2026/09/17

But, but, but ... Red Sea!

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I recently came across the pro-hard kill BMD (= trying to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles) argument that goes like this:

The Houthis shot ballistic missiles at ships in the Red Sea, so we need to shoot them down.

 

This is illogical behaviour in two ways:

1) It's insufficient evidence that a particular soluiton (hard kill BMD at sea) is needed. Other countermeasures may be better and the war might be considered a bad choice in the first place.

2)  Hard kill BMD at sea DID NOT WORK in the Red Sea. I won't even bother checking whether any anti-ship ballistic missiles were stopped by hard kill. Hard kill BMD and all other military activity DID NOT PROTECT that sea lane. Traffic was reduced by 2/3 compared to pre-October 2023 average and is fluctuating with evidence (temporary collapse to about zero) that traffic comes to de facto stop if the Houthis want so.

 

The U.S. Navy is a land attack navy with transoceanic invasion capability. It is not a navy to keep sea lanes open for trade and it is not a navy for sea battles. They gave up escorting in the 90's and sea battle in the late 40's. The nuclear land attack component (SLBMs in SSBNs) is unusable. The conventional land attack via cruise missiles and carrier aviation is mostly relevant against poor and weak countries. The U.S. is learning that Iran is not weak enough to be a suitable target for bullying.

Most European navies are NOT land attack navies. French and UK SSBNs provide an unusable nuclear land attack capability, the French surface ships and UK's submarines have a small land attack capability with cruise missiles and both these countries have weak carrier aviation suitable for bombing much less defence-capable countries than Iran only. They could bomb countries such as Morocco, Haitior Kenya a bit.

All other European naval power is about keeping sea lanes open, albeit it would only suffice if the hostile forces are limited to the Russian ones (and not in the Black Sea or Gulf of Finland). Moreover, Russia would be capable of sallying auxiliary cruiser commerce raiders in the Pacific.

What I'm getting at here is this: The Americans built their hard kill BMD because they want to overcome the so-called "area denial" to get close enough for land attack and because their escorts (general purpose destroyers) protect very high value targets (the supercarriers and the largest amphibious warfare ships in the world). Meanwhile, European navies either use warships for cordoning (GIUK gap), for hunting down stray submarines in the first days of conflict (main activity in the Mediterranean), for sealing bottlenecks (Dover-Calais, Kattegatt, Gibraltar) and possibly for escorts (particularly if the war at sea is outside of European waters). The threat by ballistic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles is rather limited in these scenarios (in large part because European air forces would largely neutralise the Tu-95 threat). I assumed a SSGN's anti-ship missile salvo for my frigate concepts as the main air defence challenge, for example.

Europeans are not going to force a convoy into area denial waters. The Americans are failing at this now in the Mid East and have such forced convoys in their "PRC blockade against Taiwan" war games/war plans, but Europeans should IMO NOT force maritime traffic for Taiwan. Taiwan can be supplied with enough food and medical supplies by air and Europe should not needlessly make the PRC its enemy, for PRC throwing its land and air power weight into Europe is really the only way how we could lose against Russia considering the dismal state of the Russian military and economy these days.

 

It's stupid drone behaviour to assume that the American way of war is the only one that makes sense (despite them failing in so many wars!) and to be emulated by Europeans. The Americans are doing some things the way they do for reasons that are irrelevant to Europeans.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2026/09/09

Protection of industry against cruise missiles

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httphttps://x.com/commandante_/status/2095476400807444622?s=20

https://x.com/commandante_/status/2095476400807444622?s=20

It's extremely easy to adapt conventional cruise missiles (the ones flying at high subsonic speed with heavier than 100 kg warheads) to still hit the right location and pierce through this passive defence.

WW2 aircraft had devices to deflect and cut (barrage balloon tether cables.
German Submarines had cable cutters in WWI already and satisfaction was such that they reappeared in WW2.

A cruise missile might lose its folding wings in a new, but it could be arranged that they get sacrificed on the last couple metres. The tail fins can be built resistant to netting. The frontal area of fuselage and engine/air inlet is small enough.

Overall, I'm, sure that you cannot protect an oil refinery against Flamingo, Tomahawk or Kalibr with scaffolding and netting. It's a defensive iteration that's soon to be rendered useless by the next offensive iteration.
 
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The good thing is that we in Europe actually don't need this. IRIS-T SL(M), 76 mm naval gun turrets & 20 to 35 mm autocannons are extremely (cost-)effective against subsonic cruise missiles. You don't even really need IRIS-T SL(M) for point defence if the threat munitions are slow (Kalibr at about M 0.8 is NOT slow). 
 
Chinese naval 76 mm gun on 6x6
 
So we have the technology (weapons, munitions and sensors), but it's of no use if we don't build, pay for it and install it.

Russia may do so until 2030, after the iterative cycles in the ongoing war reach the approximate the state of the technology. They have access to the radar tech, naval gun mount tech, anti-air autocannon tech and missile tech needed for a proper defence. They were just not able to install it in the necessary quantities yet (and Pantsir appears to be very flawed).
 
This may lead to Russia having having non-nuclear blackmail potential against us by the early 2030's. They might threaten destruction of much of our large commercial structures (which includes logistics centres, apparently) with us being unable to threaten a reply in kind due to increased Russian resilience.
 
Now full stop.
I do NOT advocate we secure all our industries with point defences!
 
The old considerations regarding defending at the border or frontline rather than point defences in the rear still apply. The potential of attacks from the sea and clandestine attacks complicate the matter, but I say a defence of the troops at the front + a strategic air defence line behind the front (continued over interrupting coastal waters) plus point defences (preferably 76 mm or cheap SAMs) for the about 200 most critical locations in the EU (most oil refineries, capitals, DNS servers, the most important transformer stations, some satellite control sites, some rail bridges and so on) makes sense to me. Moreover, some extremely critical infrastructure (such as electrical grid coordination) can be moved to underground bunkers.
 


Said defence line posited at a fairly safe distance behind the front line (150+ km behind) could combine AEW, ground-based radars (preferably on high rise buildings and masts), high end fighters (priority on intercepting high end cruise missiles), auxiliary fighters, cheap (old) combat aircraft and the point defences of capitals close to the threat border.
 
The regular Russian air force shouldn't be much of an issue to European NATO. Maybe temporarily to Turkey, maybe in first 12 hours, maybe far out over the sea, but other than that they stand no chance ONCE we stocked enough air combat missiles (the Meteor, AMRAAM and MICA stocks are at ridiculous levels). 
 
Then the remaining air defence issue for European NATO would be the (more expensive) ballistic missiles, particularly if they get the navigation technology that's jamming resistant or immune. American style hard-kill defences would be excessively expensive, so I suppose the best counter to such ballistic missiles would be resilience. Take the punches and keep going. That's what Ukraine does because it has no other option than defeat.
 
related:
 
 
S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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