Most devastating poll I've ever seen

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Poll should always be considered with caution.
This one is extreme(ly interesting):

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/08/20098910857878664.html

The USA outmatched the traditional and much-feared arch-enemy India as the greatest perceived threat by a factor of more than three!
I would have considered it as impossible that any power outranked India in that question. Unbelievable.
Hat tip to 8ak.

The good side of the coin: Iran.
It's between NATO and Pakistan.

S O
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Infantry on the offensive

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This video was apparently published to show the problem of heavily laden infantry being attacked and avoided by more nimble enemy infantry at will.

It shows something much more universal to me; infantry needs cover (or at least concealment) for its survival even against light infantry armament.

Infantry advances - infantry is being fired upon - infantry seeks cover - advance stalled.

That problem was 'solved' in the past (when infantry arms were less lethal) by using armoured vehicles, lots of support (smoke and other indirect fires) and a much higher casualty tolerance.

It's well-known that infantry isn't a primarily offensive arm. Its suitability to the tactical offensive was diminished almost as much as that of horse cavalry as long as a century ago.

Armour is different; it uses the power of the internal combustion engine to move (mobility) the tank's weight (protection and firepower) in face of strong opposition. No tank is fully invulnerable, but capable enough that tactics and training can overcome the remaining threats.
A much too primitive understanding of survivability and tank combat has led many (again and again) to believe in the end of the tank, but that has been proved to be premature again and again.

- - - - -

Nevertheless, some (usually not professional army personnel) still come up with ideas of an infantry-centric battlefield. Such ideas look like the Stryker combat team (with wheeled armoured vehicles that would drop infantrymen to do most of the fighting). Other 'visions' are about elite infantry, with every infantryman being a forward observer (modern speak: fire support team) himself. Seriously; I saw graphics on professional presentations and in professional journals that depicted infantrymen(?) hiding behind rocks and targeting individual enemy targets for indirect fires. They had at most a PDW-like individual armament, symbolizing the changing relevance of support fires and small arms.

Such concepts are fine for the application of support fires, but they're utterly off in regard to what armies really need.

An army doesn't need to kill every enemy soldier on the battlefield (how many enemies could be taken prisoner by FO teams?). Conventional ground wars look differently (unless you fought against some of the historically rare, very cohesive and disciplined enemies): There's some combat to fix the enemy reserves, then some combat to break the enemy locally and then there's the extremely important exploitation (a.k.a. pursuit) phase till an operational or strategic victory is achieved or till the offense stops because of the culminating point of attack.

It's great if a brigade can defeat a division in a battle, but that's of little value if it's not nimble enough to exploit that success decisively.

The most significant difference between the 1918 Spring offensive and Blitzkrieg was in the exploitation of success.

Im Ausnützen des Erfolges liegt die Keimzelle des Sieges.

("The germ cell of victory is in the exploitation of success." Guderian, 1940)

The mobility (and logistical capabilities) given by the internal combustion engine and the use of radios for much of the tactical communication coupled with daring commanders and much initiative down to junior NCO ranks enabled a stunningly fast and decisive exploitation of breakthroughs. The breakthrough battle was a phase of high ammunition and low fuel consumption, while the exploitation phase had reversed needs.

- - - - -

Conventional ground war fantasies related to FO infantry and Strykers have some relevance in the tactical and operational defence, but not in the offense. They would even fail to achieve a breakthrough, being the equivalent of the French army's offensive tactics in this example.


Infantry cannot sustain a high-speed pursuit in face of occasional resistance, that's obvious. It's also a reminder for the huge importance of heavy combined arms teams in conventional ground war.
Some (many? all?) firepower-centric approaches to modern tactical (technical) ground war seem to ignore the importance of exploitation.

Sven Ortmann
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The cost of carrier aviation

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The Royal Navy is under serious criticism of mis-spending the quite significant defence budget of the UK. Accusations about the level of waste reach up to 8%, and they seem to keep a recent report on it secret.
The British military has a tradition of blaming politicians and their limited budgeting for all its woes, albeit failure of its leadership to meet the expectations has been a constant for at least a hundred years.

Much of the current debate on UK military spending focuses on procurement; especially the new aircraft carriers and their aircraft, armoured vehicles for ongoing wars, helicopters for ongoing wars, a replacement strategic nuclear-armed missile for their submarines and the last batch of the new fighter.

- - - - -

I looked more closely at the aircraft carriers, their aircraft and escorts a few days ago.


They would provide the ability to attack land targets from the sea with F-35 aircraft. That's entirely redundant to USN capabilities and of almost no value in NATO defence. The only real application in collective defensive war would in my opinion be the protection of high seas convoys against today fictious air attack capabilities. That utility is redundant with offensive air war against the threat's air bases.

