2013/01/06

"Small" is sexy, apparently. Or not.

.
Over the years I've noticed a strange attraction of "small" platforms (not guns!) on many military-interested people.

"Small" warships (or even mere patrol vessels) are apparently sexy. I've seen a blog being totally fixated on the "small" fetish, and especially so on all things floating and "small". The criticism of modern Western navies and the USN in particular is very often focused on the size of the warships.

"Small" is apparently also sexy in combat aviation. So-called "counter insurgency" small combat aircraft (typically with turboprop engines and almost 100% useless in inter-state warfare) were and are very attractive to many people, and I suspect a strong contribution to this attractiveness stems from the sheer size, as the actual capabilities are rather modest.

"Small" tanks are a very recurring topic as well. There are very entrenched fans of "light" armoured vehicles such as the British CVR(T) series. Nevermind the CVR(T) scouts failed to be a success back in Gulf War '91 because the truly heavy Challenger 1 tanks had longer-ranging sensors.


This already points at one of the inherent problems of all "small" or "light" platforms; equipment.

Some popular targets for size criticisms: Ticonderoga class CGs and big carriers.

First things first. Ships.

Are more smaller ships really that much better? No doubt a smaller ship can occasionally be the superior alternative, but I doubt there's a good justification for the strength for the "smaller ship" attractiveness.

Two 5,000 ton ships moving at 10 kts for 100 nm burn all else equal more fuel than one 10,000 ton ship. The required installed power (edit: per ton for a given speed) grows hugely if you shrink the ship.

Two 5,000 ton ships will need two command centres, two full communications suites, two EW suites, two close defence suites, two guns, two times the regular amount of backup systems, two anchors, two sonar suites, two radar suites - even if they pack the same punch as one 10,000 ton ship.
Let's assume (unhistorically) that navies were willing to install the same quality equipment on the smaller ships as on the bigger one. Let's also assume both ship designs have the same range (which requires disproportionately more fuel bunkerage on the two smaller ships) - ceteris paribus the big ship would have much more ammunition and an overall much smaller crew.
There are not only economies of scale which make a big ship more efficient, but there's also important equipment which outright requires the carrying capacity of a big ship. Even the Arleigh Burke class is probably too small for the anti-ballistic missile radar antennas favoured by the U.S.Navy (I would simply install such a task force-level support radar on a rather freighter-like hull, but that's another story).
There may be many eggs in a basket with a big ship, but many inadequate small ships are hardly a better idea than few big gold-plated ones. Varying degrees of folly, but still ranked.

The offshore patrol vessel fan crowd has a particularly irritating idea for why there should be small, cheap, incapable warships: They wallow in the sunk costs fallacy.
Their argument goes like this: "Look, a 10,000 ton billion dollar ship patrolling against rag-tag pirates. What a waste! Send some small OPVs instead!"
Now ignoring for a while that counter-pirate patrols are stupid and require first and foremost a fine helicopter element (which almost all ships smaller than about 2,000 tons lack), where's the sunk costs fallacy here?
Simple: The big ship is (or would be) in the navy anyway. It's going to cruise anyway. No matter "patrol off Africa" or some exercise in the Mediterranean; the operating costs are almost entirely the same!
The huge, unnecessary, foolish expenditure is to purpose-built some additional offshore patrol vessels or corvettes for stupid patrols and stuff. Like K130s.
Sure, the big ships might be required somewhere else. Yet who says this isn't true if they are doing their regular training instead of some mission which a small ship could do as well? A warship might cruise the Caribbean when urgently needed in the Med or be in the Med when urgently needed off East Africa or cruise of East Africa when urgently needed in the Baltic Sea. In any case, when a "big" warship is truly urgently needed elsewhere, that would certainly be a more important mission than whatever a mere patrol vessel is capable of - so it can simply abandon the unimportant mission if needed.
____________

Next aviation; small was beautiful up to the 50's and 60's in combat aviation. The golden days of the agile Skyhawks and Gnats. The Gnat was so small even a tiny air-to-air missile such as the later AA-8 Aphid would have looked oversized under its wings. Sadly, ever since small combat aircraft have been decidedly disappointing save for armed jet trainers with their lowered expectations.
There's a reason for why these aircraft had their heyday in the 60's; avionics. Avionics became hugely expensive and now make up about half of the cost of a combat aircraft, with engines following as the next biggest chunk. 

