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This is a 2020 paper draft that was IIRC submitted to and rejected by CIMSEC (they published other drafts of mine). I just rediscovered it and don't remember having it published on D&F (and a quick search didn't find it, either). In worst case it's a cosmetically changed repost.
Small and regional powers with coastlines have legitimate maritime law enforcement and defence interests. Their governments should pursue the public interest, and it’s a seemingly trivial decision to seek maritime power for this.
The history of small and regional maritime powers does not easily or clearly support the notion that allocating great resources to the maritime domain is wise, though. Such an expenditure should yield greater benefits than the costs incurred, for else it causes net harm to the own country.
There are many examples of inefficient small and regional power navies:
Iran’s navy failed to enforce a naval blockade on the aggressor Iraq during the Gulf War in the 1980’s. Such a blockade was potentially decisive and the geography as well as Iranian pre-war investments in naval and air power made it look very easy, but third party intervention ruined the strategy for Iran.
The Argentinian navy proved to be irrelevant in the Falklands War save for one coastal-launched anti-ship missile and naval light strike aircraft operating from a continental airbase.
The navies of Italy and Hungary-Austria had their glorious battle at Lissa in 1866, but the naval battle winning-Austria-Hungary still lost the war.
The navies of Siam, China, Chile, Poland, Russia, Pakistan and even Germany were more a drain of resources than war winners throughout their histories. Even the navy of France has little to show in terms of useful performance relative to its budgeting since the mid-18th century.
There are precious few examples of successful and relevant small wartime navies, such as Greece in the First Balkan War (naval blockade of Ottoman ports) and Sri Lanka in the late stage of the Sri Lankan Civil War (naval blockade against arms-running boats). Auxiliary cruisers refitted during wartime were important to exploit successes of a few modern regular warships in the former case and small speedy gunboats built during wartime were decisive in the latter case.
Learning about naval history should rather discourage small and regional powers from affording much of a seagoing navy. This can be explained with a naval “The winner takes it all” pattern.
There’s rarely a naval conflict in which the inferior navy is of much utility. The superior navy can enforce or break blockades, can conduct land attacks and even invasions. The inferior navy suffers and may inflict suffering, but doesn’t prove to be decisive in favour of its country. Land-based assets, submarines and at least up to WW2 also small motor torpedo boats and auxiliary cruisers (merchant raiders) were the only tactically usually successful assets for underdog naval powers. They can still operate when and where surface warship fleets would get wiped out. Surface warship fleets are useful for dominant navies only. Yet even superior navies need to employ their surface fleets with caution and avoid many too dangerous areas.
Small and regional maritime powers should thus be aware that spending great resources on a seagoing miniature navy is most unlikely to be cost-efficient. Even a (usually expensive) submarine force is of very questionable value. The largest submarine force of history lost its war and the modern Argentinians submarine fleet achieved nothing relevant at the Falklands.
Land-based assets on the other hand may be survivable and effective enough to justify themselves with their deterrence value. Modern minehunting and minebreaking is largely done by drones, and there’s little reason why these could not be operated from land rather than from some minehunter.
Anti-ship missiles can be launched from land, and receive their targeting information from air power. This was tactically successful for Argentina and Ukraine and is an important capability to Sweden and Taiwan. They can also be launched by land-based aircraft, and be synchronised with anti-radar missiles.
Sea lanes close to the coast could be secured against submarines by multistatic low frequency active sonar (LFAS) networks that make use of semi-mobile receivers with cable connection to land and a few tug-pulled emitters, or even buoy LFAS emitters with cable connection to land. Contact verification could be done with minehunting sensor drones (that usually identify naval mines, could be delivered by rotary wing drone) or (as a most expensive and fragile solution) by ASW helicopters. Submarines could be engaged by self-deploying self-recovering naval mines (essentially electric heavyweight torpedoes), quickly rocket-delivered lightweight torpedoes (similar to the RUM-125B Sea Lance project) or rotary wing drone-deployed lightweight torpedoes.