- - - - -

Let's look at the cost, because naval aviation is typically more expensive than land-based aviation:

2 aircraft carriers Queen Elizabeth class, the program cost is apparently GBP about 4.8 billion

6 anti-air escorts Type 45 class, costs about GBP 3.4 billion

6 anti-submarine escorts (old Type 23 so far, let's take he recent Italian FREMM as placeholder*), cost equivalent about GBP 2.0 billion

2 nuclear submarine escorts, costs about GBP 2.3 billion

72 F-35B STOVL combat aircraft, cost (including half of the British R&D), costs about GBP 6.0 billion

20 Merlin helicopters* on CV/DDG/FFG (including ongoing upgrade program), costs about GBP 1.5 billion


These sums should be regarded as lower limits, as there are no spare parts, extra facilities, training, ammunition and many other costs included.

The sum is about GBP 20 billion for building two CVBGs with (at most) adequate escorts.

These expenses are necessary to project the air power of

* 72 very low observable combat aircraft (combat radius at most 500 nmi with eight SDB as offensive payload each) that can fly two or three sorties a day (many in support and defensive missions)

* several dozen cruise missiles

in international open waters.

- - - - -

Prices are relative, so let's compare. For GBP 20 billion a country like the UK could afford about 200 Typhoon fighter-bombers.

That's a factor of three to one in combat aircraft , and the Typhoons could be used with a combat radius of about 850 nmi around land bases, without mid-air refueling.

Another alternative would be to buy (more) F-35s for the RAF. Let's assume that the F-35 R&D costs are the same even though the UK wouldn't have had to contribute to F-35B development. That's USD 2.5 billion (about GBP 1.5 billion) for R&D. Add about USD 105 million (about GBP 64 million) fly-away price per F-35A (nobody knows the price for sure as of today). The GBP 20 billion would be enough for almost 300 F-35A using current cost estimates (= I wouldn't expect more than 200).

The plans for naval air power look excessively expensive to me - even in comparison to other quite excessively expensive programs.

- - - - -

On the other hand, there would be little left of the UK's Royal Navy if they removed those frigates, destroyers, aircraft carriers and some of their submarines. That does nevertheless not eliminate the looming question about whether the fleet is worth its budget.

Maybe ANOTHER fleet would make better use of the same budget?

They could build container sets to turn container ships into auxiliary land-attack vessels that would be armed with hundreds of cruise missiles and would be able to sneak covertly into position. That would costs less than a single aircraft carrier without its aviation component.

They could buy conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion - about three instead of one SSN.

They could once again prepare for actual naval convoys in order to keep sea lanes open in face of military opposition.


You can count me as a no-fan of the British carrier strategy. Well, at least it's not my tax money.
 

S O

*: Merlins and ASW frigates are legacy equipment and don't need to be bought any more. I considered their costs because I'm more interested in the cost of such a naval aviation strike capability in general than in the specific UK procurement.
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Minimum political competence on war

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Politicians decide about war and peace. They set the budgets of the military. They oversee the military, and members of parliament have to check the government's national security policy.

Their competence in national security issues is of utmost importance. It can wreck or save their nation.

I think of a six-week course on alliance and war politics for members of parliament, most cabinet members and some state secretaries.

Do I demand too much engagement on their part if I believe that such a qualification (or its equivalent) is necessary?

- - - - -

Cabinet members are highly influential in national security matters; this concerns especially the minister of defence, the foreign minister, the interior minister, the minister of transport, economics minister, minister of finance and most of all the head of government and his/her first deputy.
The state secretaries of defence and foreign ministries also need a good qualification.
The members of parliament have the power to declare war and to decide on the federal budget - they should be competent as well.

Most of these people learn much on the job (a.k.a. "too late"), but I'm convinced that many theoretical and fundamental aspects are not being learned on the job (and members of parliament learn very little about alliance and defence politics if they aren't member of the respective committees).


Maybe it sounds arrogant to demand (in many cases) additional education for these democratically legitimated politicians. On the other hand: Would a six-week course be an unacceptable effort compared to the potentially extreme importance of their competence?


Maybe they ARE competent enough in alliance politics and war politics (I see little if any evidence for that, though). In that case I would recommend a six-week course in "how to inform voters about your competence".

- - - - -

Anyway; this is just a blog - I use the opportunity to dream up a course.

Curriculum [days]:

(3) European military history
(1) treaties, U.N. charter and resolutions and other legal information
(3) Non-European military history
(1) national strategy
(2) 20th century and modern Eastern European and oriental security policies
(1) alliance theory and dynamics
(2) European alliance history
(2) crisis diplomacy history
(1) political decision-making; war or not war
(1) exercise / game on national security strategy

(1) defence budget; budgeting process, procurement system and overview
(1) military-industrial complex dynamics
(1) war economy and strategic logistics

(1) art of war overview
(2) land warfare - basics, 20th century and modern
(1) air warfare - 20th century and modern
(1) naval warfare - basics, 20th century and modern
(1) non-violent activities in war
(1) military geography and operational logistics
(1) military technology; history and representative systems
(1) political decision-making; war goals and conclusion of warfare
(1) fashions in military affairs

It may be a good idea to split this into six separate weeks, scattered over two years and with pleasant seminar locations. A seminar size of about 20 participants would be fine. That would require about five parallel courses to cover a typical parliament.

