If at first you fail, throw more resources at the problem!
Contrary to pretensions, this is the state of the Western applied operational art.
Kosovo Air War 1999:
"When asked about effects-based targeting applications in Allied Force, the former commander of the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, which provides senior warfighters with the principal analytical support for such targeting, remarked, "the campaign was more like random acts of violence than true effects-based targeting. The legal restrictions and political constraints in the target approval process were inexplicably given as excuses not to do effects-based targeting. Achieving the desired effects while minimizing the undesired effects, particularly under the restrictions and constraints that were placed on SACEUR, is precisely why effects-based targeting should have been applied. Anything else is just high-tech vandalism."
"NATO's Air War for Kosovo" Benjamin S. Lanbeth, RAND Corporation
Quite the same happened in Afghanistan 2001-2011:
It's an all-too human phenomenon, as mentioned before. I just think it's worthwhile to remind people about the lack of sophistication in actual military campaigns, which runs contrary to the impression communicated by the armed bureaucracies and its princes themselves.
*: The sorties statistic shows a lesser increase. The ratio US-allies was reversed over Libya, for which I did not find a statistic on aircraft committed during OP "Unified Protector"..