2025/02/25

An URGENT to do list for free Europe

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I hate having been correct so much with my Cassandra warnings about Americans turning Fascist and against Europe. I hate having been correct with my warnings that small wars are bollocks and alliance defence & deterrence are getting too much neglected inf ace of Russian aggressiveness.

I erred on the side of caution and overestimated Russian military and military-technological prowess (which still pointing out that they weren't as strong as they pretend and are widely believed to be).

 

So here's a list of things we need to URGENTLY do now, exploiting that the mainstream finally woke up to 'security policy' being something deserving attention:

 

  1. Harden ourselves against American economic sabotage through Microsoft, Cisco and the likes
  2. Harden ourselves against other American economic sabotage such as cutting us off from SWIFT backoffice financial services.
  3. Quickly create an alternative to Starlink and an alternative to SpaceX's reusable rockets for low satellite lift costs
  4. Kick Russian & American intelligence and most "diplomats" out, especially stop tolerating them snooping on our telecoms. This includes closing the "Russian House"s.
  5. Stop relying on NATO, for it's compromised by Americans, Hungarians, Slovakians and possibly Turks
  6. Stop relying on the EU for security policy because it's compromised and blocked by Hungary and Slovakia.
  7. Establish a new alliance that's designed to neutralise 5th column (Americans, Hungarians, Slovaks, Turks and whoever might turn to the dark side) sabotage & betrayals. 
  8. Improve nuclear deterrence based on the French arsenal (though American BMD is turning this into an elevated challenge).
  9. Establish conventional deterrence against the Americans (vs. American threats of naval blockade, naval air attacks and missile attacks)
  10. Kick American troops out of Europe.
  11. Effectively counter propaganda networks (Transatlantiker in Germany, Putin's stooges, European unification ideologues, Murdoch media, TikTok, Twitter) in order to create freedom of political action.
  12. Understand that most European nation states are capable of great efforts, not impotent.
  13. Reorient our armed forces to focus 99% on deterrence & alliance defence.
  14. Force our armed services to become more efficient (liberally fire generals & admirals), including breaking the 'miniature balanced forces' bollocks. The armed forces shall not be permitted to follow self-interest; they exist to serve!
  15. This includes focusing on mobilised strength, not peacetime active duty personnel strength & structure. 
  16. Stop relying on the arms industry. Create arms & munitions production capacity outside of the sluggish established arms makers, just as we did to nowadays unfathomable success in both world wars. The artillery munition production efforts so far are scandalously inept compared to 1915ff and 1939ff.
  17. Understand that Putin's regime has to lose its war of aggression beyond reasonable doubt (no efforts to help them saving face!) and support Ukraine accordingly, including direct intervention. Start by telling the Russians that they have already lost now that we decided so and enact a naval blockade as a first step.
  18. Get ready for a new Cold War, this time against Russia and the U.S.. This goes beyond the pure defensive on the European continents and its peripheral seas.
  19. Stay out of East Asian great power games.
  20. Seek India as defensive ally to add mass and economic potential to the bloc, but be wary of them turning full (Hindu-)Fascist, for we might find ourselves in need of allying with the PRC in the worst case scenario!
  21. Establish a "Stay out of Europe" doctrine vs. the Chinese AND the Americans and enforce it

Please note I did not pretend that huge military spending increases are necessary or in any way central to free Europe's successful deterrence & defence!

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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2025/02/24

Air-to-air missile categories


(I advise to first read this blog post. You'll later see why.)

Air-to-air missiles have commonly been grouped in short, medium and long range missiles. Short range was and is dominated by passive infrared seekers, medium range was dominated by semi-active radar seekers until AMRAAM (active radar seeker), which also blurred the distinction between medium and long range with its D version. Long range missiles have radar guidance (infrared seeker windows would be blinded by heating up much during long flights).


I believe that such categories are by now of little use. I propose a different system:

  • Pursuit missiles
  • Counter-Pursuit missiles
  • Close-In missiles
  • Low cost missiles

 

Pursuit missiles have the speed, range and seeker to reach hostile tactical combat aircraft even if they try to avoid the hit by running. Their no-escape zone is great. It happens that they also threaten and thus push back hostile support aircraft (AEW, ESM, ElInt, tanker, MPA, air/ground radar planes).

Examples are Meteor, PL-21, AIM-260 and AIM-174B

Their drawbacks are heavy weight, big size and very high costs.

Counter-pursuit missiles lack a no-escape zone large enough to force a kill. They can kill if the target is unaware, but not if it's aware enough to avoid the no-escape zone and running in time.

Examples are AIM-120, MICA RF and R-77-1

They can easily be carried by strike fighters and their cost is usually in the 1...2 million € range. This category started out as a replacement for the Sparrow/R-27 medium range air-to-air missile category and was the main weapon of fighters for about two decades, but the similar ranges mean that it's difficult to get an enemy fighter into the own no escape zone without getting into his missile's no escape zone. Tail-mounted radars and handing over the missile to another fighter to be able to give midcourse corrections by radio datalink to the missile while flying away from the threat help little if both sides use it. State of the art medium range missile air combat without decisive range (no escape zone size) advantage would likely end up as a Cannonade of Valmy; an expenditure of munition with little physical effect.

So the use for these  missiles in high end air war is likely mostly in a counter-pursuit role - it's defensive.


Close-in missiles were "dogfight"and relatively cheap missiles in the past. Their infrared seekers have become smarter, wider field of view, more sensitive, capable of 'seeing' an aircraft from any angle and capable of lock-on-after-launch. You can now shoot such a missile at a fighter behind your aircraft and hit.

