Russia's potential

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Russia is the single largest non-NATO country close to Europe (and actually in large part in Europe). It's therefore naturally the first choice for anyone who wants to check on the possibility of major conventional warfare in Europe.

Russia's military is at present large, but has outdated equipment, is ill-supplied, ill-paid, has a poor reputation among its citizens (recruit abuse) and a mixed reputation in the West.

Much of this military is bound to tasks in Asia and not available as a threat to Europe, so it's reasonable to expect that European forces are at this point relatively easily able to keep it in check (not necessarily on the first few hundred kilometres, though).

Its primary strength is probably the quantity of equipment stored in depots behind the Urals and its relatively good ability to function with quickly mobilized troops. Recent news indicate that they're about to scrap a good portion of that Cold War legacy equipment, though.
Strong internal security forces (paramilitaries) add to the picture.

The present (rumoured) nominal military spending of Russia is in the same league as that of the UK, France and the PR China, albeit with PPP advantages over the first two. Russia is unable to focus its military power in one theater due to its long Eurasian borders, though.

The potential for greater military capabilities in the future depends on many factors - politics, economy, science and engineering, fiscal health and population, for example.

Let's run a (quick & dirty) check - you won't get a better one by me for free. ;)

Politics

Russia has a pseudo-democratic, authoritarian government with dominance over regional institutions. Well, this sounds promising (for their military). Especially the ability to develop and execute long term (more than five years) political plans is relatively impressive. The ability to create really efficient long-term plans is not very impressive (because of corruption).

The past policy has demonstrated a readiness to use military force - at least on former USSR territory. It has also demonstrated a quite high degree of rationality and patience. Past domestic political competence (economic policy in the Putin era) was rather unimpressive, though.

Economy

Less than € 1.5 trillion GDP (a bit more, but not drastically more in purchasing power parity) isn't much for a country of its size and population. It's actually less than France's GDP.
Exports make up almost a quarter of the GDP, a sign of serious integration into international trade. The largest trade partners are the European and East Asian economic powers, not the former USSR states (with exception Ukraine; about 5% of exports).

The share of industrial activities is about 40% GDP, but much of this is the raw materials sector (oil, gas, mining). A well-balanced, healthy economy at a higher level of national wealth would require a very strong industrial development. This would require at least about a decade of strong growth.

Science and engineering

Russia was quite in love with scientific and technological work. They have no noteworthy anti-science or science-despising political factions (at least none that I'm aware of).
Russia had the legacy of a very strong scientific and engineering complex in the early 90's. Education and experience were robust, albeit with a serious lag in computer tech. The(ir) problem; those with good education and experience have aged by almost twenty years in the meantime. These pillars of technical and scientific competence will break away almost completely in the next two decades and most of them are likely already beyond their creativity apogee.

The small R&D activity since the 90's has furthermore driven many scientists and engineers into more 'practical' jobs. An engineer-turned-truck-driver has rarely kept himself up to date in his original trade and is very unlikely to return to his original trade anyway.
Russia's long-term competence in science and engineering is yet to be determined; it depends a lot on the budgets of its government.

Fiscal health

This points at the next point of interest; fiscal health. Here are several interesting details. The Soviet Union had a state-run economy and therefore no full-blown system of taxes. That has hurt Russia in the 90's. At one point in the 90's the CEO of Gazprom claimed that his (oil & gas) company paid half of the Russian state budget - more than the whole defence expenses.

Nevertheless, Russia was able to pay back significant loans to foreign creditors even despite huge economic troubles. That tells a bit about their ability to mobilise fiscal power if deemed necessary.

Public debt is officially at a fantastic low of about 7% GDP (Wikipedia & CIA World Factbook). This means they should easily be able to finance a stronger posture with deficit spending for many years until they would reach typical Western levels (rarely less than 40%).

The state's revenues are rather limited due to the small GDP; around € 300 billion.

Population

The population of Russia is large at about 140 million, but declining. This trend isn't irreversible, but it's an old situation that has left its demographic and economic marks.
For comparison: The population of Russia is about as large as the population of Germany plus France. Their closest ally Belarus has only as many citizens as Belgium.

The health situation of Russian males is comparably poor, apparently due to tobacco, drugs, infectious diseases (tuberculosis, HIV) and their infamous alcohol consumption. Official figures look like 12 liters pure alcohol per citizen and year, but that's apparently a manipulated statistic. A 17 litres figure slipped off Medvedev some time ago.

Traffic accidents are correspondingly a major cause of death and disability.

The statistic of only about 61 1/2 years life expectancy for males (and about 74 for females) is credible, and shocking.

These problems can be solved, but not in short order. On the other hand, the Soviet Union fought WW2 with strong personnel resources even though famine, alcohol and state terror had badly hurt the population in the inter-war years.

Manpower available for military service (age 16-49):
36.2 million males, 37 million females

Manpower fit for military service:
21.1 million males, 28 million females

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:
0.74 million males, 0.71 million females
(rounded, CIA World Factbook)

There's plenty manpower for military service, but the situation is rather poor from a workforce point of view.

- - - - -

Russia seems to have the ingredients for a quite prosperous future, including the groundwork for education, science and engineering and lots of natural resources. Its population is large, but not overwhelmingly large.
The next two decades (especially the next one) will be very important for its further development and standing. Seriously; they cannot afford the waste of resources that a major war would cause.
I personally hope that Western diplomats and governments have figured out Putin's long-term strategy better than the Western public has. This strategy for the nation's development (I assume he has one) will be extremely important for Russia and therefore also for Europe.
I think he neglected the industrial development in the past, with too much nepotism and emphasis on a strong state (instead of strong & healthy economy).

I do always keep in mind the historical precedent of Germany 1932-1939: It recovered from a terrible economic crisis and turned into a military powerhouse in just seven years. The Western powers were burdened by public debt while Germany had de-valued its WWI debt by hyper-inflation during the 20's.

Europe is really in a lucky situation. Its only credible conventional war threat is weakened for several years to come. Not entirely harmless, but badly weakened. Historical precedents point out that the picture could change in a matter of five to ten years, but the situation allows for a relaxed vigilance.

S O
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What if he told them about the terror scare?