Many politicians are experienced in ideology and would only accept such a course if its neutrality and objectivity is for sure. Greens and socialists might still reject it, but that may be a question of labelling and word-of-mouth recommendation.

S O
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Study object : Trolls

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Blogging with some audience had an interesting effect; I attracted trolls.

The trolls here (I estimate them at about 3-6 different persons) have some traits common (and some have very distinctive styles). They're not very much different from the right wing nuts whom I encountered elsewhere before; usually U.S. American, male, white and no college education.
This shall be no nation-bashing; I know for sure that many (actually apparently more than half) of the U.S.American adults have very different views. I did recently write that every country seems to have its share of idiots, so diagnosing that for a specific country doesn't mean anything about it relative to others.

I'd like to clarify that I do not consider serious criticism or misunderstandings as troll activity.
Nobody is right all the time, and experts have become internationally famous for being 75% right. You can become a millionaire in some sectors for being merely 52% right.
My blog posts are almost exclusively about areas where I disagree with commonly accepted ideas (and I post almost never about topics if I agree with conventional wisdom/mainstream), so being right even less than 50% would still be an exceptional ratio for me.

Serious, skilled criticism is very welcome. Repeat: Nobody is always right, and I'm of course interested in learning about my mistakes.

- - - - -

Here's a summary of the troll activity

There's one troll who never ever addresses any points of the blog post - he merely spews some insults and other offensive remarks. His targets: Me, other commenters, my country and/or my continent.

One troll has apparently superficial knowledge of Europe and Germany, he cites locations, writes some broken German words and points sometimes at German sources. I should emphasize "superficial" here, because he gets even most basic things wrong.

A quite widespread trait of trolls is that they assume to have knowledge that they cannot possess: About the future, for example. Or about me.
In fact, they sometimes assert to know for certain things that can be proved to be incorrect, like attitudes of mine (as evident in conflicting past posts).

Only two trolls dared to use (at least sometimes) recurring nicknames. Most troll comments are by "anonymous". I sign my posts with my real name - but these trolls are too cowardly to at least sign with initials. Well, I guess I wouldn't pay attention to being recognizable if I wrote such crap either.

Nation-bashing is very important to some trolls. Germany, France, Belgium and Europe (especially as EU) get bashed a lot, and I'd like to add; primitively, unrealistically and without any humour.

A huge and at times total inability to understand text is a strong trait of several trolls. They seem to be dominated by prejudices so much that it hampers their ability to read.

Blog posts are short, and require that the reader fills the gaps with active thinking. I don't, won't and cannot (in such short texts) explain the whole topic in perfect detail. Blog posts are no 300 p dissertations.
There are always gaps where I thought that something is obvious enough.* Trolls reliably fail to get to have reasonable thoughts at these gaps - they usually insert the maximum B.S. imaginable (and actually not imaginable to me beforehand) instead. There doesn't seem to be the slightest intent to think about what I might have thought.

Many (if not all) trolls get agitated quite reliably by blog posts that don't fit into the great-U.S.of.A.-all-else-are-wimps-hoooah! view of the world.
That tells probably a bit about their view of the world (and their origin).

Some troll comments were simply illegal. I was obliged by German law to delete/block them, because those comments were crimes by German law (and it would be illegal to tolerate them).

They also often pretend to be "amused". That usually looks to me as if they're amused by not understanding anything at all.

One troll did repeatedly assert that I had "Freudian slips" even though it was obviously just about a typo or a simple translation mistake.

Trolls often assert that I side with certain groups when there's absolutely no hint for it (at least none known to me) - and I wouldn't recount this if they weren't terribly wrong about it (actually trolls rarely if ever seem to get anything right IMO).

Trolls do at times assert that I have no clue. That's not helpful, because they don't show off any competence themselves.
I'd like to tell you that in my opinion they don't have a clue.
You see? It's meaningless. Everybody can claim that someone has no clue. Only argumentation is useful, personal attacks are pointless unless you can prove it.

At least one troll asserts that I hype the Bundeswehr and believe that it's a flawless organization. He seems to read another blog. Almost everything that I write about the Bundeswehr is is a critique (because of the 'no mainstream' thing). Look at the Bundeswehr mortars or Keiler texts, for example.

Trolls fall for hoaxes and wrong/misleading stories and keep using them for months. There was once an article about a German fighter supposedly delivering mustard to an embassy party in Croatia.
The story was stupid enough that most reasonable people didn't bother about it because it failed several plausibility checks. In fact, there was a fighter pilot carrying some mustard - while transferring the fighter to a static display. Croatia is looking into new fighters (about a squadron) for its tiny air force, and someone arranged for a display of the jet in Croatia. The mustard had about zero relevance for the flight itself.
Guess who used the hoax in an aggressive comment? Sure, a troll.
They fell for other long-rebutted stories as well.

Trolls treat the worst sources as credible arguments of theirs while rejecting far more reputable sources - in the same comment!

