DM 121 purchase / modern artillery

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I read today in military journals about a purchase of artillery munitions for the German Heer.
Specifically: 30,000 DM 121 155mm shells (don't know whether with or without fuzes) at a total price of € 63 million. Ammo isn't cheap, and probably never was.
The DM121 is a modern HE shell as its explosive is insensitive (it's hard to produce a secondary explosion by shooting at it).

Well, there's a special context for me - I read just yesterday in an interesting book about the Germany infantry in WW2. It has a chapter about the artillery regiments of the infantry divisions.
There's also a collection of battle summaries in it that show the severity of the battles.

LIV. Armeekorps, Ostfeldzug, Südabschnitt, Angriff gegen die sowjetische Festung Sewastopol, Mai 1942:
Der Artillerieverschuß des Korps mit seinen 5 Infanteriedivisionen betrug in fünf Tagen über 700 000 Granaten, dabei verschoß z.B. das Art.Rgt. 22 der 22. Infanteriedivision 100 000 Granaten.

(Battle for Sevastopol May 1942: A single corps of 5 infantry divisions fired 700,000 shells (mostly calibre 75-150 mm) in five days.)

Such a modern shell as DM121 is significantly more effective than a WW2 150mm shell and the accuracy/dispersion is improved over WW2 standards as well. The battle of Sevastopol saw an unusual artillery concentration with many additional artillery units attached to the corps.

On the other hand; it's a constant of war that the lethality of new or improved weapons and ammunition is very much overestimated in peacetime and many shells weren't used for killing at Sevastopol.

Artillery (let's focus on HE shells like DM 121) has more tasks (or had - and was capable of fulfilling them) than killing.
Artillery can cut field telephone wires, distract, suppress, block movements and sometimes it's being fired into staging areas, often based on guesses or incomplete intelligence.
Such bombardments of staging areas often did more harm and caused more losses to the Red Army than the defensive fires during its later assault.
It's an underestimated part of artillery's value in WW2 - and it's an area effect attack that doesn't benefit much of improved accuracy and dispersion.

It's not all gold that shines; our artillery saw many great improvements, but we also lost some once-important capabilities, especially those that require large quantities of personnel and material (in the own and sometimes even in the opposing force).

S O

Edit: I forgot to mention statistics. The German production of 150 mm shells in 1943 was 7.546 million shells. 30,000 shells as in the nowadays newsworthy contract equaled one and a half day's production of 1943.
150 mm wasn't the standard calibre as 155 mm is today, though. 29.4 million 105 mm shells were produced for the Wehrmacht in the same year. We can add to this about three million shells for other calibres ranging from 105 mm (cannon) to 210 mm.
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Modern sonar technology and possible consequences

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The history of sonar began as the searched for a technological solution for the submarine detection problem during the First World War.
The principle was simply; create a sound and listen technically to the echo caused by the submarine. That was a basic sonar and proved to be adequate till late in WW2.


The Germans (and to some degree the Japanese) had developed several countermeasures to active sonar, the most spectacular being a high underwater speed that rendered classic anti-submarine warfare (ASW) methods of escorts ineffective. Acoustic absorbing coating (made of synthetic rubber) was also developed and a spectacular success in tests, but wasn't durable enough and defects of the coating created problematic noises.

The immediate post-WW2 period saw the modernization of old submarines to emulate the German and Japanese high-speed submarines and the build-up of a huge Russian submarine fleet.

The response was the switch to passive sonars that detected and tracked submarines by mere listening; active sonar was primarily used for range finding.

This approach was also effective against the noisy nuclear-driven submarines. No matter what many Americans claim, even late Los Angeles SSN are apparently louder than contemporary good non-nuclear submarines (SSK).
The used of variable depth sonar arrays (towed sonars that can drop below problematic ocean layers) was also pioneered during the Cold War.
Really modern SSK were very dangerous and not really under control of ASW technology, but they were a side show next to the nuclear-driven doomsday machines (SSBN) and their escorts and hunters (SSN).

The elimination of noises on board of submarines made them so silent that passive detection became unlikely before the submarine opened fire with its torpedoes. That applies especially to SSK and the relatively noisy coastal waters that were quite much ignored by the high seas-focused SSN/SSBN community during the Cold War.
Modern SSK further reduce their vulnerability and enhance their ability to hide by becoming air-independent with Stirling engine or fuel cell-based air-independent propulsion (AIP).


Active sonar had to make a comeback, but not in its old form.

