2016/05/13

"The U.S. Army’s War Over Russia"

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edit 2023: This blog post aged fairly well, but its last part about towed artillery didn't. The Russian armed forces are so bad that even 155 mm L/39 M777 towed artillery survives in Ukrainian service for months on average.
 
by Mark Perry, POLITICO

I
That article has weaknesses (particularly the lines about tanks), but it nicely summarises an example of Niskanen's bureaucrat and the principal-agent problem in effect, two models that I've described and applied on D&F repeatedly:

2010/12/supply-demand-and-weird-statement.html
2013/08/niskanens-bureaucrats.html
2013/08/more-about-armed-bureaucracies.html
2013/09/effective-oversight-over-bureaucracies.html
2013/11/sunk-costs-principal-agent-problem-how.html
2013/12/the-limit-of-tolerance.html
2014/03/the-principal-agent-problem-politicians.html

II
The U.S. Army has a couple rock stars; two of them are mentioned in the article (MacGregor and McMaster). Honestly, I was never terribly impressed by their output. They're often referred to as intellectuals, smart and great thinkers and so on, but their published writings never seemed to be particularly impressive to me. 
MacGregor's signature book "Breaking the Phalanx" featured some nonsense (mostly about organic army aviation) and otherwise only unimpressive ordinary stuff. I was told that it was still a ground-breaking book in its context (U.S.Army) and that it broke with certain anachronisms specific to that armed service, but to me it looked not terribly different from what Europeans did in the 60's already.
So in addition to that principal-agent / bureaucratic behaviour thing, I'd also like to point out that we better not buy into descriptions of people as particularly bright ones. Form your own opinion based on their actual output!

III
It is noteworthy that the U.S.Army's complaints about being outgunned and outranged have at least some merit regarding tube artillery.
Yet this is of their own making. They failed spectacularly with their Crusader project, developing an SPG with little more performance than the PzH 2000, but multiple times its price per copy - and got it cancelled because of the excessive costs. Another attempt was to shoehorn a M109 replacement into the FCS boondoggle - but that, too, would have had no greater range than the M109. FCS was cancelled as well, and with it the SPG ("NLOS") version that offered almost no improvement over the M109.
So instead, the U.S.Army is using a M109 that's no M109 any more because every single part (hull, turret and gun) was replaced in some upgrade sometime during the M109's long time in service (with only fire control making much progress after the first very early gun upgrade). It's essentially a 3rd class SPG with an ordinary 39 cal. barrel, mediocre mobility (at least able to pass over weaker bridges than PzH 2000, though) and no particularly impressive rate of fire.
The U.S. Army's "outgunned and outranged" problem is even worse in its light and medium brigade types (Infantry BCT and Stryker BCT), for they use towed 155 mm howitzers (instead of M109 SPGs) which lack 360° traverse, are slow loading and feature a 39 cal. barrel as well. The U.S. airborne forces have essentially no artillery for use in conventional warfare and would thus be near-useless as reinforcements to the Baltic region, South Korea or Taiwan, for example. The USMC has the same inadequacy.
Yet again; these are shortcomings of their own making - the bureaucracies failed to replace equipment of the 1970's that was outperformed in the 1980's already. Often times they failed with successor projects or introduced overhyped yet obsolete-by-design systems (M777).

S O
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2016/05/12

Syrian Civil War explained [censored]

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This is a sanitised version of a rant from October 2015.

I'm getting increasingly "disappointed" by comments about the Syrian Civil War and by the Western military reactions.
Thus even though I don't think the Syrian Civil War is in any way related to the defence of my country or its allies*, I will write down an explanation. 
All of this could have been understood within the framework of 18th century art of war already.

First, Da'esh (also known as IS, ISIS, ISIL - I don't think they're a "state", though). Their success is explained by a single, simple fact: They possess strategic and operational mobility.
This is not a matter of motor vehicles. They would still possess superior mobility if they used camels only. This is NOT about hardware. Their mobility stems from their personnel structure. They have a mercenary army. Their mercs are not all in it for money, but they are - typical mercenary - not from the region, and this is all-important. A jihadist from Europe doesn't care whether he's being sent into a fight in Western Syria or in Eastern Syria - Da'esh can even send him into Iraq.

Meanwhile, the other civil war factions have always been or have devolved** into local militias or networks thereof. Their fighters typically expect to eat their mother's or wife's meals every day at home, and don't intend to fight in some part of Syria unknown to them or even inhabited by some other ethnic or religious group.
These militias cannot easily muster the troops concentration for an offensive, and the few times they did they failed, not the least due to lack of unity of command. Essentially, they can only fight at home or in other regions of their own group, whereas Da'esh can set up a Schwerpunkt and attack with local superiority at any front.

The Assad regime would have lost long ago had it not received support from some mercs as well - Hezbollah. Yet Hezbollah isn't really in this civil war to win all of Syria back for Assad - they're rather motivated to protect the Shi'ites from what would happen if the Sunni forces conquer Shi'ite territory or even all of Syria. So Hezbollah is not much of a mobile reserve for Assad, particularly not any more after they experienced severe casualties.

