The other path to victory: Influence and restriction

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The classic clausewitzian view of warfare* is that wars are won by breaking the enemy's will to resist your plans. The standard method of breaking that will is to push him into a hopeless situation. The best way to do that is to disarm the enemy - usually by winning a decisive battle.

The events in Afghanistan seem to show another promising path. I don't want to claim that the Taliban have a coherent strategy (or at least unity), but they seem to stumble onto something - as did most likely many other insurgencies before.

This other path consists of two main methods and many necessary conditions.

The first main method can be called "influence":

They gain influence in covert mode instead of setting up visible structures. Taliban don't go to a village in order to raise their flag and set up a fortified camp. Instead, they gain influence, with conspiratorial methods.

One example is the judiciary system. The Afghan Central state has established a network of official courts as judiciary systems, but these courts' judgments resemble too often an auction. The party that pays best wins. The Taliban have set up a shadow judiciary system in many places, with much less corrupt judgments (and based on their version of Islamic law).

This kind of influence gains undermines the official structures and turns them (almost) irrelevant even in places where they still exist. Official and shadow structures could even change sides in the perception fo the people; the shadow structures become legitimate and the official structures become something more akin to a highwayman.

This influence would of course be the result of covert political activity. It could be a shortcut to power for an insurgency that seeks to rule - and it needs very little if any force to use it.

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The influence method could be counteracted by the use of force if the shadow structures are not secured enough in their covert mode. It's therefore often necessary to reduce this threat to tolerable level.

This is where the "restriction" main method comes into play.

It's not necessary to destroy or disarm the enemy if you can (partially) break his will without. This works on the strategic/political level by limiting one's goals and on the regional level by the induction of fear and inefficiency.

The actions of the Taliban show this quite well. Supposedly non-combat activities like supply, camping, diplomatic trips, construction and repair are under severe threat of attack and require strong cover by combat-capable forces (or the non-combat forces need to become combat-ready).

This drives the efficiency down; the tooth-to-tail ratio (combat personnel available for operations : support personnel) becomes poor and the effective capability of the opposing army to intervene against the shadow rule is much reduced.**

Another interesting aspect is the constant threat against troops on the move. Every march becomes a dangerous operation, and every dangerous operation needs to be justified by its benefits.
The threat on the enemy forces can grow to an unacceptable level; the forces restrict their actions on mere sustainment in camps and on the roads with protected convoys. Such a total restriction isn't necessary for the shadow forces' success, though. Again, it suffices to reduce the ability of the official forces to intervene against shadow structures to an acceptable level.

The end result would be a rule of the shadow forces over almost the whole of the country - without a single decisive battle, probably even without having ever won a single battle or firefight.

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There are many necessary conditions for success on such a path. One is the political inferiority of the opponent. Another condition is his ability and intention to react with costly countermeasures. An unterrified enemy won't allow the enemy to restrict his freedom of action with the threat of losses. There's also a long list of possible mistakes that could sabotage the insurgent's efforts.

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One could argue that no victory is complete until war is over and peace begins. Well, who says that insurgents need to define victory like that? Maybe they could live well with a permanent mobilization, with a useful scapegoat in-country all the time? Maybe they define 'their' country to be freed as an area that does not include the official powers' enclaves?


I don't argue that the Taliban are on a path to victory (although I don't believe in a Western 'victory' over there as well). This was also no representative description of events in Afghanistan - this is a theoretical text.
Instead, I'm arguing that a rebellion doesn't necessarily need to go conventional (equivalent to Mao's Third Phase of guerrilla war) to win even if the enemy doesn't fold politically at home. There's at least one other path to victory imaginable.

S O

*: Carl von Clausewitz did never complete his book; he remarked before his death that he didn't properly cover guerrilla wars. His best example for that kind of war was the Spanish insurrection against Napoleonic rule.

*: See also my text on countermeasures. The force protection efforts are countermeasures and their price is huge, possibly even able to justify setting up the threat in the first place on its own.
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