A militia for the 2020's (II)

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Doctrine

 

The militia needs a fairly simple doctrine to keep the need for training beyond basic soldiering skills limited and thus affordable. The doctrine would still be separated into three phases:

 

Security phase

The militia would provide object security (bridges, depots, airports, airbases, high value civilian infrastructure nodes et cetera), support civil defence, support the police in efforts to control traffic (refugees, military convoys) while hostile ground forces are still far. The air defence component of the militia would not function as such during this phase to avoid friendly fire.

Battlefield phase

The regular army "high end" manoeuvre battlegroups would be in need of security elements and area surveillance as well as support for handling prisoners of war, casualty evacuation and handling civilians on the battlefield. The militia would provide this assistance, most notably spread out and establish numerous observation posts and mobile defensive reconnaissance teams that would detect and track hostile incursions from armoured reconnaissance platoons to entire battalion battlegroups. The militia would be quite elusive and risk-averse in this phase to preserve its strength. It would not be tasked to fight regular combat troops of an invading army much if at all.

Guerilla phase

The regular army may withdraw even when not under pressure. The militia does never withdraw. It's 100% a "stay behind" force.

The guerillas would provide two key contributions to alliance defence in this phase:

1. Attrition on the "soft underbelly" of the invader's army, thus deteriorating its logistics.
2. Diversionary effect; great many troops would be needed to provide security for the support of the invading army and for critical infrastructure.
   

Militia platoons would hide, scout, observe and seek to ambush and raid (NOT mere harassment fires) the invader's support forces. The guerilla would thus consider hostile support troops with at most bulletproofed vehicles their most formidable likely opposition, and they would be able to exploit the element of surprise very often. This has a strong influence on the equipment needs and training needs.

The air defence teams would strive to shoot down helicopters, and maybe besiege hostile forward airfields so much that they're useless in daytime.

The militia stay behind forces would also provide intelligence, such as battle damage assessment after long-range artillery fires or air strikes.

The infantry combat doctrine would emphasise small teams moving rather independently following a platoon-level ambush or raid plan. The teams would be small, nimble, stealthy and literally fit into a car. Firefights should be sudden, intense and brief. Hostile support troops may lack night vision tech, which would offer tactical opportunities to them militia that the regular army would not have in its peer vs. peer fight.

 

Guerilla teams would break contact after a brief firefight to avoid getting caught by mobile opposing forces. They could routinely set up ambushes along a pre-planned escape route (including alternative routes left and right) to inflict further damage on the enemy and to discourage dangerous pursuits.

I am not a fan of harassment fires or much emphasis on mine warfare. Both tends to lead to low intensity conflict. To snipe or to shoot a few bursts from a machinegun at long range, maybe detonate a mine or two is not satisfactory in a high intensity conflict where the militia would have to be effective in the first weeks and months. Such behaviour suits guerilla campaigns against foreign occupiers whom they just need to outlast to "win".

The greatest challenges (until the rise of autonomous drones that ruin all art of war as we know it) would be to keep a good morale and to avoid being hunted down by anti-guerilla hunting parties. The latter threat is actually part of the job description (diversionary effect), but it's fairly unlikely in the first months of war if the militia forces are very numerous in the theatre of war. The invader would face too many militia platoons to hunt them down individually with much effort each. It's more likely that the militia would restrict the invading army to main supply routes (major roads) which would be secured by convoy escorts and firebases.*

Some more doctrine details:

• militia team of four = team leader, machinegunner, two grenadiers**
• radio communications minimised (reporting unexpected appearance of threats, reporting deviation of plan, signalling a team breaks contact) with visual signals preferred
• surprise hit and run with maximum one minute engagements
• thorough scouting of hostile bases prior to raids
• POWs taken to hidden POW holding rooms after separate interrogation by team leader (then eavesdropping on them in the holding room)
• generally avoiding battle-ready MBTs unless multiple teams cooperate with all grenadiers carrying one anti-MBT weapon instead of the normal two LAWs
• laying false tracks into ambush zones selective sabotage of infrastructure (ideally by removing critical parts that could later be used for repair)
• teams separate themselves from civilians and make use of abandoned buildings leaving and entering hideouts preferably at night
• constant visual search for aerial threats
• disabling all civilian surveillance cameras in the area unless there's a permanent blackout anyway
• removing road signs indicating settlements and direction to settlements
• creating own fuel caches
• disabling petrol stations
• normally avoiding vicinity of hospitals

 

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

 

*: Firebases are an anti-guerilla concept in which platoon-sized fortified bases are scattered along a road or in a whole area. These bases each possess at least one artillery piece or at the very least heavy mortar. A Russian 122mm D-30 howitzer with 360° traverse + a 82 mm mortar for very close fires would be a fairly obvious option for the Russian army, for example. These firebases would have their fires directed by convoy escorts or patrols to give them a advantage over the guerillas. Air support would often take too long to become effective.

**: I would prefer five (adding a rifleman with a magnifying sight and more powerful cartridge), but four is all that can reliably fit into what cars will be available.

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