What would be gained by using smaller airframes? First and foremost, you would need to carry less internal fuel. There would hardly be internal volume left for it, because those avionics black boxes are not exactly following some law of perpetual shrinkage. You might drop some avionics, of course. Nobody needs some popular 50's and 60's avionics such as dedicated doppler navigation radar or those devices for aiming in nuclear bomb tossing manoeuvres any more. Yet how about avionics still in use? Would you want to shed the radar? Radar warner? Missile warner? Radio datalink hardware? Maybe sub-components such as decoy launchers? What exactly would those small combat aircraft fans want to drop?

Such details are strangely absent on the "small is beautiful" fanboi propaganda.

[fun] One might question if smaller is really better... [/fun]
Third platform category so popular in Milporn; (mini) tanks.
Sure, there's a practical upper limit for tank size; weight grows much quicker than the track area, leading to excessive nominal ground pressure. This issue could be addressed with overlapping if not interleaving WW2-stle roadwheels, but instead there's a consensus that more than 70 metric tons of weight is definitively a good reason to be concerned. Others become concerned at about 60 metric tons.
Yet the small tank fanbois look rather at tracked armoured vehicles of less than 20 metric tons. They're typically turned off by wheeled vehicles of this weight category, of course. 
There's a problem, though: Such "light" AFVs are not built for a brawl. They're fine for transportation or scouting, but clearly not reassuring to crews who know very well about their own fallibility because they demonstrated it plenty times during exercises. Sooner or later, some small mistake or simply bad luck will ruin the day. Heavy tank crews aren't immortal either, but their bar for mistakes or bad luck is mounted much higher.


I'm not interested enough in this topic for a full debunking, so please take this as a kind of inspiration for being careful about buying into the "small is sexy" crowd's propaganda. An occasional "smaller would be better" opinion is rarely suspicious, but I advise caution and a lot of self-discipline (it takes a lot to guard against enticing fallacies) when you notice some author is flogging the same dead "small is beautiful" horse or any other pet topic over and over and over again.
Feel free to apply this caution here as well. Nobody's perfect.



S Ortmann

P.S.: Please no "big" versus "small" debate in the comments. Lots of other blogs welcome such discussions instead. In case you disagree with me, just focus on the part in italic font, please.

@TRT: Don't feel offended. This blog post was long overdue. It's a summary of a decade worth of observations on these things.
.

2013/01/03

Belated Christmas gift

.
About a decade ago the U.S.Army ceased to publish its Armor and Infantry magazines in a global war on terror brain freeze. For years, it took one of those infamous AKO accounts to read the Armor Magazine online. The editors fought against this and lost the battle.I actually never bothered to find a workaround even though these journals were clearly better than average, at times even permitting outside-the-box and critical articles. There are enough alternatives anyway.

(I may have noticed this late, didn't check back often for the whole decade...)

As if my reading list backlog wasn't long enough!


S Ortmann
.

2012/12/31

Rank inflation or "Chieftains without indians"

.
Rank inflation pops up as a side topic in some posts on Defence and Freedom and I'm not motivated to write an encompassing post about it yet, but I'd like to redirect some attention at the casualties lists from recent conflicts with involvement of Western armies; Iraq and Afghanistan.

One such casualty list is here.

What's striking about these lists is that almost all KIA (and WIA) are either officers or non-commissioned officers. This applies to the casualties lists of several involved countries.

Deployments into distant dirtholes are somewhat special and may end up having a lower share of enlisted personnel than the deploying force has overall, but this effect cannot explain the ratio of officer - NCO - enlisted casualties.

Germany had this rank inflation issue for a long time, and it accelerated during the 90's when the force had to shrink without the system having the ability to shed the long-serving troops (8 years for NCOs, 12 for officers, two decades for officers who turned professional) as easily as enlisted personnel.

Tasks which were done by conscripts for decades were increasingly assigned to junior NCOs.

New personnel had to be recruited to keep the force young enough, and gifting NCO ranks to 8-year volunteer recruits ("Neckermann Stuffz") became a regular embarrassing fact of life instead of a rare occurrence.
NCO courses were watered down and senior leadership lost the Cold War's zeal to fire up training. This in turn resulted in junior NCOs being about as much trusted as were Cold War non-conscript enlisted personnel. Our Feldwebel (lowest rank of senior NCO, requiring a special course and traditionally a mainstay of German armies) became as trusted as were our junior NCOs during the Cold War. I recall some big brass guy bragging about how Feldwebel (previously platoon leader rank) shall lead all of our squads in the future (=now). It didn't cross his mind that this required watering down the same.

So basically today's Western armies use junior NCOs as enlisted personnel.

Just in case anybody doubted that our military bureaucracies need a major shake-up and it would be a good idea to do this during this magnificiently low threat era: This doubt should be gone.

S O


edit - related (hat tip to Eric Palmer blog):

.