Acoustic absorbing materials now reliably reduce the echo on submarines similar to radar-absorbing materials reducing the radar echo of stealth planes. The shaping of submarines was also altered, to reduce the direct echo by reflecting the acoustic energy into another direction than its origin (this was limited to relatively minor shape changes, though).

The acoustic absorbing coating isn't very effective at frequencies lower than 2.5 kHz, though - and thus such low frequency active sonars were installed - on the German Typ 123 frigates (LFTAS), for example.

This principle still has drawbacks; it exploits only a tiny fraction of the reflected acoustic energy and it gives away the position of the active sonar.
An ASW ship with such a sonar likely doesn't need to be silent; it's giving away its bearing anyway.
Low frequencies also place large requirements on emitter and receiver size as far as I know. The tiny helicopter-based sensors (dipping sonar - see photo, and even smaller sonobuoys) may become less relevant in the future (and therefore the whole concept of helicopters as hunter-killers in ASW).


Another approach seems to be smarter: Bi-static / multi-static sonars.
This is a combination of one or more emitters and one or more receivers - there's not just a single emitter and receiver, though.
This requires a lot of processing power and good algorithms - no insurmountable problem any more.


Multi-static sonars are auspicious because the high-value ships don't need to emit acoustic energy and because there's even no 180° reflection necessary.

Let's think about this a bit. Multi-static sonars place an emphasis on quantity and benefit by radio communication (triangulation).
That sounds to me as if the age of the large ASW ships (FFG/DDG) is probably over. It's just another hint that a cooperating swarm of small units may be more advisable.

The full exploitation of this technology requires medium bandwidth communication, a feature that's not available for submarines because water blocks all radio frequencies that can be used with such bandwidths. Submarines are relatively lone fighters, they're disadvantaged by this technology - not only because it's directed at them, but because they cannot exploit it well against their enemies.

The establishment of a multi-static sonar network by boats, ships and aviation (sonobuoys mostly) is on the other hand threatened by enemy ECM and air power.

It looks to me as if this technology enshrines the old principle that dominant sea powers prefer surface fleets while underdogs are limited to submarines because they cannot use surface fleets and air power at acceptable losses.
Submarines are still valuable for the dominant (= air superiority) power as well, though - just not so much in the focus.


Multi-static sonars may be just another nail in the coffin of the importance of large surface combattants.

Meanwhile, the cards have been mixed anew between submarines and sub hunters, and Cold War wisdom about sub hunting is in great parts already outdated - like most Cold War legacy ASW sensors.

S O

P.S.: I admit that I'm not fully informed about modern sonar tech. I may have missed essential info, but I wrote this text to show how far ASW sensors have moved away from the perception of most interested observers who tend to look at in-service systems, not so much at avant garde in-service systems and new projects.
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Tobacco smoking in the army

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There's a problem lingering for decades if not centuries, and I cannot understand why it wasn't solved yet: Smoking in the army.

1) It harms the soldier's health.
2) It reduces the lung performance and thus endurance
3) It's highly visible at night (pipes only when lighted)
4) Lighting a pipe or cigarette degrades the soldier's natural eye vision for up to 30 minutes
5) It's extremely easy to smell, much easier than sweat or differences in diet.


Front-line troops simply should not smoke. It's a deliberate degradation of their capabilities and endangers themselves and their comrades.

It should be prohibited, and this prohibition should be realized with incentives and sanctions.

These dangerous effects can even be avoided without withdrawal for the nicotine addicts; nicotine patches and chewing tobacco/smokeless tobacco (European brands don't even require much chewing, just once in a while) are effective substitutes without those dangerous side-effects.
Chewing tobacco is still a health hazard and keeping the nicotine addition still keeps the detrimental effects on concentration, but it's much better in war than smoking.

Nicotine addicts believe that nicotine enhances their concentration. That's true, but in their context.
The concentration of a nicotine addict on withdrawal is much inferior to the concentration of a nicotine addict who got nicotine recently.
The problem: Both have ceteris paribus an inferior concentration in comparison to non-addicted people. It's similar with calmness.
They're just fooling themselves.


Smoking should have been effectively banned in the army a hundred years ago. It's simply incompatible with front line competence.

Sven Ortmann
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Freedom in Germany - Part V: The reliability of the Grundgesetz

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The Grundgesetz is the constitution of Germany. It enshrines our protection rights and the basic assignment of tasks and power in our state. Respect for it is essential, or else these rights become weak.