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Eastern European NATO members

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The affection between the Eastern European governments and the U.S. government under Bush puzzled me for years. A distant power with marginal logistical links to the region (except trough Western European ports), no real history of involvement in the region, no troops in the region, few troops close to the region was assumed to be the supreme protective power?


There was a similar relationship between Western Europe and the U.S. in the Cold War - a marriage of convenience with strong advantages for both. The U.S. would have been hopeless if Western Europe had turned red, and they knew it.
What did the Eastern Europeans believe to have that could make them as important to the U.S.? Their role as supplier of auxiliary troops?

It was just as some comments in newspaper columns suggest; America brought a lot of enthusiasm, asserted leadership - and asked for real return service.

The EU on the other hand had a huge economic and fiscal relevance, and its citizens are (much) more likely than Americans to at least know where countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland are located on a globe.

The uneven, with the Obama administration even shaky security relationship seems to puzzle Eastern European foreign politicians as well; several well-known former politicians wrote an open letter to Obama about their concerns. These politicians, who were responsible for that strategy, do still stick to it.

- - - - -

The whole affair should be a wake-up call for EU leaders as well. The slumber in continental security policy was a mistake. Russia has still not officially accepted borders and sovereignty of all Eastern European NATO members. It's probably about time for the major European powers to press Putin and Medvedev on this issue beyond their breaking point.
The recognition of a neighbour's sovereignty is a requirement, even if the general intent is a good relation with win-win diplomacy.

There are some unresolved issues; problems that are nowadays quite alien to Western European powers (as for example concerns about sovereignty and integrity of your borders).

We did (for in my opinion strange reasons) invite the Baltic countries into NATO. Now we're stuck with them. We cannot kick them, we must not neglect them - the only way out of our responsibility would be to leave NATO ourselves (and have an alternative alliance).
So far all members want to stick with NATO, so let's do it for real.

- - - - -

The Eastern European nations are to blame as well. They should stop daydreaming and get serious.

The U.S. is likely not seriously interested in their defence, but in exploiting them to divide the EU and in their ability to supply auxiliary troops and U.N. votes.

Eastern European efforts in national defence (about 1.2% to 2 % GDP in the past years) had a very different tune than their public concerns about Russia. Those expenses are more comparable to Germany's military expenditures, but unlike them we have some R&D expenditures and relevant infrastructure investments outside of our defence budget and we're no frontier nation with huge concerns about a possible invader.

The downsizing of for example the Polish military and a partial 'transformation' of Eastern European armies towards auxiliary troops deployments to places that are entirely irrelevant to their national security does not sound like a robust defence policy to me.

Their relative disregard for the Western Europeans in defence policy is also a poor move if they want to increase Western European commitment. Being disregarded doesn't exactly motivate to increase your engagement if you've got plenty other topics for your distraction.

The continental European powers have a much better ability to help quickly and to actually stall an invasion. Their geo-strategic location is incomparably better than the American one. The American ability to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe would amount to almost nothing if Germany decided to go seriously neutral, for example.


Many experts discuss Afghanistan as if it was a litmus test for NATO, a decisive test. That's B.S..

The Eastern European sovereignty issues have the potential to create a real test for NATO (and the EU). That's not in-fashion, of course. It's not about rag-tag militias in distant places or fashionable counterinsurgency theory. It's about the original, real purpose of NATO, and that 's what the most aggressive NATO members have been worst at since the end of the Cold War.

S O

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Is air power the ultimate power in war?

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This was an old draft, prepared months ago. It's not fully satisfactory (not the least because there's really no statistic significance available for a single variable analysis). I decided to post it nevertheless because I'm too busy and too often away for regular posting these days.

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I've often read and heart the assertion (cliché?) that the decisive factor in war is air power. That's apparently one of those phrases that are not meant to provoke thought, but to channel it.

Some even insist that war can only be won with air dominance a.k.a. supremacy.

This is in my opinion wrong, and it's serious. It can lead to potentially excessive expenditures on air power and an underestimation of those adversaries who lack serious air power.

Let's look at historical examples.

I prefer to look at the post-1930 period (air "power" had little power till the 30's) and to ignore civil wars without (in this case relevant) foreign involvement.

I came up with a list of 37 major wars and categorized them. You can find the table here.

13 wars met the cliché:
The side with air superiority won the conflict (and air power was noteworthy).
1936 Second Italo-Abyssinian War
1936-1939 Spanish Civil War
1939-1945 World War II
1941 Anglo-Iraqi War
1941-1944 Continuation War
1967 Six-Day-War
1971 Indo-Pakistani War
1973 Yom Kippur War

1982 Falklands War (the Argentinians inflicted much air attack damage, British air superiority was probably just an air combat superiority)

1982 Lebanon War (I counted this as Israeli victory despite the mixed success of the later occupation)
1989-1990 U.S. invasion of Panama
1990-1991 Gulf War
1998-1999 Kosovo War

Three major wars were won/lost since 1930 without any party enjoying air superiority:

1932-1935 Chaco War
1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War

Eight major wars were lost by the power that enjoyed air superiority:

1937-1945 Second Sino-Japanese War

1939 Soviet-Japanese Border War (Japanese air superiority was probably limited to air combat superiority)

1939-1940 Winter War (I count this as a Soviet defeat)
1954-1962 Algerian War of Independence
1959-1979 Vietnam War
1964-1979 Rhodesian Bush War (much more than a civil war)
1965-1989 South African Border War
1979-1989 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

There are of course several excuses possible; Winter War - Soviets were weakened by purges/winter/poor tactics, Vietnam War: jungle/hippies, Afghanistan: Soviets were crumbling anyway/Stinger ...

These excuses can easily be met by another criterion: Was the conflict lopsided or not?

I marked the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, Winter War, Vietnam War, Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Israeli invasion of Lebanon, U.S. Invasion of Panama, Gulf War and Kosovo War as lopsided in favour of the side that enjoyed air superiority. Interestingly, even in this group it's only 6:3 for 'air power wins'.

Let's ignore the lopsided conflicts (the U.S. invasion of Panama cannot really tell us about decisiveness of air power, after all) for a while. The balance is then six wins for the aerially superior parties and a whopping five defeats.

I also looked at whether the opponents were well-equipped (at least relatively). "Fair" wars (not lopsided and not full-blown forces vs. militia) looked like five wins for the side that gained air superiority and two defeats.