2012/12/23

Inflationary use of the word "ally"

.
The inflationary use of the word "ally" has irritated and annoyed me for quite some time. It's inaccurate and accuracy is really desirable for a meaningful exchange of thoughts.

Americans and British appear to use the word much more often than actually warranted by "if you are attacked, we will fight with you" treaties. Germans don't use their respective word so indiscriminately, at least not in the context of countries.

One of the confusions which appeared because of the indiscriminate use of the word "ally" was about Turkey and Israel, with people asking why the U.S. government didn't staunchly support the U.S. ally Israel in its diplomatic conflict with Turkey.
Well, Turkey happened to be the true ally, and Israel being more the subsidised pet project of U.S. foreign policy. People talked of Israel as "ally" all the time*, though. 
Actually, there's no treaty saying that Israelis should fight side-by-side with Americans, while Turkey is a member of NATO (admittedly, the relevant wording of the North Atlantic Treaty barely meets the definition of a real alliance).
It was the indiscriminate (if not wrong) choice of words which confused instead of informed.

The Strategist blog has published a post citing two studies about ally behaviours, and the difference between these studies' results (one with a loose definition of alliance, the other more strict) supports the importance of not mixing up political cooperation with military alliances: Real allies joined the fight on their allies' side in about three quarters of the cases, while with the very wide definition of "ally" it's only one quarter!

It would help a lot if "partner" was substituted for "ally" more often, as it's more accurate and less confusing in many cases. This could also help to give actual allies the respect they deserve for sticking as an ally even with overly aggressive great powers.



*: With one prominent exception, the CIA.
.

2012/12/21

Is irrationality a factor for the preservation of peace?

.
What's the point of staying in an arms race? Sooner or later, most participants will fall behind for a while, and if the other party is really aggressive this will likely prove the arms race efforts to be a failure.

An arms race with a big portion of capabilities which serve more on the strategic defence than on the strategic offence could be considered as an excuse. The problem with this is that it's simply not describing post-19th century arms races well. Fortresses are not efficient enough any more.

So maybe arms races -once started for some reason- are being sustained by uncertainty?
Being just a bit weaker and thus capable of demanding a high price for aggression (maybe even win despite initially smaller military power) might explain why arms races exist and do last a while. The temporarily inferior side accepts its temporary weakness and just doesn't want to fall behind by too much?

source
Yet, how could this be? A rational inferior power would rather yield than to fight a damaging war and accept the near-certainty of defeat. The supposed exacting of a price would be a bluff. To fight a war from a position of weakness is kind of like betting your left arm in a poker game when you only have a pair of deuces.

Yet maybe it's the expectation that the inferior power will indeed follow such an irrational course (=not bluffing, with exact cards unknown to the other 'player') of action which preserves peace.


This would be quite ironic, for there's a substantial amount of irrationality in play when wars are being prepared or actually waged, too. It's almost impossible nowadays to get a good return on war efforts (save for wars of independence or special interests) and justifying the huge expenses in peacetime without an actual conflict on the horizon requires even more irrationality in my opinion.


Still, irrationality may preserve peace at times, which should influence one's judgement of seemingly irrational leaders at times. An irrational leader of an inferior country may serve the preservation of peace, while the same leading a superior power may be a threat to peace.


By the way; I'm still unsure why arms races exist(ed) at all. There are scores of examples where one side simply stopped playing along and dropped out of the race, with no aggression occurring afterwards. See Greece-Turkey or the South American dreadnought arms race for obvious examples.


S Ortmann


Similar stuff years ago, and more specific to nukes:2009/03: Nuclear deterrence: It depends!
.

2012/12/15

Camo fabrics

.
 
OK, judging by the video, one could conclude that the process isn't really complicated.
This now-ancient report on some of the first multi-colour camo fabrics with different patterns on both sides probably gives a better sense for how complicated this stuff was back then.

 

It has only become more complicated with extra ingredients for camouflage against night vision devices, insect repellents, water repellents and even attempts to make the fabric less permeable to chemical agents

Too bad; almost all of the Western textile industrial capacity went overseas during the 80's and 90's (if I remember the time frame correctly). I suppose enough is left to equip a few million persons within months, though.

Back to the old patterns; the report shows why camo patterns especially for reversible clothing and tents weren't common until WW2: It was simply beyond technological reach until the late 20's. There were multi-colour camo patterns of questionable effectiveness during the First World War, but such fabrics only appeared half-way between the World Wars. Few armies substituted properly with camo nets, though; camouflage is a usual suspect for neglect during peacetime.

S Ortmann
.