A recurring theme is also an assertion of trolls that I get "defensive". That's a bit confusing, as there's no such thing in German language that would fit the context. There's apparently at least one English-speaking country (or one of its subcultures) in which defending one's opinion with rational arguments is considered to be despicable.
That's *probably* no good thing for rational debate. It's great for ideologues who believe that yelling louder and more means to be right, of course.
The accusation(?) that I get "defensive" is especially funny as it came only from people whose comments were filled with aggression.

- - - - -

Much of the troll activities may be explainable by an unhealthy amount of aggressiveness/hate and cognitive dissonance problems. The latter may explain why "unpleasant" info agitates the trolls and the former may explain why they bother to write at all (and how they do it).

- - - - -

Sadly, this kind of trolls isn't a small group of half a dozen. As I said before; I encountered such people before. Preconceptions and sentiments as well as a discussion culture that's sophisticated only in dirty rhetoric tricks (like straw man arguments, ad hominem) are quite wide-spread in certain environments.

I wonder how much damage such stupidity does in the Western World. I imagine that this kind of people was easily duped into invading Iraq for no good reason, for example.

S O

*: I know from reasonable people that my jumps are at times too long, and I should make texts easier to understand. The difference between a reader failing to get my idea because of my failure to add detail and a troll is this: The troll fills the gap with most idiotic, personally hostile assumptions.

edit 2009-08-10:
Believe it or not, the trolls are active even in this topic. One still believes in the ridiculous mustard story, asserting to know that I'm embarrassed (he's clueless as always).
Another one calls me ignorant - without addressing anything in the blog post directly (apparently the never-touch-facts guy).
The third one simply spewed nonsense.
All three cowards posted as "Anonymous" (again).

@trolls: Forget about it. Launch your own blog.
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Russia's potential

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Russia is the single largest non-NATO country close to Europe (and actually in large part in Europe). It's therefore naturally the first choice for anyone who wants to check on the possibility of major conventional warfare in Europe.

Russia's military is at present large, but has outdated equipment, is ill-supplied, ill-paid, has a poor reputation among its citizens (recruit abuse) and a mixed reputation in the West.

Much of this military is bound to tasks in Asia and not available as a threat to Europe, so it's reasonable to expect that European forces are at this point relatively easily able to keep it in check (not necessarily on the first few hundred kilometres, though).

Its primary strength is probably the quantity of equipment stored in depots behind the Urals and its relatively good ability to function with quickly mobilized troops. Recent news indicate that they're about to scrap a good portion of that Cold War legacy equipment, though.
Strong internal security forces (paramilitaries) add to the picture.

The present (rumoured) nominal military spending of Russia is in the same league as that of the UK, France and the PR China, albeit with PPP advantages over the first two. Russia is unable to focus its military power in one theater due to its long Eurasian borders, though.

The potential for greater military capabilities in the future depends on many factors - politics, economy, science and engineering, fiscal health and population, for example.

Let's run a (quick & dirty) check - you won't get a better one by me for free. ;)

Politics

Russia has a pseudo-democratic, authoritarian government with dominance over regional institutions. Well, this sounds promising (for their military). Especially the ability to develop and execute long term (more than five years) political plans is relatively impressive. The ability to create really efficient long-term plans is not very impressive (because of corruption).

The past policy has demonstrated a readiness to use military force - at least on former USSR territory. It has also demonstrated a quite high degree of rationality and patience. Past domestic political competence (economic policy in the Putin era) was rather unimpressive, though.

Economy

Less than € 1.5 trillion GDP (a bit more, but not drastically more in purchasing power parity) isn't much for a country of its size and population. It's actually less than France's GDP.
Exports make up almost a quarter of the GDP, a sign of serious integration into international trade. The largest trade partners are the European and East Asian economic powers, not the former USSR states (with exception Ukraine; about 5% of exports).

The share of industrial activities is about 40% GDP, but much of this is the raw materials sector (oil, gas, mining). A well-balanced, healthy economy at a higher level of national wealth would require a very strong industrial development. This would require at least about a decade of strong growth.

Science and engineering

Russia was quite in love with scientific and technological work. They have no noteworthy anti-science or science-despising political factions (at least none that I'm aware of).
Russia had the legacy of a very strong scientific and engineering complex in the early 90's. Education and experience were robust, albeit with a serious lag in computer tech. The(ir) problem; those with good education and experience have aged by almost twenty years in the meantime. These pillars of technical and scientific competence will break away almost completely in the next two decades and most of them are likely already beyond their creativity apogee.

The small R&D activity since the 90's has furthermore driven many scientists and engineers into more 'practical' jobs. An engineer-turned-truck-driver has rarely kept himself up to date in his original trade and is very unlikely to return to his original trade anyway.
Russia's long-term competence in science and engineering is yet to be determined; it depends a lot on the budgets of its government.

Fiscal health

This points at the next point of interest; fiscal health. Here are several interesting details. The Soviet Union had a state-run economy and therefore no full-blown system of taxes. That has hurt Russia in the 90's. At one point in the 90's the CEO of Gazprom claimed that his (oil & gas) company paid half of the Russian state budget - more than the whole defence expenses.

