Some really, really basic things about national security

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I got into a kind of ranting mode when confronted with a specific opinion on a forum. The discussion was about whether it's acceptable to wish that a country's officer corps is combat-experienced. My point was that this requires involvement in warfare and is thus only achievable under condition of a failure of national security policy, resulting in the conclusion that combat experience is logically not desirable if you look at the whole.

Another forum member intervened with this helpful remark

It wasn't long ago I asked you what a military should do (other than attain victory). You responded with me earning a load of disrespect (but yet, never answered my question).

I don't remember the specific instance, but his description may nevertheless be correct. I'm at times "abrasive" when I'm "appalled" by a behaviour or opinion.

Anyway, here's an excerpt of my reply. I think it's decent blog material, too:

Victory as commonly defined is often a form of failure. The harm done to the own country by warfare is often greater than the harm done by not going to war (if there's any of the latter at all).
(The foolishness of the 2003-2011 Iraq conflict is a good example: pretty much nothing was gained but the busting of a few stupid fantasies. Thousands died, ten thousands were crippled, trillions of dollars were spent - for no real gain.)

The military shall -in the event of war- achieve the minimal net damage outcome for the country, with political efforts to the same end in parallel.

The mission for the government as a whole is to avoid damage altogether, to maximise the benefits of the population. The details are tricky from a philosophical point of view, but it's quite obvious that in our age you cannot really be better off with "winning" a war of choice than choosing not to go to it. You don't get to annex fertile lands or gold mines any more these days, not even oil fields.

This leaves wars of necessity, which again are only meeting the criteria if they're the least terrible alternative. To choose a more terrible alternative than a less terrible one is folly/incompetence, thus you gotta choose the least terrible (again, determining this is tricky detail stuff). Obviously, if the least terrible alternative is the only one that should be used, war can only be the way to go if it's the least terrible way to go.

After all, war is a terrible alternative, thus it's in the context "of war or not war" pointless to cover the "most beneficial" line of argument that applies to many peacetime policy outcomes.

So what's the military's purpose in peacetime?
Support the policy in its quest for good outcomes by making war and sovereignty violations less likely. This can be pursued by putting a hefty risk premium on all foreign aggressions. This risk premium is the visible and widely known probability that an aggression would fail to overcome the resistance (at costs that appear to be acceptable to the aggressor's top decisionmakers).

Thus I finally found an answer to my question what to post on this blog today. I've got some draft texts too, but it seems there's a reason why I didn't hit the "publish" button on them yet.

About war and peace (which, btw, is a label here on this blog!):

People in uniform, people in war ministries (whatever their name nowadays is) and people with a focus on the military (or even its hardware) drown out the voices of philosophy, reason and diplomacy in regard to national security debates.

It's a shame. More brain less guns could have kept many conflicts cold, millions of people alive, entire nations intact.

There may not be enough people out there who can detach from emotions and silly ideas and think rationally about war and peace when needed, but that's no excuse for not accepting that rationality is the way to go.

S Ortmann
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Functions in military theory / front lines

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I have written about different functions in military stuff over the course of this blog.

I wrote about repulsion and how having a long range may actually reduce the functional utility of a weapon (even ceteris paribus).

I referred often to the functions of a front line, which fell away when armies gave up the idea of establishing a front line.

Recently I wrote about how you could create the effects of encirclement by meeting the function of an encirclement without actually make it look like an encirclement.

Unsurprisingly, I think there's some merit in this way of looking at military theory.

The technical capability of weapons and the physical capability of soldiers very rarely coincides with what happens in real warfare. A main battle tank may be able to aim, shoot and hit while driving at 60 km/h speed, but that's not how tank combat really looks like.

A missile may be developed to destroy a radar station - and end up merely forcing the radar operators to switch their radar off for a few seconds.

An assault rifle may have the technical capability to slaughter a whole platoon in a minute, but that doesn't happen.