An ordinary ASW frigate with one ASW helicopter can cost nearly a billion dollars till operational and is a juicy “all eggs in one basket” high value target by comparison to such a resilient coastal ASW network. The frigate would no doubt be preferred by admirals on an emotional level, though.
Small and regional maritime powers need more than wartime capability, of course.
Iceland’s coastal guard has shown during the “Cod Wars” that a coast guard can achieve much with great determination and audacity in spite of little resources and without firing a shot. Policing and sea rescue boats as well as maritime surveillance equipment (over the horizon radars, light twin engine planes with FLIR, radar, E/O zoom camera and possibly additional sensors to detect illegal environmental pollution by ships) do make sense. Maritime SAR helicopters with a secondary policing (boarding) missions are another fairly easily justified coast guard asset for many of the wealthier countries.
Smalls and regional powers do also require a suitable national maritime policy to ward off territorial or other challenges, not just tools.
Such a policy should be multinational. A great power may choose to pick on a small power, but great powers are not known for overt aggressions towards a group of small powers that opposes transgressions unitedly. A challenge to a maritime exclusive economic zone claim by a warship-escorted fishing fleet should be answered by a multinational coast guard boat task force, for example. Even a modern destroyer is at great risk when surrounded by three gun-armed coast guard boats at short distance. A suitable design of the coast guard boats could make the risk in ramming incidents unbearable for every destroyer captain.
There are alternative ways to pursue a small or regional power’s goals in the littorals than a conventional miniature navy. These alternatives may be a lot more robust and useful in wartime and fully satisfactory in SAR and policing during peacetime.
Navies do define themselves as organisations with a warship fleet, and the interest in having such platforms creates a bias against non-warship answers to the challenges.
"the seat of purpose is on the land"
ReplyDeleteA small brown water navy's ultimate purpose is to prevent foreign nations from occupying its sea land and most of the time, meant to deter any actions in amphibious assault or occupying any islands/land of the home nation. The first component can be designed around a robust maritime naval police forces with limited weapons. The second component is a land-focus antiship forces (AShm, Mines, Submarines, naval defense units, suicide drones, strategic reserve/preparations for countering a massive land assault.).
In WW2 and the Falklands War, it's possible for a nation to land massive forces on a nation as unguided weapons still proliferated and as long as the rate of your landing beats out the losses, you are able to maintain a significant foothold. In future wars against a competent foreign nation (small or large), it's not advisable to do that since we don't have large massive infantry force with complement landing ships that are capable of outproduce the firepower the enemy forces can produce. The predicament we are in is even more difficult considering the lost of battleships prevent any large scale bombardment intended to fix enemy reinforcements and cripple their large battery defenses. In recognition of this reality, the US Marines have admitted to be out of the (contested) amphibious landing business and focused on the transitioning to a long range missile forces under FD2030.
Internally blogger shows 3 comments, only 1 shows.
ReplyDeleteI'll look at that problem on Monday.
one of the lost (anonymous) comments:
ReplyDeleteYou analyze the utility of a navy in world where the US navy guarantees free trade and smaller friendly powers don't have to escort their merchantmen. I do think that's the world of the past and we live in a transformation to something new that requires naval protection of own trade, paying taxes for it, and not sailing under flags of convenience.
I suppose the effort required to secure trade is the smallest in or near home waters. Europeans could very well secure trade landes from Stockholm and Oslo along London, Hamburg, Bremerhafen, Rotterdam/Antwerpen, Le Havre, Portsmouth/Southampton, Brest, Bordeaux, Coruna, Porto, Lissabon, Cadiz to Gibraltar (with detour to Dublin and Liverpool) and seal off the Med.
DeleteTo escort maritime trade in faraway places in the context of a major conventional war would require hundreds of escorts. The existing navies aren't of any use for that. In fact, their peacetime warship hull fixation gets in the way of being able to secure faraway maritime trade in wartime becuase it gets in the way of preparing for equipping armed merchantmen.