Now about the bombing campaign of Western powers and Arab autocrats:
What they're doing are strikes at intelligence-delivered targets and at targets of opportunity. They kill, maim and destroy. It's pointless, because all this does is it suppresses Da'esh temporarily and partially.
They cannot win through this campaign of attrition unless Da'esh makes a huge mistake itself. Da'esh can simply avoid defeat by keeping its exposure small enough to not lose more personnel and material to the bombing campaign and ground combat than they can replace. This isn't difficult because their opponents on the ground lack a good punch, as I explained above.
These generals employ air power not to "win", but to delay defeat - again. They did the same over Afghanistan already.

Now the Russians. It appears they bomb with a regional focus, mostly preparing or supporting offensive action on the ground. It seems they did also motivate Assad to scrape together some kind of smallish mobile reserves, which can then be supported in action by air power. Assad doesn't appear to have been capable of mobilizing enough reserves, but Russian ground forces or increased economic strength through Russian subsidies may change this. The Russians may be incapable of super-technicised, sophisticated synchronised strike packages including SEAD, aerial refuelling, standoff jamming and whatnot, but at least they appear to have a modicum of art of war understanding. They may soon disappoint in this regard, of course - and I wouldn't mind it with Eastern European security in mind.

Meanwhile, the usual warmonger suspects who write in English have no more sophisticated proposals than to throw more resources at the problem, preferably many ground troops.

Not only those who start a war are responsible for its horrors, but also those who fail to end it quickly.

edit: The Washington Post offers a map of the air attacks, and a description of the recent fighting.

edit2: I noticed that this blog post may be misunderstood. I do NOT mean to assert that Daesh is superior and will win. They are doomed because they made too many enemies, period. It's going to be defeated by land power, though - air power is merely a supportive component.


S O

*: The Turkish government is embarrassing and insulting its own military when it claims they need help from allies, but they don't care because the secular military is not the AKP's darling
**: The Assad regime, which began to rely ever more on Shia and Alawite militias the more the regular army broke apart.
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2016/05/11

Pursuit

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"A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (...). Pursuit operations begin when an enemy force attempts to conduct retrograde operations. At that point, it becomes most vulnerable to the loss of internal cohesion and complete destruction. A pursuit aggressively executed leaves the enemy trapped, unprepared, and unable to defend, faced with the options of surrendering or complete destruction."

FM 3-90 (U.S. Army), chapter 7

A pursuit usually happens when the opposing forces try to avoid or minimise combat by withdrawal or evasion while friendly forces seek to force a fight on them. Typically, this would be caused by opposing forces feeling unfit for the fight, while friendly forces feel much fitter. It may also be initiated in error, though; the opposing forces may feign weakness and withdrawal, and the pursuing force may run into a trap. The cavalry-centric steppe nomads (Scythians, Huns, Mongols) were famed for such feigned retreats for a thousand, maybe two thousand years.

The typically recommended manoeuvre for a pursuit is not to chase the opposing forces directly (by following the in their trail), but to try to race past them and flank or stop them afterwards. This and pursuit in general puts a very high demand on high speed of movement, while the same applies to those elements of the withdrawing opposing forces that try to provide security for the bulk of opposing forces. Traditionally, (light) cavalry was the branch of choice for pursuit of a beaten army at the tactical level, but at the operational or campaign level entire (mixed) army corps pursue their peers. In theory air and artillery strikes could be used to slow down the withdrawing force, even by scattering anti-vehicle mines. Yet in practice the artillery will likely lack the range and air forces would first need to be convinced to be helpers of the ground forces, enablers of ground forces manoeuvre success, rather than ground forces' rescuers and prime time killers in their own right. To crater a road at a bottleneck would typically mean to not directly drop that bomb on some hostile vehicle for an air force-attributed attrition effect.
"Lediglich frontales Nachstoßen der im fortschreitenden Angriff befindlichen Teile vorderer Linie genügt allein nicht. Der Erfolg wird erst dann erreicht, wenn es gelingt den weichenden Feind
- zu überholen
- zu überflügeln
- sich ihm vorzulegen"
 "Handbuch der Taktik, Eike Middeldorf et al, 1957

(A merely frontal push of the attacking elements of the forward line alone does not suffice. Success will only be achieved if one succeeds to 
- to overtake
- to outflank
- to place oneself in front of 
the evading enemy.)
 
"It is difficult to intercept and destroy the enemy by merely following the enemy withdrawing from his front and carrying out a pursuit, and it is necessary to push in from the enemy's flank and carry out a pursuit toward the enemy's rear. In other words, it is necessary to be positioned so that the pursuit is carried out from abroad front. In view of the above, in order to intercept and destroy the enemy, pursuit must be carried out over a wide and deep area."
"Principles of War", 1969, p.99

A wide/broad pursuit also reduces the susceptibility of the pursuing force to the feigned retreat tactic somewhat.

Moreover, it's essential to be ready for pursuit (and exploitation in general) at the time of the opportunity. This requires suitable reserves in the right place.

The withdrawing forces are usually not very orderly, not well-secured, demoralised - they are not ready for combat. This offers the prospect of great successes even to small pursuit parties if only those are in a much better state. This is why reserves are so important; those forces that convinced (by combat) the opposing force to withdraw will be morally and physically unfit and would take too much time to regain the necessary order. At least nowadays we could also expect them to be too obsessed about caring for the wounded and some prisoners of war may be burdening them as well.