The difference between input potential and actual outcome isn't the only indicator for the importance of function, though. Actions have usually effects that are not obvious at all. Many actions serve a purpose, a function in war.

The difference between potential and actual result is the really important thing. We need to understand the functions that rule warfare, more so than the tools. A look at the tools is too deceiving, for it merely reveals the potential, not the actual effect.

- - - - -

Let's finally look in detail at one of the functions that interest me very much, for I see no substitute in place after its loss yet: The front line.

What does a front line do?

Basically it keeps weak forces from advancing much. A proper front line may be infiltrated, but the risk/price is usually high. It can be penetrated by an offensive (under some circumstances), but it cannot be overwhelmed by a general advance along most of its length.

It does thus keep the enemy largely from advancing and thus creates security in the rear. This in turn enhances the efficiency of forces in the rear, for they can train, repair and move supplies without needing to pull much local 360° security. Of course, they also sleep better. Sleep deprivation is a big issue in wartime.

Front lines have a geometrical reason for their (past) existence.
Back in the 18th and even 19th century artillery wasn't long-ranged. It was feasible to protect a town against fires with a fortified ring around it. The longer the artillery ranges became, the greater the necessary diameter of the fortifications. This in turn led to an ever longer circumference (2 * π * radius)- up to the point when it became pointless to allocate so many defenders to a single town. In some places the defensive rings of multiple towns came in contact and it was less inefficient to give them a joint defence.

expanding fortifications lines of Cologne,
4th century to 1877, (c) D. Herdemerten

By the late 19th century it was obvious that town fortifications were pointless. To fortify the border of a state was an alternative. The geometrical reason is simple. Imagine a large circle and now fill it up with dozens of small circles. The large circle surrounds more area than the sum of the small ones, but its circumference is much smaller than the sum of theirs.

The increased lethality of small arms (= less defenders needed per length) and the mass mobilisation of troops with conscription actually enabled the fortification of an uninterrupted front line from Switzerland to the North Sea in late 1914 (as predicted by Bloch). The same was never fully possible on the Russian front in the First World War, but there was still a front line: The function of a front line was met with less ambition than total resistance against offensives.

The probably weakest form of front line came into being in World War Two, again on the vast Eastern Front; the weakened Wehrmacht wasn't able to fully man a front line, thus it had to create its effects with very few resources.

It was mostly a strong point defence with connecting trenches for patrol and surveillance purposes. Indirect fires (especially artillery and mortars) dominated the observed ground without much small arms fire. Again, it was possible to infiltrate, but infiltrations were met by counter-attacks. The less troops with direct fire weapons man a front line, the more they need to be substituted for with indirect fires. A continuous trench line was desirable for the safety of patrolling, but it was no longer always an integral  component as in 1916.

The key for such a front line was to force the superior opponent to concentrate forces for an overwhelming breakthrough offensive. The rear troops were quite secure till this breakthrough occurred, and there were operational counters even to successful breakthroughs. A front line can meet its function even if it's unable to stop the enemy.

Nowadays it's unlikely that traditional, continuous front lines will be established in a conventional war. There are likely too few troops. This has actually been correct since the early Cold War, but the fixation on nukes kept many from seeing it.

- - - - -

The essential components of defence: Direct fires - counterattacks - indirect fires - surveillance.

The less forces per length, the more emphasis has to be shifted away from direct fires. Artillery fires are the classic gap-filler for thin defences.

Modern forces couldn't have short range direct fires along the length of a front line.

Their surveillance of a long line is also in doubt because of weak scout and infantry components (contrary to the sensors fashion). Indirect fires are now high quality, but low quantity (and accurate indirect fires against moving targets are still difficult).

Could all this be made up for with counter-attacks? Hardly.

You need a substitute for the discouraging effect of an established front line, or else your opposing force may put you into extremely risky and disadvantageous situations by exploiting much of its mobility potential. There's no front line that forces them to concentrate for hours or days for a predictable push, after all. They might appear just about everywhere, at any time.