I agree that we could cover our home waters with mostly land based assets. How would Europe protect far away trade, which is likely our role in a China vs USA, both with allies, conflict?
DeleteThe US doesn't have the personnel for a merchant marine, they might help with migration, but seaborne trade heavily relies on officers from Europe. Europe has an essential role in the world, organizing seaborne trade by providing much of the highly skilled labour.
1. Be ready to accept the few losses caused by hostile submarines that reach the Indian Ocean for raiding. Shit happens, few boats would do a 3rd patrol and they have but a couple torpedoes each (and would want to return with some for self-defence). Chinese torpedo stocks are unlikely to be huge.
DeleteShit happens in war.
2. Defend against auxiliary cruiser raiders with your own auxiliary cruisers.
3. Container ships have goods from many and for many countries today. Many countries will be interested in securing a couple convoys. This includes India. The Arabs should stop relying on foreigners to secure trade in their home waters. The U.S. is stupid to patrol there (driven by its irrational hatred for Iran based on events 44 years ago that were paid back with horrid interest long ago).
4. Have legislative bills and stuff ready to pass a law regulating insurance for ships damaged or lost in warfare actions. Same for commandeering ships for auxiliary cruiser/armed merchantman escort roles.
5. Find or create substitutes for PRC/Taiwan/South Korea/Vietnam/Japan as suppliers (save for Japanese exports by air freight and certain services).
6. Patrol at Suez Canal (in Red Sea) and Gibraltar to seal the Med off, also inspect all ships before they enter canals or ports in Europe.
Not one frigate would be needed, albeit legacy frigates could be used for Suez Canal-India and Suez Canal-Striat of Hormuz lanes IF and ONCE we can secure the European waters with other means.
What if China builds significant torpedo stocks and secures access to the Indian Ocean, because they need this for their own supplies?
DeleteReplacing Korea, Japan, and Taiwan might be quite costly, requiring industry subsidies, because they have directed economies with the goal of making their countries globally economically and technologically indispensible. Are we going to subsidize alternative producers in Europe?
How do we coordinate measures with the US?
So far thank you for your reply.
China's base in the Indian Ocean is mostly Pakistan. Whatever airbase or port the PLAN/PLAAF use in wartime would be neutralised by bombing of some kind.
DeleteEurope and North America coordinate by groupthink.
the other lost (anonymous) comment:
ReplyDeleteNavies used to escort trade ships. This task was taken over by the US navy, but seems to be no longer provided by them, especially since the Chinese are the major exporter and shipping sails under flags of convenience. Escorting trade might require more of a navy from small powers than you suggest.
It doesn't work.
DeleteThe Polish Navy of WW2 escorted nothing.
The German navy was unable to escort overseas trade lanes
The Italian navy of WW2 was unable to escort outside the Central Med and Aegean Sea.
The Siamese navy of WW2 was worth nothing.
The Chinese navy of WW2 was worth nothing.
The Dutch navy of WW2 wasworth nothing.
The Belgian navy of WW2 was worth nothing.
The Danish navy of WW2 was wprth nothing.
The Austro-Hungraian navy of WW1 could not leave the Adriatic Sea.
To buy and maintain a couple warships does not magically enable a small or geographically difficult sited country to secure its maritime trade.
Underdog navies don't get to protect maritime trade well past their homewaters, if anywhere at all.
I respectfully disagree. The destroyers of the Polish navy successfully retreated to the UK, where they were later joined by some of the submarines- Not only did they do sterling work as both combatants and trainers (particularly at a time when the UK was heavily overstretched) They represented the only Polish forces to have true continuation from the old government. They further came an inch from thwarting the invasion of Norway when they sank the Rio de Janeiro. The mines they laid and how they forced the Kriegsmarine to escort convoys in the Baltic probably alone would make the navy a solid investment.
DeleteFurther if they had been fighting the Soviets or the Lithuanians instead then the navy would have been exceptionally useful. If not vital for survival. If the Entente had any prewar planning then they may have been able to take advantage of the weakened naval presence in Germany's west.