- - - - -

There is a trivial answer to the challenge of pursuit: Readiness, timing, placing, reserves etc. are all solved problems if only you have a small yet combat-capable force in the back of the opposing forces. Yes, I'm coming back to THIS again. A company-sized element of armoured recce is a sword of Damocles to every opposing forces' manoeuvre commander. It forces 360° security on him, it disrupts his flow of supplies, cuts him off from rotary army aviation support ... and in the event that his brigade runs into trouble and is forced to withdraw said tiny armoured recce element would be ideally placed and highly dangerous for a pursuit action. It wouldn't even need to manoeuvre into position any more. In fact, it would have the choice between maximising attrition by itself and trying to slow down the withdrawing force for a greater pursuit success by larger (and then relatively faster) friendly forces. On top of that, it may cause a panic storm (or accept a disproportionate quantity of prisoners of war surrenders) because the beaten, withdrawing troops would be disheartened by its presence. They couldn't know what caused the noises, the rising smoke columns - and it's quite a stretch to expect forces to withdraw towards or through a threat.

On the other hand, I don't really think that pursuit or withdrawals as described in field manuals should be found in future European-style land warfare. Aside from the fact that there should be peace, evasive manoeuvres and aggressive manoeuvres should be largely indistinguishable until an army formation was really shattered by a well-prepared blow. I suppose that the forces would withdraw in utter disorder (more positive choice of words: "in dispersion"), which is the quickest method of movement and the one that could be stopped the least. This assumes that no obstacle such as a river provides bottlenecks through which only organised forces could pass safely (through engineer efforts or by fighting through an occupied bridge). A somewhat orderly withdrawal of large forces smells very much of the foot-mobile armies of the past. Fully motorised forces would flee very differently.


Coming back to the 'reserves are important' thing: A battalion battlegroup or brigade appears to be the army formation of choice for conventional land war, and usually it would split its combat vehicles into no more than two elements (afaik). There's very little reason to believe that the commanding officer of such a manoeuvre element would keep reserves for pursuit - any reserves would likely be employed to achieve the effect that convinces the opposing force to withdraw in the first place.
"Reserves" don't need to be organic, though. Another battlegroup nearby (less than 50 km away) could be tasked with the pursuit by a higher CO (division or corps level). What matters is that suitable forces are available for the job. It's old-style division-centric thinking to expect these reserves to be held ready by the same CO who led the effort to compel the opposing force to withdraw.
So once again, having multiple manoeuvre elements puts an advancing opposing force at great risk: Two elements could defeat it and force it into a withdrawal with a coordinated two-axis assault, while a third could mount a devastating pursuit. This prospect should serve as a great deterrent, since advancing with one or few manoeuvre elements would put them at great risk. This is somewhat reminiscent of the function of a front line: It would take a concentration of forces (that's not easily overburdened by 360° security and not easily thrown into disorder and ruined by a pursuit) to advance. A couple of manoeuvre elements could be threatening enough to deter an advance by opposing forces this way, without actually getting into contact.
You'd need powerful manoeuvre elements for the assault, but weaker/smaller ones could do the pursuit.

S O
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2016/05/09

Delaying actions

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"A delay is a form of retrograde (...) in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (...). The delay is one of the most demanding of all ground combat operations. A delay wears down the enemy so that friendly forces can regain the initiative through offensive action, buy time to establish an effective defense, or determine enemy intentions as part of a security operation. Normally in a delay, inflicting casualties on the enemy is secondary to gaining time. For example, a flank security force conducts a delay operation to provide time for the protected  force to establish a viable defense along its threatened flank. Except when directed to prevent enemy penetration of a phase line (...) for a specific duration, a force conducting a delay normally does not become decisively engaged."
FM 3-90 (chapter 11-5)

I'll spare everyone the nitpicking about that definition. My short(er) definition is as follows:

"A delaying action serves the purpose to slow down the advance of opposing ground forces by yielding ground for time. It is preferable for the defending force to not get fixed or engaged decisively. Slowing down the opposing forces typically is prioritised over reducing them."
I personally consider delaying actions as the dominant part of modern mobile warfare. Forces would be thinly distributed in most areas of a theatre of war due to a low ratio between forces and area, so "economy of force" is most important in most places. Save for harassment a delaying action can be executed with the worst ratio of friendly to opposing forces if only the friendly forces are technically no less mobile than the attacking opposing forces. This typically poor ratio of forces is what makes a delaying action "demanding" according to the U.S.Army definition above.
Befitting von Clausewitz' Schwerpunkt concept, you need to minimise defences in most places in order to amass enough or as many as possible forces for the Schwerpunkt or the main effort for decisive offensive action. Those reserves freed from failing in 'defending everywhere' could also have a "fleet in being" effect of deterring major hostile offensive operations by being available for counterstrokes.