I actually gave away parts of my idea for a substitute in earlier posts. My working title is "skirmish corridor".

I won't describe it in detail here because the point of most of my blog posts isn't to inject my ideas into readers' brains; it's to inspire their thought. A single brain rarely produces great ideas, but a thinking society will succeed. Well, that and the text is already long enough.

S O

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A "15 years too late" analysis on precision munitions and survivability

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Precision munitions and smart munitions were the big hype of the 90's, but obviously I didn't blog during the 90's. Nor did I have particularly well-founded views on them back in the 90's. So pardon me for coming late to the party, please.

First some context, for no analysis should be done with an empty stomach:

Back in the World War Two era, the best defensive practice on flat land (against an enemy who preferred night attacks) was to have a forward line of own troops (FLOT, VRV - Vorderer Rand der Verteidigung) as a screen for the main daylight defensive positions (1). This forward screen was made up of small teams in ambush/observation positions or on patrol. Such far forward troops were naturally exposed to detection, no matter how well they camouflaged and concealed themselves. Sooner or later they were spotted.

In short: The more important position was to be screened against detection by a more expendable position. This led to a surprise advantage for the defender in major defensive battles and added uncertainty for the attacker in general.

- - - - -

Long-time readers of this blog do probably remember that I advocate camouflage and concealment all the time, period. Even small exposure is in my opinion acceptable only for very short duration (about 2 minutes).

That's of course a judgement result, not the reasoning itself.

To prove that I'm correct I would need to prove that even the aforementioned forward screen could not expose itself nowadays without unacceptable attrition rates or mission failures.

The relation of overall lethality of fires (most notably indirect fires, = rocket, howitzers and mortars) is the key. It has to be worse (=more lethal to the defender) today than back in WW2 to yield worse (for the defender) results. This lethality has to be seen in context of target quantity if you look at the macro scale (this relation isn't so important on the tactical level).

WW2:

Many high explosive warheads  x  low probability of hit Ph.(2)

Fires usually had to be 'walked in' on the target, spending the surprise effect.(3)

2011:

Few high explosive warheads x high probability of hit

Fires can be very accurate on first salvo.

Now the question is whether

much HE x low Ph

is smaller, equal or bigger

few HE x high Ph

"smaller":

This would mean that accuracy (surprise) is the key advance, while firepower overall has decreased.

"equal":

This would mean that accuracy (surprise) is the key advance, while firepower overall is the same.

"bigger":

This would mean that dispersion and accuracy (surprise) advances are overmatching the loss of ammunitions quantity.

The "smaller" and "equal" cases would -if true- allow the conclusion that precision munitions are not so much important as is the accuracy (knowledge of positions, environment and trajectory, correct calculation). You could -in this simplistic model- have the same effect with lots of dumb rounds being fired by good gunners and good guns.

The "bigger" case (which is widely implied or asserted to be true in publications) would suggest that the hype about the small dispersion of precision munitions (small circular error probability, CEP) was correct.

Well, what's the overall lethality that I meant?

'Shells' times quality of dispersion (less dispersion = better quality) is the measure against targets which don't evade fires when possible.

Against targets which do evade incoming fires you need to magnify the effects a lot to represent today's situation, for modern fires take immediate effect and leave no time for running to a secondary position.

- - - - -

I may not have made myself clear about this in previous texts (can only point out so much at once). The dispersion is in my opinion important, but not in itself the reason why modern ground forces need to break contact after a short time to prevent getting caught by support fires. They need to do so because you cannot run away from modern mortar or artillery fires.

That's why I have my conclusions about the role of modern support (indirect) fires, even without being able to solve the high explosives x dispersion equation (which is extremely complicated if you want to do it thoroughly) even though publications focus usually on one variable of this equation.