The conflict between most comparable forces in the list was likely the 1939 Soviet-Japanese Border War: The Russian tank/motorization superiority defeated the Japanese air superiority. The Japanese air superiority in this case is disputable anyway, as it was probably limited to a better air combat kill ratio.

- - - - -

Let's sum up:

Air power can be decisive and it's worth its expenses - up to a point. It is possible to win a war without air superiority and even against it.

History tells us that spending much on air power when fighting an enemy who does not fight alike is quite often a path to defeat than to victory.

Several successful air power exploitations have occurred over relatively simple terrain that gave little concealment to ground forces.

Air combat superiority needs to be exploited to achieve an air attack superiority to counter enemy strengths.

Lopsided conflicts and conflict over terrain that favours air/ground attacks have probably many mislead in the West about the utility of air power.

The Kosovo air war reminded us of the relevance of camouflage/concealment/deception against the effects of air superiority.

Air superiority failed most often when even boots on the ground (and in the house of the enemy) didn't suffice.


The ultimate power in warfare is in my opinion willpower, not air power.

S O

P.S.:
It seems impossible to get a unquestionable compilation of wars for this purpose. It's possible to dispute "major", win/lost/draw", whether air power was relevant, whether air superiority was achieved and held and so on.
Feel free to reserve scepticism, but at least one thing should be obvious by these samples: Wars can be won without air superiority/supremacy/dominance, even against it. Many have focused too much on WW2 and the wars in the Arab World.

I did use the common meaning of "win"/"lose" in this mini survey.
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About armoured reconnaissance and cavalry

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Post-WW2 armies had much less divisions than we were used to in both World Wars, but the world didn't shrink geographically.

This would create very unstable, fluid situations in conventional land warfare. Conventional land war would in many scenarios look a lot like the exploitation phases of mobile warfare in WW2. It's quite impossible (and not intended) to build promising defensive lines nowadays (with few exceptions). The battles would look similar to those episodes of historic land battles that happened after the dissolution of defensive lines or after the capture of fortresses.
The similarities would have their limits, but the low personnel density, high technical mobility of modern land war made the lessons from the past about mobile warfare especially interesting to me.

I began looking more closely into armoured reconnaissance ops of WW2 last year and got a satisfactory picture of this in the meantime. The German armoured reconnaissance history was most easily accessible because it saw much more action than British and American armoured reconnaissance.


The Spähaufklärung (small scouting teams; 2-3 armoured reconnaissance vehicles) has been very important and it was especially effective in France due to specific operational conditions and the road infrastructure. Spähaufklärung is - despite the modern electronic means of reconnaissance - still important in the German army (Heer).

This probing, looking and reporting wasn't the whole business, though. Armoured reconnaissance on the Eastern Front was much more, and it was very interesting.
The operation of a Panzeraufklärungs-Bataillon (armoured reconnaissance battalion) in the offence (as part of an armoured division that's always supposed to attack, march or rest) on the Eastern Front often had distinct phases with a significant share of combat.

Phase 0:
The battalion waits in the division's marshalling area, ready to exploit a breakthrough. The battalion receives and distributes existing intelligence about the enemy and area (aerial photography, prisoner interrogation reports, agent reports, maps).

Phase 1:The battalion receives its orders and its CO orders few Panzerspähtrupps (2 or 3 light AFV with long-range radio) forward.

Phase 2:Additional Panzerspähtrupps are being sent towards the reconnaissance Schwerpunkt to increase the scouting density.
The combat troops (early on often a motorcycle infantry battalion assigned to support the reconnaissance battalion) move behind the Panzerspähtrupps towards the reconnaissance Schwerpunkt.
Some Panzerspähtrupps are being recalled and possibly sent forward towards the Schwerpunkt as well.

Phase 3:
Panzeraufklärungs-Kompanien (armoured reconnaissance companies) advance and fight to ensure the reconnaissance success and to overwhelm enemy forces when they're not ready to fight to prevent the establishment of effective defences.

The enemy finally establishes new effective defensive positions.

The Panzerspähtrupps are being recalled and assembled for further action.

The Kampfgruppen(combined arms combat teams) of the armoured division are advancing into marshalling areas in front of the enemy defensive positions.

Phase 4:
The armoured division breaks through the enemy's hasty defence positions and advances.
The armoured reconnaissance battalion is usually kept out of this fight and ready to begin anew (Phase 4 = Phase 0).

The interesting thing about this is the combat element; the armoured reconnaissance battalion exploited its agility (short column), speed (motorised) and off-road capability (half-tracks) to meet the enemy when and where he wasn't combat ready. Hours and even minutes were often tactically decisive in that war. A battalion that sabotaged the establishment of a defensive line before the main force arrived was obviously invaluable.

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Let's look at quotes from FM 17-95 "Cavalry Operations" (U.S.Army, late 1996):

The fundamental purpose of cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and to provide security in close operations. In doing so, cavalry facilitates the corps or division commander’s ability to maneuver divisions, brigades, and battalions and to concentrate superior combat power and apply it against the enemy at the decisive time and point. Cavalry clarifies, in part, the fog of battle.

Cavalry is, by its role, an economy of force. The flexible capabilities of cavalry allow the commander to conserve the combat power of divisions or brigades for engagement where he desires. The combat power of cavalry units, in particular, makes them ideal for offensive and defensive missions as an economy of force.

The ACR performs a variety of offensive operations in support of the
corps scheme of maneuver. The primary missions of the regiment are reconnaissance and
security operations. During these missions, especially offensive cover, the regiment
may perform movement to contact and hasty attacks to destroy enemy reconnaissance, security, and main body forces.

There's much to criticise in that FM, but it has interesting aspects.
The 1990's ACR was a force meant as a kind of advance guard, rear guard or off-Schwerpunkt force for its corps. It did clearly lay out armoured reconnaissance forces (with helicopters) that were distinct from the main battle forces and capable of independent combat operations.

The French did also appreciate the need for combat capability in armoured reconnaissance units; most of their post-WW2 reconnaissance AFVs had serious guns (76-105mm) with the more recent VBL being an exception (it's a kind of budget vehicle that also lacks powerful sensors).