Now about the textbook version of delaying actions (aggregated from many sources, not only the FM 3-90):
You divide the share of friendly forces that are suitable (speed, morale, training, equipment, supply state) into at least two different elements.
Engineers reduce the trafficability of the routes (blowing up bridges, cratering roads at bottlenecks, flooding terrain, causing forest fires to make forest roads impassable, fake and real mines, removal or manipulation of road signs etc.).
The element more close to the advancing opposing forces tries to force them off the road with long-range artillery fires (to slow their movement), and then forces them to deploy into battle formation (slower than march column) with a far ambush. A prioritisation of slowing down instead of attrition would typically suggest that this friendly force makes its presence known before the far ambush in order to force the opposing force to deploy and thus spend time without substantial line of sight combat (Remember? No decisive engagement!). A greater emphasis on attrition and an effort to build up a reputation for dangerous far ambushes early on would require to execute the far ambush for real. The problem is then to avoid decisive action even through the opposing force can move at 50+ kph on the battlefield and line of sight are often only 500-3,000 m and can be reduced further by obscuration efforts (mostly artillery-delivered multispectral smoke). 
The defenders risk being overrun by a rapid counter-ambush assault. Obstacles (such as scatterable mines) may help in this regard.
A frontal far ambush makes withdrawal of the ambushers less difficult and an attempted flank attack on it costs the attacker more time, while a flanking far ambush allows for a better attrition effect, particularly the destruction of other than lead elements (such as bridgelaying and minesweeping tanks, which in the end may have a greater slowing effect).

So the defenders force the attackers to deploy, waste time in a minefield or unsuccessful flanking move and ideally withdraw in time to avoid decisive (close) combat, though possibly causing and suffering some attrition.
This forward delaying element then withdraws, and an incompetent delaying action would demand this very same force to set up the next far ambush itself. A competent commander would instead have arrangements for a second element to allow the retreating friendly forces to pass and execute the next far ambush. It's impossible for a single element to maintain a delaying effort without vastly superior mobility.

- - - - -

Now about the modern picture:

(1) The advancing opposing forces are nowadays an all-offroad capable, all-motorised force. This is true even of Toyota technical-based improvised civil war forces in developing countries.
They can move in dispersion, with individual platoons or companies moving with several kilometres spacing. The delaying effort could then be the sum of (small) unit engagements. Attrition would naturally become more prevalent (since every far ambush salvo might eradicate an entire manoeuvre element) and frontal assaults (overrun attempts) on far ambush positions less likely. Flanking on the other hand would be more easily against the defenders, since inevitably some advancing manoeuvre elements will be farther forward than others.

(2) There's likely no front-line going to be established soon for want of enough forces, thus it's not so risky to be "behind" opposing forces any more. No front-line will cut such forces off any time soon, after all.
This allows for an alternative and supplement to the far ambush, especially on the operational (~corps command) level of war: Substantial forces* "left behind" or manoeuvring into positions behind an advancing hostile force would threaten its supply lines and its support elements (which are only marginally capable of line of sight combat). This would at the very least force a 360° security effort on the advancing opposing force, turning it into a moving pocket. This means a weakened tip of the spear and thus less offensive power (making delay by far ambush easier and attrition more important), but it's also most uncomfortable for the opposing commander. He might be tempted to 'clean up' those elements in his rear, which of course would cost a lot of time, since those elements can resist removal by a delaying effort of their own. A delaying effort in the 21st century does thus not need to be about withdrawal (the attacking opposing force may well move away  from the bulk of friendly (our) forces when engaging a pesky element in its rear). Accordingly, it also doesn't need to be about trading space for time. In fact, space may be gained if the opposing force attempts to get rid of an element in its rear.

(3) Delaying actions may be considered to be shaping operations.
To slow an opposing force down allows for less-impeded friendly elements to manoeuvre into position for a decisive engagement (for a synchronised pincer attack, for example). To force a 360° security effort on the opposing force may reduce the surprise effect on such an action, but also reduce the opposing force's ability to resist it. A delaying action may also be used to slow down a withdrawal (another reason why a delaying action isn't necessarily trading away territory) in order to make a pursuit more effective.
Delaying actions may also be kept the dominant choice of course for days in order to build up forces or to exploit superior long-range artillery firepower or superior air/ground attack strength. Entire army corps might refuse to offer battle brigades vs. brigades if this improves their odds of success.** Tactics treaties are often excessively focused on how to win a battle during the battle, while the preferable course of action is to refuse battle until shaping operations almost guaranteed success in battle. This necessitates some alternative effect (other than battle or front-lines) to keep the opposing forces from advancing and accomplishing their objectives in the meantime.

(4) Delaying actions should refuse decisive actions, that is the delaying elements should avoid their own destruction. That's generally a good idea, but as mentioned before, the ratio of forces is usually disadvantageous in a delay, so offering battle to the death (of either the friendly or the hostile element) is typically a losing proposition in a delaying action. The problem nowadays is that about 80-90% of casualties are caused by indirect fires (non-line of sight combat) in conventional warfare, so the classic view that the delaying element would risk its destruction primarily in close line-of-sight combat is probably inaccurate and obsolete. Sure, close combat may still eliminate the element and make its withdrawal very, very difficult. Yet its destruction (or attrition high enough to make the element incapable of staying on its mission) is more likely by repeated artillery (and other support) fires. The focus for survivability on a delaying action mission should thus not be on avoiding close combat any more. Instead, it's important to avoid artillery and other support fires. Short range air defences, withdrawal within 2-3 minutes after giving away one's position, irregular movements to avoid shelling on the move between ambush positions and so on will require additional capabilities and efforts and narrow down the freedom of action of the delaying forces.
On the other hand, the destructive and inhibiting effects of indirect fires may be used to greater effect than ever before in the delaying effort itself. Modern artillery typically has about 30 km range, about 40 km with fewer munitions and 80-100 km range with very few munitions. A moving opposing force could be threatened by artillery almost at all times, potentially forcing it into a dispersed and offroad movement instead of a quick and efficient road march even without classic delaying actions (far ambushes).