2012/12/14

TO&E debates

.
A comment asked me to discuss something with an example TO&E (table of organization and equipment), and I declined. I'm still convinced that the relatively popular toying with TO&E is largely a waste of time.

I did mention that there are rare useful thoughts in such discussions, and that these could be better discussed in a generalised way. Here's a small collection of such thoughts and discussions which I picked up over the years:


General requirement; units or small units which are supposed to function if split need to be laid out for it.
In a simple (and by technology by now obsolete) example, a mortar battery (platoon) would need to be able to leap-frog, providing continuous support with at least half of the tubes while the battalion is on the move (while mostly deployed). There were some historical TO&Es which did not provide double fire control equipment and personnel as well as enough radios for this purpose.
___________

Another is the idea of having a Verfügungszug, a kind of bodyguard small unit at disposal of a commanding officer. A battalion commander would this way always have a platoon from which to draw couriers, replacement leaders, men for scouting missions, a security team for himself, guards for the HQ and finally if not most importantly a reserve in a crisis even after all 'line' battalions were thrown into action already.
Such (small) units were very popular in the pre-firearms age, but have fallen out of fashion. There were proposals to revive the concept since the 80's at the latest.
___________

Related, there's the proposal in the air to establish a scout/sniper platoon on infantry battalion level. Some armies assign a few snipers directly to 'line' (infantry) companies. Designated marksmen down to squad level (the UK with its LSW/SUSAT combo even had kind of designated marksmen in support units) exist as well. Yet, the highly trained specialists with scout/sniper skills make little sense if dispersed like this. Their casualties, sick and non-deployable soldiers wouldn't be distributed evenly, leaving some units without their support. Their specialisation furthermore requires uncommon training - the whole issue of maintaining proficiency is best-served by having them together in one small unit, in a pool.
Strangely, relatively few battalion TO&Es world-wide feature a scout/sniper platoon (as far as I know).
___________

The ever-lasting optimization challenge between having technical support troops pooled at a relatively high level or dispersed as organic support to a relatively low one. It appears that the former approach (preferred by the Soviets) works best with armies of modest access to said skills, while the latter is the more luxurious approach which costs more, but also performs better.
___________

TO of PzBrig 12,
(c) TUBS
The ever-lasting span of command (not "control") issue. It's easy to lead two manoeuvre sub-units plus your organic support and HQ, but such TO&Es get criticised a lot. Three manoeuvre units provide many more tactical options, but often lead to the unimaginative "two up, one back" tactics.
There are proponents for four manoeuvre sub-units, pointing out the many more tactical options and especially the ability to create a main effort without committing the essential reserve (example: two left, one right and one reserve).
I'm most unimpressed by these, for it's utterly common to see manoeuvre units to shrink a lot or be joined into fewer ones after the strength dropped somewhat. Many brigades don't deploy fully to a theatre of war, and would be even less understrength if they hadn't received replacements from other cannibalized brigades. This latter work-around is not available in a large-scale war, of course.  Add the inevitable early casualties, the sick and the troops used for a non-textbook purpose and you end up with understrength forces which make a mockery of such detailed tactical considerations.
I prefer to keep searching for info and thoughts on how to cope with understrength and loss of experienced junior leaders rather than to pay much attention to the recurring span of command debates.
____________

Tooth-to-tail ratio or share of infantry debates; too few infantrymen is a persisting problem, and was so ever since 1944 (with the Soviets and Germans bled white and anglo-americans burning through their pre-invasion infantry strength multiple times as well).
The lack of infantry has been known for decades, but somehow infantry isn't sexy enough.
The (edit: early) Stryker brigade (edit: TO&E draft) was criticised for being infantry-weak (astonishing, considering its textbook combat tactics - as little as such exist - were dismount-centric). Almost all Western or Warsaw pact brigade TO&Es known to me were weak on infantry ever since the 60's (German brigades lost a lot of their infantry strength over successive army structures).
____________

Mixed or separate branch battalions. You can have a tank battalion and an infantry battalion, train them separately and mix them into two mixed battalions only for action or higher-order training. Another approach is to train them as mixed battalions from the beginning.
The widely preferred approach is to do the former, for it makes training more efficient (there's enough wasted waiting time for soldiers without additional inefficiencies already). The problem of qualifying the senior leaders (battalion staff and commander) in leading such combined arms forces is often dealt with by giving them tours through different branches. You don't want a purely infantry-minded in command of a tank company on certain terrains, for example. There are nevertheless recurring demands for mixed battalions and organizational experiments for the same; an idea which is as undying as laser weapons and flying jeeps.
Even the idea of switching from one TO&E to another once company-level training is complete (a horror for inertia-obeying bureaucracies) gains no ground permanently. This is in part because the mixing is supposedly helpful in tailoring mixed battalions according to needs. Again, I call B.S. because you can only mix what you have - a more infantry-centric mixed Bn forces you to have at least one infantry-weak one made of what's left.
So in the end brigade TO&Es usually show pure branch battalions, completely unrelated to how they would fight and an absurdity if you keep in mind that standing units were originally standardized in order to make it more easily known to higher-ups what kind of force they are.
____________