The Grundgesetz also limits the employment of our military in Germany. There was a scandal late in the imperial period where military units assumed some powers and bullied civilians in Elsaß-Lothringen. This was a lesson that showed the necessity of limiting the actions of the military.

We had a long, very long debate about the (so far unsuccessful) idea of the minister of the interior that this should be changed (he's notorious for stupid ideas like that). Years went by and he didn't get what he wanted.

Then came, weeks ago, an aborted attempt to free hostages on Somali ships with a federal police special unit (GSG9). The GSG9 is still being celebrated for the hostage rescue on the airport of Mogadishu decades ago, it's a natural mission for it.

Yet, there were more and more Somali hijackers on those ships, the risk grew and the mission planning was aborted.

So what's the lesson? "Shit happens."? Not so for our republic-rearranging minister of the interior. He calls for a change of the Grundgesetz to enable the use of military special forces for such a mission.

I mean, WTF?

* The military special forces don't have magic abilities. They are at a low personnel strength. It's questionable whether they would be better.

* The KSK was founded more than ten years ago, and hostage rescue was one of its great justifications fromt he beginning. So what's about that!?

* There's already a parliamentarian mandate for the fight against pirates and the hostage rescue wouldn't even have happened on the territory of another state.

* A change of our constitution that empowers the state to use the military - for such a tiny, unimportant affair like the rag tag pirates!?

The CDU/CSU chancellor and minister of the interior (conservatives) are for this change, the other coalition party is decidedly against it. This stupid change won't happen.

The proposed change wasn't about domestic Bundeswehr powers, but it followed the pattern of Schäuble & Jung wanting more police-like powers for the military, even if only outside of Germany.

This is the proposed addition to article 87A (new paragraph 5):

Außerhalb des Hoheitsgebiets der Bundesrepublik Deutschland dürfen die Streitkräfte nach den Regeln des Völkerrechts, auch zur Unterstützung der zuständigen Bundesbehörden, eingesetzt werden. Das Nähere regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

(Outside or the territory of the federal republic Germany the military forces are allowed compliant with international law also to be applied in support of authorities in charge. A federal law regulates the details.)

I attempted to stick closely to the original, so forbear with the broken wording, please.

Interesting: It's a carte blanche for the use of the military, with constitutional rank - possibly allowing military actions "in support of" civilian authorities without parliamentarian mandate.

We've had many military missions that required a mandate of the parliament - and were in tandem with civilian authorities (federal police, technical services THW) - this paragaph could be used to legalize military actions without the parliament.

It's deeply disconcerting to me that we've had a minister who worked for four years primarily on dismantling protection rights against the state and enlarging the power of state authorities (mostly domestic spying, but also this Bundeswehr thing). Four years of salami attacks, tearign apart our freedom in many small steps and manipulating the perception of normality.

I expected him to be fired years ago, but he was only stopped by parliament in his plans, he wasn't discarded by the chancellor.

In fact, there's a whole pattern* of lacking respect for individual rights, belief in the good-doing of authorities and incompetence among CDU/CSU federal cabinet members.

The respect for the constitution isn't very strong either - it seems to be little more than a law that requires a larger majority to be changed to them.

That's our biggest party, the one that will likely have the most chancellors and (relative) the most ministers in the next two decades!

Deeply disconcerting.

Sven Ortmann

*: There will be eleven more examples for this in the series, all caused by CDU/CSU politicians.

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Semi-submersibles

. The German submarines of WW2 were not what people expected them to be (and what many still think they were). As someone has put it, they were no real submarines, Unterseeboote (undersea boat) yet, but mere Tauchboote (diving boats). Even the introduction of snorkels didn't change that much, as submarines at that time were still dependent on fresh air from above surface till the first nuclear-powered submarine. The Germans of WW2 turned this insufficiency of submarines of their time into a strength. Their tactic against convoys was not an underwater attack, but a surface torpedo attack - only the withdrawal was under water. This worked quite well at night when detection was possible, but the Allies spent enormous efforts on solving the problem and forced the Germans to develop some of the first SSK - high-speed submarines that were much more able to fight under water. The Japanese actually did the same with the a bit less sophisticated Sen-Taka and Sen-Taka Sho, btw. The key to the German type VII submarines' success in early WW2 design laid on the surface, though: They were able to sneak past the few escorts at nighttime thanks to a small bridge/superstructures silhouette. The detection of such a small object was very tough in 1939-1942, radars were still in their infancy. Back to the present... Latin American drug smugglers use many techniques to smuggle their freight, and one of their latest success stories are semi-submersible boats that move at the surface, but with a minimal signature above water. Just like Type VII. More here. Their success is a harsh kick of reality into the balls of those who trust sensors and modern technology. The boats should be easy to detect, but were in fact not - even today a semi-submersible could slip past the Coast Guard. Coast Guard and USN already fear that the Latin American drug smugglers could learn how to make real submarines that would be invisible to radar. So we spent decades of the Cold War preparing for all-out warfare at sea and a couple of improvised submarines in relatively confined areas would be a huge challenge? Anyway - the relevant part of this all is the low observable and low freeboard of such designs. It's risky, but could pay off in certain niche applications.