Nevertheless, Russia was able to pay back significant loans to foreign creditors even despite huge economic troubles. That tells a bit about their ability to mobilise fiscal power if deemed necessary.

Public debt is officially at a fantastic low of about 7% GDP (Wikipedia & CIA World Factbook). This means they should easily be able to finance a stronger posture with deficit spending for many years until they would reach typical Western levels (rarely less than 40%).

The state's revenues are rather limited due to the small GDP; around € 300 billion.

Population

The population of Russia is large at about 140 million, but declining. This trend isn't irreversible, but it's an old situation that has left its demographic and economic marks.
For comparison: The population of Russia is about as large as the population of Germany plus France. Their closest ally Belarus has only as many citizens as Belgium.

The health situation of Russian males is comparably poor, apparently due to tobacco, drugs, infectious diseases (tuberculosis, HIV) and their infamous alcohol consumption. Official figures look like 12 liters pure alcohol per citizen and year, but that's apparently a manipulated statistic. A 17 litres figure slipped off Medvedev some time ago.

Traffic accidents are correspondingly a major cause of death and disability.

The statistic of only about 61 1/2 years life expectancy for males (and about 74 for females) is credible, and shocking.

These problems can be solved, but not in short order. On the other hand, the Soviet Union fought WW2 with strong personnel resources even though famine, alcohol and state terror had badly hurt the population in the inter-war years.

Manpower available for military service (age 16-49):
36.2 million males, 37 million females

Manpower fit for military service:
21.1 million males, 28 million females

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:
0.74 million males, 0.71 million females
(rounded, CIA World Factbook)

There's plenty manpower for military service, but the situation is rather poor from a workforce point of view.

- - - - -

Russia seems to have the ingredients for a quite prosperous future, including the groundwork for education, science and engineering and lots of natural resources. Its population is large, but not overwhelmingly large.
The next two decades (especially the next one) will be very important for its further development and standing. Seriously; they cannot afford the waste of resources that a major war would cause.
I personally hope that Western diplomats and governments have figured out Putin's long-term strategy better than the Western public has. This strategy for the nation's development (I assume he has one) will be extremely important for Russia and therefore also for Europe.
I think he neglected the industrial development in the past, with too much nepotism and emphasis on a strong state (instead of strong & healthy economy).

I do always keep in mind the historical precedent of Germany 1932-1939: It recovered from a terrible economic crisis and turned into a military powerhouse in just seven years. The Western powers were burdened by public debt while Germany had de-valued its WWI debt by hyper-inflation during the 20's.

Europe is really in a lucky situation. Its only credible conventional war threat is weakened for several years to come. Not entirely harmless, but badly weakened. Historical precedents point out that the picture could change in a matter of five to ten years, but the situation allows for a relaxed vigilance.

S O
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What if he told them about the terror scare?

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Eastern European NATO members

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The affection between the Eastern European governments and the U.S. government under Bush puzzled me for years. A distant power with marginal logistical links to the region (except trough Western European ports), no real history of involvement in the region, no troops in the region, few troops close to the region was assumed to be the supreme protective power?


There was a similar relationship between Western Europe and the U.S. in the Cold War - a marriage of convenience with strong advantages for both. The U.S. would have been hopeless if Western Europe had turned red, and they knew it.
What did the Eastern Europeans believe to have that could make them as important to the U.S.? Their role as supplier of auxiliary troops?

It was just as some comments in newspaper columns suggest; America brought a lot of enthusiasm, asserted leadership - and asked for real return service.

The EU on the other hand had a huge economic and fiscal relevance, and its citizens are (much) more likely than Americans to at least know where countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland are located on a globe.

The uneven, with the Obama administration even shaky security relationship seems to puzzle Eastern European foreign politicians as well; several well-known former politicians wrote an open letter to Obama about their concerns. These politicians, who were responsible for that strategy, do still stick to it.

- - - - -

The whole affair should be a wake-up call for EU leaders as well. The slumber in continental security policy was a mistake. Russia has still not officially accepted borders and sovereignty of all Eastern European NATO members. It's probably about time for the major European powers to press Putin and Medvedev on this issue beyond their breaking point.
The recognition of a neighbour's sovereignty is a requirement, even if the general intent is a good relation with win-win diplomacy.

There are some unresolved issues; problems that are nowadays quite alien to Western European powers (as for example concerns about sovereignty and integrity of your borders).

We did (for in my opinion strange reasons) invite the Baltic countries into NATO. Now we're stuck with them. We cannot kick them, we must not neglect them - the only way out of our responsibility would be to leave NATO ourselves (and have an alternative alliance).
So far all members want to stick with NATO, so let's do it for real.

- - - - -

The Eastern European nations are to blame as well. They should stop daydreaming and get serious.

The U.S. is likely not seriously interested in their defence, but in exploiting them to divide the EU and in their ability to supply auxiliary troops and U.N. votes.

