Is Germany at war because of ISAF?

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Our politicians (well, those in power) resist the notion that we're at war or that at least the Germans in Afghanistan are waging a war.

I'm quite sure that Afghanistan is a country at war; there's a civil war between the "national" and foreign forces on one side and a decentralized collection of Taliban groups plus some other armed fores (smuggler clans, for example) on the other side.

This doesn't mean that we or our soldiers there are at war - not in itself.
Combat itself is not necessarily war.

So let's have a closer look at it:

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The German ministry of defence writes on its website:

Seit Dezember 2001 ist die Bundeswehr – gestützt auf ein breites Mandat des Bundestages – in Afghanistan präsent. Im Rahmen der International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) unterstützt sie die afghanische Regierung bei Herstellung und Wahrung der Inneren Sicherheit, solange einheimische Kräfte dazu noch nicht vollständig in der Lage sind. Außerdem wirkt sie beim Wiederaufbau des Landes mit.

Translation:
Since December 2001 is the Bundeswehr - resting on a broad mandate of the Bundestag - in Afghanistan. It supports in the framework of the (...) ISAF the Afghan government in the establishment and maintenance of the internal security as long as indigenous forces aren't fully capable to do this. Furthermore, it helps in the reconstruction of the country.

-> Official national (BMVg/government) position:
ISAF supports the Afghan government as long as it cannot do its jobs on its own.



The ISAF website says

NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force.

Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover Afghanistan’s whole territory. The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial 5,000 to around 50.000 troops coming from 42 countries, including all 26 NATO members.
(...)
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.
(...)
ISAF is a coalition of the willing - not a UN force properly speaking - which has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Nine UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776 and 1833 (on 23 September 2008). A detailed Military Technical Agreement agreed between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority in January 2002 provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.

NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003 upon request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and soon after, the UN gave ISAF a mandate to expand outside of Kabul.

-> Official multinational (ISAF/NATO) position:

"ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations (...)"


Now let's look at the international stage (United Nations);
ISAF was authorized by the UNSC, after all.

It began with
S/RES/1386 (2001)

Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment;

It got extended (duration) by S/RES/1510 (2003).

S/RES/1563 (2004) extended ISAF again and added

Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan Transitional Administration and its successors and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate;

S/RES/1623 (2005) extended again...

S/RES/1659 (2006) was a bit more creative extension:

3. Affirms the central and impartial role of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including coordination of efforts in implementing the Compact; and looks forward to the early formation of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan Government and the United Nations, and with a secretariat function to support it;
4. Welcomes the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (iANDS) presented by the Afghan Government and the political, security and financial pledges made by participants at the London Conference; notes that financial assistance available for the implementation of iANDS has now reached $10.5 billion; further notes the intention of the Afghan Government to seek debt relief through the Paris Club;
5. Recognizes the risk that opium cultivation, production and trafficking poses to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, welcomes the updated National Drug Control Strategy presented by the Afghan Government at the London Conference, and encourages additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy including through contribution to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund;
6. Acknowledges the continuing commitment of NATO to lead the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and welcomes the adoption by NATO of a revised Operational Plan allowing the continued expansion of the ISAF across Afghanistan, closer operational synergy with the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and support, within means and capabilities, to Afghan security forces in the military aspects of their training and operational deployments;

S/RES/1707 (2006) extended.

S/RES/1776 (2007) had this as creative part:

Stresses the importance of increasing the effective functionality,
professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector in order to provide long-term solutions to security in Afghanistan, and encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police

S/RES/1833 (2008) adds another extension to 13 October 2009 and has this

Stresses the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector, encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in order to accelerate progress towards the goal of self-sufficient and ethnically balanced Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country, welcomes in this context the progress achieved by the Afghan Authorities in assuming lead security responsibility for Kabul, and stresses the importance of supporting the planned expansion of the Afghan National Army;

-> Official international (U.N.) position:
ISAF is a mission to assist the Afghan government under NATO leadership in consultation with an UNSecGen representative and OEF.

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These statements are lacking an important part or a war mission: They do not tell that ISAF's mission was to defeat an enemy or to at least force warring parties to end warfare. ISAF is by official design not meant to win or end the war, but to add security and stability to Afghanistan till the Afghan government takes over.
It was meant to be an Afghanization project from day one (unlike OEF-A).

The clausewitzian understanding that war is about breaking the will of an enemy (if necessary by disarmament or death) is completely missing in ISAF's mission.


The job of ISAF is - as I read it - not to defeat the Taliban or any other group, but to assist the government (forces) and to provide security. It's a kind of policing job.

ISAF is more about buying time than about defeating an enemy.

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Well, is ISAF at war, is Germany at war?

It's certainly a strange situation - it would be a very unusual level of violence for a war with German participation, for sure.

My take is now that we're in fact not at war. The official documents about the ISAF mission, the political intent, the intensity of violence and the art of war tell me that we're not at war.

We're instead in what could be called a peacekeeping mission gone wrong. ISAF doesn't really succeed to keep war away - it merely succeeds in keeping the Taliban mostly in the underground and in suppressing large-scale violence. Yet, we don't pull out either.

I was changing between the "it's war" and the "it's no war" position for a long time, and now I think that -unless we see great changes- it's not a war. It's another kind of mess.


ISAF is a peacekeeping mission gone wrong.
I stick to my opinion that we should have no more than maybe a dozen soldiers (military observers) in Afghanistan. The investigation of the topic's question was nevertheless interesting. I also recovered a little bit of my respect for our SecDef. Just a bit.

Sven Ortmann
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