 

The minimal freeboard offers a tiny radar signature and target area to sea skimmer missiles. This design could possibly be used to build relatively missile-resistant boats. The low signature could also help to enhance their overall survivability against radar-based threats.

 

S O

Old military literature

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I had a look at old military journals recently - both in my personal collection and those archived in the internet.

The result was sobering.

1980's military literature was close to utter uselessness for today. Pretty much everything about the organizational and political domains as well as everything quantifiable was completely obsolete. Especially the planning for the German army in 2000, dated 1989, was devastatingly obsolete as early as 1990.
The end of the Cold War was indeed a time of many radical changes.

A couple of still useful articles were in 1980's journals, though. These were the articles with military history context - and they focused on military core competencies more often than not. An example was an article about Stoßtrupps (raiding patrols). That one was timeless. Much of it applied to stone age warfare as much as to today's and likely also to future infantry warfare.


1990's articles weren't much better than the 1980's articles, though. The technological foresight was either wrong or didn't reach out farther than about five or at most ten years. Again, political and organizational topics were a waste of time and paper.

Many pages were wasted on (hyping up) hardware projects that didn't yield any in-service hardware even as of today. It's sobering to see how the authors argued that this or that toy that was never bought would be absolutely indispensable as of today. On the one hand they were exaggerating or simply wrong - on the other hand they tell us about how incomplete today's equipment probably is.

And again, articles about military history and military core competencies proved to be the most worthwhile.


My conclusions are simple:

1) Truly useful articles in military-related journals are about military history and/or military core competencies (tactics mostly).

2) Articles about hardware are informing about present or near-term state of the art, but not about the medium term or long term future.

3) I possibly read the wrong journals.

Sven Ortmann
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Small Update: German federal elections 2009

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Germany's government is a coalition of its two biggest parties, but the list of their common intents seem to be exhausted.

We'll have the next federal elections on September 27th.
The election will be for parliament seats. The parliament elects the Chancellor who chooses ministers - usually based on coalition agreement between high-ranking party officials including the chancellor.

Current poll results can be seen here.

You can find my description of the German party landscape here.


I took the simple average of the poll results for a quick look at the possible outcomes, the percentages are only rough estimates, of course:

A new "Große Koalition" (great coalition, like Merkel's) with CDU/CSU and SPD would gain 65%, but as mentioned before; it's pointless. They don't want to rule together any more, it would be a waste of time.

A "Jamaika Koalition" (Jamaica coalition) with CDU/CSU, Grüne and F.D.P. would be possible with 62%, but the Grüne don't want this.

A Schwarz-Gelbe Koalition (black-yellow coalition, like Kohl's) with CDU/CSU and F.D.P. would probably be possible at 52% and is the first choice for both parties. I think that it's also the most likely version.

An Ampelkoalition (traffic lights coalition) with SPD, Grüne and F.D.P. is equally possible at 52%, but the F.D.P. isn't enthusiastic about the other two parties.
It's my personal favourite.

A Schwarz-Grüne Koalition (black-yellow coalition) with CDU/CSU and Grüne might be possible at 48%, but the CDU/CSU prefers the F.D.P. and the Grüne aren't enthusiastic about CDU/CSU (CSU in particular) anyway.

A Rot-Gelbe Koalition (red-yellow coalition, like Schmidt's) with SPD and F.D.P. is unlikely at 42%, especially as the F.D.P. would prefer a coalition with the CDU/CSU.

A Rot-Grüne Koalition (red-green coalition, like Schröder's) with SPD and Grüne is quite unlikely at 38%, but it's the first choice of both parties.