Specialised brigades versus unitary ones. This debate happens occasionally; there was a German debate on this decades ago, but we eventually understood our terrain in North and South Germany (Cold War times) was too different for a unitary brigade TO&E. This didn't mean the different brigade TO&Es which were developed made more sense, of course. Nowadays you can't even be sure that a Panzerbrigade has a different TO&E than a Panzergrenadierbrigade.
Ground forces with emphasis on being chess figures for great power gaming by bored and irresponsible politicians (also known as "expeditionary forces") cannot anticipate the kind of environment they will be sent to (unless said politicians prefer to play their games in about the same sandbox region over and over). This gives new life to the idea of unitary regiments or brigades. See USMC MEUs.
____________

Some stupid Milblogger proposed PGM companies, trying to provoke some thinking about how to include vastly different and relatively new means into TO&Es. Same with electronic warfare and signals stuff.
____________

The integration of reconnaissance or observation support into manoeuvre forces: The "how" is much-discussed, while I simply propose to keep dedicated recce organic above manoeuvre team (Bde, Bn) level because I consider it a necessity to have recce attached to areas, not formations or units. It's a long story and was occasionally mentioned on this blog.
One driver of discussions around the general topic of how to organize organic recce was and is the RSTA quasi-battalion introduced in the U.S.Army. It proved useful for recce, but didn't bring much fighting power or boots on the ground - and that's what brigade commanders always want more of (often with good reasons).
Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)
 ____________

Finally a TO&E aversion speciality of mine; I *strongly* dislike the idea of having army aviation elements in manoeuvre forces. The armoured cavalry regiments of old were extreme examples for this nonsense. There's little debate going on about this, for almost no army has so many helicopters to spare as to disperse them like this. The helicopter support dependency which developed in parts of Afghanistan could revive the issue if enough helicopters are available for such follies around 2020, though.
____________

Right now (or yesterday) I cannot remember other TO&E topics which ever attracted my interest, at least not below divisional level (there's an ongoing discussion whether to shed the divisional or corps level of command; I'm for keeping the corps level).
It's conspicuous how combat troops-related TO&E debates seem to dominate the list despite the fact that support troops are in the majority and have been so for generations.


See? None of these topics really required an actual TO&E here; they can all be described with words and in general terms. (The two graphics have only decorative value.)

.

2012/12/12

[Deutsch] Ein Lehrstück über die Wichtigkeit einer unabhängigen Presse

.
[This blog posts centres on a German newspaper article about the failure of the press in Greece.]
 


Als wir die Liste veröffentlichten, haben wir deshalb nicht nur journalistisch korrekt, sondern auch moralisch richtig gehandelt. Man hat sich nicht deshalb an der Liste gestört, weil »persönliche Daten« bekannt wurden, sondern weil diese Liste die Realität widergespiegelt hat. Darauf waren die Namen griechischer Politiker, Publizisten, Geschäftsleute, Ministerfreunde, die von Besitzern griechischer Medien und von Bankern wiederzufinden, die bislang Immunität bei ihren politischen Gönnern genossen hatten.
Das war der Grund, warum jene Polizisten, die mich verhafteten, zugleich ihre Solidarität bekundeten. Sie erleben tagtäglich den Widerspruch und die Heuchelei der Herrschenden. Die jeweiligen griechischen Regierungen erscheinen nicht nur wegen der Einführung der rigorosen Sparmaßnahmen unsympathisch und unpopulär. Sie benutzen gleichzeitig die Krise, um bestimmte Interessen zu bedienen.

Diesen Fall sollte man einerseits im Kopf haben, wenn einflussreiche Köpfe der Presse und Politiker sich bei Schampus arg gern haben, aber auch in Hinblick auf die in vielen Ländern - und auch bei uns - zunehmende Konzentration des Eigentums an Presseorganen. Schließlich ist es auch noch in Bezug auf die öffentliche Kontrolle der öffentlich-rechtlichen Sendeanstalten relevant, aber da hatten wir ja bereits unseren eigenen Warnschuss-Skandal.

Ohne Wachsamkeit daheim nutzt alle Wachsamkeit da draussen nicht viel.


S Ortmann
.