- - - - -

This combat element isn't organic to modern German armoured reconnaissance units (see HDv 241/100 "Das Panzeraufklärungsbataillon" and HDv 242/100 "Die Panzeraufklärungskompanie"). Today we've got increased visual and electronic observation capabilities instead. Aufklärung durch Kampf (here translated with Reconaissance in force, albeit both are not fully identical) is an exception ("Aufklärung durch Kampf ist eine Ausnahmesituation im Rahmen der Aufklärung.")
Combat units shall be attached under special circumstances for reconnaissance in force ("In besonderen Lagen kann dem Bataillon befohlen werden, durch Kampf aufzuklären. Dazu muss das Bataillon in jedem Fall mit kampfkräftigen Teilen verstärkt werden."). This is quite contrary to the manual's assertion that opportunities for reconnaissance in force are unpredictable and short-term in nature.

German doctrinal reconnaissance in force does not take into account that the reconnaisance battalion might encounter enemy forces that are not combat ready. This opportunity for success in combat in order to help the brigade/division/corps in its mission by interfering with enemy preparations is absent.
The German armoured reconnaissance battalion doesn't have an emphasis on helicopter operations as the U.S. cavalry has. Helicopter operations are army-level operations in the Heer (there's a German helicopter-mobile division remotely similar to the 101st).

The greatest deficit of current German armoured reconnaissance doctrine is probably the lack of a counter-reconnaissance mission (and therefore no necessary emphasis on counterreconnaissance). It's fine to see the enemy, but you also want him to be blind!

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The relative emptiness of the battlefield seems to demand a strong reconnaissance element in modern armies - this has probably been neglected way too much. We know about the enormous lethality of modern arms (although the lethality of new munitions was usually overestimated in peacetime). Most NATO ground forces are confident that they could defeat opposing forces - if the odds aren't strorngly in OPFOR's favour.

The sheer capability to defeat opponents in combat isn't much in doubt. The ability to control and dominate large areas without occupying too many combat troops with non-combat missions is in doubt, though.

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I am thinking about a new balance for ground forces; a triad of support, combat and scouting units.
The scouting units would flood the area like water (bypassing powerful enemy forces, but overwhelming weak/unprepared enemy forces by a temporary concentration of several units).

Heavy reconnaissance units wouldn't need to be entire battalions - they could be even more nimble combined arms companies (anti-tank firepower, anti-infantry firepower, infantry, heavy mounted mortar, air defence missiles, short-range UAV). Such independently moving companies would be extremely difficult to track, fix and destroy. The combat power of such scouting units would make them versatile and effective in many scenarios. I think of these as combat units for employment in low force density missions.

(Light reconnaissance units for more tank-unfriendly terrain could be based on area control platoons that employ Jagdkampf-like light infantry tactics in areas without emphasis on mobile warfare.)

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The modern trend looks different. Reconnaissance is becoming more and more a function of sensor employment. Such observation-centric reconnaissance companies and battalions often retain the ability to do Spähaufklärung, but their combat power is in some armies even too small for a counter-reconnaissance fight against improvised (armoured) reconnaissance troops.

New sensors are fine, but they cannot replace the proven combat functions of reconnaissance battalions. Sensors can detect an enemy who's not ready to fight, but sensors cannot defeat him. Long-range and aerial firepower has its limitations and won't replace surface action for decades to come.

The new German armoured reconnaissance (observation) vehicles (Fennek) are insufficiently armed to defeat even antique armoured reconnaissance vehicles (7.62mm machine gun or 40mm automatic grenade launcher).

The emphasis on technical means of terrain observation and the neglect of combat in reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance may be the result of more than six decades without relevant land warfare. There was very little combat experience in conventional land war that would be relevant for our (NATO defence) purposes.
The Indo-Pakistani Wars were probably the most relevant experiences; the terrain, force matchup and force density in Israel's wars were very unrepresentative for our needs.

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I would like to recommend some books for those who are interested in the employment of the German armoured reconnaissance units in WW2:

"Die deutschen Panzeraufklärer 1935-1945", Wolfgang Fleischer & Richard Eiermann, 2005
Short overview, not too technical, more tactical info than in hardware-centric books.

"Taktik im Russlandfeldzug", Eike Middeldorf et al, 1956
Lessons learned and suggestions for the Heer in the 50's; comprehensive and competent.

"Handbuch der Taktik", Eike Middeldorf et al, 1957

It's redundant to the '56 book in regard to armoured reconnaissance.

English readers could be interested in

"German Armoured Cars and Reconnaissance Half-Tracks 1939-45", Bryan Perrett, 1999

This has at least some info on organization and employment.

S O
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Economics: Deflation or inflation?

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I return sometimes to economic topics, just for fun. This is actually a bit more than just about economy.

There was a huge scare about a supposedly coming deflation in late 2008, and I see still some headlines about possible deflation. I had some quite strong discussions about this topic during last winter.

My take is simple, but it's not obvious enough for those who prefer to float with the current:

There were superficial early indicators for a USD and even EUR deflation, the seeds for the deflation fear. Indicators are mere indicators, though.

My thoughts included political behaviour, politicians/bureaucrats/technocrats and the fact that the U.S. invents new money at unprecedented rates. The early indicators and many economic theories and models are of questionable value in extraordinary, unprecedented situations like ours.

The ideal situation for a debt-reducing surprise inflation is a time of deflation scare.
That's a perfect, incredibly advantageous situation. Inflation doesn't reduce government (and other) debt much if it's expected inflation. The opposite - expected deflation - is like a godsend for a government intent on reducing its debt by inflation. This may be (or not) an actual federal U.S. strategy. The PR Chinese government isn't so uneasy about its dollar reserves because it expects them to rise in value, after all.


My scenario: The expansionist fiscal and central bank policies CAN cause an inflation, and it would surprise (extremely!) those who expect deflation.

I don't question that we could still see USD deflation (although the fiscal and central bank policies have fought against this tendency with great might) or that it was a possibility.

- - - - -

Yet, I was very irritated about how certain 'some people' were about a forthcoming deflation - completely ignoring the arguments pro inflation. I had the subjective impression of more inflation-related news and reports coming from Europe than from the U.S. anyway (both related to the USD).
'Some people' assumed that some early indicators were reliable and markets on autopilot; they ignored the capability of central banks and governments to steer against the trend and to even exploit it for their purposes.