- - - - -

I insist that delaying actions are very, very important in modern conventional (state vs. state) mobile warfare. Meanwhile, field manuals still appear to imply that it's a poor man's choice and to be avoided if possible. Instead, I would consider it as the first choice, in preparation for (possibly never happening) brigade-on-brigade battles later on.


S O

*: More than long-range scouts / LRRP / Fernspäher and in this case no Jagdkommando, for I emphasise mobile warfare and thus mounted combat in this text. I'm rather thinking of quite combat-capable armoured recce units.
**: I really need to write about the 'fleet in being' effect sometime.
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2016/05/08

Political resolve for collective defence

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There are occasional polls about alliance resolve, and whether the populations of certain countries would be willing to go to war if the alliance was attacked. A recent one incidentally asked this again, with a somewhat typical result.

I strongly doubt that such hypothetical poll questions are useful at all.
Aside from that, translations often change the actual meaning and most likely interpretation of a question very much, so you need to know the actual question and know the language to actually understand what was asked. I inquired the pollsters from earlier such polls for the German wording of the question, and none ever replied - so I won't give them the benefit of a link.

'Some people' simply LOVE  such poll results, for they fit to their prejudices, and then many of them go on fantasizing further. I won't honour this with any links either.

Instead, let's look at how the political mobilization for war actually looks like historically and likely also in the future.
In modern times an important step was to kill the idea that war is avoidable. An aggression by another power makes this obvious (reducing the question to whether to participate). Aggressors need to use different devices; typically a great urgency is suggested (such as Blair's lie about "45 minutes" threat by Saddam's non-existing missiles), or poor defenceless people about to be massacred (Kosovo, Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine, and the story about Yezidis on a hill encircled by ISIS eerily sounded like a failed try, though it was partially true).

Another important step is the endorsement of war. Trusted figures - politicians*, journalists* - support going to war or abstain but favour it (by the choice of topics, guests and narratives for political discussions, for example). This would happen before almost any war, but is absent in advance of any poll about political resolve to defend the alliance.

And then there's the general manufacturing of consent**, a kind of crowd-sourced subconscious propaganda effort by political parties and the press that favours a certain narrative to the degree of eliminating dissenting ones from almost all public discussions.
I must admit that Putin somewhat undermined the manufactured consent of the West by somehow attracting at least many far right folks as a kind of hero of theirs, establishing a channel for a Russia-favouring dissenting narrative. Sadly, they've so far never been more fair than the establishment one and the establishment narrative would almost certainly prevail in the foreseeable future.

Last but not least, we don't have plebiscites for the decision to go to war. Almost any German government would agree*** to article 5 proclamation and initiate V-Fall / Verteidigungsfall (state of war) without hesitation if the alliance defence criteria were objectively met by an aggression. There may be some salami tactics-style minor border incident that would not trigger such a maximum response, but most likely it would lead to a Spannungsfall (military mobilisation).
There's no realistic option for a German government to limit participation in collective defence to token, symbolic contributions even if it wanted to: Many German military forces are under NATO command and would not be directed to deploy by the German minister of defence or chancellor, but by the CO of SHAPE once there's an aggression.

And yes, we'd ignore much red tape if there's an actual war. We'd have to.

Thus in short: Nobody is 'ever going to gain my respect' for his or her 'quality of thought' by proclaiming that Germans would not defend NATO.****

_ _ _ _ _

And now a special message to Americans: It's disrespectful to question German resolve to defend the alliance in the event of an actual aggression against it. After all, we agreed to the article 5 activation and participated in that Afghanistan bollocks of yours because of it - in response to anything but an actual aggression against the alliance. The Baltic countries and Poland may discuss this topic, but you Americans better join the waiting queue on this topic at the very end!

S O

*: Probably "trusted" less than ever before, so maybe this isn't all that applicable to near-future conflicts any more). 
**: I introduced this term 'manufactured consent' only recently on this blog, but I've actually read the book more than a decade ago already. I added this line of argument to the blogging because revisiting the old meta topics became somewhat stale. 
***: Anything else is unthinkable in the German political landscape that saw even the greens agree to the Kosovo war. We can revisit this diagnosis once there's a PDS Die Linke-only administration (that's never going to happen unless the Soviet Union reappears and overran us).
****: It's different with EU members that are no NATO members; hardly anyone perceives the EU as an alliance even though it's one. The media would probably hurry up to put the spotlight on this in the event of an aggression.
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2016/05/04

Breakpoints in land battles

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A comment by kesler12 asked me to provide some support for my claim that in actual battle units usually break after losing a minority of their strength (the context was that simulated combat where men do not fear for their lives tends to have much higher casualty rates and much more resolute defences).