R-73 fired at target behind launching fighter

I do strongly suppose that their primary mission should shift from dogfight shot vs. a platform to hard kill defence versus an incoming missile. Fuse and warhead need to be designed accordingly. They may also be usable as short-time freeflying decoy if equipped properly.

These missiles need to (and short range air-to-air missiles do) cost much less than a million €, but I think so far the short-ranged missiles are still primarily designed to hit platforms. Thrust vectoring permits to minimise fins and rudders, so these missiles could be packed in compact multiple missile launchers.

 

Low cost missiles have recently been introduced to fight cheap drones over the Red Sea and Ukraine. So far they are unguided 70 mm Hydra rockets with a cheap guidance and steering nose section. Some fighters have 30 mm guns (example Rafale) and can make use of the new 30 mm HE munitions with proximity fuse to battle cheap drones, so they would not need a low cost missile for the job.

- - - - -

How do 'stealth' fighters fit in this? They may be very difficult targets for any kind of missile. IR-guided missiles might be main killers in a stealth fighter vs. stealth fighter combat. Or maybe stealth fighters avoid hostile peer ground to avoid detection by hostile long wavelength radars (which usually require big antennas and are thus not installed in fighters). They might end up as 'fleet in being', deterring deep incursions and serving as launch platforms for pursuit missiles (if those fit into missile bays). The Su-57 was meant to be a stealthy-enough fighter with DIRCM (dazzling laser that targets infrared seekers). This might prove to be much more formidable IF THE DIRCM WORKS than the interested public gives credit to the concept. Stealth-DIRCM vs. stealth-DIRCM might require a spam of missiles with seekers that have spectral filters to block out the laser - three missiles with three different filter setups would defeat a Su-57 even if the latter used two different laser wavelengths in its lasers. Then the killing blow missiles would be "pursuit missiles", but their required range would be driven by the demand for a no-escape zone as great as the own platform's (fighter's) effective sensor range against the opposing fighter.

 

I think these missile categories make more sense than the traditional ones. My categories guide attention towards the diminished lethality of AMRAAM et al when both sides have such missiles, guide attention towards the hard kill defence concept and towards the issue of defeating super cheap drones (/cruise missiles) with even less expensive munitions.

 

S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de
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2025/02/18

Appropriate demands for peace talks in the RUS-UKR war

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I've seen some stupid takes on what Russia and Ukraine should negotiate about. So let's write about that.

 

Appropriate points for negotiations are:

(1) Russian armed forces withdraw from Ukraine's territory (as of 2013) within 7 days

(2) Russia recognises the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine (as of 2013)

(3) Russia hands over all minefield maps regarding the Ukrainian territory

(4) All persons who UKR considers to be POW in Russian hands have to be repatriated within 14 days.

(5) All UKR-identified abducted children have to be repatriated within 14 days of UKR demanding it (could be years later) 

(6) Russia has to pay reparations equal to UKR loss of GDP relative to trend path PLUS Ukrainian increases of military spending during invasion 2014 - date of peace treaty relative to 2013 military budget PLUS 200 billion € (for damage done)

(7) Russia has to withdraw all armed personnel from Moldova (Transnistria)

Further appropriate (though not necessary) points for negotiations are:

(8) Destruction of the Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M bombers save for a handful thoroughly demilitarised museum pieces

(9) Demilitarisation of the Russian oblast bordering on Ukraine

(10) Russia recognising the sovereignty and internationally recognised borders of all other CIS countries

(11) Payment of reparations through transfer of seized Russian assets abroad, in USD/EUR/JPY/CHF in annual (inflation correcting) rates for the next 30 years, ten years of steady natural gas deliveries in yearly amount of Ukraine's consumption in 2013 valued at the price it paid for Russian gas in 2013 (no inflation correction)

(12) Russia accepts that the treaty about Russian use of Sevastopol for its navy is voided

(13) Russia  recognises the Holodomor genocide committed by the Soviet government (capital Moscow) against the Ukrainian people 

(14) Russia permits all ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars to move to Ukraine including their wealth

(15) Russia accepts repatriation of all voluntary Russian passport holders in Ukraine

Nice to have:

(16) Demilitarisation of Kaliningrad Oblast

(17) Ban on Russian warships in the Black Sea

(18) Russian withdrawal of armed Personnel from Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) 

(19) Russia returns all captured heavy equipment to Ukraine (to avoid war propaganda shows)

(20) Russia is banned from having airborne ground forces

(21) Russia is banned from having surface target missiles of 100...5.000 km range for 25 years

(22) Russia reimburses the foreign countries who assisted Ukraine for their deliveries to Ukraine (not for domestic capacity building)

(23) Russia reimburses the foreign countries who had expenses for war refugees due to this war 

(24) Russia joins the cluster ban convention (destruction of all covered cluster munitions within 6 months) and permits international inspections to verify its compliance with it

 

Ukrainian bargaining chips are:

(1) occupied Kursk Oblast territory (though it's of symbolic size)

(2) whether, when and which sanctions of Russia end

(3) when Russian POWs will be released

(4) continuing attacks to collapse the Russian economy (especially attacks on and sabotage of oil refineries)

(5) threat of advance on the ground

(6) threat of commerce raiding Russian maritime commerce with auxiliary cruisers with European help

 

Acceptable locations for the negotiations: Switzerland, Ukraine

 

War losers don't gain territory or  reparations.

Aggressors should not be rewarded with territory or reparations.

The Russian Federation is both aggressor and (soon) loser in this war.


Framing the conversation matters. It's irresponsible to let Russians or American idiots frame the discussion on how a peace settlement should look like.



S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de
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