Sun Tzu: the Art of War (IV): Tactical Dispositions

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I will use this easily accessible translation version

http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html 

to comment on the Art of War, and I will pretend that Sun Tzu was indeed a historical person. 

Sun Tzu artist's impression from Qīnggōngdiàn Cánghuàběn
清宮殿藏畫本 / 清宫殿藏画本

IV. Tactical Dispositions

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

It is common in sports and warfare that you cannot win from a position of inferiority without taking risks. The risk aversion shown in this first paragraph makes sense in the context of a few states struggling against each other with decisive battles and trying to destroy each other. It's no good advice for campaigning in general. You need to dare something to achieve something.

Eisenhower had a prepared statement of resignation in his pocket when he ordered the Normandy invasion. He would have been catastrophically ineffective if he hadn't accepted the possibility of defeat.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

The literal "security" effort is very important from the lowest tactical levels to the operational level of war. It's also a diversion from whatever effort shall bring victory. You may have combat troops securing your flanks and rear and your supply convoys, but those combat troops may be lacking at the actual battle.

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.  

The absence of certainty is trivial, but some opponents are in a hopeless situation without being at fault for it.

4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

This is a huge contrast to earlier parts that pretended victory or defeat was all about whether a general did everything right. Sun Tzu is really not to be taken literally!

Such inconsistencies enable modern readers to cherrypick whatever fits their pre-conceived notions.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

This was commented upon before; it doesn't require superior strength to win battle. It doesn't even only require superior local strength. Superiority also doesn't provide much reliability of success, either.

7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

Reading the battlefield to detect opportunities, risks or even only to understand what's going on is very difficult on a modern battlefield. It's "empty", usually. You may hear vehicles and explosions, but you see very little even in absence of artificial smoke. Everyone tries to stay alive, and this necessitates to be not easily visible for almost the entire duration of the battle. Everything that can be seen can be shot at, and what can be shot at can be destroyed or killed.

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

Sun Tzu is here basically back to making the demand that the general contributes as much as possible to victory himself rather than merely exploiting favourable circumstances such as resources abundance. 

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

That is, unless the enemy makes no mistakes, either. Once again, it's trivial to see that the literal interpretation of Sun Tzu's lines is plain nonsense. He demands that the general isn't sloppy, makes full use of the art of war - but everyone makes mistakes, period. To avoid mistakes altogether is simply no option.

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

This is super important, and I wrote about this before at least twice. The battle should be won in advance by creating the conditions for victory (shaping operations et cetera). This may take a bit more time, but it provides better odds and even in the event of success lower losses than a riskier brute force approach. To seek superiority by amassing more forces for decisive battle in a Clausewitzian way of war is not satisfactory on its own. Even a superior army force should first erode the opponent's morale and supply situations, seek to surprise and to fight at superior readiness in general.

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.

And yet again Sun Tzu pretends that victory or defeat is all about the general he seeks to advise, ignoring that the opponent may be symmetrical. This is once again meant to motivate the student of war rather than an accurate statement about war itself.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

I suspect that something was lost in translation. These two paragraphs are way too ambiguous.

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

Pursuit often if not most often caused greater losses to a defeated army than battle itself did. You need to keep your route of escape unknown if possible and reach a safe distance to the enemy army main body. Then you need to reassemble, motivate and reinforce the army before it could succeed in battle again. This was mostly about setting up a new defensible front line in the rear during the World Wars and the Korean War

Clausewitz introduced the concept of 'culminating point' to describe that at some point even a successful attack becomes so weak that a previously defeated defence becomes an equal force again. To go beyond this point risks a successful counteroffensive.

A typical historical reason for this would be the detachment of troops for occupation duty and an ever-growing distance to one's depots. 20th century warfare also knew culminating points, and they were typically about getting too far ahead of the rail head. Most supplies were moved by ships or rail over long distances and moved by lorries or carts only for a relatively short distance. To stretch the latter would reduce the throughput, and the attacking forces would run out of fuel or (back in 1914) artillery munitions.

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de 

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