I couldn't find the original summarising article or report that I would have preferred to supply and I sure won't even try to assemble the dozens if not hundreds of separate tiny bits that form the general picture, but I did find an old study with a statistic analysis that seems relevant:

Robert L. Helmbold, RAND Corporation, 1971

He tried in typical (then still new) operational research style to develop a formula for calculating when a force would 'break' and retreat. His hypotheses had to be tested, and he used a database of 1080 historical battles, and the author produced these diagrams:

As you can see, the winning defenders suffered up to 20% casualties in about 90% of the battles and 20-25% casualties in another about 5% of the battles. Meanwhile, the attacks - which faltered obviously - suffered less than 40% casualties in more than 90% of the battles.

Next, the same from 612 battles won by the attackers. Again, about 90% of the losing defenders suffered "only" up to about 40% casualties.Keep in mind that it's a rule of thumb that usually more casualties occur during pursuit than before the defence broke!


These were historical battles, many of which were rather unlike modern combat engagements, but human nature largely stays the same, I suppose. Either way, the results are so very striking in support of the assumption that defending forces yield after suffering less than 50% casualties that this should be accepted as true IMO.

What I remember from the old summarising article that I keep not finding (I suspect it's in Infantry Magazine 1990's, Armor magazine 1980's or 1990's or in Military Review somewhere, or maybe it's some RAND report.) is:
Many defences break after 10-20% casualties over a time span of hours or days. The most resolute "stubborn" defending forces suffered up to 40% casualties before retiring.
Other sources support more assumptions:
Only encircled forces or forces that couldn't flee (such as Japanese island defenders) went to 80% casualties and beyond without routing. Attacks stall after similar (lower) casualty rates as defences break, and they stall the earlier the more "veteran" and less "youthful" the units are. "Veteran" units tend to be more stubborn (less fragile) defenders (and less vigorous attackers), and so are forces with a higher share of married men (who tend to be less prone to give up).

S O
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"The Giant Al Qaeda Defeat That No One’s Talking About"

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"Something significant and positive just happened in the Middle East, and most Americans are not aware of it. The United Arab Emirates, under the banner of a Saudi-led coalition, late last month delivered a major blow to the most lethal Al Qaeda group on the planet—Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the primary Islamic extremist group operating in Yemen."

By Michael Morel, Politico

Take it with a grain of salt considering who wrote it. Still, it's an example of some rarely respected military forces doing something effectively that Western forces didn't. Another example is Kenya's intervention in Somalia. Essentially every time we expect some military force to only embarrass itself we're setting ourselves up for a surprise.

A big part of the difference between how we perceive the actions of Western high budget forces and non-Western forces derives from the difference in reporting about such actions. The press often easily accepted and disseminates the narrative of events as conveyed by Western forces (in which they naturally look successful and effective), while being much less cooperative with rather alien armed services. Sometimes, they're even outright hostile, as in 1999 when Yugoslavian security forces were very successful in tracking down and destroying armed insurgent groups after their attacks and the bodies were presented to the West not as Yugoslavian military success, but as massacres committed against civilians.

There's a supposedly ultra-left documentary and book by Noam Chomsky, "Manufacturing consent". It's supposedly ultra-left because it uses evidence from the Reagan era (when the Reagan administration's actions were considered as being right wing actions) as examples for how the media reports with bias (not necessarily due to a conspiracy) and thus 'manufactures' consent with the own government's actions even when an unbiased view would not do so at all. I read the book and have to say that over the last decades it proved to be much more applicable than expected, and is rarely disproved by anecdotes. The described bias appears to be largely and typically effective.
We should thus guard us against such a systemic bias when forming our conceptions, our understanding of the world. This includes our appraisal of military / defence policy.

A ministry of defence official who paints Russia as a threat that we'll need to raise several thousand additional troops against merely does his job and follows his bureaucracy's self-interest in more attention, more funds, more personnel et cetera.
We cannot expect the mainstream press to look up the IISS book (or this blog) and look at the real world ratio of military strengths and the finer issues of timelines of forces' arrivals  in the event of a conflict. Most of them will simply repeat, disseminate the claim as news, usually without even only offering the view of the Russian MoD as a counter.
Likewise, the Russian ministry of defence has the free choice of whether it wants to paint itself as the powerful defender of the motherland who nevertheless should grow in order to restore Russian glory (which would serve the desire for prestige and respect in addition to attention, funds, size) or to paint itself as in dire need of more men resources (implying weakness and coincidentally being accurate). Their press will prefer to follow their line, not NATO's - and this doesn't even require a control of the press by Putin's cronies. It's simply what the press tends to do. It's in its nature.

This, by the way, is one reason why one should pay attention to non-mainstream sources. Yet keep in mind that non-mainstream and 'crazy' often are terribly close to each other, often even overlapping.


S O
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2016/05/03

Bundeswehr personnel strength

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I remember, back in the 90's I claimed to friends that the Bundeswehr could safely reduce to 200,000 personnel and we would be just as safe as we were with about 300,000. Some ridiculed me, which I never fully understood.
Later on, we were at about 250,000 and I claimed that we could make do without conscription and go down to 150,000 ... same result.

Conscription hasn't been active since 2011 and we're at 177,000 personnel now and still perfectly safe. In fact, just about every serving insider I spoke to during the last years confirmed that most likely we could get rid of thousands of personnel (mostly officers) in high level staffs and would be strengthened by such a move, so most likely we could make do with 170,000 without even losing any power.