A Rot-Rote Koalition (red-red coalition) with SPD and Die Linke is utterly unrealistic because of only 38% and because the SPD and Linke are enemies since the Linke sucked up the SPD's left wing and because the Linke is the far left wing, partially descendant of the Eastern German SED socialists.



Our election system eliminates (with exceptions) votes for parties who didn't get 5% of the total vote. This means that for example a 10% result in an election can lead to 10.5% of the parliament's votes for a party. I calculated accordingly in my examples above.

The "small" parties (greens, liberals, far left) are unusually strong at this time while the social democrats are unusually weak due tot he de-facto loss of their left wing to far left and greens. I'm not informed from where the many per cents of the liberals come from; maybe in part from the conservatives. The F.D.P. is about twice as strong as usual after eleen years of opposition and quite unliberal policies.


The relevance for defence affairs is - as always - unclear.
One of the two ruling parties will continue to rule, and both are committed to the present foreign policy (CDU: chancellor, SPD: foreign minister and candidate for chancellor).


The Grüne (greens) would be an influence towards less funding for and use of the military as they claim to be pacifist, but their behaviour in the Schröder government questions this entirely.

The CDU is a bit more pro-USA than the SPD, but the difference is quite subtle (as in domestic policies as well).

Additional overseas commitments are quite unlikely with all coalition variants.


The F.D.P. would be a cornerstone for citizen rights protection, albeit its top politicians (especially its chairman) are in my opinion quite questionable - and unknown variables in governments, as they left the government with the end of Kohl's coalition eleven years ago.


The election campaign season will be during summer and it may be that a lot of proposed laws may be delayed till after the elections (I hope so).

Sven Ortmann

Close air support

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Close air support (CAS) is an inherently controversial subject since the latest phase of the Afghanistan Civil War began.

It depends on the point of view, though:

It's a great thing according to RMA fans.

It's a demonstration of our inability (to wage 3GW) for 3GW fans.

It's a (near-)criminal civilians killing thing for journalists and peace activists.

It's a necessity in face of a minimum casualties policy and lack of armour support for soldiers in theater.


My opinion: It's just a misleading experience.

Air attacks are usually coupled with ground combat; air attack based on aerial sensors alone is rather an exception and no CAS.
The ground forces usually encounter an enemy, fix him or get fixed themselves and call in an air strike to hit the enemy when their organic weapons and their ability to maneuver don't bring a decisive success. Units as small as a squad or platoon get air support or even count on it as the primary means of combat support.

This has several conditions, few of which would be given in combat against strong adversaries:
* The enemy's position is known.
* The enemy wasn't lethal enough to win before the air strike arrives.
* The enemy wasn't survivable enough to move decisively.
* The enemy can be fixed due to a lack of organic smoke capability and lack of enemy fire support.
* The enemy lacks effective battlefield air defences to prevent CAS aircraft loitering.
* The enemy lacks effective air combat capabilities to prevent CAS aircraft loitering.
* The ratio of air support to ground forces in combat looks like one combat aircraft on station per platoon in combat or better.
* Radio/satellite communications are possible, no bandwidth or jamming problem prevents communication.


The availability of air support as enjoyed by Western ground forces in small wars is an exception.
It was bought with extreme effort on part of air forces and naval aviation - especially in terms of midair-refueling. It was only possible because only few platoons are in combat at once - and the enemy isn't more than a lightly armed ragtag militia.

The German manuals for infantry clearly state that the infantry cannot expect to get artillery support and would likely be limited to their mortars as fire support. Air support is correctly being treated as exception in these manuals.


That's why I sometimes side with the 3GW people when they complain that tactical problems should be solved without much material support.
German officers had a rather despising opinion about the massive artillery support used by American and Russian divisions on the attack, as they tended to have much more limited artillery support and had still achieved much. I recall one post-WW2 opinion of a former German officer who argued against that attitude; he saw material as a substitute for blood; a favourable trade. He was certainly right, but with a caveat:

Material support can be and will be scarce in future conflicts - that's when our forces need to achieve their missions without it. We must not fall prey to the impression that the current wars with their extremely rich air support are a look into the future of high intensity conflict.

S O

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Officers fired for inaptitude

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MOSCOW, April 28 (RIA Novosti) - A large number of senior Russian military officials are to be discharged over a failure to pass an aptitude test, Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov said on Tuesday.

"We are not going to keep officers who are not fit for their positions," Gen. Pankov told journalists, as reports indicated around one-fifth of officers had failed the military aptitude test.

