.
I saw some calls for all logistics vehicles to be bulletproofed.
Everyone, pay attention to the context!
The Russian army gets its tires shot and its soft-skinned logistics vehicles (and not just those) demolished while invading a country and facing the partially-armed working age population.
The Ukrainians have hardly any such problems with their logistics vehicles while defending their own territory.
The real lesson is that a dispersed and lightly armed militia with training at most up to small unit level can cause trouble to invaders*, and that's not news.
S O
*: This and other events in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine supports a concept of mine, which I didn't fully explain in public yet. In short, it's similar to Spanocchi's Raumverteidigung; battalions that
- provide point defence/security for depots, airbases, airports, powerplants, bridges and such and provide counter-reconnaissance,
- then when hostile ground forces arrive in their area en masse the battalion disperses to become the everywhere-present eyes of the army and
- once it has stay-behind status it ambushes and raids support troops, helicopter forward bases and provides intelligence such as PGM targeting info and after a PGM strike battle damage assessment.
.
I think the real learning here, rather than bulletproof everything is: "Don't invade a country like Ukraine, Siria, Irak, etc. Instead of that help to defense others"
ReplyDeleteJM
S.O.
ReplyDeleteYour concept sounds very much like Guy Brossollet. Have you read his thesis?
Brossolet's concept is not similar. I read a 1976 translation of it.
DeleteHe basically had areas of infantry platoons forming some kind of frontline-in-depth, with tank companies and especially attack helicopters added as mobile elements.
What I summarised in this blog post is MUCH more similar to Spannocchi's Raumverteidigung, though not at all the same.
Object security is a simple concept, and the stay-behind part is basically Jagdkampf. The militia's role in the battle phase is understandable in its relevance with these two blog posts:
Deletehttps://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/06/defensive-reconnaisance.html
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-historical-problem-of-carrier-borne.html
The main difference between Brossollet and Spannocchis concepts is, that in Brossollet Defence without an battle the jagdkampf part is only one part of an bigger overall, and that as you mentioned tanks and helicopters (today ucavs) would be added as mobile elements. But despite this mobile elements the tasks of the regional light infantry forces would be completly similiar to what you wrote here:
ReplyDeleteSecurity, Counter-Reconaissance, Counter SF, Disperse, Recce and Intelligence, Raids and Sabotage and Guerilla
The only difference would be, that in Brossollets concept there are no bataillons which will then disperse, but the troops start in smaller units which then cooperate for greater tasks like security until serious enemy forces enter the room. So the concept is more network, more an net of military units which cooperate horizontally. Imo this could be superior to a bataillon structure, which is imo to conventional for the jagdkampf part of its fight. And if the target is to disperse anyway, then why an bataillon structure before that?
Hybrid Units which can form different kind of TOEs are imo always more complicated and not as good as units which are more specialised from the beginning.
"So the concept is more network, more an net of military units which cooperate horizontally. Imo this could be superior to a bataillon structure, which is imo to conventional for the jagdkampf part of its fight."
DeleteI buy your argument in case of regular forces with good peace time training. However, if we talking about militia (6 months basic traing, some yearly refresher) the coordination of platoons will not work IMHO, you need something above for larger operations. And the bataillon is the unit you would train in peace time, so some command structure is there.
Imagine a Southern German hilly landscape, with woodland on the hills and agricultural fields in the valleys.
DeleteThe infantry platoons would fill the woodland, tank companies would flow through the valleys ad attack helicopters would rush from firefight to firefight. That was Brossolet's concept in 1975, inspired by limited French budgetary ability to afford large mechanised forces, helicopter warfare over Vietnam that made helos look affordable like Jeeps and a few years earlier way too optimistic exercise results in which AH-1 attack helicopters ruled over the very little capable American SPAAGs.
It was effectively a deep infantry-manned frontline with mobile technicised reserves: A combination of 1950's thinking with specific 1970's delusions about helos.
Here's a quick photo about Brossolet's scheme from the book.
Deletehttps://ibb.co/1v1Tjps
Replace the helos with uav/ucav/loitering munition and it still sounds like a good concept for me.
DeleteUlenspiegel:
>>>I buy your argument in case of regular forces with good peace time training.>>>
I never wrote about milita style units which are imo near to worthless in modern warfare. And excellent peace time training is one of the most important points of all to create fighting power, and is exactly what our "professional" forces in the west are lacking now.
"I never wrote about milita style units which are imo near to worthless in modern warfare. "
DeleteLook, here we disagree. Militia in front countries like Poland would do what we see now in Ukraine.
Militia in "hinterland" countries would provide precooked recruits for regular units, save a few months training in wartime.
I agree with that conspicuously much. A 6-month volunteer militia would be a good recruiting channel for the Bw and give us large personnel reserves on the cheap. A basic militia with competence up to infantry battalions only is also a fine basic building block for countries that don't really face any threats, but want to be able to quickly raise a military if threats arise. Portugal and Slovenia could choose this route
DeletePoland got ridiculed a couple years ago with its plan to raise ten thousands of light infantry militiamen
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_Defence_Force_(Poland)
and I felt uneasy about the critique they got. Such a force can be extremely cost-effective and deterring if done right. The Ukraine War appears to confirm this.
The only exception is the snowy season. Tracks betraying all your movements are a huge problem. "Luckily", weeks of snow cover everywhere seem to be a thing of the past in Central Europe.
"The only exception is the snowy season. Tracks betraying all your movements are a huge problem."
ReplyDeleteIf I fight on own teritory and have some time I would think about using the cooperation of civilian population to prepare many tracks. If each barn is the meeting point of two or three tracks the enemy stays dumb....
Even radar can document such tracks (also tracks in soft soil), and record snapshots for later comparison to identify fresh tracks.
DeleteTechnical countermeasures aside, occupiers often impose a curfew. They could send some vehicles with basic foods into a village once a week and maintain total curfew for the rest of the time, shooting civilians found outside on the spot like they were kill count horny American snipers.