consciously refrain from armoring these tanks frontally against large-calibre cannons (120mm and more), then this weight question is put into perspective and becomes irrelevant. And IMO this armour concept is obsolete. If we follow this path of greater calibre cannon, more frontal armour against this kind of cannons, greater calibre cannon etc, this will make the MBT overall obsolete and useless.
The question remains how to use these tanks. What doctrine and fighting-style would then be used ?! You see a problem of complexity in the separation of infantry and tanks, I see it (keyword Bronegruppa) more flexibility and possibilities.
And last but not least: NAMER IFV can carry up to nine troops. As they use an unmanned turret which do not protrude into the passenger compartment. There are also variants of the T-15 prototype which can transport 9 troops, although it is now planned that it should transport 7 troops but more ammunition instead.
The OMFV Lynx would also be an good example. 50mm Autocannon, and up to 9 dismounts. But it doesn't matter if there are 9 men or less. I myself wrote explicitly of 7 men for the HIFV in my calculations. And with 7 men per HIFV, I came up with up to 525 more infantrymen with the same number of vehicles compared to a formation with MBT.
If the HIFV would even transport 9 men, which I had not explicitly written (I wrote 7 men), then the advantage would be even greater. Because then you would even have 600 more infantry in comparison to the MBT / APC combination. Or enough transport capacity for other things, like ammunition and more rockets.
Guns up to 75 mm can fire at high angles, and K2 Black Panther can tilt its hull to add elevation to 120 mm.
DeleteSuppression is a job for machine guns.
I recently wrote about 120 mm being the biggest sensible calibre for a long gun and armouring against frontal MBT gun shots being a poor compromise.
Lynx has 8 dismounts. It's IMO unrealistic to let the commander of such a vehicle dismount, regardless of doctrine.
Autocannon full auto has actually a dispersion that makes vehicle size relevant. Big vehicles also catch nore 152 mm HE large fragments.
Last Dingo: If the armor protects against these splinters, the larger area is irrelevant. In addition, it is a question of the direction from which the fragments come. If the vehicle is taller than anything else, only the side faces are larger. There is usually no practically relevant difference either from the front or from the roof surface.
DeleteUsing the namer, the vehicle itself is 3,7 m wide, 2,5 m tall (excluding the unmanned turret), and approximately 7,6 m long. For comparison, let's take the particularly compact G5 as APC: it is about 3m wide (compared to 3.7m), it is about 2.5m high (same height) and 6.5m long (compared to 7,6m).
In the end, this M113-like APC is just 1 meter less in length and about half a meter less in width. And since both are the same height, this is actually only relevant for the question of the roof armor. From the front, the surface of the Namer on which splinters can hit is practically the same, and the side surfaces of the Namer are each 1 m x 2.5 m more surface. Ultimately, the Namer has 5 square meters more area that can be hit by splinters.
That's not much and practically irrelevant. On the other hand, the armor of the Namer is significantly better. While the G5 is destroyed by the aforementioned 152mm artillery shrapnel at close range, a Namer can absorb such hits at much closer distances.
Suppression by machine guns is currently a key success factor in Ukraine. Because the suppression by an autocannon is much better than by a mg and you also have a much higher effective range so you can deliver this supression over far longer distances.
The OMFV Lynx has 9 dismounts. whether that makes sense (2 man crew instead of 3) is an open question. But to emphasize it again: it doesn't matter whether the HIFV has 7 or 8 or 9 dismounts. I counted 7 myself. With 8, the advantage would still be greater than in my calculation with 7. The essential point here is not how many dismounts the vehicle has, but that the MBT is deleted and no MBT is used. This is the main point.
Using HIFV instead of MBT is the concept I am writing about here and it solves the transport problem on the spot. And I deliberately don't write IFV, but HIFV, because normal IFV (I agree with you) are insufficient.
Spare two fregattes for the bundeswehr and you would have the money for an HIFV force without mbt. That is not an argument against APC, all you wrote about them is quite true and right. And HIFV do not exclude APC either, you can use them both.
The plates that protect sights are not nearly as resistant as the hull, and probability of hit is much higher with point detonated 152 mm HE frag effect if the sensor is mounted 1 m higher. Even strong IFV armour is going to suffer occasional penetration by 152 mm HE, and target size matters statistically. Moreover, bigger = more difficult to hide.
DeleteI don't see much use for direct fire suppression over longer distances than 7.62NATO can deliver (300...600 m depending on scenario). Autocannons vs. ATGM teams is very much a myth. It hardly ever works in battle, and rarely so in exercises (unless the ATGM team sucks).