Eastern European efforts in national defence (about 1.2% to 2 % GDP in the past years) had a very different tune than their public concerns about Russia. Those expenses are more comparable to Germany's military expenditures, but unlike them we have some R&D expenditures and relevant infrastructure investments outside of our defence budget and we're no frontier nation with huge concerns about a possible invader.

The downsizing of for example the Polish military and a partial 'transformation' of Eastern European armies towards auxiliary troops deployments to places that are entirely irrelevant to their national security does not sound like a robust defence policy to me.

Their relative disregard for the Western Europeans in defence policy is also a poor move if they want to increase Western European commitment. Being disregarded doesn't exactly motivate to increase your engagement if you've got plenty other topics for your distraction.

The continental European powers have a much better ability to help quickly and to actually stall an invasion. Their geo-strategic location is incomparably better than the American one. The American ability to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe would amount to almost nothing if Germany decided to go seriously neutral, for example.


Many experts discuss Afghanistan as if it was a litmus test for NATO, a decisive test. That's B.S..

The Eastern European sovereignty issues have the potential to create a real test for NATO (and the EU). That's not in-fashion, of course. It's not about rag-tag militias in distant places or fashionable counterinsurgency theory. It's about the original, real purpose of NATO, and that 's what the most aggressive NATO members have been worst at since the end of the Cold War.

S O

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Is air power the ultimate power in war?

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This was an old draft, prepared months ago. It's not fully satisfactory (not the least because there's really no statistic significance available for a single variable analysis). I decided to post it nevertheless because I'm too busy and too often away for regular posting these days.

------------------------------------------------------

I've often read and heart the assertion (cliché?) that the decisive factor in war is air power. That's apparently one of those phrases that are not meant to provoke thought, but to channel it.

Some even insist that war can only be won with air dominance a.k.a. supremacy.

This is in my opinion wrong, and it's serious. It can lead to potentially excessive expenditures on air power and an underestimation of those adversaries who lack serious air power.

Let's look at historical examples.

I prefer to look at the post-1930 period (air "power" had little power till the 30's) and to ignore civil wars without (in this case relevant) foreign involvement.

I came up with a list of 37 major wars and categorized them. You can find the table here.

13 wars met the cliché:
The side with air superiority won the conflict (and air power was noteworthy).
1936 Second Italo-Abyssinian War
1936-1939 Spanish Civil War
1939-1945 World War II
1941 Anglo-Iraqi War
1941-1944 Continuation War
1967 Six-Day-War
1971 Indo-Pakistani War
1973 Yom Kippur War

1982 Falklands War (the Argentinians inflicted much air attack damage, British air superiority was probably just an air combat superiority)

1982 Lebanon War (I counted this as Israeli victory despite the mixed success of the later occupation)
1989-1990 U.S. invasion of Panama
1990-1991 Gulf War
1998-1999 Kosovo War

Three major wars were won/lost since 1930 without any party enjoying air superiority:

1932-1935 Chaco War
1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War

Eight major wars were lost by the power that enjoyed air superiority:

1937-1945 Second Sino-Japanese War

1939 Soviet-Japanese Border War (Japanese air superiority was probably limited to air combat superiority)

1939-1940 Winter War (I count this as a Soviet defeat)
1954-1962 Algerian War of Independence
1959-1979 Vietnam War
1964-1979 Rhodesian Bush War (much more than a civil war)
1965-1989 South African Border War
1979-1989 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

There are of course several excuses possible; Winter War - Soviets were weakened by purges/winter/poor tactics, Vietnam War: jungle/hippies, Afghanistan: Soviets were crumbling anyway/Stinger ...

These excuses can easily be met by another criterion: Was the conflict lopsided or not?

I marked the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, Winter War, Vietnam War, Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Israeli invasion of Lebanon, U.S. Invasion of Panama, Gulf War and Kosovo War as lopsided in favour of the side that enjoyed air superiority. Interestingly, even in this group it's only 6:3 for 'air power wins'.

Let's ignore the lopsided conflicts (the U.S. invasion of Panama cannot really tell us about decisiveness of air power, after all) for a while. The balance is then six wins for the aerially superior parties and a whopping five defeats.

I also looked at whether the opponents were well-equipped (at least relatively). "Fair" wars (not lopsided and not full-blown forces vs. militia) looked like five wins for the side that gained air superiority and two defeats.

The conflict between most comparable forces in the list was likely the 1939 Soviet-Japanese Border War: The Russian tank/motorization superiority defeated the Japanese air superiority. The Japanese air superiority in this case is disputable anyway, as it was probably limited to a better air combat kill ratio.

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Let's sum up:

Air power can be decisive and it's worth its expenses - up to a point. It is possible to win a war without air superiority and even against it.

History tells us that spending much on air power when fighting an enemy who does not fight alike is quite often a path to defeat than to victory.

Several successful air power exploitations have occurred over relatively simple terrain that gave little concealment to ground forces.

Air combat superiority needs to be exploited to achieve an air attack superiority to counter enemy strengths.

Lopsided conflicts and conflict over terrain that favours air/ground attacks have probably many mislead in the West about the utility of air power.