"The Defense Ministry took a decision to carry out unplanned tests among officers and NCOs. A considerable number of senior officers have proved inapt and will be dismissed from the Armed Forces," he added.

Pankov said 85% of senior military officials had taken the test so far. He said 50 generals and other people occupying senior positions would be dismissed from the Armed Forces. He also said 133 officials would be reshuffled.

This makes me recall tips like "An organization should change by at least 10% every year." or "An organization should fire the 10% worst performing employees every year." or a study result that was if I remember correctly like "7% of the personnel in an organization can block 79% of the most necessary reforms.".

The Russians have - like many other modern forces - a badly top-heavy force structure. Armies with more general officers than combat battalions and navies with more admirals than ships are normal - not an exception - in NATO. These firings are apparently part of a planned downsizing that happens in great part among the officer ranks.

This reform shows a political willingness to reform the Russian Army. It does also show a willingness to fire high-ranking officers.

That's something that I missed when for example several German soldiers died in Afghanistan in a bus. A bus! A BUS!
I would have fired just about everyone 2nd lieutenant upwards who did neither prevent nor report/protest (but knew about) the madness of using a soft bus on predictable routes in a war zone. In fact, I think I would have fired everyone involved from Uffz upwards. That's the lowest NCO rank.

Firing officers for competence should be the most distinguished activity of political oversight over the army. You cannot hope that an organization corrects all of its own faults itself.

The U.S.Army's leadership fired (or relieved of command) about 500 officers ranked colonel or higher in WW2 (especially early in WW2) for incompetence as far as I know.


We should more often revert to the tool of firing leaders for incompetence. It might cure many problems. It's worth a try.

S O

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Irritating media coverage

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It's quite irritating about what our media reports.

The Sri Lankan government decided to launch a final offensive against the breakaway Tamil country in the north and its military advances for months. Finally, an end to this quarter century-long Sri Lankan Civil War is in sight.
What do many reporters do? Call for a ceasefire because civilians are trapped (actually kept hostage by the Tamil Tigers, as it seems).
Germans have a saying: "Besser ein Ende mit Schrecken als ein Schrecken ohne Ende." (Better end with terror than terror without end.)



A Narco war is raging in a Mexican city and journalists from the Western world descend on Mexico City (because, after all, the city with all that killing is way too dangerous as a permanent base for the journalists). One of many influenza virus appears in Mexico City (actually having begun in September 2008) and what happens?
Many reporters in that place, so a mediocre event becomes a global scare.
Seriously nuts.



The government of Pakistan attempts appeasement with the Taliban, fails, decides to act militarily in SWAT valley (as was demanded by the West since the initial appeasement).
Our reporters can of course not report from SWAT valley (hey, even a Pakistani journalist was killed there, so ours certainly don't go there!).
What do they see? Troops moving in at truck speed (so not that much visible) and civilians fleeing at walking pace (actually the most normal thing in warfare ever).
News: Civilians are suffering, fleeing, terrible, human tragedy...blabla.
Of course are humans suffering. It's about violence. There's no way to get rid of the problem but violence. The Pakistani government really tried, but non-violent methods failed.
So reporters, STFU about side effects and stop delivering badly distorted news! We want to know whether the Pakistani army succeeds in combat!



I'm none of those who generally bash the media, especially not about bias. The "bias" that many see in certain media outlets is defined by the relative position of the media to the observer; the same source can feel like being too far left, balanced or too far right - depending on the position of the observer.

Certain other media defects are apparent, though. The news filtering performance seems to be unacceptable. Our societies should develop means to correct this in order to get better news.

Maybe the end of centralized news filtering has come anyway, though. The internet allows everyone to filter himself - maybe that's the fix for the problem that's so badly needed. A decentralized, partially international news provider. It's no wonder that the newspaper business is in decline in many countries.

One problem remains with the internet, though: How to finance investigative journalism that cannot be replaced by intrinsically interested and unfunded people writing blogs and homepages?


The really, really sad thing in this is that our democracy rests on information for every voter. We need information and we need the information-providing agents (media). Our democracy sucks if our media sucks. Our politics cannot be better than our media in the long term.
A good (quantitatively and qualitatively) supply of news is vital for our freedom, well-being and for our democracy.

Sven Ortmann

P.S.: I'm no right-wing "kill 'em all!" guy. In fact, I identify myself most with the German liberals (not comparable with U.S. "liberals"). BS can exceed my tolerance threshold, though.
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