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"Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer" 1st Ed. by Werner Oswald (1970) has a nice list of the approximate prices of AFVs as of end-60's. I appreciate it as a look back at the price ratios of a time before electronics bloated the prices of AFVs.
M-113 (tracked APC, 11 dismounts, machinegun ): 250k DM
HS 30 (tracked IFV, 5-6 dismounts, 20 mm gun): 350k DM
Marder (tracked IFV, 7-8 dismounts, 20 mm gun OWS): 800k DM
Leopard (MBT, 105 mm gun): 1,000k DM
Marder protection upgrade over M-113 and HS 30 was mostly resistance to 14.5 mm API, which was later cheaply realised for Israeli M-113 with add-on armour. The Leopard's protection (maximum 70 mm steel) was barely enough to protect against a T-34/85 and T-44, unsatisfactory even against a T-54.
The only substantial electronics in these vehicles were a radio and a intra-crew communication system. The Leopard had a gyrocompass and main gun stabilisation. HS30 and M-113 had petrol instead of diesel engines at that time, but a diesel wouldn't have changed the price much.
Electronics got MUCH much expensive starting in the 1980's when thermal imagers (sometimes for gunner AND commander) and laser rangefinders were introduced in quantity. That is, except for APCs, which didn't need those because they had no weapon to "justify" the expense. Many IFVs (IIRC beginning with some Bradley upgrade in early 90's?) even receive full main gun stabilisation (Warrior being a notable Western exception).
So the cost multiplier between having a bullet-proofed and fragment-proofed box driving off-road with a strong infantry section and a full-blown IFV combat vehicle with a small infantry section systemically increased.
The ability to provide high offroad mobility with protection to great many infantrymen thus vanished. Nowadays you may spend more than a million Euros per dismount seat if you stick with the IFV concept.
In this light I'm hoping for good success of the Trackx, a new tracked APC project by Patria - a company known for having the most affordable yet good 6x6 APCs among Western countries.
It's more of a MT-LB successor than a M-113 successor, but it would be most promising with a mass-produced C-UAS RCWS (low price due to economies of scale, with machinegun).
S O
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The situation with Ukraine seems to suggest much smaller infantry unit of maneuver. The idea of infantry machine-gun based fire superiority is likely obsolete as infantry retreat deep into cover against FPV threats as opposed to controlling long sightlines in a continuous front, and the main infantry role is storming tunnel like structures.
ReplyDeleteThis likely elevates existing IFV designs just when RWS enables vehicles carrying full sized squads with good organic firepower.
The IFV was always a concept for mobile warfare.
DeleteUkraine informs us little about that. The BMPs were scary in the earliest weeks with a high volume of 30 mm HE fire, but predictably too poorly protected for much exposure to the enemy.
After reading the last tactics used by the Ukrainian army about the use of drones it seems that the most important element in the offensive is speed and not armor.
ReplyDeleteProbably the most effective tactics for front line advance would be to advance fast using light APC's like the TRACKX to establish new defense posts with some troops and surveillance and drone systems and then retire. Maybe also using engineer vehicles to establish a supply line and also armor direct firepower (for suppressing defenses rather than enemy tanks).
Of course all that after a previous cleaning up of the front line regarding enemy drones and troops.
All of the above will be replaced with a fully drone assault if state of the art technology makes that possible. In that case only light transport APC's would be really needed.
Regarding all these technologies I find very interesting the book "Guerra multidominio y mosaico: El nuevo pensamiento militar estadounidense" of 2021 in spanish.
JM
"Speed" in this case only means to shorten exposure. That has never been a bad idea, but it can be achieved in more ways than just moving at a higher velocity.
DeleteEven this ancient treatise
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/10/stop-go-tactic.html
is kinda relevant, especially in regard to area broadband jamming and no-fly air defence free fire zones.