By the way; there has been near-constant frustration about the lack of realism in training in regard to indirect fires lethality and thus wrong training and doctrine. This goes back to at least the early 80's in literature. Unsurprisingly, I have yet to see an army manual from any country (I know infantry manuals from eight) that emphasises that unlike in WW2, hostile indirect fires are accurate on first salvo now.

The incompetent harassment mortar teams of Third World insurgents did certainly not help to press this point about modern indirect fires into the minds of our army leaders.

S Ortmann

(1): An approach similar to scouting in general: Jeopardize few in order to buy better security for many. This fundamental approach has mostly been lost to today's Western officer Corps due to their quest for (almost) no KIA on their teams. Such an approach is incompatible with singling out few for high risks, as high risks have (supposedly) to be avoided altogether. Their approach would increase the average risk-taking in a great war.

(2): A measure of dispersion rather than accuracy in this context.Dispersion tells how close the impacts are to each other, while accuracy tells whether the centre of the impacts group was close to the target.

(3): It was possible to avoid this and instead just fire short fire mission with many artillery battalions at once. This shotgun effect came surprisingly and at least some firing batteries were usually on target without corrections. The ammunition expenditure of this tactic permitted it only for large target groups and afaik it was preferred as a defensive fires tactic and not used much for the destruction of defensive positions. The exception was IIRC rocket artillery.


edit 2012/08: I read this old blog text today and now I understand it's very difficult to grasp, for I laid out my thoughts poorly. In case you don't get what I mean, just focus on the underlined parts and keep in mind that the classic responses to indirect fires were to (a) find shelter in field fortifications or (b) run to a new position faster than the enemy can correct his indirect fires aim.

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British Labour party considers an attack on the independence of the media

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"Phone hacking fallout:
Labour plans tighter media regulation"

To resist the temptations of authoritarianism is an eternal challenge.

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On "I"nitiative

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The concept of "initiative" is a mosaic piece of military theory that has confused many, provoked many discussions - and enabled many men in fancy uniforms to talk much without saying anything.

Discussing the role of "initiative" in military theory was fashionable long before I bothered to blog about anything. This didn't lead to any convincing writing about it reaching my bookdesk, though.

The main point of contention appeared to be (in my eyes) whether "initiative" in itself is valuable or whether it's just randomly associated with both good and bad moves.

Here are some snippets from U.S. doctrine (handy because published in English) about initiative:

When the friendly force has the initiative, it can force the enemy to conduct continuous operations to react to friendly actions and then exploit the effects of continuous operations on the enemy.

Possession of the initiative allows a commander to continually seek vulnerable
spots and shift his decisive operation when opportunities occur.

FM 3-100 actually kind of defines "initiative":

Initiative has both operational and individual components. From an operational perspective, initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout the battle or operation. Initiative implies an offensive
spirit in all operations. To set the terms of battle, commanders eliminate or reduce the number of enemy options. They compel the enemy to conform to friendly operational purposes and tempo [...]. 

From an individual perspective, initiative is the ability to be a selfstarter, to act when there are no clear instructions or when the situation changes. An individual leader with initiative is willing to decide and initiate independent actions when the concept of operations no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the accomplishment of the commander’s intent presents itself [...].

In the offense, initiative involves throwing the enemy off balance with powerful, unexpected strikes. It implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of an attack. [...]

In the defense, initiative implies quickly turning the tables on the attacker. It means taking aggressive action to collect information and force the attacker to reveal his intentions. Defenders aim to negate the attacker’s initial advantages, gain freedom of action, and force the enemy to fight on the defender’s terms. [...]

This much-abbreviated quote shows that the doctrine writers were once again confused.
The deleted parts did in great part reveal that "initiative" serves as a justification for the promotion of "mission-type orders". That's not what interests me here, though.
The same goes for the "individual" aspect of this idea of initiative in which being motivated to fight and thinking independently in conjunction supposedly already equals "initiative". In other words: The U.S.Army used one word for two completely different concepts.