The Siamese navy's main contribution was to lose the war with the French, forcing the Japanese to step in. If the Siamese had been able to win that naval fight, then it is likely the war would have been considered a total victory.
Belgian did not really have a navy.
The Chinese navy consisted of a handful of tiny coastal defence ships and even smaller gunboats. They did an ok job stopping the Japanese from straight up rushing Naking, but investment was absolutely minimal, just enough to keep up some basic level of training.
The Danish governments entire strategy was to surrender as soon as possible. They probably could have stopped the coup de main on Copenhagen if the government had actually deployed them.
The Dutch navy stopped the Germans from crossing the IJsselmeer, got the gold reserves and a load of captured Fallschirmjager out the country. The Dutch submarines sank basically every other Japanese ship in 1941. Unfortunately in the case of the Pacific their destroyers were subordinated to convoy defence when they really would have done better on the front line. Still, you cannot argue it is worth nothing.
The fact that the Italian navy was able to supply a half dozen overseas armies against the strongest naval power in the world is no mean feat.
And really, the ww1 Austro-Hungarian fleet was meant to fight alongside the Italian navy rather than against it. tbh it is remarkable that the managed to dominate the Adriatic considering what they were up against.
The Germans would have never been able to supply or trade with Scandinavia without their navy. Without Swedish iron ore, ball bearings or copper things would have gotten dicey quickly. Finland could not have been supplied either, likely leading to them peaceing out, this leave the soviets marauding up and down the coast. Not to mention (bringing it full circle) even the polish navy could have messed germany up!
Poland was overrun.
DeleteGerman navy was unable to escort overseas.
Siam lost the war and gained nothing from its navy.
Netherlands and Dutch East Indies were overrun.
Denmark was overrun.
Austria-Hungary lost the war and disintegrated. Its army failed in part due to poor training and equipment. A large share of pre-war military spending went to the navy, which secured jack shit trade lanes during the war.
The concept of opportunity costs applies; most if not all naval funds of these countries would have been more militarily effective if spent on the army.
Small navies don't secure trade. They're underdogs that were in the past at best forces of diversion (submarine warfare forcing shipbuilding on the enemy) or coastal defence (now best be done from land due to increased ranges and minehunting drones).
"The Germans would have never been able to supply or trade with Scandinavia without their navy."
ReplyDeleteSorry, expensive battlesships and cruisers did not protect the supply.
And in 1914 the war would have been over in winter with half the money spent for the Kriegsmarine used for MGs and heavy artillery instead in the pre-war years.
I agree in part with S O, but as with all in live it depends:
ReplyDelete- In geography: WW1 Hochseeflotte half its size would have been a nightmare for RN if operated from a location like Spain's.
From Germany location I think it should have been at least 80-90% of RN if not parity to do an impact. Money would have been more effectively spent in the Heer.
Nowadays Germany only need enough assets to operate against Russia in Baltic and North See.
- Enemies: If you have a naval objective and is possible to have a navy superior to the enemy then it can be employed with great effect.
This is the case of Greece in 1st Balkan War where its navy was able to thwart troop movement of Ottomans.
Regia Marina in WW2 was build with the Marine Nationale in mind because any rational planner know that a war with UK was stupid. With that premise its composition was rational.
Argentine navy in 1980 didn't really need General Belgrano cruiser against Chile nor Brazil and Veinticinco de Mayo carrier had very limited capacities. Their submarines kept the British ASW very busy.
Nowadays, Greek navy should have mostly small support units and coastal defenses plus submarines against Turkey. Maybe also 2-4 good ASW/AAW frigates if there is an opportunity of reaching Cyprus. The money could be better spent in AEW&C aircraft and drones of all types.
In the other side Turkey's navy I think is grossly oversized unless they want to invade Crete that seems an stupid plan.
Summarizing: Navy's size depends in the geopolitical context.