I think I understand your HIFV force idea, but
- it largely ignores the tactical dilemmas of using a mounted combat machine for transport duties
- it assumes that armies can make do without 'big bangs' of 75...125 mm calibre. I say they don't want to make do without, and the effect of 30...50 mm HE on buildings is too dissimilar to what 75...125 mm do to buildings.
- HIFVs would be of little use when not committed to line of sight action (just a bit of air defence against slow aerial targets several km behind FLOT/VRV), while MBTs can act as auxiliary SPGs in indirect fire roles, see
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2023/04/a-compact-and-agile-exploitation-brigade.html
Last but not least, this was a blog post APC vs. IFV, so making the case for HIFV vs. MBT is a bit out of place. You're kinda arguing that MBTs should have dismounts and rapid fire guns.
An interesting way to use the APC (that has probably been forgotten in the transition to IFCs) used to be to dismount the machine gun (usually a .50 or 7.62), mount it on a tripod (that was always carried in the vehicle), and augment a defensive position. Suddenly a defensive position consisted of double the "normal" amount of automatic weapons. In the Cold War, the .50 was considered capable of killing light armour (perhaps less so now), so it also augmented the anti-armour plan. At the same time, it freed up all the vehicles for resupply activities.
ReplyDeleteF: That is an interesting point. But it would be quite simple to construct an HIFV with an HMG that you can dismount at the spot for usage in a dismounted role. Or to give the infantry more and better machine guns (for example SIG338 instead of the currently used MMG).
ReplyDelete'Notoriously poorly-armoured' M3 Halftrack = overwhelming strategic success. Produced in such great numbers that every allied armored formation had all they needed and production was halted over a year before the war ended. Many parts were compatible with American trucks, scout cars, and other vehicles.
ReplyDeleteMarginally 'better' armored Sd.Kfz. 251 = strategic failure. Underpowered, ridiculously maintenance intensive, complicated, design that never was, and never could, be produced in numbers required.
The best quality in war is availability: a function of numbers produced, ease of maintenance/repair, and battle damage recuperability.
GAB
All that I've seen about SdKfz 251 points at a reasonable cost of about 1/5th of a Panzer IV.
DeleteSdKfz 251 offroad ability was superior to M3 Halftracks.
IMO the problem was rather that SdKfz 251 was dispersed on too many roles instead of sticking with an all-round APC version with a single shielded machinegun.
Germany produced no vehicles in the qty required until there was not enough fuel any more. The lorry production figures are ridiculously small, for example.
"All that I've seen about SdKfz 251 points at a reasonable cost of about 1/5th of a Panzer IV."
DeleteCost was not the constraint, production capacity was - the key point is the SdKfz 251 was a poor fit for what the 1939-1945 Heer actually needed. Germany would have been much better off with a simple, mechanically reliable vehicle like the M3, albeit with metal, rather than banded rubber tracks. Good enough, is still ‘good enough,’ and certainly superior to not having ‘enough.’
Anyway, the Anglo-Canadian armies took the battle taxi concept to the next level in 1944 with their 'Kangaroos' - using surplus tanks, and tank based SPH hulls to move their infantry en mass. Kangaroos were the HAPCs of their day, but even with weak armor, they were effective.
Back to costs, it is almost impossible to compare costs between to totally different economic systems (totalitarian vs free market), and largely irrelevant.
GAB
"'Notoriously poorly-armoured' M3 Halftrack = overwhelming strategic success. "
ReplyDeleteWithout the officers who were able to use the offered mobility the thing is only a "overwhelming success". :-)
;) back at you, but… U.S. strategy in WW2 was all about keeping the British, Soviets, and Chinese in the fight: being able to supply halftracks to equip six (6!) armies with all they asked for (ANZAC forces +Russia, and USA) is a massive success. The USA has never been a continental land power - we fake it and generally do a mediocre job; we are a lot better with space-air-sea for obvious reasons.
DeleteGAB
You deride the idea of a "support" IFV but that's exactly how Ukraine is getting most value out of them right now in a defensive context. The terrain there - artillery/drone dominated, entrenched - is utterly unsuited to mass armored attacks of the type you describe APCs as being perfect for, even if Ukraine had the initiative right now. But the Bradley has proven to be useful as both a taxi and a mobile pillbox providing fire/anti-tank support on sectors of the front as needed.
ReplyDeleteThey even seem to be operating vehicles with a pit stop maintenance regime - the vehicle pulls off the road for repairs/crew change and then gets back into the thick of it because the relatively few Bradleys they have are so valuable.
I do criticize the IFV mostly for its inefficiency and point out that it cannot fulfil the originally intended function anyway.
DeleteThat's not the same as saying that it's not effective.
I could kill with a flintlock blackpowder smoothbore pistol. That doesn't mean it's a good idea to use it in war.
A 16" gun battleship can do damage, but spending part of a defence budget on it would be inefficient.