At least a few years back "initiative" was one of the five "tenets" of (U.S.) army operations. The attention on it did go so far to assert that
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A commander never surrenders the initiative once he gains it.

as if no such thing as the culminating point of attack did ever exist. That shall not be my main focus here, either - no matter how stupid such a generalisation is.

By the way:

FM 3-90 "Tactics" (2001) word search for "initiative": 83 x found

FM 3-100 "Operations" (2001) word search for "initiative": 167 x found

- - - - -

My definition/interpretation what is usually really meant with "having the initiative" in military writings:

The opposing force is so much occupied with coping with your actions and/or threats that it doesn't mobilise the resources to execute major actions that are more than mere reactions. (1)

This may sound eerily familiar to the first quote above, but there's a major difference in my opinion. U.S.doctrine and as a consequence much anglophone writing (thinking?) about initiative in military theory/arts purports that "initiative" is gained by and a benefit of aggressiveness. Gaining "initiative" is supposedly always about the offence. Even in defence, it's about switching back to offensive action.

It's all quite similar to the typical OODA school of thought.

Well, big institutions like that have a certain claim of legitimacy if they define technical terms. I will thus not argue that they got the definition thing wrong (although they should learn to be more concise!).

Instead, I will argue that they got their doctrine wrong.

Read my definition again, please.

*waiting*

Finished? OK. 

The key difference is that I do not assert that you need offensive action to gain the Initiative (I will write it with "capital "I" as in German in order to signal that I mean my idea of it).

You may just as well gain the Initiative by overstretching the opponent's resources by the multitude of threats that you pose to him.

Chess players know this. You do not really need to attack in order to paralyse an opponent who's weaker in figures. Sometimes all his figures are totally irreplaceable in his defensive scheme because your many options for attacks require him to defend so much.

A historical example would be El Alamein. Rommel had lost the initiative by failing in his last attack - and no amount of attacking would have helped to regain it. Nor did relentless pressing the previous offensive preserve his initiative. Montgomery had the Initiative because he was strong enough. He decided the time, location and direction of the next offensive - Rommel had no say in this any more after he failed to break through at El Alamein.

An opponent does not only need to cope with your actions, but also with your threats. He must not expose himself so much that you can exploit this much. The more threats he needs to counter with his precautions, the less offensive power is left for major moves of his own.

Judging by what I read and heard about it, this means that your opponent loses the initiative once he can barely cope with all the risks/threats (to him) that you create. This is the paralysis and disadvantage that some doctrines want to achieve through initiative.

U.S.Army doctrine is thus in my opinion not only lacking clarity and concise definitions in regard to "initiative", but is also - and this is a bigger problem in practical application - promoting  aggressiveness too much with it.

- - - - -

There's more to it: You can box your enemy into a corner by keeping him totally occupied with your threats, but what happens if he loses hope to counter your threats with defensive posturing?

He may attack like a cornered, wounded predator. There's no point in waiting till one of the unavoidable gaps is being exploited, right? (2)

This is an insight that aforementioned official writings would not create - because they lack the idea that you could gain initiative by anything else than attack.

S Ortmann

(1) : Clarification: You only have the initiative if you still have the reserve resources to stage a substantial offensive effort.
(2) : This kind of explains the 1944 Ardennes Offensive.
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Readiness in mobile warfare

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Some old book contained rules of thumb for meeting engagements and generally the decision for or against an attack directly out of a formation movement.

That wasn't about hasty attack or not - a "hasty attack" is still a planned attack. The author that I'm thinking about did indeed write about switching from movement to fight without any break.

His key criterion was an unusual one, I haven't seen it much in military theory during the last years: Relative readiness for battle.

His advice (based on German WW2 experiences) was to attack without further preparations if your readiness for battle is superior.

Preparations only serve the purpose of improving your relative readiness for battle, but the other side of the coin is that the opponent doesn't necessarily sleep all the time and improves as well.