- - - - -

Economists, even much-respected professors, opposed each other in debates about inflation vs. deflation expectations because it's really difficult (if not impossible) to KNOW in advance what would happen. It seemed really foolish (if not arrogant) to me how some laymen still claimed to be right beyond doubt, and everyone who disagreed didn't get it or is supposedly bad at economics.

It was especially ridiculous to hear about how this or that conclusion was supposedly "econ101" when it wasn't and when the same people had only a very superficial understanding of economics while discussing against actual economists who had learned much more than economics basics.
The inflation/deflation topic was a great case study about dirty rhetoric tricks, just like most rather emotionally-laden topics.

Some laymen were discussing this macro economic topic as if it was some kind of domino game, without entities in it that could influence events with their will.

Funnily, some of the same people were quick at criticizing professional economists for their supposed "homo economicus" theory. That's an outdated economic theory about perfectly rational human behaviour that gets nowadays more attention among economics laymen than among real economists. Economic students learn it in their first year - for about 20 minutes - because it's simplistic and a part of the whole.

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We had so many short-sighted short-term policies in the past decades that few still consider our supposedly unstable democratic governments as capable of daring medium-term strategies. Yet, that's probably what we're experiencing. It may sound like a conspiracy theory to some, but the situation is simply perfect for a surprise inflation that would eradicate much of the U.S. government's debt. The enabler is the federal Reserve Bank, which invents new dollars at an astonishing rate.


The same can happen in the UK (much less likely). It's almost impossible in the Euro zone because of the design of the ECB.

- - - - -

Very active readers of the security-related blogosphere may already have understood this as what it is: Nothing less than an attack on a certain blogger who picks up topics, blogs for months or years strongly favouring one side of the topic and retreats silently once it is obvious that he picked the wrong team (as in case of "peak oil" as reason for the oil price troubles, for example).


S O

P.S.: I don't expect serious inflation in the Euro zone - the ECB lacks the organizational structure for such a scenario. It was designed for stability, not as a major political actor.

edit 2014:
Basically neither much inflation nor much deflation happened in the last five years in the U.S. or the Euro zone. The crisis doesn't seem so very much unprecedented any more; the great depression and the Japanese Lost Two Decades are useful parallels. The latter points at a lingering susceptibility to deflation. The very much inflated money quantity (M2, M3 et cetera) in the U.S. still holds the potential for much inflation if the anticipated "tapering" isn't done well. Overall, the last five years look a lot like a single long postponement of either deflation or inflation - with many more years of muddling through as third scenario.
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Conscription in Germany: Politics

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Germany has officially a conscription, but 88% of our soldiers are volunteers or professionals. Some of those volunteers are serving voluntarily a bit longer than a normal conscript does and wouldn't serve without the conscription.
We don't seem to send any real conscripts to missions outside of NATO territory.


The discussion about conscription in Germany hasn't been very fundamental, but usually focused on the "Wehrgerechtigkeit" - whether the method of conscripting is just. The shrinking of the Bundeswehr plus the enlarged population base (unification) reduced the per cent need of the Bundeswehr for conscripts. The need for more long-serving volunteers to master the casualty- and failure-sensitive missions in overseas further reduced the absolute need for conscripts. The ministers of defence have attempted to compensate and spin away the problem with two measures;
* much shortened basic service - that makes conscripts officially useless for demanding tasks
* increased fitness standards
They had a bit luck as well, because the baby boom children generation became eligible for military service til the 80's.

That wasn't enough spin, though. Only about a sixth of a generation is called to serve in the Bundeswehr and half of the young men are being declared to be unfit to serve (a ridiculously high percentage that tells more about the standards than about the men).

It's obvious: To serve or not to serve as conscript is a lottery nowadays. For men. An overwhelming majority of Germans acknowledges that our conscription discriminates men, but for unknown reasons this is not a mature though for discourse among high-level politicians.

This situation is a strange one, as few parties still back the system. We'll have federal elections this September and the political programs have been published. That's what they tell us about the parties' intents:

CDU/CSU (conservatives, most likely to join the next government, with chancellor)

(...)
Die Wehrpflicht ist auch angesichts der neuen Bedrohungen der Sicherheit unseres Landes zukünftig notwendig. Sie ist ein wichtiges Instrument der Sicherheitsvorsorge.
Die Wehrpflicht verbindet Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft. Wir wollen jedoch für mehr Wehrgerechtigkeit sorgen und die Wehrpflicht attraktiver gestalten. Den Zivildienst wollen wir als Ersatzdienst erhalten. Er hat große sozial- und jugendpolitische Bedeutung. (...)

In short: conscription is necessary due to the 'threats to national security'. They assert that the conscription is an important link between forces and society (that's based on assumed lessons of the Weimar Republic). The alternative civil service has great social importance.

F.D.P. (liberals, likely junior partner of the conservatives)

(...) Sie müssen als Instrument einer wirkungsvollen Friedenspolitik professionell, flexibel und schnell einsetzbar sein. Hierzu reicht eine einfache Fortschreibung überkommener Strukturen unter Beibehaltung der Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht nicht aus. Die Wehrpflicht ist nicht mehr zu begründen. Sie ist in ihrer Ausgestaltung zutiefst ungerecht und für die Einsatzbereitschaft der Bundeswehr mittlerweile sogar kontraproduktiv. Sie muss schnellstens ausgesetzt werden. Deutschland benötigt Streitkräfte, die gut ausgebildet, modern ausgerüstet, voll einsatzbereit und schnell verlegbar sind. Das kann nur eine Freiwilligenarmee gewährleisten. (...)

(...)Die von der FDP geforderte Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht bedeutet auch das Aus für den Zivildienst.(...)

In short: They call for a deactivation of the conscription. The forces would need to be for "effective peace policy" (= overseas deployments, apparently liberal newspeak) and the continuation of old structures like the conscription is counter-productive to this. They assert that only a volunteer army can meet their requirements. They also complain about the present conscription being unjust. The second quote also calls (in a chapter about social policy) for a deactivation of the alternative civil service as well.

SPD (social democrats, less likely party to lead a new coalition, incl. chancellor)

(...) Die Wehrpflicht weiterentwickeln. Wir setzen auf die Fortentwicklung der Wehrpflicht, die unter Beibehaltung der Musterung die Möglichkeit einer flexiblen Bedarfsdeckung des erforderlichen Bundeswehrpersonals mit einer Stärkung des freiwilligen Engagements in der Bundeswehr verbindet. Wir streben an, zum Dienst in den Streitkräften künftig nur noch diejenigen einzuberufen, die sich zuvor bereit erklärt haben, den Dienst in der Bundeswehr zu leisten.