The Kosovo air war reminded us of the relevance of camouflage/concealment/deception against the effects of air superiority.

Air superiority failed most often when even boots on the ground (and in the house of the enemy) didn't suffice.


The ultimate power in warfare is in my opinion willpower, not air power.

S O

P.S.:
It seems impossible to get a unquestionable compilation of wars for this purpose. It's possible to dispute "major", win/lost/draw", whether air power was relevant, whether air superiority was achieved and held and so on.
Feel free to reserve scepticism, but at least one thing should be obvious by these samples: Wars can be won without air superiority/supremacy/dominance, even against it. Many have focused too much on WW2 and the wars in the Arab World.

I did use the common meaning of "win"/"lose" in this mini survey.
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About armoured reconnaissance and cavalry

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Post-WW2 armies had much less divisions than we were used to in both World Wars, but the world didn't shrink geographically.

This would create very unstable, fluid situations in conventional land warfare. Conventional land war would in many scenarios look a lot like the exploitation phases of mobile warfare in WW2. It's quite impossible (and not intended) to build promising defensive lines nowadays (with few exceptions). The battles would look similar to those episodes of historic land battles that happened after the dissolution of defensive lines or after the capture of fortresses.
The similarities would have their limits, but the low personnel density, high technical mobility of modern land war made the lessons from the past about mobile warfare especially interesting to me.

I began looking more closely into armoured reconnaissance ops of WW2 last year and got a satisfactory picture of this in the meantime. The German armoured reconnaissance history was most easily accessible because it saw much more action than British and American armoured reconnaissance.


The Spähaufklärung (small scouting teams; 2-3 armoured reconnaissance vehicles) has been very important and it was especially effective in France due to specific operational conditions and the road infrastructure. Spähaufklärung is - despite the modern electronic means of reconnaissance - still important in the German army (Heer).

This probing, looking and reporting wasn't the whole business, though. Armoured reconnaissance on the Eastern Front was much more, and it was very interesting.
The operation of a Panzeraufklärungs-Bataillon (armoured reconnaissance battalion) in the offence (as part of an armoured division that's always supposed to attack, march or rest) on the Eastern Front often had distinct phases with a significant share of combat.

Phase 0:
The battalion waits in the division's marshalling area, ready to exploit a breakthrough. The battalion receives and distributes existing intelligence about the enemy and area (aerial photography, prisoner interrogation reports, agent reports, maps).

Phase 1:The battalion receives its orders and its CO orders few Panzerspähtrupps (2 or 3 light AFV with long-range radio) forward.

Phase 2:Additional Panzerspähtrupps are being sent towards the reconnaissance Schwerpunkt to increase the scouting density.
The combat troops (early on often a motorcycle infantry battalion assigned to support the reconnaissance battalion) move behind the Panzerspähtrupps towards the reconnaissance Schwerpunkt.
Some Panzerspähtrupps are being recalled and possibly sent forward towards the Schwerpunkt as well.

Phase 3:
Panzeraufklärungs-Kompanien (armoured reconnaissance companies) advance and fight to ensure the reconnaissance success and to overwhelm enemy forces when they're not ready to fight to prevent the establishment of effective defences.

The enemy finally establishes new effective defensive positions.

The Panzerspähtrupps are being recalled and assembled for further action.

The Kampfgruppen(combined arms combat teams) of the armoured division are advancing into marshalling areas in front of the enemy defensive positions.

Phase 4:
The armoured division breaks through the enemy's hasty defence positions and advances.
The armoured reconnaissance battalion is usually kept out of this fight and ready to begin anew (Phase 4 = Phase 0).

The interesting thing about this is the combat element; the armoured reconnaissance battalion exploited its agility (short column), speed (motorised) and off-road capability (half-tracks) to meet the enemy when and where he wasn't combat ready. Hours and even minutes were often tactically decisive in that war. A battalion that sabotaged the establishment of a defensive line before the main force arrived was obviously invaluable.

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Let's look at quotes from FM 17-95 "Cavalry Operations" (U.S.Army, late 1996):

The fundamental purpose of cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and to provide security in close operations. In doing so, cavalry facilitates the corps or division commander’s ability to maneuver divisions, brigades, and battalions and to concentrate superior combat power and apply it against the enemy at the decisive time and point. Cavalry clarifies, in part, the fog of battle.

Cavalry is, by its role, an economy of force. The flexible capabilities of cavalry allow the commander to conserve the combat power of divisions or brigades for engagement where he desires. The combat power of cavalry units, in particular, makes them ideal for offensive and defensive missions as an economy of force.

The ACR performs a variety of offensive operations in support of the
corps scheme of maneuver. The primary missions of the regiment are reconnaissance and
security operations. During these missions, especially offensive cover, the regiment
may perform movement to contact and hasty attacks to destroy enemy reconnaissance, security, and main body forces.