A quick switch from movement to voluntary combat of course require some timely knowledge about your forces and the opposing forces - leading from the advance guard is imperative for such an approach.

The most stark difference in readiness for battle known to me (and in absence of strategic surprise) is the fate of the 5th motorised French division during the night of 16th/17th May, 1940. The division was in bivouac along a road - vehicles standing on both sides of it - on a length of ten kilometres, together with elements of a French infantry division and a French armour division.

During that night, the mere advance guard of a German armour division obliterated the 5th motorised division - it ceased to exist as a formation, with burned-out wrecks littering both roadsides on ten kilometres length.

No analysis of the hardware involved alone could explain this outcome.

Relative readiness - and thus readiness for battle in general - is obviously a major factor in warfare. It's another way to look at surprise in warfare, but it's more than that.

A formation does not need to be surprised in order to be less ready for battle. Earlier battles, poor positioning or movement, lack of suitable equipment and many other factors can contribute to inferior readiness for battle. It's thus more worthwhile to study readiness than to study surprise.

Readiness for battle is linked with agility, for reaction lags contribute to a lack of readiness against a sudden threat.

Readiness for battle - which is in large part an organisational and training challenge - ought to deserve more attention than the costly procurement of high-tech "force multipliers" that supposedly make a helicopter six times more deadly than its predecessor and so on.

You seek a cheap way to multiply your forces' capabilities? Make them the most ready for battle and seek mobile warfare!

S O

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On Third World militaries

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It's "on and off and on again" interesting to me to look at and think about developing countries' (para)military forces. I mean countries such as in West or East Africa, not partially modern countries such as Brazil, India or oil countries.

The typical developing country has few benefits from its military. It's way too often rather a threat to political stability and usually overstretched once an actual armed conflict arises.
Border conflicts and all-out interstate warfare are rather rare. The most typical form of warfare is against an armed insurrection by a minority or against paramilitary forces infiltrating from a neighbouring country at war.

An article about the rebuilding (from scratch!) of the army of civil war-torn Liberia caught my interest a while ago and points in my opinion at the most important aspect: It's all about the personnel.

You don't need much equipment for a typical developing countries' military, especially not heavy equipment. Some cheap NORINCO small arms, mortars and RPGs plus a few patrol boats, some trucks and pickups, tents, some fatigues and boots plus a useful radio equipment are about all that it takes.

All else is a question of personnel (competence and motivation).

First of all, the personnel should not have a murderous (civil) war background or be suspected of corruption.
Second, it should be properly trained, properly cared for and loyal to the law.
Third, it shouldn't be some conscript force but rather a cadre force in order to enable a quick force expansion in times of crisis.

I would begin by setting up an academy for gendarmerie training (half year basic gendarmerie course). Indeed, I wouldn't set up a military at all, but only a gendarmerie (semi-police, semi-military institution).

This gendarmerie would be the only representative of the central government's privilege of the use of force. 

The other police institutions could be locally elected sheriffs, and of course this aims at empowering the populace to get rid of corrupt local police through elections.

Parliament and government institutions can run their own compound security service and high-ranking officials can get a driver-bodyguard - but these would be restricted to handguns and a purely defensive employment of the same.

The gendarmerie would

(1) enforce lawfulness of local police forces (investigation and arrest, protecting local elections)

(2) guard the borders, serve as customs agency

(3) guard wildlife sanctuaries

(4) control resource usage (detect and investigate illegal wood harvesting, fishing, mining, pollution etc)

(5) prepare as cadre force for warfare

(6) serve as coast guard, including search and rescue

(7) provide basic airport policing and investigate illegal flights based on reports of civilian air traffic controllers

(9) serve as national police reserve, for example for securing large public events

(10) run its own academy

(11) guard prisons and watch prisoner labour groups (and as such oversee some construction projects)

(12) accompany anti-corruption officials as enforcers

(13) guard embassies

(14) serve as basic intelligence agency for observation of armed forces in neighbouring countries

(15) serve as basic counter-intelligence agency, mostly for providing basic security for critical government institutions (foreign ministry, ministry of gendarmerie, head of government office)

The seeming jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none approach is probably necessary to give the forces a good utility in peacetime. It helps furthermore to keep the gendarmerie fragmented and with near-permanent personnel turnover even in leadership positions: These would be very difficult conditions for a coup d'état planner.