In short: blablabla. They don't really tell anything. It may range from irrelevant changes to a deactivation of the conscription. They should be embarrassed.
Other sources than their program indicate that they probably think of a deactivation of the conscription.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (greens, former pacifists (pre-'99), possible junior partner)

(...) Die Bundeswehr muss europatauglicher und UN-fähiger werden. Wir wollen die Bundeswehr auf 200.000 Soldatinnen und Soldaten verkleinern, die Wehrpflicht abschaffen, den Zivildienst umwandeln und die Freiwilligendienste ausbauen.
In der Bundeswehr wollen wir einen freiwilligen militärischen Kurzdienst von zwölf bis 24 Monaten einführen, der Frauen und Männern offen steht. (...)

In short: The Bundeswehr shall be more optimized for (as peaceful as possible) overseas missions. Conscription shall be abolished. Alternative civil service shall be transformed. The Bundeswehr shall offer a short-term volunteer service of 12 to 24 months,. The size of the Bundeswehr shall be reduced to 200k (-20%).

I don't get why they want to emphasize short-term volunteers if they want to reduce the Bundeswehr by more personnel than it has conscripts.

Die Linke (socialists, turned pacifist in opposition, least likely to join the next government)

(...)
* radikal abrüsten: die Wehrpflicht abschaffen; die Bundeswehr zu einer Verteidigungsarmee umgestalten und deutlich verkleinern; (...)

In short: Disarmament, abolition of conscription, modify the Bundeswehr into a much smaller defensive force.

These socialists are hypocrites; they treat the Bundeswehr as if it was the anti-democratic military (NVA) of socialist Eastern Germany. They pretend to be peace-lovers now (as usual when socialists are an opposition party).

- - - - -

It's interesting that this lingering topic has made it into some newspapers as a topic for the elections. The party chairman of the liberals has attacked our conscription as unnecessary and a harassment of our young men. He's most likely to form a coalition with the pro-conscription conservatives (and his party is unlikely to ge the minister of defence seat).

The present minister of defence has a low standing and low competence, so he's likely to be replaced in a new coalition; either by a conservative or (less likely) by a social democrat. Everything else would be a premiere.

- - - - -

The present polls (2009-07-28) say

CDU/CSU 36%
SPD 23,5%
FDP 14%
Grüne 12%
DIE LINKE 10%

A classic black-yellow coalition of CDU/CSU and F.D.P. with Merkel as chancellor is most likely.
More about our parties here.

- - - - -

We could easily live without conscripts - their share of the Bundeswehr is small and they rarely get any tasks of importance any more. I have concerns about the issue of a sufficient reserve pool, but that's nothing that seems to worry our federal top politicians.
The greatest obstacle to a deactivation of this underpaid and sexually discriminating unfree labour is not national security policy: It's social policy.

Citizens can object to armed service and have to serve in an alternative social service. The income is similarly marginal as for conscripts (it's unfree labour, after all) and these social services are concentrated in social community services; caring for elderly in nursing homes, for example.
A deactivation or abolition of our conscription would deprive the private sector of tens of thousands of cheap unfree labourers. Efforts (so-called reforms) to reduce the costs of our social and health services are common in German federal politis, and an end of this unfree labour system would cause some new cost problems.

- - - - -

Oh, before I forget it: It's politically incorrect to call our conscription what it is:

An underpaid and sexually discriminating unfree labour with partial removal of human rights.

I challenged people to disprove this assertion for years, but so far all failed because it's true. We as a society have just become used to this instrument that was introduced by monarchs two centuries ago and reactivated by the Nazis and finally by the present state for the Cold War.

S O

edit 2015-12: I found a Swiss article which argued for a Swiss militia of volunteers. It's in German, and covers some of the same points as I did on this blog. By the way, conscription was deactivated in Germany a while ago, in one of the many political u-turns in which Merkel turned her party's decades-old policy upside down once the pressure became unbearable to her.

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Lessons from German military vehicle history

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I looked a lot into the history of historical German military vehicles and found that it's full of lessons.

The primary lesson of WWI were probably that internal combustion engines can indeed replace horse power for operational supply purposes. Horse-drawn carts were limited in their radius of action because horse fodder had to be transported as well - and was both quite voluminous and heavy in comparison to the performance. It was impossible to supply corps adequately far away from the closest railway station. This was a huge logistical problem of the Schlieffen plan.
Trucks also raised the transport capacity of roads (ton-kilometers/day), that proved invaluable for the French at Verdun. Finally, motorized tractors enabled road mobility (not just rail mobility) for heavy guns.

There was another lesson as well; the importance of raw material supply. Natural rubber supply was quickly cut off by the British naval blockade and trucks had to switch to spring-cushioned metal wheels halfway in the war.


The 20's were a period of much basic development (like 8x8 systems), but also of strange ideas.
One such strange idea was that off-road vehicles had to be very agile in terms of turning radius. All axles were steerable in some models, and the turning radius was reduced by several metres. The utility of this extra complexity, cost and weight was near zero.
Another idea was that relatively simple, jeep-like cars would need three axles (apparently to reduce nominal ground pressure).
Both requirements led to the idea that off-road vehicles would be complex, large and heavy.

The 30's were a time of greater realism, but most military vehicles were still way heavier than normal. The Czechs produced some complex, no-compromise off-road trucks (Tatra) - that failed spectacularly to match the off-road utility of even commercial models in WW2.

The German officials attempted to develop some "standard" ("Einheits-") models of cars and trucks and anticipated that at least field units would need dedicated military designs. The only successful result of their program was a 2.5 ton truck (6x6) "Einheits-Diesel". Its ability to drive on muddy Russian roads was excellent, but its production got cancelled in mid-war because its payload was considered to be inadequate (apparently "inadequate" only in relation to its costs).


Wartime soft vehicle production was falling very short of the forces' needs, barely matching the peacetime recapitalization needs. Much of the automotive sector was producing non-automotive equipment during the war.
Ten thousands of foreign trucks had to be captured and produced in foreign countries (especially France) - almost exclusively commercial designs.