Personnel strength  of the Bundeswehr 1959-2010
This is the only diagram I found about the development of the personnel strength. keep in mind that 1/4 of Germany was fielding a second military until 1990 and the quantity of civilians employed by the ministry of defence has shrunk as well. Outsourcing on the other hand has grown. Personnel strengths have dropped post-2010 due to the end of conscription.

Do I advocate a smaller Bundeswehr?
Well, I see very little actual defence value in the German navy, for sure! I suppose the navy could be reduced by about 1/5th, with about 1/4th of the ships in mothball rotation. This way we would have three crews for each four ships, with a 4th crew consisting of reserves, to be ready for action within a few months. Knowing the Bundeswehr, the biggest risk of this would be that the 4th unit would likely be cannibalised for spare parts and thus impossible to reactivate quickly. On the other hand, there's hardly any serious opportunity to claim that NATO needs the German navy for maritime superiority about even the rest of the world. A cut of naval strength across the board, across NATO, would be irrelevant for actual collective defence and deterrence. Navies are hardly of any relevance for the only not totally unlikely defence scenario; a defence of the Baltic members.

The German air force (about 28k personnel) has its issues, I suppose it over-emphasizes combat aircraft. That's typical of seemingly all Western air forces, since without good reason combat pilots who gather hardly any experience in leadership or administration rise through the ranks the fastest among air forces' officer corps. Air defence is atrophying (especially since the stupid slow MEADS project that cannot possibly be cost-efficient at the planned quantities) and a second strike leg in form of guided ballistic missiles isn't even only under development. Instead, overpriced air-launched cruise missile missions get crammed into the scarce aircraft sorties, with a questionable focus on the destruction of stationary hard targets. So I wouldn't say that the German air force should have less personnel, but sure it should have different priorities.

Finally, the army (I will omit the Streitkräftebasis, the support armed service, for want of knowledge about it. Seriously, it's quite a blind spot of mine especially since I left service before it was established).
I suppose we're doing the army business completely wrong, and current developments aren't pointing the right way either. I'm convinced that as a NATO and EU member not at the (relevant) frontier, but very close to it, we should have an army that can deploy quickly (days) and in force by road march. It should also be able to double its strength within less than two years. It's primitive and stupid to ask us to forward deploy forces into the Baltic countries. That's what people who repeat formulas instead of thinking themselves ask(ed) us to do, and the same kind of people agreed to it. We're by geography the country that should focus on quick deployment by road, not by deployment by air, not predeployment, not deployment by sea, not deployment by rail.
Well, how much personnel would one fine army corps require?
There used to be the term of "divisional slice", that is the army strength divided by the quantity of its full active division (or equivalents thereof). The divisional slice used to be at 50,000 personnel for personnel-inefficient forces, and rather 40,000 with complex and more well-run ones. Sadly, this is utterly useless in this case, for even if I assumed a two-division corps strength I could simply not tell how large the army should be since so many of the support troops who used to be part of a such a divisional slice are now in the Streitkräftebasis. I can't tell how big a portion of the latter serves the army. I can only guess that a two-division equivalent army corps (enough to take on about half of the Russian army in Europe) would produce an estimate of 80,000-90,000 army personnel. This might fit into a 150,000 personnel military considering the relatively small size of air force and navy personnel demands, but maybe it would end up at 170,000 if much of the Streitkräftebasis could be allotted to navy and air force.

On top of that I would recommend a parallel reservist force with basic (~infantry) training and junior NCO training tasks only. This could replace the basic training organisation, but would be bigger than that.
- - - - -

I think we COULD safely reduce the military power of Germany (spending, personnel strength) by much without adding any risk to German sovereignty. At the same time I don't think we SHOULD do so. Germany is a relatively rich European country, has a relatively competent military and is relatively close to the most relevant frontier for collective defence. It's only suitable from a European solidarity point of view to demand that the largest European country with such advantageous conditions does more than the bare egoistic minimum.
At the same time I have absolutely no difficulty considering substantial parts of our military spending to be wasted and irrelevant for actual (collective) defence or deterrence - especially for operations outside of Europe (including dedicated equipment for such missions), for the navy and for stupid programs like MEADS.

I've recently seen a call for a political rally against militarism. Such political views of radical anti-military sentiment and radical pacifism exist, but I don't share them. I'm a moderate pacifist - against beginning or joining wars, but fine with (collective) deterrence and self-defence.
A problem is that many people say "defense", but think "military", thus I often write "actual defence" on this blog. Another problem is that many people don't think or don't pay attention to facts and judge that we're too weak, not spending enough or not numerous enough against a particular threat - when in reality it's the opposite situation. In reality, NATO could spend much less and have much less personnel across the board and then on top of that demilitarize both North American NATO members entirely ... and Europe would still be safe, still be superior militarily to the sum of all of its neighbours. But nowadays it's not only the aggregated nominal strengths that matter, but also their timeliness. Germany is in a unique location in this regard, so this is a strong argument for air and particularly land forces that can become effective at the frontier almost as quick as the Polish ones. Again, I see no real case supporting even only the mere existence of the German navy.

related:

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2016/05/01

Russia's military spending - current developments

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"The drop in Russian state revenues has affected Russian military modernization to some extent, though the Russian government has made an effort to insulate the military from budget cuts. Although the 2015 military budget was cut by five percent mid-year, the total allocation was still 25 percent higher than [2014]’s budget. This allowed the military to continue its modernization process, conduct operations in Syria, and fulfill its training and exercise programs.
With oil prices remaining low, the military is facing a more difficult financial picture in 2016. In November, the Finance Ministry announced that the total 2016 defense budget would be largely the same as in 2015. However, last month, an additional five percent cut was announced, which will result in the first annual net decline in Russian defense spending since Vladimir Putin became president in 2000.
As a result of the deteriorating financial outlook, the fulfillment of the 2011-2020 State Armament Program is now in question. The Russian military continues to develop new designs and receive new hardware but has been forced to reduce the quantities purchased of some items and to defer some big ticket items."

hat tip to Russian Military Reform blog
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2016/04/29

Soldiers at rest

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I very well remember certain parts of my own military service. We all developed not only the ability, but also the habit of a super-quick nap whenever the opportunity arose. Two minutes time to sit at a table? Nap. Other guy left the car, went into the building to use the photocopy machine? Nap in the car. At the restroom in a stall? Nap.
That was during the times when there was a lot of stress, mostly when one was being trained, particularly during basic training.

The normal service as the opposite of stressful. Once I messed up my calendar and was on unauthorised leave - and nobody even noticed (my unit was way overstaffed at that time and personnel affairs was a mess).

On other days I simply enjoyed the warmth of the sun and watched the scenery, kind of in a picnic mood. Serving as a soldier means in most jobs and most months to be bored most of the time. Even the supposedly overworked guys made sure they had their extra breaks.

Similarly, even ground combat troops on a mobile warfare campaign on a day with much movement would wait most of that time. Wait for something to happen, wait for orders, wait for moving again. Wait for hot food. Maybe they'd pull security as a picket, but that, too, would be essentially be about waiting for anything to happen. Usually a recall or relief.

Historically, even fully motorized forces aren't advancing all that quickly. 50 km/ day average for several days in a row is fast, 100 km/day average for several days in a row has yet to happen with larger forces. The actual movements may be twice as much as the distance gained, but the lesson is still that a tank's top speed of 70 kph or a lorry's top speed of ~90 kph does simply not translate into hundreds of kilometres advances or even only movements by entire brigades. Supply convoys may do this, but it's unheard of from combined arms formations.

The dominant activities of the personnel of a combined arms brigade on a campaign are thus going to be resting/waiting, sleeping, eating, personal hygiene - whereas actually moving forward in a motor vehicle may take less time than chowing on a typical day.* 

Yet field manuals and writings about military theory or doctrine appear to focus mostly on what would be done while shooting or moving. The resting that may actually be more decisive (think of security efforts, physical exhaustion, officers collapsing after four days for want of sleep) is largely being treated as an affair that NCOs would take care of. As if it's some kind of basic activity of the trade that never makes a difference.

I began to treat it differently this year, for even though you may rest or wait, this doesn't necessarily apply to the opposing forces. Survivability, security and to some degree secrecy (protection against surveillance) during resting and waiting may be more important than the synchronisation of a fix + left hook movement or similar action-focused things.

A force that dissolves during a rest won't be of use when there's an opportunity for action. This goes beyond a call for proper security efforts. It's about paying attention to the phases of relative inactivity as abut as important as the actions. Navies have the "fleet in being" idea. That's the idea that a fleet in a harbour, ready to cruise and offer battle, still has a huge effect on the opposing forces despite its inaction. It forces them to deploy forces as a counter and it restricts their freedom of action because many actions would be too risky in face of that ready-to-hit-you "fleet in being". 
I know of no equivalent term in land warfare theory or field manuals. There's no "brigade in being", the closest thing is a QRF (quick reaction force), but that's rather a fashionable term for "reserves". Reserves were once the centrepiece of land warfare art; they decisions where to keep, when to employ and when to disengage with reserves was most important, and to fix (keep busy) all opposing forces' reserves while still having considerable reserves ready for offensive action was considered THE decisive thing in battles.
I'm under the impression that this withered away during the Cold War, since the very wide frontages of the 25-26 divisions of NATO along the roughly 1,000 km wide Central European front(ier) seemingly allowed for no substantial reserves. Moreover, reserves are fractions of the total force ordered to wait, not the supposedly "busy" forces who are still waiting and resting most of the day. So there's a difference to what I was writing about above.

The recent blog post on the 'ink blot' approach to campaigning in conventional warfare was focused on this issue of entire battalion battlegroups doing nothing, and HOW and WHERE to do nothing. The WHY is about sustainability; neither troops nor material would allow for constant action. The idea was to not simply rest anywhere, but in chosen, specifically suitable places. Preferably with a useful spacing, uninterrupted radio comms, suitable choices of routes for evasive or aggressive marches and most importantly; some degree of protection against long range fires and aggressive small forces. Preferably, the location should be secured against surprise raids with little effort, allowing a rather large share of the troops to rest, restock, maintain and repair instead of trying to protect themselves against terrible surprises.

I understand that many people - including readers - think differently and focus on the "action" part. Yet judging by time, the "action" part is a tiny share of a campaign. Soldiers don't shoot about 99.99% of the time, and don't move about 80-90% of the time during a conventional war campaign.


S O

*: Though depending on the stress level, soldiers may also develop a habit of speed-eating. My record was a full meal worth of 20 minutes in four minutes. Medical doctors would probably not approve.
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