The personnel would rotate irregularly, leaving enough experienced personnel in one function, but infuse new personnel as well. This near-constant movement of personnel (average duration on a specialty about 1-3 years in a row after 1 month training) should make it more difficult for individual units to get on a wrong track.

The defence itself could be based on a motorised infantry + local guided militia approach. Small teams of gendarmerie would train and lead village or local militias while gendarmerie with quickly trained enlisted volunteers would strive for a quick end in an interstate conflict through small unit and unit competence and small formation manoeuvre. Meanwhile, other quickly trained enlisted volunteers would reinforce the gendarmerie in its civilian functions. These volunteers would sign up for a two-year period, possibly extend for one ear each or get accepted into the academy for full gendarmerie training after the first two years. The motivation would come from decent pay and a bonus for later applications for government jobs or for access to higher education. Real gendarms would work for pay that's enough for a family and a pension that's enough for a household of two.

The academy would be the one central piece, and its leadership has to be selected carefully, for the academy leadership is probably the only part of the gendarmerie that would be able to pull off a coup d'état. It would thus be very restricted in terms of available weapons and ammunition. The academy could also serve as the institution's symbol and pride.

I would separate it into basic training, advanced (officer) training and specialisation training - three months, three months and one month respectively.

Developing country military affairs may lack pseudo-sexy fighters, tanks and aircraft carriers - but they add some facets to the topic of personnel. We (in the "West") don't regularly think of a military as a force to be kept in check for it could otherwise attempt a coup d'état, do we?

S O
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About time for a new political joke category in Germany

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Politische Piratenwitze - political pirates jokes.

I'll give it a shot with my own creation:

Warum schickt Berlin die die Bundeswehr zur Piratenjagd vor Somalia?  -  Weil die Piraten in Berlin sind!"

(Why does Berlin send the Bundeswehr to Somalia for pirate-hunting?  -  Because the Pirates are in Berlin!"

Background:

The Piratenpartei Deutschland has gained 8% of the seats in the Berlin state elections 2011.

They don't fly the Jolly Roger, but a sail is still in their logo.

What's the reason for the success of such an exotic party (which has about 1 in 3,500 Berlin's inhabitants as members)?

Put simply, the failure of the FDP and the other parties to prevent the slide towards a surveillance and police state, as well as stupid copyright law excesses and similar. The original libertarian political area has been vacated by most of the (so-called) liberals (just like they shed their social wing, too) years ago - save for a single federal minister who does a good job on this. Nowadays they FDP is reduced to shameless promotion of certain business interests, as evidenced quite early during the current federal legislation period when they pushed for a quite inexplicable value added tax cut for the hotel sector.

The FDP has had a major problem in its relative similarity with the greens on many liberal (that is, not shamelessly pro-employers) topics, and now it's even facing a party that specialises on this neglected area. Which is a shame for both (so-called) liberals and greens, of course.

Well, let's hope these pirates aren't as harmless in the pursuit of libertarian agenda as they're unarmed.
Maybe they'll eventually board the Bundestag as well and call for an end of the stupid pirate-hunting off Somalia's coast?

S O
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About setting priorities on Mindanao (and maybe everywhere)

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(I struggled to find an appropriate title.)

S O

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Link to a discussion

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Link to a discussion on Auftragstaktik, centralised synchronisation, centralised coordination, cooperation and deconfliction I got involved in on the Ink Spots blog (in the comments).

related:
2009/07 Airspace deconfliction
2010/11 Planning vs. competence
2011/03 More on horizontal cooperation

S Ortmann
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