The problem of a good jeep-like vehicle got eventually solved by accident: The original VW Beetle was modified with more ground clearance and a new shape and was introduced as a very light and cheap 4x2 vehicle, the famous "Kübelwagen" (which was in fact a more general term). Its soft surface performance was astonishing even without 4x4 (few 4x4 and a couple thousand amphibious 4x4 versions were produced as well).


It introduced the off-road concept that became later known as "buggy". It was able to negotiate soft soil by moderate ground pressure (low weight) instead of complex 4x4 drive for maximum traction.

The best light trucks were also available by accident; the 3 ton Opel "Blitz" was a commercial 4x2 vehicle, but proved to be superior to most other light trucks on the poor "roads" of Eastern Europe.


The heavy trucks were apparently all satisfactory, but not very important.

Finally motorcycles; the German army failed to appraise their limited durability in pre-war tests and extended the use of motorcycle into troop transport. The reason was apparently that the motorcycle was the natural successor of the horse. A single motorcycle was less efficient than a motorcycle with sidecar - and that was their choice. Sadly, a good motorcycle is still less efficient in troop transport than a car and a car is less efficient than a light truck.
They somehow failed to do proper operational research on this.

The choice of the motorcycle models was problematic as well. Military motorcycle competitions on difficult tracks were held until 1939, but relatively light (as 350ccm) motorcycles dominated these competitions. The reason was that the competitions were short and placed an emphasis on handling characteristics - the strength of light models.

The later actual war (WW2) placed a much greater emphasis on durability during many weeks of uninterrupted campaigning on unpaved roads without thorough maintenance and repair.


Almost all motorcycles lighter than 500ccm (cylinder volume) were failures.
Some heavy (500-750ccm) motorcycles proved to be great, but were more expensive than a car with four seats.

- - - - -

We could draw the lesson that dedicated military vehicles are probably not that good as they seem to be. Another possible conclusion is that requirements-driven development may be inferior to the diversity of the commercial vehicle portfolio.

It seems to be much more complex than that, though.

The Wehrmacht's experiences during WW2 were compressed in a period of just a few years The problem of muddy, unpaved roads and very difficult circumstances for maintenance were dominant factors. Their relevance is in question.

The Bundeswehr chose light motorcycles during the Cold War. It didn't expect to fight in Eastern Europe, and the light models were affordable and good enough on paved roads.

The great success of air-cooled vehicles as the Kübelwagen Typ 82 was in part based on extreme climates (Sahara, Russian winter) that played no role for the Bundeswehr till the 90's.


Several NATO armies bought more commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) trucks during the 70's and 80's for their low price (and to help the national automotive sector in times of crisis). These vehicles usually showed a central problem: Civilian cars and trucks are designed for high mileage in a period of 10-20 years. Modern military vehicles get a relatively modest mileage over a period of 20-40 years unless they're used in a major war.
This means that the higher initial cost of dedicated designs is in great part justified by their long life. Corrosion and other material failures (seals, rubber components, rust) are very different durability problems than the wear by movement. Firefighting trucks have the same challenge.

The idea of designs based on requirements, standardization and even vehicle families proved to be feasible with less politicized bureaucracies as well.



We could still expect the same for a major war as the 1930's planners: The most suitable military vehicles would likely need to be limited to field units, with commandeered vehicles being used in "rear" areas, in less demanding (on-road) tasks. Even the huge modern automotive sector would need several months to converse its production to military designs - and would probably need to make changes to those designs.

A certainly valid lesson is that vehicles need to be tested thoroughly, in all seasons and on different soils. Short competitions are inadequate compromises that weed out the greatest duds at best - long troop testing is simply necessary to unveil weaknesses.

Another (obvious) wisdom and conclusion is that simplicity is a strength in itself. We should remember this well. Today's automotive designers have a greater choice of gadgets and technical solutions than ever before - and they're enticing.


We should also check rationally whether our idea of off-road capability is a good one. The German planners of the 20's had a huge emphasis on the turning radius for no good reason. Modern Bundeswehr trucks can do impressive stunts with movable axles on uneven terrain.


Maybe we should place a stronger emphasis on soft soil performance (mean maximum pressure) and simplicity again?


There's one more thing that we should remember as lesson: The extreme importance of the ability to improvise, mobile repair shops and the standardization of spare parts.

S O
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The value of prestige and other intangible benefits

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They perceive their courage exploited, their lives risked, merely so that Britain can 'show willing' to the Americans.

Mail Online, July 9th 09

This made me think once again about all that "relations" and "prestige" stuff in politics.
How much blood and (real) treasure is it worth? What's an acceptable exchange rate between blood and prestige? Do the relevant decision makers think about this?

Germany attempted to get a permanent seat in the UNSC (and since gave up on the idea as far as I know). Our politicians told us that Germany must accept international "responsibilities" to show itself worthy of such a seat (and to 'buy' it).

Well, we sent thousands of troops to Bosnia, thousands to Kosovo, thousands to Afghanistan, hundreds into several other place ... the list is long, yet the supposed deal was no deal. The argument that playing on the international stage with military force would give us benefits seemed to be a false one.
We actually just had expenses, killed troops, injured troops, spent billions of € and got much of our red light districts taken over by refugees from nations where our soldiers were supposed to help.


I'm quite sure that the public would not have tolerated these missions if it had known the effects in advance, yet we continue to run these missions; that's the power of inertia and habituation.

- - - - -

The British, Australians and Canadians have a similar situation in my opinion. Their intent was no UNSC seat (Britain got one anyway) - it was rather a "good relationship" with the USA.
Blair repeated several times that Britain needs to fight along the Americans to have any influence on their actions.

Well, I'd say Blair was an extremely poor strategist if he had influence on GWB's foreign policy.
He was also an extremely poor strategist if he had none despite the disadvantages for Britain that he accepted. In short: His foreign policy looks like a huge failure to me.
The wisdom of sacrificing troops on the altar of American favour is increasingly being questioned in the UK as far as I know. Here's another example, one that focuses on whether this strategy can succeed at all because of the UK's limitations.

The Australians and Canadians most likely suffered more dead by their participation in American wars than they would have suffered otherwise. This makes me think that their national security policy was a failure as well.

- - - - -

Some German rulers of the 18th century sold their troops to England for fighting American insurgents. They got "subsidies" (gold) for it. This policy was very despised even at the time, but perhaps even smarter than the present German and British policy.
Well, at least they got something for it.


