Fred Kaplan wrote an advisable column about the "leaked" McChrystal memo here.
This was especially interesting (my emphasis):
The British had been chased from the continent in 1940 and didn't return in force until late 1943.
Churchill kept the impression of active and promising warfare with the Bomber Command, small commando operations like the St. Nazaire Raid, the Dieppe Raid and the desert war. None of these actions was really decisive in itself, but at best a preparation for later operations.
What would have happened to British willpower if the British had won in Libya in 1941, done no commando actions, not done the disastrous Dieppe Raid and not bombed German civilians?
This is an interesting mosaic piece for a complete picture of warfare in my opinion. It might be advisable to produce otherwise ineffectual events in order to sustain public support and troops morale - or to break the enemy's morale.
A requirement to create such promising events may be a necessary part in a new Western strategy in that (stupid) Afghanistan involvement. This may even be more important than everyday info ops.
Many people still recall info about "Operation Anaconda" in 2002, but how much do we remember about everyday affairs in Afghanistan in 2006?
Hero stories might very well qualify as such useful events as well. Imagine Pat Tillman coming back with exciting battle stories instead of becoming a victim of fratricide. That could have been even more advantageous for political support as a successful brigade-sized operation.
Sven Ortmann
.
This was especially interesting (my emphasis):
Counter-insurgency wars rarely produce such events. Conventional wars can also have long phases without significant activities if both sides are separated by geography (Napoleon vs. England) or major obstacles (Maginot line during the Phoney War).
Obama committed himself to a new strategy for Afghanistan this past March. He is now wavering, not so much because many congressional Democrats and a majority of the American people have turned against the war. (Congress would almost certainly vote in favor of appropriations, just as it did in the bleakest days of the Iraq war, if just to "support the troops," and a successful battle or two might well turn public opinion.)
The British had been chased from the continent in 1940 and didn't return in force until late 1943.
Churchill kept the impression of active and promising warfare with the Bomber Command, small commando operations like the St. Nazaire Raid, the Dieppe Raid and the desert war. None of these actions was really decisive in itself, but at best a preparation for later operations.What would have happened to British willpower if the British had won in Libya in 1941, done no commando actions, not done the disastrous Dieppe Raid and not bombed German civilians?
This is an interesting mosaic piece for a complete picture of warfare in my opinion. It might be advisable to produce otherwise ineffectual events in order to sustain public support and troops morale - or to break the enemy's morale.
A requirement to create such promising events may be a necessary part in a new Western strategy in that (stupid) Afghanistan involvement. This may even be more important than everyday info ops.
Many people still recall info about "Operation Anaconda" in 2002, but how much do we remember about everyday affairs in Afghanistan in 2006?Hero stories might very well qualify as such useful events as well. Imagine Pat Tillman coming back with exciting battle stories instead of becoming a victim of fratricide. That could have been even more advantageous for political support as a successful brigade-sized operation.
Sven Ortmann
.
"What would have happened to British willpower if the British had won in Libya in 1941, done no commando actions, not done the disastrous Dieppe Raid and not bombed German civilians?"
ReplyDeleteAn interesting idea.
I think the problem that Obama now faces is that the media where very much anti-Bush and used military problems as a weapon against him. Now Obama takes over and he is finds public opinion is against the war.