There's much to criticise in that FM, but it has interesting aspects.
The 1990's ACR was a force meant as a kind of advance guard, rear guard or off-Schwerpunkt force for its corps. It did clearly lay out armoured reconnaissance forces (with helicopters) that were distinct from the main battle forces and capable of independent combat operations.

The French did also appreciate the need for combat capability in armoured reconnaissance units; most of their post-WW2 reconnaissance AFVs had serious guns (76-105mm) with the more recent VBL being an exception (it's a kind of budget vehicle that also lacks powerful sensors).

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This combat element isn't organic to modern German armoured reconnaissance units (see HDv 241/100 "Das Panzeraufklärungsbataillon" and HDv 242/100 "Die Panzeraufklärungskompanie"). Today we've got increased visual and electronic observation capabilities instead. Aufklärung durch Kampf (here translated with Reconaissance in force, albeit both are not fully identical) is an exception ("Aufklärung durch Kampf ist eine Ausnahmesituation im Rahmen der Aufklärung.")
Combat units shall be attached under special circumstances for reconnaissance in force ("In besonderen Lagen kann dem Bataillon befohlen werden, durch Kampf aufzuklären. Dazu muss das Bataillon in jedem Fall mit kampfkräftigen Teilen verstärkt werden."). This is quite contrary to the manual's assertion that opportunities for reconnaissance in force are unpredictable and short-term in nature.

German doctrinal reconnaissance in force does not take into account that the reconnaisance battalion might encounter enemy forces that are not combat ready. This opportunity for success in combat in order to help the brigade/division/corps in its mission by interfering with enemy preparations is absent.
The German armoured reconnaissance battalion doesn't have an emphasis on helicopter operations as the U.S. cavalry has. Helicopter operations are army-level operations in the Heer (there's a German helicopter-mobile division remotely similar to the 101st).

The greatest deficit of current German armoured reconnaissance doctrine is probably the lack of a counter-reconnaissance mission (and therefore no necessary emphasis on counterreconnaissance). It's fine to see the enemy, but you also want him to be blind!

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The relative emptiness of the battlefield seems to demand a strong reconnaissance element in modern armies - this has probably been neglected way too much. We know about the enormous lethality of modern arms (although the lethality of new munitions was usually overestimated in peacetime). Most NATO ground forces are confident that they could defeat opposing forces - if the odds aren't strorngly in OPFOR's favour.

The sheer capability to defeat opponents in combat isn't much in doubt. The ability to control and dominate large areas without occupying too many combat troops with non-combat missions is in doubt, though.

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I am thinking about a new balance for ground forces; a triad of support, combat and scouting units.
The scouting units would flood the area like water (bypassing powerful enemy forces, but overwhelming weak/unprepared enemy forces by a temporary concentration of several units).

Heavy reconnaissance units wouldn't need to be entire battalions - they could be even more nimble combined arms companies (anti-tank firepower, anti-infantry firepower, infantry, heavy mounted mortar, air defence missiles, short-range UAV). Such independently moving companies would be extremely difficult to track, fix and destroy. The combat power of such scouting units would make them versatile and effective in many scenarios. I think of these as combat units for employment in low force density missions.

(Light reconnaissance units for more tank-unfriendly terrain could be based on area control platoons that employ Jagdkampf-like light infantry tactics in areas without emphasis on mobile warfare.)

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The modern trend looks different. Reconnaissance is becoming more and more a function of sensor employment. Such observation-centric reconnaissance companies and battalions often retain the ability to do Spähaufklärung, but their combat power is in some armies even too small for a counter-reconnaissance fight against improvised (armoured) reconnaissance troops.

New sensors are fine, but they cannot replace the proven combat functions of reconnaissance battalions. Sensors can detect an enemy who's not ready to fight, but sensors cannot defeat him. Long-range and aerial firepower has its limitations and won't replace surface action for decades to come.

The new German armoured reconnaissance (observation) vehicles (Fennek) are insufficiently armed to defeat even antique armoured reconnaissance vehicles (7.62mm machine gun or 40mm automatic grenade launcher).

The emphasis on technical means of terrain observation and the neglect of combat in reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance may be the result of more than six decades without relevant land warfare. There was very little combat experience in conventional land war that would be relevant for our (NATO defence) purposes.
The Indo-Pakistani Wars were probably the most relevant experiences; the terrain, force matchup and force density in Israel's wars were very unrepresentative for our needs.

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I would like to recommend some books for those who are interested in the employment of the German armoured reconnaissance units in WW2:

"Die deutschen Panzeraufklärer 1935-1945", Wolfgang Fleischer & Richard Eiermann, 2005
Short overview, not too technical, more tactical info than in hardware-centric books.

"Taktik im Russlandfeldzug", Eike Middeldorf et al, 1956
Lessons learned and suggestions for the Heer in the 50's; comprehensive and competent.

"Handbuch der Taktik", Eike Middeldorf et al, 1957

It's redundant to the '56 book in regard to armoured reconnaissance.

English readers could be interested in

"German Armoured Cars and Reconnaissance Half-Tracks 1939-45", Bryan Perrett, 1999

This has at least some info on organization and employment.

S O
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