Let's look at the official German post Cold-War missions in foreign countries:
(excluding disaster relief and similar actions)

90/91 MCM ships to Med and Persian Gulf
1991 Alpha Jets to Turkey (gesture)
92-96 enforcement of naval arms embargo on Yugoslavia
93-94 army troops to Northern Somalia
95-today troops in Bosnia
1999 Kosovo Air War
99-today troops in Kosovo
01-03 troops in Macedonia
02-03 NBC troops in Kuweit
2006 troops guard elections in Kongo
01 -today ships in Med
02-today troops, aircraft and ships in/next to Eastern Africa (OEF)
02-today troops in Afghanistan (ISAF)
06-today naval arms embargo on Hezbollah
08-today anti-piracy force near Somalia

Present German out-of-area missions

The Bosnia mission was a mixed success and an end is in sight. Bosnia was certainly close enough to us to be of national interest.

The Macedonia mission was a success and still not far away.

The Kosovo missions were terrible in my opinion, but that's a topic in its own right.

I don't see noteworthy, tangible benefits of any other mission. Some missions were even running counter to official German foreign policy by freeing American resources for the war of aggression against Iraq in 2003. Several missions (like the naval embargoes and anti-piracy patrols) were inherently incapable of achieving the purpose of their mission.

All of these missions were at least in part justified by a supposed need to bear a share of the burden, to be recognized as an important nation in international affairs.

The relationship with the U.S. certainly didn't look like rewarding the OEF and ISAF missions. The GWB administration sabotaged our Eastern Europe policy and disregarded German interests whenever they had different interests.
GWB is gone, but the attitude seems to still go strong. It's a kind of "Give him an inch and he will take a mile" behaviour. We supplied thousands of auxiliary troops (contrary to German public opinion) and what did we get?

* No noteworthy rewards or advantages.
* Requests for ever more troops.
* Some German bashing from non-officials for not completely giving up our new sovereignty and accept a status as auxiliary troops pool for U.S. presidential adventures.

- - - - -

The insatiable thirst of U.S. presidents for auxiliary troops is actually not the topic,. It's just a highly visible, related symptom that serves as an example. This is about intangible rewards for military action, and their real value.

It seems to me as if government foreign politicians have a strange set of preferences and are under influence of group think. They seem to value things like "prestige", "symbolic actions" and "good relations" (meant to be bought by political bribing) much higher than many (most?) of their nation's citizens.
Or at least they seem to pretend to care that much about it.

I personally don't rate such supposedly good relations as very valuable. I prefer good relations based on actual friendliness and satisfactory win-win agreements, not on transfers.

There's also the question of durability. How long does any "prestige" or "good will" last? Does it last only till the next government? Does it decay once policy changes? It certainly seems so.


Prestige seems to be grossly over-valued in modern foreign politics, especially if it's based on loss of life, health and treasure.

Sven Ortmann

P.S.: I expect that most readers simply think "article 5" all the time. My answers:

* Article 5 is not applicable to Australia.
* Was sticking to NATO a good choice for effectively non-threatened Canada post-1990? They were and are free to leave, and alliances were always in history just temporary. There's no indebtedness because of having been allied in the past. And even if it was - wouldn't the other members owe more to Canada than Canada to them?
* And finally; Article 5 is about defence. The enemy was long chased from power, no alliance ever required or requires to defend by chasing the enemy to the last man. ISAF is not about article 5.
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Too big to fail (and I'm angry about it)

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The Airbus A400M project is a disaster in my opinion (I favoured the much more promising An-70 from the beginning).

Several air forces concluded a fixed price contract with Airbus to develop a medium military transport aircraft at a fixed price, date and performance (payload/range).

Airbus is over price by billions (€), behind schedule by at least four years and doesn't seem to be able to meet the payload/range requirement. Especially the schedule problems got only worse since they admitted to be in trouble months ago.


A) They promised too much.

B) They kept their best engineers out of the project and withdrew more good ones to fix their troublesome civilian A380 and A350 projects.

C) They don't get an appropriate sanction.

Airbus already missed milestones weeks ago, but got a delay till end of July. Now it's official; our secretaries of defence stick with the project, it will be four years late, be likely be more expensive and no-one seems to expect that the original performance expectations will be met.

By the way; the whole project rests on demands for airlift for political overseas adventures - it's incredibly cost-inefficient for real defence.

- - - - -

This begs the question; did the consolidation of the Western (and indeed-world-wide) arms industry on the systems integrator level hurt us? Are these companies like EADS (Airbus), MBDA, General Dynamics, BAe Systems, Eurocopter too big to fail?

They certainly looks too big to fail to me. Their projects either don't get canceled even if they suck or they get alternative contracts real quick.

- - - - -

The A400M case shows another problem as well: Lack of spine.

It was a great opportunity to punish Airbus badly enough to prohibit such failure (overly optimistic promises, low resource priority) in the future.
The tool of fixed cost and performance contracts would have been fearsome to suppliers, but would most likely have been very effective.

It's ruined now. They blinked to save Airbus from multi-billion losses (inflicting the same losses on the taxpayer instead!) in order to save the competitiveness of Airbus with airliners.

In worst case Airbus would have had to attract additional equity capital. The politicians saved the riches of Airbus' current shareholders, not Airbus itself! They did so with taxpayer money!

The damage to the taxpayer is huge; it's in the billions of € for the German taxpayers alone.

About Airbus current shareholders: It's 100% EADS, which again has shareholders, of course. The stock price for EADS shares rose by 1.4% at the day of the news about the A400M renegotiation. Many traders apparently already expected that the politicians would care more about the shareholders than the taxpayers.

As of 3 July 2007 41.63% of EADS stock is publicly traded on six European stock exchanges, while the remaining 58.37% is owned by a "Contractural Partnership". The latter is owned by SOGEADE (27.38%), Daimler AG (22.41%), SEPI (5.46%) and Dubai Holding (3.12%). SOGEADE is owned by the French State and Lagardère, while SEPI is a Spanish state holding company. France also owns 0.06% of publicly traded stock.

Wikipedia

I want to see all responsible politicians (and all bureaucrats who advised to do this) sacked. "Lack of spine" is a VERY friendly interpretation of their actions.
 

S O
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